Showing posts with label thalidomide. Show all posts
Showing posts with label thalidomide. Show all posts

Sunday, October 01, 2017

Latest Legal Settlements Suggest Hazards of Making Pharmaceutical Regulation More Lenient, as is Apparently Favored by New FDA Leader

The new US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) commissioner Dr Scott Gottlieb is promoting making the agency's mechanisms to approve new drugs more lenient, according to the Cardiobrief blog.  Blogger Larry Husten wrote:

Gottlieb’s entire career has centered on loosening regulatory restrictions to enable industry to thrive. At the core of his philosophy is the view that with fewer restrictions the force of unbridled capitalism will unleash a torrent of industry innovation. In this view negative consequences, should they occur, will be quickly addressed by an efficient marketplace.

Should we trust pharmaceutical companies to innovate in such a light-touch regulatory climate?  On Health Care Renewal we have noted ethical violations by most of the major pharmaceutical companies, often involving deception in marketing, manipulation and suppression of clinical research, and distortions of dissemination of medical information, such as articles ghost-written by authors paid by industry.  We have documented numerous legal settlements of cases arising out of such misbehavior.

It is no surprise that more legal settlements have marched into view during the last few months to add weight to concerns about making regulation of the pharmaceutical industry more lax.  To summarize them, in chronological order...

Celgene Settled Allegations it Deceptively Marketed Thalidomid and Revlimid for $280 Million

Per the New York Times, July 25, 2017:

The pharmaceutical company Celgene has agreed to pay $280 million to settle claims that it marketed the cancer drugs Thalomid and Revlimid for unapproved uses, the company said on Tuesday.

Under the terms of the settlement, which resulted from a lawsuit filed by a whistle-blower — a former sales representative at Celgene — the company will pay $259.3 million to the United States and $20.7 million to 28 states and the District of Columbia.

In particular, years before the company got approval to market its drug Thalidomid (generic name: thalidomide, the same drug that caused severe birth defects when marketed in Europe in the 1950s)

sales of Thalomid quickly took off, in part because — as [whistle blower] Ms. Brown claimed in her complaint — Celgene 'flooded the country' with sales representatives who were under heavy pressure to pitch the drug to oncologists for a variety of cancers. The F.D.A. sent Celgene two warning letters, in 1998 and 2000, claiming the company had been marketing the drug to treat cancer. In 2000, one Wall Street analyst estimated that 90 percent of Thalomid’s sales were to treat cancer, according to Ms. Brown’s complaint.

However, the drug was not approved for use in cancer until 2006. Also,

in 2005, the company received approval to sell Revlimid for a rare cancer, and Ms. Brown’s complaint claims that the company — as it had with Thalomid — marketed it to treat a broader range of cancers. It also pressured doctors to switch Thalomid patients to Revlimid, which is more expensive.

Ms. Brown’s complaint also claimed that Celgene’s inappropriate marketing of Thalomid exposed patients to heightened risks that included potentially fatal blood clots and other side effects. Those risks were added to the drug’s warning label only after it received the approval for cancer treatment, Mr. Guttman said.

Thus the company's actions may well have harmed patients.

We previously discussed, most recently in 2010, the immense price Celgene charged for Thalidomid, despite the fact that this compound, developed about 60 years ago, is available for pennies in many countries.  

Nonetheless, and also despite the amount of money that Celgene was making selling its drugs for unapproved uses (e.g., Revlimid's sales last year were nearly $7 billion), the US Department of Justice declined to get involved in this case.  Also, like most legal settlements involving big health care organizations, the company did not admit any wrongdoing, and no person who enabled, approved, or directed the misbehavior suffered any negative consequences.

Insys Settled Allegations of  Promotion of Narcotics for Unapproved Uses for $4.5 Million to Illinois

Per the Chicago Tribune, August 18, 2017:

An Arizona drug company has agreed to pay Illinois $4.45 million to settle allegations that it deceptively marketed and sold a prescription opioid drug for uses not approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Insys' actions may well have contributed to the current opioid epidemic.

The company heavily marketed the drug to Illinois doctors with records of prescribing high volumes of opioids regardless of whether those doctors were prescribing opioids to treat cancer pain, the state alleged.

In particular,

According to Madigan's office, the top prescriber of Subsys in Illinois was Dr. Paul Madison, who wrote about 58 percent of all prescriptions for the drug in the state despite treating few, if any, cancer patients. Madison, an anesthesiologist and former owner of the Watertower Surgicenter on North Michigan Avenue in Chicago, was indicted in 2012 by the U.S. attorney's office in Chicago for billing insurers for procedures he didn't perform, and his medical license was suspended in November, according to Madigan's office.

