Background
As we most recently discussed here, the basics of the case were:
- The case became public with an apparently routine legal settlement between CareFusion and the US Department of Justice
- the CareFusion settlement for $40.1 million was made in response to allegations that kickbacks were made to promote ChloraPrep, a solution meant for preoperative and other health care skin cleaning
- the Department of Justice news release also alleged that payments were made to a corporation called Health Care Concepts to conceal kickbacks made to its owner, Dr Charles Denham
- the implication was that Dr Denham was supposed to influence a standard writing committee run by the National Quality Forum, a well known organization that promotes quality improvement, issues authoritative practice standards, a form of clinical practice guidelines, and has contracts with the US government for quality of care activities
- the draft of the standard written by the committee allegedly included the use of ChloraPrep, although mention of that specific medication was removed in a revision
- NQF leaders asserted that after hearing of the case from the DOJ, the organization severed ties with Dr Denham and the non-profit organization he runs, established a policy not to accept money from funding organizations whose leaders are on its committees, reviewed all the standards set by the committee of which Dr Denham was co-chair, and twice revised its conflict of interest policy.
I opined that the NQF response to this case was more open and pro-active than responses by many other organizations to cases involving conflicts of interest, although there was still room for the NQF to further strengthen its conflict of interest policies.
The Plot Thickens
Since last week, three more articles on the case have appeared, in Modern Healthcare, the WBUR CommonHealth blog, and on ProPublica. These pointed out additional disturbing aspects of the case.
Dr Denham's and CareFusion's Relationships with the NQF Were Even More Complex than Heretofore Revealed
According to ProPublica,
in response to questions from ProPublica, the Quality Forum divulged that Denham’s nonprofit was one of its contributors, and that in 2007 and 2008 it received $485,000 in donations from a foundation affiliated with Cardinal Health, a company that spun off CareFusion in 2009.
Also,
Between 2006 and 2009, Denham’s nonprofit donated $725,000 to the Quality Forum. The group and Denham had a five-year contract, but the Quality Forum declined to provide a copy or explain the terms, saying only that it was ended three years early, in 2010, after concerns about Denham emerged.
Not only did the non-profit help fund the NQF, it was directly involved in relevant NQF activities,
According to [Dr Denham's attorney Lawrence] Gondelman, Denham’s nonprofit was obligated to provide financial and staff support for Quality Forum projects, including evidence-based medicine reviews, hosting webinars and creating multimedia presentations about the safe practice recommendations.
Furthermore, while the NQF asks committee members to disclose conflicts of interest verbally at the start of each meeting, again according to ProPublica,
Both [Dr Patrick] Romano and Dr. Peter Pronovost, who leads a patient safety institute at Johns Hopkins Medicine, said they had been unaware of Denham’s financial ties with CareFusion. Quality Forum officials said Denham never reported them, nor did he mention them during the 2009 meeting when members were asked to disclose their financial relationships, the transcript shows.
'He clearly lied,' Dr. Christine Cassel, the Quality Forum’s president and CEO told ProPublica. 'He just didn’t say anything about any of his business relationships.'
The Clinical Evidence in Support of the CareFusion Product Denham Touted was Dubious
According to ProPublica's review of a transcript of the meeting about the NQF standards that Denham co-chaired,
At the safe practices committee session on Aug. 19, 2009, Denham twice appears to reference the New England Journal of Medicine study, the meeting transcript shows. Although he did not cite the study or ChloraPrep by name, Denham remarked that research to be published soon in a 'major journal' would show the effectiveness of the 2 percent chlorhexidine antiseptic.
CareFusion's ChloraPrep is apparently the only well known 2 percent chlorhexidine antiseptic.
However, the same article pointed out that the study too was affected by conflicts of interest. Its authors "all reported ties to Cardinal Health,' the company from which CareFusion was spun off. Furthermore, ProPublica charged that Dr Denhams company was involved with the financing of that study.
Also, per an interview with Brian Johnson, publisher of MassDevice.com, WBUR reported:
the government says there are several ways this study did not use accepted protocols. For example, a member of the company’s sales and marketing staff reviewed the data from the clinical trial and edited the final study. Prosecutors also say the company failed to 'review, evaluate and report safety information' and failed to obtain and maintain accurate records showing all financial transactions from CareFusion to Dr. Rabih Darouiche, the lead investigator on the study.
