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Thursday, April 22, 2021

Disinformation: a Medical Meditation. Dander At Half Mast.


Are there no foes for me to face?

Must I not stem the flood?

Verse 3, Isaac Watts (1674-1748),
"Am I Not a Soldier of the Cross?"

Introduction

In what follows I expand on our ongoing series—most recently appearing here—on the crisis of fair and accurate information in science and medicine. I divide this meditation into four sections—"meditation" used to excuse a certain amount of meandering, hoping readers will bear with me. I enumerate these sections in order for those with less interest or time to pick and choose.

  • What's logical and what's illogical: the disciplinary messiness of disinformation, what else impacts the acceptance of disinformation?
  • What's the broad media problem, old and new?
  • Was there any responsibility on the part of elites, institutions and academics in bringing about the mistrust that now, ironically, lingers about them like a bad smell? And how did the elites treat their own innovators?
  • Within health care, what are the more narrow, "hidden" sources of disinformation and information asymmetry among actors, including patients?

For all of us, disinformation means information degradation around our health, both that of our populations (vaccination→autism) and that of individuals (nostrums→cure). Disinformation means intimidation of experts and the deprecation of expert knowledge. It means free communication in the arteries of our society suffers from a kind of thrombosis, as true believers latch onto all the niduses of nonsense that disinformationists increasingly spew, often with disastrous results.

A. Beyond Logic.

looking across so many different domains and disciplines, it's remarkable to see how much has been written about disinformation. It's all the more strange we've really only just scratched the surface, leaving us incredulous when Kennedys and Trumps alike smear it around. Enter the concept of disinformation as a search term in any engine. Or put it into an academic search engine. What comes back is a tsunami of attempts to wrestle with this phenomenon, crossing many disciplines.

So for this writer it's daunting to stare at a blank page and consider what more to say. At the beginning of this year, HCR's series editor, Dr. Poses, wrote a lucid piece on logical sources of disinformation. But the very vastness of the expanse of work on the subject, epistemologically, methodologically, its sprawling and protean nature, its slipperiness, may actually give us a clue to why disinformation seems so hard to pin down. (At the risk of being slightly off-kilter I'll treat it here as interchangeable with misinformation.*)

Yet as we enter this post-covid age of proliferating echo-chambers, with all this blather that seems meaningless to some yet somehow persuasive to others, ponder it we must. Political science, philosophy, computer and data science, sociology, cognitive psychology, social psychology, communications, legal studies, clinical medicine and more all help us focus on what disinformation might be, and what we might do about it. 

For starters, the philosophical science of logic is a good place to begin. Pretty quickly, however, dip into sources on "logical fallacies of reasoning" in science and medicine, such as this one, and an even cursory glance implicitly warns you: go further. Look beyond logic. "White skin causes inferior brain capacity" or "vaccine causes thrombosis" are classic examples of the post hoc propter hoc fallacy, the exposition of which goes all the way back to the Hippocratic Corpus in Greek antiquity. Logic! Illogic! Every freshman medical student comes across this in introductory medical decision making. But peruse the laundry-list of fallacies to which the human mind is inexorably drawn. Even in the "logic" laundry lists, you quickly see that many, if not most fallacies simply don't have a logical basis at all: they depend on a whole mug's gallery of social and psychological tendencies, misconceptions, and biases.

If lying is weaponized, then a major part of the problem must be how the human brain elaborates patterns of behavior to deal with real or perceived adversaries, to gain the upper hand in social conflict.  Far more than it is logical, such adversarialism is emotive and primitive-brain. Gaslighting for example has no real logical component. Indeed, its very illogic is part of its eerie power. So is the brain's poor track record when it comes to assessing risk. NY Times editor Jenée Desmond-Harris quotes these statements from her social media feeds:**

You say you won’t get the vaccine because you don’t know what’s in it but you'll eat a hot dog!

You think the government is using the vaccine to put a tracking device in your arm, but have you looked at your life and asked whether there’s anything worth tracking?

You’re afraid the vaccine might kill you, but guess what we know can kill you? Covid!

 What sets all of these apart is the illogic of risk assessment. We're hard-wired not to be logical. We're tuned in mainly to other things: fight versus flight; the over-privileging of gurus' opinions; big-name pretty-faces, sports stars and entertainment figures. We're also tuned in, as we've come to learn recently, to the pronouncements of blow-hard reality-show idols skilled at fanning the flames of illogic in our reptilian brains. These flames include fear of the Other, tribal shibboleths, the pursuit and possession of secret knowledge (e.g. QAnon); or pride in in-group belonging (Proud Boys, Boogaloo Bois, Three Percenters, many others).

There's another supra-logical bias that's less emotional but certainly not steeped in pure logic: historical. I speak to Black friends who explain vaccine hesitancy using the "remember Tuskegee" trope. Understandable, completely. But history doesn't repeat, it just rhymes, we've all heard it by now. And not just post-Tuskegee (or post-HeLa) suspicion of Big Science, but concern among many groups that the deck may be stacked in some way so let's just wait and see who springs for this newest-ride-in-the-park. Logical, but in a different way, really, coming from a different part of the brain: the social brain, exposing, let's say, its own different sort of logic. (On the Black experience see the excellent column, author What Doesn't Kill You Makes You Blacker.) For this author, Damon Young, the upshot is "weigh it all out, then decide." Of course.

If, say, you want to advocate for herd immunity, addressing historical bias requires some rudimentary knowledge of historical narratives and social circumstance. Then one might begin fully to understand their power as determinants of behavior. Historical, social and emotional foundations swirl powerfully around and beyond what's rational, and end up dictating behavior. They all impact the degree of presence or absence of that most basic commodity, trust. Trust is something that's in dangerously short supply in a fragmented society that never really was e pluribus unum. The importance of coherence, of a social compact, was something our teachers peddled in schools who had their own institutional interests in perpetuating certain myths.†


B. External Forces I. Media and Technology: the Disinformationist's Nidus of Nonsense 

1. Old Media.

I know it's nothing new for me to say this, but just because we have more forms of media proliferating, or more technologies to give us all the new flavors of megaphone, why would we expect the resulting information to be better? To quote Uncle Joe, come on, Jack! Not better information. Just a widening cornucopia. Just a louder, covid-spiked, Harley roar of intrusive noise.

Yet there are many who think they benefit. Actually, the media barons and tech bros clearly do benefit. Right in the wallet. It's absolutely beneficial for those acting as intermediaries for health (actually, all) information to put out there what's discomfiting, alarming, or otherwise stimulating in those places that dopamine seems to work its magic. What's perhaps less well recognized is just how calculating this is, even as some members of the "Great PR Families" (Sacklers, moreMurdochs, more) begin to show just an inkling of a superego long after the patresfamilias have done most of their damage.

Examples? Here are a couple. Start with those that preceded the current almost post-apocalyptic Fury Road of tech blogs and secret covens and digital echo chambers. One of the intriguing things about the early, print-only media moguls—or mogul wannabes—was how they seemed all to style themselves as Renaissance Men. The opiate kings, the Sacklers, spent lavishly on art and plastered their names everywhere—a common enough trait for the filthy-rich.‡

In any case, for those new to Health Care Renewal, the disastrous disinformation peddled by this media-savvy family revolved almost exclusively around a single trope that was pumped out through many subsidiary channels. Such channels includes speaking engagements by "pain specialists" at lavish detail-man sponsored dinners, touting the safety of these drugs that had made them multi-billionaires. Interestingly, the family got into trouble just a little too early—at least I think this is true, please write a comment below if you know otherwise—to benefit fully from the digital-channel revolution.

In 2014 a more recent example of the use of Old Media to flatter physicians into robot-prescribers was described in detail by physician-historians Scott Podolsky and Jeremy Greene, now respectively at Harvard and Johns Hopkins. They compare two media-savvy physicians from the 1950s, '60s, and '70s, the zenith of the print era in medicine and of post-war medical triumphalism. They contrast two roughly contemporary physician leaders, internist William Bean (1909-1989), a midwestern leader who tended to published in posh AMA journals, and immigrant psychiatrist Félix Martí-Ibañez (1911-1972) who tended to self-publish in his own Sackler-style "throw-aways" such as MD and his popular book Centaur. Both built careers out of flattering their medical brethren.