We previously discussed Insys' stealth public relations campaign against medical marijuana here.

However, as in the previous case, the US DOJ was not involved, the company did not admit wrongdoing, and no individual involved in the misbehavior paid any penalty.

Novo Nordisk Settled Allegations it Minimized Risks of Victoza for Nearly $58.7 Million

Per Reuters, September 5, 2017:

Novo Nordisk will pay nearly $58.7 million to resolve claims the drugmaker’s sales staff downplayed the importance of U.S. Food and Drug Administration-mandated warnings about the cancer risks of its diabetes medication Victoza.

The U.S. Justice Department said Tuesday’s settlement would resolve claims Novo Nordisk supplied its sales representatives with information to give to doctors that created the false or misleading impression that warnings were wrong or unimportant.

In particular,

The lawsuit said that program required Novo Nordisk to provide doctors information about the potential risk of a rare form of cancer associated with the drug, which gained FDA approval in 2010.

Victoza’s FDA-approved labeling also contained a boxed warning related to that form of thyroid cancer, the lawsuit said.

Novo Nordisk’s sales force employed messages and tactics that created a false or misleading impression with doctors regarding the cancer risks, leading some physicians to be unaware of them, the lawsuit said.
Thus, again this company's actions appeared to pose a risk to patients.

This company also has a track record of ethical misadventures.  In 2011, we discussed several previous settlements by Novo Nordisk.  Nonetheless, the US DOJ decided not to be involved in this litigation, which, as in the other cases above, did not result in admission of wrongdoing, nor any penalities for individual involved in the misbehavior.

Novelion Subsidiary Aegerion Pleaded Guilty, Fined $40 Million for Misbranding Juxtapid by Minimizing its Adverse Effects

Per Reuters, September 22, 2017:

Aegerion Pharmaceuticals Inc will plead guilty to two misdemeanors and pay $40.1 million to resolve investigations into its marketing and sales of an expensive cholesterol drug, U.S. authorities said on Friday.

The settlements will resolve long-running investigations into Aegerion, a subsidiary of Canada’s Novelion Therapeutics Inc, by the U.S. Justice Department and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission related to its drug Juxtapid.

In particular,

Prosecutors said after the U.S. Food and Drug Administration in 2012 approved Juxtapid for treating a rare genetic condition that causes high cholesterol, Aegerion promoted it for patients who had not been diagnosed with the condition.

Juxtapid, which cost $250,000 to $300,000 annually per patient, featured a black box warning on its label that it could cause serious liver and stomach problems, prosecutors said.

Sales representatives also were trained to tell doctors and patients that Juxtapid would 'take patients out of harm’s way' and prevent 'impending' heart attacks and strokes, despite the lack of data supporting those claims, prosecutors alleged.

Numerous patients discontinued using Juxtapid after suffering conditions including liver toxicity and gastrointestinal distress, prosecutors said.
Thus, once more, the company's actions appeared to result in patient harm.

The company also signed a deferred prosecution agreement.  By pleading guilty, it admitted the misbehavior in this case.  However, again no individual involved in the misbehavior faced any penalties, despite the severe nature of the adverse effects the company deceptively minimized.

AmeriSourceBergen Settled For $260 Million Allegations of Illegally Selling Repackaged, Perhaps Adulterated Drugs so as to Avoid FDA Regulation

Per Modern Healthcare, September 27, 2017:

AmerisourceBergen Specialty Group, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the major wholesale drug distributor AmerisourceBergen Corp., pled guilty to illegally distributing misbranded drugs and agreed to pay $260 million to resolve criminal liability for skirting regulatory oversight.

Between 2001 and 2014, according to court records unsealed Wednesday, the group's now-defunct subsidiary Medical Initiatives prepared millions of syringes that had been filled with cancer drugs and shipped them to providers in all 50 states.

Medical Initiatives removed the drugs from their original glass vials and repackaged them into plastic syringes in an unclean and unsterile environment, allowing the company to sell excess drug product in the vials known as 'overfill,' according to court records. It combined the contents of multiple vials in a process known as 'pooling,' despite many of the vials carrying a 'single-use' designation.

