Planned Obsolescence Disguised as Innovation, Oligopoly Disguised as a Free Market, and the Enrichment of Oligarchs

The New York Times published another article in its series on the high cost of US health care.  This one, focused on the care of type 1 diabetes mellitus and other chronic diseases, shines some light on the business management practices that now determine how our health care system functions, or not, and implies who benefits the most from them.

Planned Obsolescence Disguised as Innovation

The article first discussed the brave new world of type 1 diabetes treatment.  The introductory theme was:

Today, the routine care costs of many chronic illnesses eclipse that of acute care because new treatments that keep patients well have become a multibillion-dollar business opportunity for device and drug makers and medical providers.

Much of modern diabetes treatment seems to depend on medical devices and disposable medical supplies:

That captive audience of Type 1 diabetics has spawned lines of high-priced gadgets and disposable accouterments, borrowing business models from technology companies like Apple: Each pump and monitor requires the separate purchase of an array of items that are often brand and model specific.

A steady stream of new models and updates often offer dubious improvement: colored pumps; talking, bilingual meters; sensors reporting minute-by-minute sugar readouts. [Diabetes patient] Ms. Hayley’s new pump will cost $7,350 (she will pay $2,500 under the terms of her insurance). But she will also need to pay her part for supplies, including $100 monitor probes that must be replaced every week, disposable tubing that she must change every three days and 10 or so test strips every day.

Of course, the device and supply manufacturers claim that the high prices reflect the value of the wondrous new innovations:

Companies that produce the treatments say the higher costs reflect medical advances and the need to recoup money spent on research.

Yet now the Times reporter was able to find physicians who claim the "innovations" are really just the latest version of planned obsolescence:

Diabetes experts say a good part of what companies label as innovation amounts to planned obsolescence. Just as Apple customers can no longer buy an iPhone 3 even if they were content with it, diabetics are nudged to keep up with the latest model.

For example,

Those companies spend millions of dollars recruiting patients at health fairs, through physicians’ offices and with aggressive advertising — often urging them to get devices and treatments that are not necessary, doctors say. 'They may be better in some abstract sense, but the clinical relevance is minor,' said Dr. Joel Zonszein, director of the Clinical Diabetes Center at Montefiore Medical Center.

'People don’t need a meter that talks to them,' he added. 'There’s an incredible waste of money.'

Pharmaceutical companies have also discovered this model.

insulin ... has been produced with genetic engineering and protected by patents, so that a medicine that cost a few dollars when Ms. Hayley was a child now often sells for more than $200 a vial, meaning some patients must pay more than $4,000 a year.

In particular,

Synthetic human insulin is safer for patients, who sometimes developed reactions to animal insulin. But it is made by only three companies: Eli Lilly, Sanofi and Novo Nordisk. Manufactured in microbes, each one’s product has minor dissimilarities that reflect the type of cell in which it was made. Since the companies owned the cell lines, it is nearly impossible for other companies to make exact copies or even similar versions that would be cheaper, even once the patents expire. And the pharmaceutical companies defend the patents ferociously.

What’s more, the three companies continued to refine their product, adding chemical groups that made the insulin absorb somewhat more quickly or evenly, for example. They are called insulin analogues, and their benefits are promoted tirelessly to doctors and patients.

Of course, the pharmaceutical companies also claim that it's all about innnovation,

Dr. Todd Hobbs, chief medical officer of Novo Nordisk, defended the rising prices of insulin, linking them to medical benefits. 'The cost to develop these new insulin products has been enormous, and the cost of the insulin to the consumer in developed countries has risen to enable these and future advancements to occur,' he wrote in an email.

 Not everyone is convinced,

'The insulins are tweaked for minor benefits that may help a small number of patients with difficult-to-control diabetes, and result in major price increases for all,' [Kings College, London, UK Professor] Dr. Pickup said. Because of analogues, he added, Britain’s National Health Service has had to spend 130 percent more on insulin in the past five years.

In the United States, said Dr. Zonszein at Montefiore, the price of Humalog, Lilly’s analogue insulin, was typically two to four times that of its older human insulin line, called Humulin. 'There is not a lot of difference between Humulin and analogues,' he said, but he noted that Humulin was getting 'hard to find.' Sanofi Aventis has stopped selling its older product in the United States, and Mr. Kliff, the financial analyst, said other companies were likely to follow suit, effectively forcing patients to use the costlier versions.