Yet "high road" Bean became notorious for his vicious assault on "low road" Martí-Ibañez for the latter's exercise of "a decline in taste, the faults of bombast, and flatulent writing. … [The author’s scholarly colleagues] must have winced at the polycythemic and apoplectic style of this literary centaur." What was interesting, though, was the fact that both of these "medical humanists" were furiously sucking at the teat of Big Pharma. Big Pharma has always been, one infers, to medicine what the Koch Brothers are to the Republican Party. (Or, let's say, fat-cat donors to both political parties.) Drs. Podolsky and Green conclude that the real argument was over what we might call "intention to inform." That is, disinformation. They conclude that for some, e.g. Bean, it was a bridge too far—open, overt pandering—when Martí-Ibañez declared that the "'whole operation [of running Martí-Ibañez's media] is done so artistically by our spellbinders that the reader, without knowing exactly what has happened, falls gratefully under the magic spell and reads, enjoys and remembers everything stated in MD. As a consequence of this special mood in which he is placed by the magazine we can logically assume, and I am sure it could be proved, that the reader is more receptive to advertising messages because their power is considerably enhanced by the mere fact of their being within the covers of MD'  With this," the authors conclude, "the fault lines between the humanistic visions of Martí-Ibañez and Bean are clearly exposed."

To some extent, then, information, even in public health and the current pandemic, is now seen by many as simply an arm of marketing. As we've seen, such an approach has its powerful antecedents, going back to the post-war period and probably before. Since when did marketing people feel the need to be truthful? For them, the mission's never been about putting out some semblance of the audience's actual reality. Rather it's been about "controlling the narrative" in order to achieve market dominance in any given domain. The "crime" of Martí-Ibañez was that he pulled the curtain aside and admitted overtly what he was doing.

And, as a sort of coda to the old-media story, let's recall the immediate past flowing right now into 2021. The team put together by the White House the to combat our still-ominous viral epidemic ended up only "spinning" the epidemic to benefit the Orange Man in the Oval Office. Hence the truly chilling story—a non-digital story—of the White House's efforts to muzzle the CDC and bowdlerize its message. How did that work out for the people of the United States? More on that in a minute.

2. New Media. To Each Person Their Own Megaphone

New media clearly has the edge when it comes to creating megaphones and echo chambers. This digital world of tiny communities and hermetically-sealed "pages" can and does spawn much larger cohorts of belief. It's all fractionated and atomized. Each person to their own echo chamber. A new report—thanks here to Anne Peticolas for this reference—on The Disinformation Dozen shows how new media have all but cornered the market, literally, on antivaccinationism. The entire antivax movement is dominated by a dirty dozen writers' names, individuals who've almost cornered the market. Two-thirds to three-quarters of all content originates with these twelve nattering nabobs of negativism. That's enough for herd immunity! In the era of Old Media—so much for Internet democratic leveling—it's hard to imagine even a Random House, Simon & Schuster or National Bible cornering the market for cult belief.

In a subsequent writing I'll address some of possible ways to combat this meretricious lack of information balance. In the meantime, one way to confronting it with awareness, at least a start, is to make a point of lurking somewhere you don't like to be. For me, that's here. The digital on-ramp is so, so much more accessible than its print predecessors, especially for digital "content creators."

Actually, all these digital rabbit-holes provide an answer—the wrong one—to the question I posed above, "how did that White House manipulation of the Covid narrative work out?"  The question could've been taken as rhetorical.  For example, more specifically, "how did White House disinfo affect the CDC?" Yet here we have the author of the entirely suspect Health Impact News complaining that the "medical tyrants now [2020] had Big Tech behind them, and it was time to make their main move: Seek to vaccinate every person on the planet using the fear of a 'pandemic' to accomplish their plans." For them, such manipulation was clearly a good thing, and everybody got to define for themselves what was signal and what was noise. If vaccination were just noise, then countering the "medical tyrants" was surely God's Work.

There are so many more new media like this, splintering off, every-man-his-own-megaphone, each decrying the conspiracies of  mainstream media, each purveying their own truth. If every man his own-megaphone, ergo every man his own truth. At which point, there is no truth, just truthiness, right? Um, not right. These new media mavens are the folks for whom, unlike the old-media Sacklers and Murdochs in their day, the benefit is harder to divine. Maybe, given the frictionless access to all these new media—WhatsApp? Slack me! No, SMS! No, Instagram!—it's enough to be a mini-mogul with your shiny new mini-megaphone. If you don't get rich, at least you'll be be famous, adorned in previously unimaginable numbers of followers.

And there's always the hope of becoming a Sackler, or even a Zuckerberg.§

[Note: six days after this blog posting was uploaded, the redoubtable Peter Hotez came out with a similar plea for stronger counter-measures in a well reasoned Nature piece. Entitled "COVID vaccines: time to confront anti-vax aggression," he avers "Halting the spread of the coronavirus will require a high-level counteroffensive against new destructive forces." Amen.]

Mostly, though, the digital infomeneurs, or infomanures, are going to have to settle for some lesser bit of notoriety and their perceived access to the special joys of secret knowledge. Mostly, they're followers masquerading as leaders. Followership itself, where there's a putative "leader" such as "Q" of QAnon, is incredibly strong, as we learn repeatedly from the burgeoning literature on cults, from Jim Jones to Scientology to antivax. Indeed, if we plunge into any of these rabbit-holes, sometimes it's hard to tell the leaders from the followers.

Oh, and here's the Oz-like, surreal part of that last assertion: followers versus leaders. Look at QAnon. Who is its mysterious "Q"? A recent bit of sleuthing, if what it purports to reveal can be confirmed, is instructive. In a new television documentary for HBO, it seems the medium really can be the message. All that secret knowledge about the Man in the High Castle, 'Q,' may well emanate from the guy who built the megaphone, Ron Watkins. Watkins is the guy behind the curtain, administrator of 8kun, a favorite online base for conspiracism. Seems there's one born every minute in the Land of the Paranoid. Watkins is the latest in a long line of salesmen. For every Jonestown there is a Jones, or, in Oz, "not a bad man just a bad wizard." Or, let's say, a bad man and bad wizard.

Next, during the post-pandemic transition, moving from BC (before covid) to AD (after disinfo), everyone's head will swivel in a permanent driving info-torrent. Billowing spam, social media rooms'n'zooms, spoofed identities, random come-ons for new health insurance. (And let's not forget your expired automobile warranty.) There's a weird and enervating synergy between the disinformation bubbling up out of those flickering screens and the cramped ennui seeping out of public health restraint. Little wonder then that such synergy, in the spring of 2021, draws antisocial behavior—Fury Road! Mass Murder du Jour!— from people we squint to encounter, and shrink back, as we venture out into the daylight.

The article goes on, “'[w]e really shouldn’t be all marching in lockstep like lemmings to go and do what the government tells us to do,' said [Chris Christie], positioning himself as a political outsider. 'They’ve [the experts?] screwed up too many times for us to do that. But I really do believe the facts that I’ve learned, and the experiences I’ve had, should make at least everybody … think hard' about getting a vaccination." Note the faux outsiderism in which politicians takes great pains to distance himself from those uppity experts, and gives only a qualified recommendation lest he be identified to closely with those Others.

There's nothing terribly new about this disinfo-fueled attitude. An aw-shucks, populist-tinged suspicion of government and of elites actually works. It produces effects that benefit the issuer. It pretty much deep-sixed Barack Obama but may save Joe Biden. It's actually nothing new in the least, having long ago been described by Richard Hofstadter in his 1963 landmark Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. But it has taken on a new cast in the twenty-first century, receiving impetus both from new technologies (every man his own platform) and Ronald Reagan's now-canonical 1980 inaugural dictum, "government is not the solution to our problem, government is the problem."

Reaganism was a major source of energy for the wave on which Donald Trump is just the more recent surfer. Just a little over a decade earlier, the Kennedy-Johnson years had come blasting to a close with shots heard around the world, political and scientific. Of course this doctrine's culmination came in the more debased form we saw, and sadly continue to see, in Trumpism.

You can fill in the blanks from here on out. What ensued? Disinformation. And it just keeps on coming. But maybe, just maybe, we could be coming to the end of a forty-year cycle of science- and government-bashing.

But here I'm offering here a meditation not on historical cycles, but on disinformation. It's not just Trumpism's right wing shock jocks and wrestling enthusiasts who're to blame. So we must turn next to some exploration of how, across multiple disciplines over these same forty or so years, academic elites may have contributed, to a national mistrust of science and medicine.