In order to avoid the Food and Drug Administration's regulatory oversight, AmerisourceBergen Specialty Group did not register Medical Initiatives as a repackager or manufacturer with the agency, records show. Instead, the group portrayed Medical Initiatives as a state-regulated pharmacy, exploiting an exemption to the FDA registration requirement that is reserved for legitimate pharmacies, not for manufacturers or repackagers, authorities said.
Given the problems with sterility, again the company's actions possibly could have harmed patients.

However, yet again, this settlement did again involve a guilty plea, but again no individual involved in the repackaging and adulteration suffered any negative consequences.

Discussion

All the cases discussed above were of behavior that could have harmed patients.  Many of the companies involved had records of previous ethical misadventures.  While a few cases resulted in corporate guilty pleas (to misdemeanors), none resulted in monetary penalties that would have much impact on the companies' finances, and none resulted in any negative consequences for people who enabled, authorized, directed or implemented the bad behavior.


These, just the latest in the march of legal settlements by large health care organizations, again demonstrate how often and how seriously pharmaceutical companies (and other organizations) may misbehave, and how the leaders of these organizations exhibit continued impunity, never having any legal accountability for their organizations' actions.  These settlements again demonstrate the relatively light touch US regulators, including the FDA and DOJ, have exhibited when dealing with these organizations.

So what could happen if that touch is lightened still more, particularly by the ongoing initiatives of the current US FDA leader?  I submit the results will be higher drug prices, more use of minimally effective and/or seriously risky drugs, and larger compensation for top managers of pharmaceutical companies.  Will the public actually also get access to "life saving" drugs?  Perhaps, but most of the offerings of drug companies in the last years have had minimal efficacy, and rarely have been proven to extend life.

Why is Dr Gottlieb pursuing these initiatives?  Is he a true believer in market fundamentalism, perhaps untrammeled by lack of evidence supporting it?

Maybe he as he become intoxicated by all the money he previously made from the pharmaceutical industry.  Prior to his approval by the Senate, his extensive financial dealings with the pharmaceutical industry were detailed by the New York Times, and Stat News, among others.  The NYT article said:

The nominee, Dr. Scott Gottlieb, has spent the bulk of his career working in the drug and health care industry, which experts say raises the potential for myriad conflicts of interest. If confirmed to head the F.D.A., he would wield considerable power over companies and investment firms that have paid him millions of dollars over the years. From 2013 to 2015, for example, Dr. Gottlieb received more than $150,000 to advise Vertex Pharmaceuticals, a company whose two approved drugs are seen as breakthrough treatments for cystic fibrosis but carry list prices of more than $250,000 a year. He’s the acting chief executive of Cell Biotherapy, an early-stage cancer biotech firm that he helped found. He has served for years as a consultant to pharmaceutical giants like GlaxoSmithKline and Bristol-Myers Squibb and is paid by other companies for his expertise.
So Dr Gottlieb's move to the FDA was yet another example of the revolving door pheonomenon.



The Stat article concluded,

It also reflects the normalization of conflicts of interest in medicine, which has been debated in the pages of the New England Journal of Medicine and in the Lown Institute blog.

Gottlieb has criticized government efforts to shed light on conflicts of interest, such as the Physician Sunshine Act, as 'federal tinkering' leading to “the demise of American medicine.” We believe his confirmation will lead to the demise of some FDA rules that are already barely keeping a lid on useless or dangerous medical products.

That may not be so far in the future, if Husten's concerns mentioned at the top of this post are true. And when conflicts of interest start having such real world effects, they cease to be merely conflicts of interest, but become corruption.

We have long been railing against conflicts of interest and corruption.  Until recently we noted only some conflicts of interest affecting US government leaders, most often in the form of the revolving door.  Most of the conflicts we discussed involved health care professionals and leaders of health care organizations.

So we used to write things like this (in July, 2016):

True health care reform would first make transparent the web of institutional and individual conflicts of interest that seems to tie together nearly all big health care organizations, and open discussion of how to make health care organizations better serve health care rather than the narrow financial interest of their top leaders.

Or this (in June, 2016):

True health care reform would first expose these conflicts, then reduce or better yet, eliminate them, and make health care more about helping patients and less about making money by marketing commercial products.

However, since the last presidential campaign, more and more conflicts of interest and apparent examples of corruption involving President Trump, his family, and his ongoing business interests have appeared, so that at this time the Trump regime seems to be riddled with conflicts of interest and corruption (for example, see these lists compiled by the Sunlight Foundation and Newsweek).  Conflicts of interest and corruption involving the highest levels of US government have even more potential to damage patients' and the public's health than those involving, say, physicians or hospital CEOs.