The arguments about valuable innovation also do not explain why the prognosis of diabetes in the US does not seem to reflect all the money we spend on the disease,

Complication rates from diabetes in the United States are generally higher than in other developed countries. That is true even though the United States spends more per patient and per capita treating diabetes than elsewhere, said Ping Zhang, an economist at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

The high costs are taking their toll on public coffers, since 62 percent of that treatment money comes from government insurers. The cumulative outlays for treating Type 1 and Type 2 diabetes reached nearly $200 billion in 2012, or about 7 percent of America’s health care bill.

So to summarize, there is considerable evidence that companies that make drugs and devices to manage type 1 diabetes constantly provide "innovations," yet most are minor changes that encourage obsolescence of previous products, but do not provide important increases in benefits or reductions in harm for patients. 


Oligopoly Disguised as a Free Market

Many in the US sing the praises of our supposed free-market health care system.  As noted above however, the insulin market is an oligopoly, dominated by three companies.  The diabetes device market is also dominated by a few companies, and in particular, the insulin pump market is dominated by a single company,

Medtronic is the dominant insulin pump manufacturer, serving 65 percent of American patients and the majority of those worldwide. Though smaller companies sell cheaper pumps, it is hard to make inroads: Once familiar with the Medtronic system and its extensive support network for troubleshooting problems, patients are reluctant to switch. Doctors are leery of prescribing equipment from a new company that may be out of business in a year; their office computer may not sync with the new software anyway.

Of course, Medtronic public relations will justify it all again based on innovation,

Medtronic declined to talk about specific prices, but said a core tenet was to make only 'a fair profit.' Amanda Sheldon, a spokeswoman, added: 'We are committed to reinvesting in research and development of new technologies to improve the lives of people with diabetes, and our current pricing structure ensures that we can bring new products to market.'

The article also discussed the prices of treating chronic diseases other than diabetes.  For example, see how a nominally non-profit hospital priced treatments for chronic diseases,

Dr. Kivi was on high doses of steroids for debilitating joint pain that left him unable to walk at times.

But when his last three-hour infusion at NYU Langone Medical Center’s outpatient clinic generated a bill of $133,000 — and his insurer paid $99,593 — Dr. Kivi was so outraged that he decided to risk switching to another drug that he could inject by himself at home. 

However,  this pricing appears to have been facilitated by the hospital's increasing market domination generated by its purchase of physician practices,

He had moved his care to NYU Langone to follow his longtime doctor, who had moved her practice from a nearby hospital where the same infusion had been billed at $19,000. The average price that hospitals paid for Dr. Kivi’s dose of Remicade late last year was about $1,200, according to Medicare data.

So in summary, a few companies now dominate the production of drugs and devices for the management of diabetes, and a few large hospitals may increasingly dominate the treatment of particular chronic diseases.  Such oligopolists are able to increase prices without improving treatment to or outcomes of patients.

Enrichment of the Oligarchs

This example shows how the current US health care system is dominated by huge organizations, mostly for-profit corporations but including some nominally non-profit corporations that act similarly.  They loudly proclaim innovation, but much of that innovation seems to provide few benefits to patients, and actually appears to be planned obsolescence.  The result is high and ever-rising prices. So if patients do not benefit from this, who does?

It does not appear to be the health care professionals,

Meanwhile, as the price of supplies rises, endocrinologists remain among the lowest-paid specialists in American medicine, meaning severe physician shortages in many areas and long waits to see a doctor.

We  have seen other examples of how leaders of the big health care organizations have become as rich as royalty.  Therefore, let us consider the pay of the leaders of the organizations mentioned above.  I will focus on the two US based corporations, Eli Lilly and Medtronic, and the New York hospital, NYU Langone Medical Center.

Eli Lilly

According to the company's 2014 proxy statement, the 2013 total compensation of its five highest paid hired executives was

- John C Lechleiter PhD, CEO                                      $11,217,000

- Derica W Rice, CFO                                                   $5,176,822

- Jan M Lundberg, PhD, EVP, Science and Technology   $4,774,535

- Michael J Harrington, General Counsel                          $3,174,222

- Erico A Conterno, President Lilly Diabetes                    $3,009,041

Note that all of these executives save Mr Harrington have also amassed more than 100,000 shares of company stock, and Dr Lechleiter has amassed more than 1,000,000.