C. External Forces II. Academia and the Chattering Classes

At some point between Hofstadter's 1963 publication and Reagan's 1980 inauguration, in almost every discipline of social sciences and humanities and on both sides of the Atlantic, the academy began a radical shift. Academic thinkers, especially those who were the Oedipal young pupils of the postwar generation such as Hofstadter, turned against his approach to a positive narrative of what many thought of  as a postwar liberal consensus. They reasoned, not without justification, that that consensus had perpetuated a new war in Asia along with economic disparity, racial injustice and colonial domination. Arguably one upside of this revolt against the post-World War II regime was the partial melioration of some of these ills. But there was an equally clear downside. It had to do with the value of science, medicine, "progress" and the pursuit of "truth."

Heretofore, in approaching the way the public might view science and the quest for truth, Americans relied on narratives of progress. This so-called triumphalist view stemmed from a positive philosophy that emphasized both the reality of a goal and men's ability to home in on that goal through a combination of empirical practice and theoretical refinement. A new wrinkle was added in 1962 when Thomas S. Kuhn, a physicist with an interest in the history of science, injected a sort of Darwinian, punctuated idea of what he called paradigm shifts. In such shifts, Kuhn portrayed positive science lurching in new directions through generational and disciplinary change, leading to new communities of practice. For philosophers of science, he folded into the mix some important notions of social participation and discontinuity.

What Kuhn may or may not have anticipated was the fact that another, more radical and more nihilistic epistemology was about to supersede his own notion of how and why scientists change their world views. In some ways it was almost an anti-epistemology, because it was consonant if not causative in relation to the outcome we've been talking about: "every man his own truth." In another irony, the shift in many disciplines' outlook on "truth" was itself a sort of paradigm shift, both disciplinary and generational, away from a western-centric emphasis on elites and Heroic Dead White Men, and toward a rather insular and jargon-laden sociological analysis.

In a number of ways this was, in fact, a salubrious shift. It had a de-centering and iconoclastic effect. But as some of its own practitioners (vide infra, discussion of Bruno Latour) would come to point out, it went too far. Apart from loosing the grip of expertise on policy making—populists' insistence that we don't have to listen to those pointy-headed guys—more focally it loosened and deprecated scientific and medical institutions' valuation of the social sciences and the humanities. Around the United States, one by one, medical school departments examining the history of medicine and health care either ceased to exist or morphed into "medical humanities." Too often this last could be roughly translated into "Ethics Lite."

Only now, with the pandemic, are we seeing new pleas for, you guessed it, the reincorporation of such a "long view" back into medical education. We can expect to see more pronouncements such as Molly Worthen's recent analysis proclaiming that "A Once-in-a-Century Crisis Can Help Educate Doctors," urging an improvement on what has by now shrunk to "off the beaten track [discussions and courses] engaging a small, self-selecting group of students." A revived version of this study of the long view would goes well beyond the old paradigms, neither overly triumphalist nor overly cynical. It would emphasize topics as patients' own narratives, science as it is really practiced (see below), and far more complex stories of earlier epidemics. (Yale's new Covid-19 study group garnered 65 students: not bad.)

Long before Covid-19, mid-20th century scientific triumphalism had come crashing down with the notion of American virtue. A multicentric approach labeled variously as post-modernism, structuralism, deconstruction, post-structuralism, or "the Strong Programme," this new narrative dethroned the idea of progress as a peculiarly slippery and pernicious western instrument of domination. Replacing the idea of progress was a focus on scientists' and physicians' actual, often baser motives in conducting science. The new narrative revolved around social control and career ambition. From the French school came particular critiques of psychiatry and prisons. From the Scottish school came critiques of science and scientific communities, such as that exposed in Barry Barnes's and Steven Shapin's 1977 manifesto on Britain's Mechanics Institute.

Our purpose in this paper is to show how the founders of British Mechanics' Institutes thought a scientific education would aid in the social control of those artisans who were their designated target. We intend to elicit from the public statements of the movement's leaders the basis and structure of their own belief that a regimen of scientific education for certain members of the working class would render them, and their class as a whole, more docile, less troublesome, and more accepting of the emerging structure of industrial society.

An analogous and contemporaneous argument was made for medical care by Leicester sociologist Nicholas Jewson in his 1976 article on "the disappearance of the sick man." In this still oft-cited article, Jewson posited the inevitability of a loss of human and social relations by 19th century patients as the result of incursions into medical—especially hospital—care by technology and bureaucracy. And at the same time, medical science was suspect as new GMBs—Great Man Biographies, except delete the 'G,' these were anti-GMBs—tried to show not the actors' genius but, rather, their feet of clay. The net result of dethroning life sciences, exact sciences, and medical care was, within academia, a decline in interest in the narrative of progress, suspicion around clinical research, and at least possibly a decline, though I don't think anyone's ever quantified it, in actual boots on the ground to study these topics.

Interestingly, whatever the influence or lack thereof between post-modernism in academia and general population (or politicians') attitudes toward science and truth—and vaccines—it seems pretty clear that current events in the 2020s are clearly starting to reverse both trends. And this reappraisal, accompanied by a striving toward a more nuanced and realistic view of science and medicine, actually started before Covid-19 and the idolatrization of the appropriately scrappy truth-teller Anthony Fauci. In 2009 the whole Jewson "sick-man" concept, after it was invaginated by a whole generation of college students, was reassessed in an important critique. Some years later but still before the pandemic, the toppling of Louis Pasteur's statue, discussed below, was also upended.

What's wrong with bringing scientists and physicians down a notch? We do it all the time in this blog! The answer is tricky. Maybe nothing's wrong with it. (Maybe it doesn't even make a difference, so have at it!)  But for a generation, the leveling of the idea of progress was prevalent and could well have had some negative effects. The truth is that neither narrative was adequate to the task. Not "N1," the narrative of man inexorably pursuing inexorable progress across the ages. And not "N2," the narrative of science as social control and truth as hopelessly elusive, . A new narrative was called for and is just starting, with some assist from a virus and the people who study it, to emerge.

One wishes that someone I once briefly but enjoyably worked for, Anthony Fauci, the sharp-elbowed former basketball guard and gruff opponent of Capitol Hill swells, were here in a video. He'd pipe up and say, in that gravelly Brooklyn-inflected voice: "sure, we screw up, and there's plenty of career science-and-medicine types—go look at the White House in 2019-2020—puffing up their careers at the expense of the rest of us. But we're trying to get closer and closer to the reality here. We need to cut down on all those people dying out there. With a little help, we can do that."

Oh, wait, Fauci is here (here), sort of, in a video!

To see how medicine really works, pace all the earlier philosophers and sociologists of science, let's look at how the changes I've been describing rather abstractly were actually embodied in two key figures. Neither is American so US readers may not be familiar. Both are illustrative of important changes that actually calm my dander and give me cause for some optimism.

The first, Bruno Latour (b. 1947) is a Paris-based author with global reach. His Wikipedia page calls him, as befits the polymathic member of a celebrated French viticultural family, a "philosopher, sociologist and anthropologist." My Neeva search results page arrays his photograph alongside those of the much-older figures Thomas Kuhn and Michel Foucault, both born 1922. N1 and N2, side by side. I doubt that Latour, unlike some of his UK compadres of the iconoclastic "strong programme" ilk, ever really needed to work. But in his early years, based eccentrically at the School of Mines in Paris, work he did, profligately, publishing yet another heretical work on Pasteur and then a slew of subsequent books and articles including the important and still-available 1986 Laboratory Life. (This last was co-authored by UK sociologist Steve Woolgar and in the current edition introduced by none other than Jonas Salk.) That later book's subtitle was telling, reflecting Latour's own early program: "the deconstruction of scientific facts."

In recent years, however, Latour, much of whose current output seems to be positioned in the province of literature for the management community, seems to recant. And this is the interesting part. In the 20th century I met Latour, an astute, personable, and sensitive individual. I was fascinated when, in 2004, in Critical Inquiry—a journal not well known to science-and-medicine types—he published a piece called "Why Has Critique Run out of Steam?" In it he first posed a question that, by the turn of the century, must have bubbled up in many academic minds,

My question is simple: Should we be at war, too, we, the scholars, the intellectuals? Is it really our duty to add fresh ruins to fields of ruins? Is it really the task of the humanities to add deconstruction to destruction? More iconoclasm to iconoclasm? What has become of the critical spirit? Has it run out of steam?"