 So we now must say that true health care reform in the US first requires vast reduction in the conflicts of interest and corruption of the leaders of US government.  

Wednesday, April 28, 2010

Oh, the Prices We Pay, Reloaded - Celgene Balks at Explaining High Price of Thalidomide

A brief article on Bloomberg.com implied that Celgene has been fighting efforts by the Canadian Patented Medicine Prices Review Board to get pricing data about the drug Thalidomid (thalidomide):
Celgene Corp., the biotechnology company specializing in blood-cancer medicines, will get a hearing before Canada’s highest court over the country’s demands to provide pricing information for the drug Thalomid.

The Supreme Court of Canada today agreed to hear Celgene’s appeal of a Federal Court of Appeal ruling that said Canada’s Patented Medicine Prices Review Board was entitled to information about the pricing of the drug. The high court gave no reason for its decision.

Celgene’s two top-selling drugs are Revlimid and Thalomid, for a form of blood-cancer called multiple myeloma. They brought in more than 80 percent of the company’s total $2.25 billion in 2008 revenue.

It should be no surprise that Celgene may be sensitive about the price of Thalidomid. We posted back in 2005 about the stratospheric prices of new drugs that seemed disproportionate to manufacturing and development costs on one hand, and the value of the drugs for patients on the other. We noted that thalidomide, a very old drug that notoriously was found to cause birth defects when it was given to pregnant women, but that then showed promise as an anti-cancer drug, was being marketed in the US for $29 per capsule (approximately $25,000 a year), while a generic form sold in Brazil for $0.07 per capsule.
 
The amount Celgene manages to make from this very old (and demonstrably cheap to produce) molecule is vivid, albeit anecdotal evidence about what has gone wrong with health care prices in the US.  Despite health care insurance companies' protestations that their goal is to provide reasonably priced health care, they seem utterly incapable of negotiating down the prices of even the most obviously over-priced drugs.  And the US government Medicare program so far is prohibited by law from negotiating prices.  How our supposed free market health care system has tilted so far in favor of pharmaceuticals is a reason to wonder, but ought to be reason to investigate. 
 
Meanwhile, Celgene's 2010 annual report shows that the company has sold more than $400 million worth of Thalidomid yearly since 2007. The company's total sales in 2009 were $2.567 billion, while it spent $795 million on research and development, and $754 million on general, sales, and administrative expenses. According to the company's 2009 proxy statement, in 2008 its CEO received over $8.5 million, its COO over $5.1 million, its CFO over $2.1 million in compensation, and a senior vice president over $3.0 million. The total compensation of its five highest-paid hired managers (compare to a total of 2813 full-time employees in 2009), approximately $20.5 million 2008, was was approximately 2.6% of the company's net income in 2009, and just under 1% of its total sales.
 
As we have said previously, so the health care bubble continues to inflate.  One cause is"compensation madness," including "insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit."  Another is the amazing acquiescence of those who pay bills at all levels, from the individuals who ultimately fund health care through salary dollars not earned, health insurance premiums, co-pays and the like, and tax payments, through the health care insurers and government agencies who did not balk at paying $25,000 a year for thalidomide in 2005.  If we really want to provide accessible health care of good quality and a reasonable cost, we will need to develop mechanisms to pay more reasonable amounts for health care goods and services. This will require some courage facing down the corporate and organizational insiders who have made themselves very rich from the current craziness.

Wednesday, December 09, 2009

More Air Into the Health Care Bubble: the $30,000 a Month Cancer Drug

Over four years ago, we posted about the stratospheric prices of new drugs that seemed disproportionate to manufacturing and development costs on one hand, and the value of the drugs for patients on the other.  For example, back then we noted that thalidomide, a very old drug that notoriously was found to cause birth defects when it was given to preganant women, but that then showed promise as an anti-cancer drug, was being marketed in the US for $29 per capsule (approximately $25,000 a year), while a generic form sold in Brazil for $0.07 per capsule.

That was then, and this is now.  This week, the New York Times reported on a $30,000+  per month cancer drug. 
A newly approved chemotherapy drug will cost about $30,000 a month, a sign that the prices of cancer medicines are continuing to rise despite growing concern about health care costs.

The price of the new drug, called Folotyn, is at least triple that of other drugs that critics have said are too expensive for the benefits they offer to patients. The colon cancer drug Erbitux, for instance, costs $10,000 a month and the drug Avastin about $8,800 when used to treat lung cancer.