Thus, it appears that this study may have been manipulated (in particular, by a company marketer's editing) to make its sponsor's product look more favorable (in this case, particularly by ignoring data about safety and adverse effects)
NQF Went Farther to Endorse CareFusion's ChloraPrep than Was Heretofore Appreciated
According to the WBUR interview,
The NQF didn’t adopt a recommendation of Chloraprep but Denham hosted webinars with Dairouche under the NQF brand for hospital staffers that absolutely endorsed Chloraprep. So while it didn’t end up in the official financial recommendations, there certainly was influence.
However, according to ProPublica things were even more complicated. Denham promoted ChloraPrep in not one, but two instances,
At the safe practices committee session on Aug. 19, 2009, Denham twice appears to reference the New England Journal of Medicine study, the meeting transcript shows. Although he did not cite the study or ChloraPrep by name, Denham remarked that research to be published soon in a 'major journal' would show the effectiveness of the 2 percent chlorhexidine antiseptic.
[Dr Peter] Pronovost said it wasn’t necessary to actually identify ChloraPrep because it was well known as the product with the 2 percent chlorhexidine formulation.
The committee members agreed that chlorhexidine was an effective antiseptic – guidelines by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) say so as well. But studies show it also works in other concentrations and combinations.
Discussion turned to recommendations for preventing infections caused by central lines, the thin tubes inserted into a vein to deliver fluids or medications. Dr. Gregg Meyer of Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston, the co-chair of the committee with Denham, brought up the forthcoming study.
'Chuck (Denham) made me aware of it,' Meyer said. He then asked Pronovost, a leading expert on preventing central-line infections, what he thought
The final report did delete the specific reference to ChloraPrep as the preferred method for preparing surgical sites,
.After the meeting, when the committee’s draft report was published in late 2009, a recommendation for preparing surgical sites to prevent infection did not name ChloraPrep but did specify its telltale formula – a 2 percent chlorhexadine and alcohol antiseptic.
That draft recommendation was challenged by 3M, a company that makes a competing product. A scientific review of the evidence by a Quality Forum ad hoc committee found a lack of clear evidence to support one skin prep product over another. As a result, the recommendation to use the ChloraPrep formulation on surgical sites didn’t make it into the final 2010 safe practices report.
However, the final report did appear to endorse ChloraPrep for reduction of central line infections,
On the separate issue of reducing central-line infections, the 2009 draft report endorsed a chlorhexidine antiseptic but did not specify any one concentration – just as the committee decided. Yet the final 2010 report does call for a 2 percent chlorhexidine and alcohol antiseptic like ChloraPrep.
Also, again per ProPublica, the NQF seemed to have been roped into other efforts run by Dr Denham to promote ChloraPrep,
Although Quality Forum officials seemed surprised to learn this last week from ProPublica, the group is listed as a co-host, with Denham’s nonprofit, of a webinar where the 2010 safe practices guidelines for central-line and surgical site infections are presented.
The presentation, posted on the website of Denham’s nonprofit, states that the Quality Forum recommends the ChloraPrep formulation to protect against both central-line and surgical site infections.
CareFusion also cites the Quality Forum’s endorsement in at least one brochure on its website.
Summary: a Longer Row to Hoe
It looks like NQF will have to deal with even more specifics if it wants to prevent future compromises of its standards due to conflicts of interest and manipulation of the clinical research evidence base.
It will have to consider:
- Whether individual disclosures of conflicts of interest can be trusted
- Whether it is prepared to deal with the apparently nearly infinite variety of conflicts that creative minds can produce to promote vested interersts
- How to be appropriately skeptical of clinical evidence used to devise standards when such evidence is now so susceptible to manipulation and/or suppression to further vested interests
- How to better recognize the various kinds of machinations that the conflicted may endeavor to promote their interests
Again, my question is whether it may just be better to ban individuals with conflicts of interest from roles in which they may influence standards in favor of vested interests, rather than continuing to try to "manage" the complex web of conflicts and the actions they may produce generated by an increasingly commercialized and simultaneously poorly regulated health care system.
By the way, if anyone in other organizations is sitting back thinking this is just an NQF problem, they ought to think again. As we have discussed, the web of conflicts of interest, both individual and institutional, is vast, and the extent of manipulation and suppression of the clinical research base is equally vast. Every health care decision maker, health policy decision maker, and health care organization is confronted by similar problems which may differ only in the details.
Again, I applaud the NQF for trying to deal with these issues upfront, and hope that others will learn from the lessons this case provides.
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