Latour has become less interested in science-as-crap and more in the effect of computers—and the effect of academia on the body politic. So at the end he answers his own question, cryptically but still tellingly, in this way:

[We wish to be] generating more ideas than we have received, inheriting from a prestigious critical tradition but not letting it die away, or “dropping into quiescence” like a piano no longer struck. This would require that all entities, including computers, cease to be objects defined simply by their inputs and outputs and become again things, mediating, assembling, gathering many more folds than the “united four.” If this were possible then we could let the critics come ever closer to the matters of concern we cherish, and then at last we could tell them: “Yes, please, touch them, explain them, deploy them.” Then we would have gone for good beyond iconoclasm."

As the pandemic finally started to rage and much of the world was in lockdown a decade and a half later—early summer 2020—Latour was interviewed by The Guardian. He was asked to meditate on three of that newspaper's cardinal concerns that haunted the new century's tumultuous third decade. Climate, coronavirus, and post-truth: call them the three horsemen, or "the revenge of the real." Here, in extenso, are his final two responses to queries put by the newspaper's interviewer.

Your work has often challenged the objective, God’s-eye view of science. You argue convincingly that humanity cannot be so detached. But the political right have twisted this approach to undermine all expert knowledge on the climate and nature crises. Any regrets?
A critique of how science is produced is very different from the post-truth argument that there are alternative truths that you can choose from. Post-truth is a defensive posture. If you have to defend yourself against climate change, economic change, coronavirus change, then you grab at any alternative. If those alternatives are fed to you by thousands of fake news farms in Siberia, they are hard to resist, especially if they look vaguely empirical. If you have enough of them and they are contradictory enough, they allow you to stick to your old beliefs. But this should not be confused with rational scepticism.

Has the Covid-19 crisis affected our belief in science?
The virus has revealed the number of things you need to know to decide what is factual and what’s not. The public are learning a great deal about the difficulty of statistics, about experiment, about epidemiology. In everyday life, people are talking about degrees of confidence and margin of error. I think that’s good. If you want people to have some grasp of science, you must show how it is produced.

Couldn't have said it better myself. Latour was, and is, the consummate observer of science and medicine. His writing has gradually evolved to a point where he can no longer be called either a triumphalist or an iconoclast. He seems to be suggesting a new, middle way, in which science and truth are always provisional, but if pursued within existing guardrails ought to be trusted. In lay terms we could call it the law of 20-20-hindsight-but-it's-the-best-we-got. To test this hypothesis we can next exam the career of another European scientific leader, this time an practicing scientist rather than a philosopher. Like Latour she has strong ties to the US but emerges from the European tradition.

In the mid-1980s, far removed from the issues of how either societies or their elites look upon truth, a Hungarian biochemist named Katalin Karikó (b. 1955), two year old daughter in tow, accepted an invitation to join the staff of Philadelphia's Temple University. With this choice she strove to pursue her research on the transcription of messenger RNA. At that point mRNA, yoked to very new technologies, promised much. But it did not yield results fast enough for US medical schools. Ten years later she transferred (1989) to the University of Pennsylvania's neurosurgery department. By 1995 she'd been demoted and removed from that department's faculty track. Not enough of her grant proposals had achieved funding. (My report here is assembled from many fine accounts of her work, two mentioned below, most of them based on interviews. All are available upon a simple name search. The NY Times also reported part of this story after the present blog was written. Best among them are from The Guardian and, especiallyThe Harvard Crimson.)

Karikó's work continued at Penn only because of certain contingent factors: first and foremost, she believed in the power of mRNA as an eventual therapeutic and soon thereafter vaccinology tool; second, she was tenacious and willing to accept a lesser post in order to pursue the work even after it repeatedly failed to yield the paramount coin of the realm, NIH largesse; and, third, a conviction about the  mRNA technology shared with her clinical colleague Drew Weissman. And, yes, fourth—maybe most significantly—she wanted to hang on to the tuition reimbursement benefits that allowed her daughter Susan, a promising athlete and rower, to attend college at Penn. 

It took another ten years, down into the middle of the first decade of the present century, for Karikó's mRNA work to come to fruition. She landed on her feet through the creation of Germany's BioNTech where she became a partner in 2013. The company now collaborates with Pfizer to produce and deliver the phenomenally effective mRNA Covid-19 vaccine. Thus, two small pharmaceutical houses, one led by European scientists (including two Muslim Turks) barely known until last year in the US, the other Moderna, a uniquely American success story with a Black female lead scientist, both came to the rescue.

Pause to consider how these stories might be written. Are being written. Much ink is being shed about the greed of Big Pharma. As if that were the whole story. There is another story. It is the story of the creation of mRNA vaccines. Blind luck, as some might have it? There is another story.

In 2008, three years after Karikó's breakthrough discovery of how mRNA might effectively be slipped into cells to crank up its protein synthesis machinery, her daughter Susan Francia (photo) went to Beijing and won Olympic gold in rowing. Four years later, in 2012, the year before Karikó left Penn's employ to join BioNTech, Francia pulled it off again, winning her second gold in London. Motivation, just maybe, enough. Meanwhile Karikó and her colleague Weissman are packed for Stockholm. But their intellectual property remains at Penn, which repaid her in 2013 by refusing to reinstate her to tenure-track status.

But of course now, as recognized Queen of mRNA and money-pump for Penn, in an appropriate but rather empty gesture Karikó is still pictured on the university's website as an adjunct. In a 2020 interview, she reflected that "I thought of going somewhere else, or doing something else. I also thought maybe I'm not good enough, not smart enough. I tried to imagine: everything is here, and I just have to do better experiments." And so she did.

Was it all a random walk? In no way does the mRNA vaccine story resonate with either of the traditional narratives of how science is "supposed" to work: 20th century triumphalism versus a leveling and often cynical postmodernism. Failure to explain or understand science has thrown the popular narrative, especially in our post-covid dawn, to the disinformationist wolves. Academic authors are just beginning to catch up by asserting more nuanced narratives of how science works, and hence why we should at least provisionally trust the Karikós and Faucis of the world.

To conclude these micro-biographies, I should add that the choice to spend substantial time on Latour and Karikó has a lot do with how each in their own way illustrates the problem of trust. Who can find a trustworthy overarching truth narrative in science? Especially once you actually personify it, take it down to the level of the individual life lived. In some ways we've outlived the usefulness of heroes. But, maybe, in some ways, not so much. Another recent biography to instruct us is a recent account by Johns Hopkins historian Daniel Todes of Ivan Pavlov's life lived. This work also conveys the same nuanced understanding.

In an interview Todes veered close to Latour, evidenced in this quote from his own university's magazine, describing himself as "... basically a realist. I believe that there's an objec­tive reality independent of our consciousness. I don't think science is just a matter of opinion. But it's a deeply human endeavor, and reality being infinite, there's an infinite number of ways into it. Metaphors define paths into this reality—the questions that are asked and aren't asked." Thus we're left with narratives of the search for truth in science and medicine that at some level are compatible with all of the flavors of meta-narrative, from Kuhn to the very latest attempt. That, to wit, is The Knowledge Machine, a promising new (2020) version of the narrative of science from NYU professor Michael Strevens. I hope to discuss it here soon.

One final irony seems worth pointing out before we move on. The academic critique of science and medicine was far from eroded by the forces of the right. The notion of "alternative truth" has in fact been embraced by the right. The year 2017 was a banner year for those open arms. Orwell had sort of predicted it in his "newspeak," but in 2017, after 45 was inaugurated, Donald Trump's senior advisor told Chuck Todd that the president's press secretary was merely disseminating a different flavor of truth: "alternative facts."

And speaking of irony: while the right embraced the possibility of "alternative fact," it was ultimately the left that found every-man-his-own-truth wholly discomfiting. Yet the "truth" as portrayed by the left, like Henry Ford's choice of Model T colors, could also prove pretty confining.


D. From the Ridiculous to the Sublime: The Provider and The Patient

In this final, shorter section I'd like to pull the focus back and away from the shambolic bloviators sprinkled across our political and intellectual elites. For elites of all persuasions, it seems the Covid-19 pandemic has been a pivotal time for public engagement: seeking either to emit or to combat disinformation. Pull the focus to a level more sublime, that of individual relationships between clinical actors. What's happening between physicians and patients as they migrate from face to face encounters to telemedicine? What's happening between physicians and patients as face to face encounters shrink down to fifteen minutes?  What happens when much of that fifteen minutes is deflected, for the physicians, from high-touch and hands-on to the creation of the perfect electronic note? What happens when that document creation is conducted with eyes deflected away from the patient and toward the flickering screen? How does trust between the two parties fare with these changes when they are coextensive with the outside rise of social media?