So what could be the rationale for this breathtaking price?

Drug Effectiveness

Could it be that the drug is extremely effective? Not according to the NY Times:
Folotyn has not yet shown an effect on longevity. In the clinical trial that led to approval of the drug, 27 percent of the 109 patients experienced a reduction in tumor size. The reductions lasted a median of 9.4 months.

But considering all the patients in the trial, only 12 percent had a reduction in tumor size that lasted for more than 14 weeks. The trial did not compare Folotyn to another drug or a placebo

A PubMed search revealed no sign that this trial had been publsiehd, and no publications reporting any controlled trials of this drug.

So at best, this drug at best may temporarily shrink tumors, although that assertion is based on evidence that has not yet been published or subject to peer-review. It does not seem that the tremendous price of the drug could be justified by tremendous benefits to patients.

Research, Development and Manufacturing

So, perhaps the drug was very difficult and expensive to create, manufacture and develop?  That does not seem to be the case, either.

Folotyn's generic name is pralatrexate. As the name suggests, it is a chemical compound very similar to the much older anti-cancer drug methotrexate. [See O'Connor OA. Pralatrexate: an emerging new agent with activity in T-cell lymphoma. Curr Opin Oncol 2006; 18: 591-597.]  It was first developed not by Allos Therapeutics, but by Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, Southern Research Institute, and Stanford Research Institute.  The Allos Therapeutics 2008 annual report noted that the company's total research and development expenses for the drug from 1992 through 2008 were $26.8 million (so much for the urban myth that the average drug costs $1 billion to develop.)  Based on the estimate that the drug would cost roughly $30,000/ month from the NY Times, the company could recover all the development costs of this drug after 893 patient-months of use.

Allos Therapeutics does not actually make pralotrexate, but outsources its production, according to the company's .  The firm's total yearly manufacturing costs (for several experimental drugs as well as pralotrexate) in 2008 were $6.7 million.

So it does not seem that the tremendous price of the drug could be attributed to the costs of discovering, developing, or manufacturing it.

So where would the money go?

General and Administrative Costs, Executive and Board Compensation

Allos Therapeutics seems to spend a disproportionate amount of money on marketing, general and administrative costs.  According to the 2008 report, "marketing, general and administrative expenses include costs for pre-marketing activities, corporate development, executive administration, corporate offices and related infrastructure."  In 2008, these expenses were $23 million, in one year, almost as much as the company spent over 16 years to research and develop Folotyn.

Allos Therapeutics has enriched its corporate insiders.  According to the company's 2009 proxy statement, in 2008, CEO Paul L Berns received $2,091,600 in total compensation; Chief Commercial Officer James V Caruso received $1,259,700; and Chief Medical Officer Pablo J Cagnoni received $1,408,700.  The total compensation of the five highest paid executives of the company in 2008, $5,945,500, was over 10% of the entire company's budget, $53,639,000. 

Mr Berns, who has only been with the company since 2006, owned 994,606 shares or equivalent (at a price of $6.62 per share on 4 December, 2009, worth $6,584,292).  Mr Caruso owned 272,072 shares or equivalent,and Dr Cagnoni owned 386,245.   Although two board members, Stewart Hen and Jonathan S Leff seemed to be serving by virtue of their positions with Warburg Pincus & Co, whose Private Equity VIII LP owns over 29% of Allos Therapeutics stock, Mr Hen and Mr Leff received $120,700 and $119,400 to sit on the board.

These amounts should be considered in light of the fact that the company is comparatively tiny.  Its 2008 report disclosed that it only has 81 full-time employees, of whom fully 31 "are involved in marketing, corporate development, finance, administration, and operations."  The company has never made money.  Its 2008 report noted losses of over $20 million a year in the past five years, and a total loss of over $289 million.

So one wonders if the real reason pralatrexate was priced so high was to justify the millions that top company leaders have reaped from a company that lost money over the 16 years?

Summary

The NY Times reported that people outside of Allos were not pleased with the price of Folotyn:
Dr. Lee N. Newcomer, senior vice president for oncology at the big insurer UnitedHealthcare, called the price of Folotyn 'unconscionable.' He said that Folotyn alone would cost as much as UnitedHealthcare now typically spends in total to treat a lymphoma patient from diagnosis until death. That median expenditure now, he said, is $87,000 for a little over a year of treatments.

But Dr. Newcomer said insurers would be obligated to pay for Folotyn because there were no alternatives.