I found instructive hints in a recent piece in Media and Communication, an open-access journal of applied research in communications and media technology. In this article a team from Madrid and Bournemouth make the point that patients looking for a plan to understand their illness—e.g., some illness mimicking coronavirus—will more than likely be let down and leave the office confused. He or she will leave carrying a thick sheaf of papers purporting to convey the "after visit review," aka the AVR or "Clinical Summary." In the majority of instances, nowhere in that thick pile of papers, a cumbersome list-of-lists, lurks any real plan. Hence the AVR lacks any information even while "it takes only a few clicks to find a reputable health advice source to refute [disinformation]" that may include "virus spreading through mobile phone networks" or "radiation from such networks suppresses the immune system against the virus." It's not a fair fight. Lacking information they can actually use, the patient joins "many people [who] break lockdown rules [and] pour onto the street to smash ... phone masts in many countries."

[Note added post-publication, with thanks to fellow HCR blogger Anne Peticolas: A quite similar view was just expressed by the blogger and Down Mainer country doctor Hans Duvefelt. In his plaint, "Some People Don't Think Like Doctors," he notes that "in a patient’s medical record, we have a fundamental need to know in what order things happened. ... But [omitting] that seems to be how people with a bookkeeping mindset prefer to view the world." And indeed, the genesis of the electronic health record, and what sustains it to a significant degree, originate in hospital back offices. That's where managers—it's the CFO who finds the exorbitant scratch needed to pay for an EHR—have always counted the beans. And now, with the EHR, as Dr. Dorio's recent HCR piece amply demonstrates, that's where they can dictate their own chosen surrogate markers of "productivity."]

I suspect, however, that most patients and more than a few health care providers don't know is that new rules governing all such matters are now just around the corner for information sharing. As a result of the 21st Century Cures Act, starting this spring, access to their own electronic health records must now be given to patients. A decade or so ago, in anticipation of such information-sharing requirements, a new movement sprouted. However improbable it might have seemed at the time, the Patient Portal suddenly sprouted from small start-up companies. Soon they were being acquired by the large, "big iron" EHR companies, unless in some cases those folks decided to roll their own portal platforms. Either way, and with a few recent exceptions such as cross-institutional sharing, document uploads, limited messaging and future appointment requests, such portals continued to offer the same limited usefulness as the Clinical Summary.

The AVR was that big wad of paper handed to the patient as he or she left the office. The portal was more like a keyhole through which the patient could peer at their own living document, containing, however, often misdescribed, medication and other lists. Evolving as an afterthought, the AVR was—and still is—most useful for wrapping fish. Hiding in plain sight within it was a big, black hole at its center. What should have filled that hole was supposedly some description of the actual plan contemplated as the result of this particular visit. Not the incompletely reconciled meds list. Not the mostly-irrelevant list of earlier diagnoses of gouty toe and earwax. Not the irrelevant list of future routine follow-up appointments within a vast hospital-based system. In other words, not the wholesale data-dump that could be parsed by the computer, deemed to be sufficiently discrete to fit this list of lists—but was in fact wholly useless for this visit.

Garbage in, garbage out.

Why such a remedial oversight? The actual plan for the patient, in case after case, was either too slippery or too time- and energy-comsumptive for the provider within that fifteen minute stretch. The default alternative was hence just to push out a document with that black hole in the middle. Such a meaningful plan would have had to be discursive, likely to contain at least a couple of if-then statements and, above all, tell the story. The story, how to plan going forward, is what the patient needs. Conversely, the story, with at least an implied plan (don't succumb to the vaccine-mongers) and look-forward with rationale (conspiracy!): this is what the patient gets from disinformationists.

The story is what the physician lacks time to craft properly for the patient at some appropriate point late in that fifteen-minute visit. The patient is left vulnerable, an opportunity missed. As a physician I blush to think that other professionals, including most lawyers, notwithstanding their oft-contorted and -ontrived ways of near-impenetrable prose, fully understand the need to tell the plan. But we don't. Why? Why have we abdicated compliance with this obvious need? Are we that pervasively controlled by our paymasters? And why have our paymasters abdicated asking us to provide it?

Oh, wait. Maybe it's simple. Measure what you can count, simple as that. "Meaningful Use" of the EHR has required that everything be measured—viz., the numbers of e-prescriptions, the numbers of usually-inaccurate problem lists, "medication reconciliation" that is anything but reconciled. But what's most meaningful is what just happens to be less easily mensurable. 

And besides, lawyers actually get paid to do this stuff. Explaining and planning stuff. Sometimes in legalese. But they do it.

Doctors don't. Ever. Or ... hardly ever.

It turns out, however, that there are actually ways to empower providers and patients with beneficent technology to counter this sad lack of information symmetry. (It's asymmetry, think about it, both within and without the exam room.) With the advent of the Patient Portal the health professions have already yielded to the lately-acknowledged need for greater openness. Further, some patients are already beginning to benefit from an even more radical beneficent information initiative. A lucky few are now blessed with full access to their electronic records, through the OpenNotes movement pioneered by Harvard's Thomas Delbanco.

One next step must thus be the enhancement of the AVR so that it becomes a truly useful tool. In a future essay, I'll outline strategies with which to fashion such an enhancement. If successful, such methods could finally, along with portals and OpenNotes, level the information playing field. 

Disinformation is thus a broad and scalable concept with sort of fractal features. It works at the level of the dyad of physician and patient. It scales to institutions, then to societies with all their tribal animosities, and then, ultimately, to problems of international cooperation. Disinformation is like a virus. It's pernicious in the way it insinuates itself into life's interstices. But counter-measures are out there. Marshalling such counter-measures requires, however, a concerted effort of of will. Most critically, countering disinformation requires sheer perseverance. It requires the grit of people like Katalin Karikó, if trust is to be restored and this brackish disinformation flood is finally to be stemmed.

___________________

*Misinformation is a term often used to explain bad outcomes such as that experienced when homeless persons are unable to get assets such as stimulus payments or vaccinations. Disinformation seems to connote, for some, more agency on the part of the one seeking to impart "information" that's not merely disrupted but purposely distorted.

**New York Times "Opinion Today," 9 April 2021.

†Of course we're not alone in this myth-making. The French have their own cherished myth of laïcité. Once upon a time the Germans had the myth of cultural purity. Useful myths are remarkably persistent. The problem is that their stewards all too often preserved the wrong myths. On the other hand, now abandoned by many as unfortunate myths are notions such as "truth," and "science," actually the very ones we need to revive. Then perhaps struggle to agree on the basic meanings of other notions such as "infrastructure," "speech" or "bipartisanship."

‡The HCR piece referenced in the preceding sentence, with its link to the rag (1960-?) started by Arthur Sackler (1913-1987, features a link to his Medical Tribune. That link seems now to be broken. Some discussion of the family's playing on the culturati role as compensatory for the hard-driving PR behavior is in the still-available WaPo obituary. The magazine, which reached 600,000 physicians, is still available in one or more archives. In the paragraphs immediately following, see also my discussion of other pharma-associated actors' use, in high and low places, of the media megaphone, with a link to the superb recent article on which much of it is based. Just as I complete the writing of the present meditation, a new biography of Arthur Sackler and his family, New Yorker writer Patrick Radden Keefe's Empire of Pain, hits the bookstores. I have not seen an advance copy but it is getting much notice in traditional media. This includes a forthcoming NY Times review that states "Arthur may have been the first to blur the lines between medicine and commerce, and he pioneered modern drug marketing, but his sins pale compared with those of the OxySacklers."

§It's worthwhile recalling that only Zuckerberg, of course, became a Zuckerberg

¶Typically, on the street, one hears this particular trope translated as "mistrust of all science and mistrust of Big Medicine—but not my own doctor." [My paraphrasis.] This in itself can be a problem, given the number of resurgent medical messiahs we've been seeing.


Friday, December 18, 2009

Arguments for Maintaining the Health IT Status Quo on Defects Nondisclosure Clauses

As I wrote at Healthcare Renewal here, I recently posted a web petition "Transparency and Openness in Electronic Patient Records and Other Healthcare Information Technology Systems" at http://www.webpetitions.com/cgi-bin/print_petition.cgi?99504454 , calling for an end to Nondisclosure Clauses [of defects, problems, EHR-related adverse events, etc.] in HIT contracts. The petition reads:

We, the undersigned, believe in transparency, accuracy, and accountability in scientific research, especially in matters related to healthcare.

We believe contractual nondisclosure clauses [1] that prohibit or restrain unfettered disclosure and dissemination of information about healthcare information technology problems related to bugs, design defects, suboptimal user interfaces, other factors that can adversely affect care, and the adverse events and near accidents these problems cause, are unethical.

We believe that patients and clinicians have a right to knowledge of healthcare information technology problems and defects that can distract clinicians and/or reduce clinician effectiveness and productivity. We also believe that hospital governance personnel have the fiduciary responsibility as well as obligation under Joint Commission safety standards to protect patients, clinicians and others working within and for their organizations from the potential consequences of healthcare information technology problems [2].

We believe that only through transparency about healthcare information technology can medical ethics be maintained, the rights of patients to the best possible care be protected and medical science advanced.

Therefore, we call for such clauses to be refused by governance bodies, vendors of healthcare information technology to refrain from including such clauses in their contracts, and the U.S. Congress to prohibit nondisclosure clauses related to medical devices and healthcare information technology.

Furthermore, retaliatory actions against those who in good faith report such matters or incidents should be prohibited.

[1] Koppel R, Kreda D. Health Care Information Technology Vendors' "Hold Harmless" Clause: Implications for Patients and Clinicians, JAMA. 2009;301(12):1276-1278.

[2] Silverstein S. "Health Care Information Technology, Hospital Responsibilities, and Joint Commission Standards." Letter to the Editor, JAMA. 2009; 302: 382.

As I had spelled out many months ago at "Health Care Information Technology Vendors' Hold Harmless and Keep Defects Secret Clauses" here, and in a July 22, 2009 letter to the editor in JAMA entitled "Health Care Information Technology, Hospital Responsibilities, and Joint Commission Standards", I believe these clauses:

  • Are responsible for stagnation in health IT industry thinking that requires an unrelenting focus on the needs of clinicians and patients;
  • Cause hospital executives to violate their fiduciary and Joint Commission safety obligations to patients and staff;
  • Perhaps even put clinicians themselves in a conflict of interest with their own professional ethics (that call for widely sharing information about potential risks to patients).

The Joint Commission nor any other healthcare regulatory body has done anything about such contract clauses since that time, to the best of my knowledge despite being made aware of these issues by direct email to JC leadership.

I've noted few signatures to the petition so far, but have received some feedback and noted other justifications for maintenance of the status quo. The arguments fall into several categories that defend the status quo of HIT defect/problem nondisclosure clauses. The categories of argument include:

  • Legal arguments (or perhaps I should say 'legalistic'): e.g., HIT is not a "medical device", is not regulated, therefore such clauses are nobody's business but the seller and buyer.
  • Semantic arguments (arguing about words): e.g., the Joint Commission safety standards calling for "the organization to communicate information related to safety and quality to those who need it, including staff, licensed independent practitioners, patients, families, and external interested parties" really do not mean communication to other healthcare organizations, regulatory bodies, the press, etc.
  • Corporatist arguments: the clauses are needed to protect the industry and protect "innovation" - however, innovation without adherence to patient's rights and medical ethics is not innovation at all in my mind (cf. the Tuskegee Study of Syphilis).
  • Statist arguments: e.g., we know what's best for medicine, and even if HIT today does have problems and hurt people, it's for the greater future good that their diffusion should be unimpeded by free dissemination of information on downsides.
  • Logically fallacious or irrational arguments: e.g., the circular argument that there's no reason to prohibit nondisclosure clauses about HIT defects and patient incidents, since these problems do not occur in the first place -- or if they occur patient harm is "always" averted by clinicians.

While these type of arguments are interesting and may make for excellent debate, (and medical ethicist George Annas at BU taught his medical students, myself included, well on such issues): none of these arguments are aligned to the ethics, customs and traditions of medicine and the oaths taken by its practitioners.

The oaths taken by healthcare IT companies (i.e., to the speculators investing in this technology) leave much to be desired in that regard.

On the other hand, here is a sentinel reason for supporting their quick abolishment, a strong informatics-based reason to abolish nondisclosure clauses:

As admissions such as "We are unable to share documents [relating to likely problematic EHR's - ed.] as our contract with XXXX includes a confidentiality clause" at http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/tony_collins/2009/11/claim-of-censorship-over-cerne.html indicate, to the point of rejecting a FOI request for information, there are unknowns in health IT (as Tim the proprietor at Histalk wryly noted, the refusal probably is not on the grounds of having glowing praise to report).

How many other data points have not made it to the literature, either peer reviewed or press? Does anyone know definitively?

Do we really know that Medical Informatics research therefore represents a valid sampling of the events that transpire when HIT is designed and implemented?

A parallel and currently controversial issue in pharma is the deliberate suppression of negative or neutral clinincal trials results, with an emphasis on the positive, to protect a drug candidate or an actual drug in postmarketing surveillance. Does this not potentially taint the science?


-- SS

Wednesday, May 27, 2009

Harvard's EMR Justification: We Just Have To Do Something?

I think what I termed "irrational exuberance" over health IT is now devolving into just simple irrationality.

I am unfamiliar with the reasoning employed below (in boldface) by the Harvard researcher, Ashish Jha, MD, MPH (who authored the April 2009 EHR usage survey "Use of Electronic Health Records in U.S. Hospitals" in the NEJM).

From "Cash for Computers", HealthLeaders Media, May 11, 2009. First, my opinions:

... "This forced timeline [by 2014] is a very bad thing. I'm concerned it is going to take an experimental technology and turn it into a train wreck," Silverstein [me - ed.] says. "We need a more gradual process where we can learn from mistakes on a small scale to avoid reproducing them on a large scale ... So now, Silverstein says, healthcare providers are caught between their mission to provide quality care and the financial pressure to install an unproven technology that may threaten the mission.

"Health IT, when it's done correctly, can improve healthcare and reduce costs. But health IT when it is not done well has the exact reverse potential," Silverstein says. "It can impair healthcare, decrease quality, and create other adverse effects for patients. That is the missing element in this discussion."

Then, Jha's:

A need to act

Others aren't so pessimistic. Jha [Ashish Jha, MD, MPH, the lead author of the survey, and an associate professor of health policy and management at Harvard] says hospitals will have five years to establish EHR before federal penalties kick in. And because it involves the federal government, Jha says it's more than likely that those deadlines will get pushed back even further
[not according to ONC chair and fellow Harvard professor David Blumenthal, who as I noted in this post said HIT timelines were "cemented in law" - ed.]

Jha says critics are "missing the point."

"I'm not suggesting EHR is going to be a panacea,
but the one thing that is absolutely true is there is nothing else out there now that has any more political appeal," Jha says. "Everybody agrees, whether you are a conservative, moderate, or liberal, that we have to do something about healthcare. So the one place where we can all come to agreement is we have to do something about electronic records."

$20+ billion and penalties upon already squeezed practitioners and hospitals for non-adoption of expensive, experimental technology is a lot of "doing something.", especially at a time when many are medically uninsured or underserved.

I am also not sure about what point critics are "missing." (Note: I am not a critic, but am a gadfly of healthcare IT mis-design, mismanagement and fraud.)

It appears that reasoning at Harvard has dropped to the level of "we should do it, because we have to do something." Good intentions trump outcomes. Not to make a comparison between HIT and other types of medical experimentation, but it's likely the PI's of the Tuskegee Experiment felt the same way.

Ironically, Harvard is home to Medical Informatics pioneers such as Dr. Octo Barnett, coauthor of the National Research Council report warning that approaches to today's HIT are inadequate.

-- SS

Wednesday, August 03, 2011

Time For A Summer Vacation at ONC - And Ethical Education of Health IT Zealots

A Microsoft Developer's Network (MSDN) blogger "Family Health Guy" a.k.a. Sean Nolan writes in a July 31, 2011 post entitled "Time for a summer vacation at ONC" that:

I’ve spoken at some length about my enthusiasm for the current leadership at HHS and ONC. President Obama has both directly and indirectly engaged some really gifted individuals to help us address healthcare challenges through the use of information technology --- which is awesome ... I’ve had the good fortune to participate in a few of these, and it’s been some of the most rewarding work of my career.

Truth is, I’m not used to seeing such great work out of government. So I’m a bit reluctant to throw out what could be perceived as a negative message --- but after my own two-week vacation thinking about it I’m convinced the time is right to ask ONC:

PLEASE, TAKE A BREAK!
JUST STOP TALKING FOR AWHILE AND LET US IMPLEMENT STUFF.