Furthermore,
'This drug is not a home run,' Dr. Brad S. Kahl, a lymphoma specialist at the University of Wisconsin, said during a meeting of an advisory committee to the F.D.A. on Sept. 2. 'It’s not even a double. It’s a single.'

Saying that even a single was helpful, Dr. Kahl was part of a majority on the panel that recommended approval of the drug, 10 to 4.

But after recently learning what Allos planned to charge for Folotyn, Dr. Kahl said he was 'disappointed' by the 'excessive' price.

'It dampens my enthusiasm for using that drug,' he said. 'It creates these huge ethical quandaries about trying a drug that has a modest benefit for the average patient at enormous expense.'
So the health care bubble continues to inflate.  I suggest that the case of the ridiculous pricing of Folotyn shows how this bubble is in part generated by "compensation madness," not only "insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit," but also insiders able to become rich at the expense of even tiny, money-losing corporations.   But the bubble is also generated by the amazing acquiescence of those who pay bills at all levels, form the individuals who ultimately fund health care through salary dollars not earned, health insurance premiums, co-pays and the like, and tax payments, through the health care insurers and government agencies who did not balk at paying $25,000 a year for thalidomide in 2005, and seemingly will not balk at paying $30,000+ a year for pralatrexate in 2009.

If we really want to provide accessible health care of good quality and a reasonable cost, we will need to develop mechanisms to pay more reasonable amounts for health care goods and services.  This will require some courage facing down the corporate and organizational insiders who have made themselves very rich from the current craziness. 

NOTE (21 December, 2009) - See also comments on the Postscript blog.

Wednesday, July 13, 2005

Oh, The Prices We Pay: Thalidomide for Cancer

The New York Times recently reported on the high prices paid for drugs to treat cancer, notably the newer "targeted therapies." Some examples included:
  • $54,000 per year for Avastatin, made by Genentech,
  • $31,000 per year for Terceva, made by Genentech, and
  • $25,000 for Thalidomid, made by Celgene.
The article shows how the prices of these drugs drastically ratcheted upwards in the 1990's, starting with Taxol, made by Bristol-Myers-Squibb, at $4,000 per year, starting in 1992, through Herceptin, made by Genentech, at $20,000 per year, in 1998, to Erbitux, at $100,000 per year, made by Bristol and ImClone Systems.
The article stated that these prices are unrelated to manufacturing costs, and simply based on what the market will bear. A biotechnology analyst, Geoffrey Porges, said, "it's sort of one of those things where everyone looks over their shoulder at everyone else, says, 'he started it, it wasn't me,' and it builds."
Of course, this raises the question of why those organizations whose goal is to control health care costs, particularly federal payers represented by the Commission for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and managed care organizations haven't been able to address this price inflation.
A notable example is Thalidomid, whose price is listed above. Thalidomid is thalidomide, a drug whose adverse effects in the 1960's lead to major reform of the US drug approval process. (For a background article on the history of thalidomide go here: Rouhi M. Thalidomide. Chemical and Engineering News, June 20, 2005. ) "Chemie Grünenthal introduced thalidomide--under the brand name Contergan--to the German market on Oct. 1, 1957, as a sedative to treat insomnia as well as to reduce nausea associated with pregnancy." Richardson-Merrell had applied to introduce thalidomide, under the trade name Kevadon, to the US in 1960, but the application was held up by a diligent officer of the US Food and Drug Administration, because of inadequate documentation of drug safety. The drug never made it to the US market, because by 1961, there were widespread reports in Europe of babies born with severe deformities to mothers who had taken thalidomide. (For more background on the history of thalidomide, see the materials from the NIH here, and from the March of Dimes here.) Later, discoveries that thalidomide had anti-inflammatory properties lead to studies of its use in several severe diseases, including multiple myeloma.
Now, what can the possible rationale for charging $25,000 per year for the nearly 50 year old drug thalidomide for multiple myeloma, other than it is considered a new "targeted therapy?" The drug is a relatively simple molecule first sold, again firs sold almost 50 years ago. Its manufacture does not involve high technology. Celgene raised the price of thalidomide from $6.00 to $29.00 per 50 mg capsule from 1998 to 2004. The price of a 100 mg capsule in Brazil is $0.07.
So thalidomide becomes another poster child, not only for the production of serious birth defects that lead to reform of the drug approval process 40 years ago, but also for how those organizations who claim to control health care costs are willing to pay amazingly high prices for "high tech" health care interventions, even if they are just re-named low-tech interventions from the last century.