Why stop now? I think the answer is increasingly clear. Between Meaningful Use Stage 1, the Direct Project and the Health Data Initiative, government has kicked industry out of a funk it’s been in for the previous decade, and we’re seeing a ton of really exciting and positive innovation. But nobody, and certainly not ONC, knows at a detailed level how to turn that innovation into ubiquitous market reality.

What we need now is a period of implementation, competition and iteration to figure out how to deliver on the promise.


I find this attitude to be somewhat - well, let's just say, in a somewhat negative message, psychopathic.

We're talking about real, live human patients as the subject of our "figuring."

For, during the period of implementation, competition and iteration during which "we" will be figuring out how to deliver on "the promise" of experimental health IT medical devices, we shall be putting at risk and injuring non-consenting patients with our IT lessons-learned, and burying our more serious mistakes.

A far better way to figure out "how to deliver on the promise" would be to follow the protocols and procedures used to figure out how to deliver on the promise of other medical devices. These protocols and procedures, and ethical guidelines as well (link), were developed over decades in response to abuses of the past. (The Tuskegee experiments come to mind.)

That calls for controlled clinical trials under informed consent for safety and efficacy, careful study of the results, weeding out of unproven or dangerous technologies via regulation, and all this even before wide-scale rollouts of these health IT medical devices. Even after rollout, there needs to be a robust post-marketing surveillance process.

That's how it works with other medical devices and with pharmaceuticals. HIT medical devices deserve no special accommodation for any logical or ethical reason I can think of.

A lesson here: computer people, and health IT zealots of any background, need to be kept at arm's length from clinical settings, and on very short leashes in those settings.

-- SS

Aug. 3 addendum: the "period of implementation, competition and iteration to figure out how to deliver on the promise" in the UK did not turn out very well.

Monday, March 07, 2011

Dr. Scott Monteith on "The Best Compromise" on Physicians and Use of Troublesome Health IT

I have posted two guest posts by Dr. Scott Monteith, a psychiatrist/informaticist, at the Jan. 2011 post "Interesting HIT Testimony to HHS Standards Committee, Jan. 11, 2011, by Dr. Monteith" and the Dec. 2010 post "Meaningful Use and the Devil in the Details: A Reader's View".

Here is another, with his permission. He is responding to a talking point from a health IT commentary website that was distributed among the AMIA evaluations special interest group readership.

Dr. Monteith asks some very probing questions. He writes:

I would like to respond to what I see as being one of the most important and challenging “real-life” issues confronting clinicians, and is captured in this excerpt [below, from the multi-vendor sponsored site HISTalk - ed.]:

HisTALK: ... Somewhere between “we vendors are doing the best we can given a fiercely competitive market, economic realities, and slow and often illogical provide procurement processes that don’t reflect what those providers claim they really want” and “we armchair quarterbacks critics think vendors are evil and the answer is free, open source applications written by non-experts willing to work for free under the direct supervision of the FDA” is the best compromise.

That is, this excerpt performs the helpful task of framing “the best compromise” somewhere between two extreme viewpoints.

It would be helpful (at least for me) if this group could discuss what “the best compromise” actually ‘looks like’ in practice. How does one actually understand and live within “the best compromise”?

Let’s start with a relatively simple scenario:

What should clinicians do when they are working with EHRs that have known “problems” that are putting patients at risk, and the problems are not being immediately addressed, either directly or indirectly through, for example, an acceptable “work around,” or other adjustments to the EHR or local business processes?

Should the clinician continue to use the EHR and…

  • assume that others (e.g., vendor, IT department, administration, etc.) will fix the problem(s)?
  • report the problem(s)? Once? Twice? Three or more times? (How many?) To whom?
  • inform the patient of the known problem(s) (if the problem(s) apply to the patient)?
  • inform the patient that we do not have a good understanding of how to balance or even understand the risks posed by the EHR, given the dearth of peer-reviewed literature and algorithms? (What is “acceptable risk” for a given EHR problem? Does the EHR-related problem’s risk/benefit analysis change if the patient is in the hospital for a simple, nonlife-threatening problem vs. a complex, life-threatening problem)?
  • give the patient the option to NOT use the EHR? (Note that we almost always give patients the choice to refuse other “risky ventures” such as diagnostic procedures and treatments.)
  • inform their medical malpractice insurance company of the EHR-related problems?
  • submit the problem(s) to the organization’s ethics committee, if there is one?
  • report the problem(s) to the organization’s risk management staff?
  • report the problem(s) in writing or verbally?
  • stop using the EHR?

Etc. (including some combination of things).

Can providers (especially physicians) legitimately rationalize, given our ethical (to patients and our colleagues) and legal obligations (to patients and the state where we are licensed), the use of tools that are posing risks to patients and providers, when those risks are not spelled-out, not well understood, not peer-reviewed, etc.?

(Obviously everything we do has risks, but we are obligated to revel and discuss those risks as noted above. Further, the risks/benefits of a given diagnostic or treatment intervention are the product of peer-reviewed algorithms. Are patient’s aware of the risks associated with their doctor’s or hospital’s EHR?)

Again, the above excerpt suggests that there is a “ best compromise.” But what is/are “the best compromise(s)”?

I joke with friends that I am a “radical moderate” – that is, I usually find myself committed to the “middle ground” in most complex and thoughtful discussions. But when it comes to EHRs, I am finding it difficult to define or understand what a “moderate” or an acceptable “best compromise” looks like.

Given the current EHR exuberance driven by ONC’s incentive dollars and vendor profits (or hoped-for profits), we all know that the “politically correct” approach is to “go along” and be an “early adopter” (without too many protests). But is the politically correct approach really the “best compromise,” especially in light of our ethical and legal obligations?

I am anxious to hear what other people think about this matter. I am sincerely seeking help in better understanding a sensible, real-life “best compromise” for those of us in the trenches.

Note that if we cannot define “the best compromise,” then what does that say about us? How can we justify “getting on board” with patient care tools (e.g., EHRs, eRx’ing, etc.) that are posing risks (known and unknown), with no clear processes for informing patients, not giving patients their choice to use these e-tools, no clear evidence-based risk/benefit analyses, etc.?

My own pithy, initial responses are as follows:

Re: Given the current EHR exuberance driven by ONC’s incentive dollars and vendor profits (or hoped-for profits), we all know that the “politically correct” approach is to “go along” and be an “early adopter” (without too many protests). But is the politically correct approach [i.e, "go along to get along" - ed.] really the “best compromise,” especially in light of our ethical and legal obligations?

No, for the reasons after your comma. [i.e., in light of our ethical & legal obligation - ed.]

One should look to the past for lessons in what the "compromises" might be.

How about the Flexner Report of 1910 as a start?

The treatises on human research protections penned largely after the Tuskegee experiments and the horrors of WW2, such as these as listed on an NIH web page "Office of Human Subjects Research, Regulations and Ethical Guidelines" might also shed some light:

  • The Belmont Report Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research

I further opine:

Re: How can we justify “getting on board” with patient care tools (e.g., EHRs, eRx’ing, etc.) that are posing risks (known and unknown), with no clear processes for informing patients, not giving patients their choice to use these e-tools, no clear evidence-based risk/benefit analyses, etc.?

Perhaps with the line that "I never make mistakes ... everything I do is an experiment."

The technology is experimental. Perhaps the best way forward is to treat it as such.

In medicine I think there's a rich history of how to conduct proper (and improper) experimental research.

Again, Dr. Monteith raises some critical questions that need to be answered.

Or, more correctly, needed to be answered a long time ago, and long before planned national rollouts of healthcare information technology.

-- SS

Friday, September 07, 2007

An Over the Top Denunciation of the "Comparative Effectiveness Crowd"

Many have raised concerns that physicians too often favor the latest, most expensive, most high-technology, and sometimes most invasive treatments, contributing to the high costs and often bad outcomes of health care. One solution would be better research comparing the various possible treatments for particular problems. We recently posted about the controversy over such comparative effectiveness research, particularly Dr Scott Gottlieb's reasonable concerns with the approach, but failure to acknowledge similar and worse problems affecting the alternatives to comparative effectiveness research.

In a new commentary in the Washington Times, Robert Goldberg, "vice president of the Center for Medicine in the Public Interest," went over the top in his denunciation of what he called "the comparative effectiveness crowd."

The cost or comparative effectiveness crowd claims that, opposed to drug companies, it is guided purely by scientific and economic facts about which medicines are more effective for the money. And they only have our better health in mind — no matter what it costs.

Except that what guides these decisions smells more like bias or fear, not science. And both can kill.

His first objections to comparative effectiveness came from a set of personal anecdotes. The first one was


A couple of years ago my daughter was being treated for an eating disorder that required the use of Abilify, an atypical anti-psychotic. Public Citizen calls it a 'worst pill' that should not be on the market at all. Consumers Union calls a 30-year-old drug that causes cognitive impairment a 'Best Buy.'


The second one was


When my cholesterol nearly reached Barry Bonds levels, I went initially on a generic drug that was a Consumers Union best buy. My legs and arms cramped up in a week and my cholesterol levels were unchanged. I was gene tested and found that lovastatin, simvastin and Lipitor would cause muscle pain but that Crestor would not. The comparative effectiveness crowd hates gene testing because it identifies individual differences that screw up their ability to make sweeping judgments about what's best for everyone. Crestor is not a best buy and Public Citizen tells people not to use it.

Obviously, neither anecdote provided any justification for Goldberg's assertion that comparative effectiveness research "can kill."

Beyond that, I was at first bewildered by these anecdotes, which seemed unrelated to any actual comparative effectiveness research. Goldberg did not cite and I am not otherwise aware of any comparative effectiveness research relevant to the treatment of the clinical problems he mentions, the use of atypical anti-psychotics for eating disorders, and genetic testing to identify susceptibility to adverse effects of statin drugs for increased cholesterol.

But I then realized that these anecdotes were about Goldberg's apparent grudge against Public Citizen's Worst Pills web-site and Consumers Union's Best Buy Drugs site.

Regardless of what one thinks about these two sites, however, equating them to some "comparative effectiveness crowd" makes little sense. There are lots of people, including yours truly, who believe that comparative effectiveness research has some merit, but have no affiliation with either of these organizations.

But it gets worse. Goldberg then criticized what the "comparative effectiveness people" had to say about hypertension. His first point was about the fixed-combination drug Bildil (isosorbide dinitrate plus hydralazine, made by Nitromed.)

Black Americans have an 80 percent higher death rate associated with strokes due to hypertension than the general population. For years cardiologists have sought to find — in the absence of fully understanding the complex interaction of genetic, lifestyle and clinical factors — a treatment that could cut into the death rate. So the Association of Black Cardiologists cosponsored the research on a drug called Bidil. The FDA initially rejected the drug as a blood pressure treatment when it first tested on everyone. But sub-population and the sort of genetic analysis the comparative effectiveness people deride as "surrogate endpoints," suggested that it worked to reduce death in blacks. It retested the drug against placebo on blacks and demonstrated a 43 percent reduction in death.

Jerry Avorn, a Harvard Medical School professor, who is a high priest of comparative effectiveness research, when he isn't testifying on behalf of trial lawyers who sue drug companies for a living, derided the results. He called FDA regulation a "minimal standard that would be unacceptable anywhere else in research." He claimed since Bidil wasn't tested against other drugs the results were meaningless.

There is one glaring problem with this argument. Bildil was not tested as a treatment for hypertension. The recent controversial research on Bildil assessed it as a treatment for congestive heart failure (CHF), not hypertension. [Taylor AL, Ziesche S, Yancey C et al. Combination of isosorbide dinitrate and hydralazine in blacks with heart failure. N Eng J Med 2004; 351: 2049-2057. Link here.] That study was indeed performed by people in the Association of Black Cardiologists, and it found that Bildil reduced the death rate for patients with congestive heart failure by 43% compared to placebo. But congestive heart failure and hypertension are not the same (although admittedly hypertension is one of several possible causes of CHF). The Taylor et al study has nothing to do with Bildil as a treatment for hypertension. (See our blog post here on the Bildil controversy.) For that reason, the first paragraph by Goldberg above makes no sense. Thus, the remainder of his disagreement with Professor Avorn on this issue also makes no sense.

Then Goldberg addressed the ALLHAT trial, which really was at least close to a comparative effectiveness study of some commonly used anti-hypertensive drugs. Goldberg described part of its methodology thus,
That five-year, 42,000-patient trial studied the comparative effectiveness of older blood-pressure drugs (diuretics) against newer medicines in reducing heart attacks. Patients were allowed to switch to a combination of drugs only if they 'failed' on the older medicine first. 'Failed' is another word for having a stroke or heart attack.

That would have been a bizarre way to run a study. But it was not how ALLHAT was conducted. Goldberg's description of the ALLHAT methodology also appears to be nonsense.

In fact, patients whose blood pressure was not controlled on the assigned drug were given additional drugs.

The treatment goal ... was a DBP [diastolic blood pressure] of less than 90 mm Hg and an SBP [systolic blood pressure] of less than 140 mm Hg.

If participants did not meet the BP goal while taking the maximum tolerated dosage of the initial medication, an open-label Step 2 agent ... or an open-label Step 3 agent ... could be added.

[From The ALLHAT Officers and Coordinators for the ALLHAT Collaborative Research Group. Major cardiovascular events in hypertensive patients randomized to doxazosin vs chlorthalidone: the Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to prevent Heart Attack Trial (ALLHAT). JAMA 2000; 283: 1967-1975. Link here.]

Furthermore, the study drug could be discontinued for a variety of reasons, not just stroke or heart attack. These included refusal of the patient to take the drug, a "symptomatic adverse event," excess blood pressure, too low blood pressure, and "other." [From Figure 1 in Wright JT, Dunn JK, Cutler JA et al. Outcomes in hypertensive black and nonblack pateitns treated with chlortalidone, amlodipine, and lisinopril. JAMA 2005; 293: 1595-1608. Link here.]

Goldberg's description of the results of ALLHAT was,

ALLHAT concluded that diuretics were more cost-effective in reducing death from all forms of heart failure, (not heart attacks) and were therefore cost-effective overall.

That was wrong too. The main result of ALLHAT appeared to be that the two newer, more expensive drugs (amlodipine and lisinopril) did not reduce the rate of any of the bad outcomes of hypertension measured, death, coronary heart disease, congestive heart failure, stroke, or renal failure, compared to the older drug, the diuretic chlorthalidone, in either black or non-black patients.

Goldberg's final criticism of Avorn was,

So, Avorn opposed approval of Bidil, which reduced deaths from stroke among blacks by 43 percent but is making money peddling the ALLHAT regimen to doctors even though it increases stroke related death among blacks by 40 percent. Can you say Tuskegee study?

This was, at best, a total non sequitur. Bildil, again, was not tested or advocated as a treatment for hypertension. It was a treatment for congestive heart failure. Furthermore, black patients given chlorthalidone had statistically significantly fewer strokes than those given lisinopril, but slightly (but not significantly) more strokes than those given amlodipine. Black patients and white patients given chlorthalidone had less CHF than black patients given either of the two other drugs. [From Wright JT et al.]

So Goldberg's attempt to link Avorn with the Tuskeegee experiment is, at best, further bizarre nonsense.

His final rant was really over the top, and was totally unsupported by any of his previous arguments.

Comparative effectiveness has nothing to do with patient wellbeing or better evidence. It's about hating drug companies and know-it-alls claiming they know better. Such studies are rigged against new drugs and designed to eliminate the individual differences that are at the heart of the next generation of personalized medicines. Drugs that Avorn, ALLHAT and Public Citizen claim are cost-effective could be hazardous to your health. Want to feel better or stay alive? Take a medicine advertised on TV instead.

We have noted before that Goldberg works for an organization, the Center for Medicine in the Public Interest, whose president is Senior Vice President for Global Health Affairs at the big public relations firm Manning, Selvage and Lee. Manning, Selvege and Lee has many big pharmaceutical accounts, as listed on the CommuniqueLive.com site. This suggests at least an indirect conflict of interest, favoring the interests of the pharmaceutical industry, that should have been revealed in this op-ed article.

But my main complaint about Goldberg's article was not that it amounted to stealth health policy advocacy. It was non-stealthy health policy nonsense. The article was riddled with gross errors about how the results of particular clinical research studies, how they were done, and the context in which they should be interpreted. Most of its arguments amounted to nothing more than, to be charitable, a series of non sequiturs.

It sadly appears that comparative effectiveness research now arouses such passion in the supporters of the pharmaceutical industry as to render some incapable of coherent argument. Why respectable main stream media outlets would publish the resulting gibberish is hard to tell.

Hat tip to Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report.

ADDENDUM (27 September, 2007) - Robert Goldberg left a comment below, which in my humble opinion, does not do much to support his position. In case there is any doubt that he was the actual author, he posted the same thing on the DrugWonks blog. My full reply is here.