It should be no surprise, given our recent discussion (e.g., here) of the currently symbiotic relationship among top health care corporations and academic medicine, that several of the members of the Lilly board of directors that has exercised stewardship over the company, and is thus responsible for these gargantuan compensation packages and the business practices discussed above are top academic leaders.  These include,

- Alfred G Gilman, MD, PhD, Regental Professor Emeritus, recent (until 2009) executive vice presdient, provost, and dean of medicine, University of Texas Southwestern 

- William G Kaelin Jr, MD, Professor of Medicine, Associate Director of Basic Science, Dana-Farber Cancer Center, Harvard University

- Marschall S Runge MD, Executive Dean and Chair of the Department of Medicine, University of North Carolina Medical School

- Katherine Baicker PhD, Professor of Health Economics, Harvard University School of Public Health  (I must note that Prof Baicker is also - amazingly - on the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee, MEDPAC).

- Ellen R Marram, Trustee, New York-Presbyterian Hospital

- Ralph Alvarez, President's Council, University of Miami

- R David Hooper, Trustee, Children's Hospital of Colorado

- Franklyn G Pendergast MD PhD, Professor, Mayo Medical School

All but the newest directors were paid at least $250,000 a year by the company (and thus by the executives the directors are supposed to supervise), and all but the newest directors had accumulated tens of thousands of shares of stock or the equivalent as pay for their services.


Medtronic

Similarly, according to the company's 2013 proxy (the latest now available), CEO Omar Ishrak made $8,975,866 in 2013, and the next four highest paid executives all made over $2,500,000 each.   Mr Ishrak owned or could acquire the equivalent of more than 500,000 shares of stock, and the other top paid executives owned of could acquire from over 100,000 to over 1,000,000 shares of stock.

Again, the executives were nominally supervised by a board of directors that included an academic and non-profit leader, Dr Victor J Dzau, MD former chancellor for health affairs at Duke University, and president-elect of the Institute of Medicine (note that we discussed Dr Dzau's conflicts of interest most recently here).  It also included a former government leader, Michael O Leavitt, former US Secretary of Health and Human Services; and a hospital leader, Preetha Reddy, Managing Director of Apollo Hospitals Enterprise Limited (India). 

NYU Langone Medical Center

The Medical Center's 2011 US form 990 is old, but the latest available, and is remarkably obscure, omitting, for example, mentioning the titles of any of the people listed as highest paid officers and employees.  The current CEO, was listed as receiving total compensation of just over $2.000,000.  Four individuals then received over $1,000,000.  The 990 form also mentioned that the Medical Center provided some individuals with first class travel, tax gross-up payments, housing allowances, and reimbursement for personal services.  Neither the 990, nor the center's web-site makes all the possible conflicts of interest of its trustees obvious.   

So in summary, the large organizations, for-profit and non-profit, that are able to greatly increase their prices through planned obsolescence disguised as innovation, and oligopoly disguised as free markets, are able to make their top executives very rich, and also enrich those who are supposed to exercise stewardship over them. 


Summary

An extensive journalistic investigation revealed how certain aspects of chronic care in the US health care system are dominated by a few large organizations.  These organizations are able to charge very high prices, mainly through market domination, and with the aid of marketing and public relations that tout planned obsolescence as valuable innovation.  The leaders of these organizations have become wealthy, often fabulously so.  This state of affairs has not been challenged by those who are supposed to provide stewardship, including many prominent academics.

The US health care system is the most expensive, on a per capita basis, in the world, and far more expensive than that in any other developed country.  Yet there is no evidence that its results are superior to those of other countries.  What evidence there is suggests in fact that our results are mediocre at best.

The current example suggests how the US system differs from those of other countries.  It has an ostensible free market focus.  Yet the system appears more to be an oligopoly, with most of its market components dominated by a few large organizations, run as an oligarchy, by a small, overlapping in-group of managers, executives and their cronies, with elements of corporatism, that is with the cooperation of, rather than regulation by government entities and leaders

A real free market health care system would include a level playing field.  This could only be achieved by the government acting as a fair umpire, not a crony.  Anti-competitive practices would have to end.  Oligopolies would have to be broken.  Deceptive marketing and public relations would have to be exposed.  Leaders would have to be made accountable, especially for putting patients' and the public's health ahead of their own enrichment.  All this would be horribly difficult, as the oligarchs have amassed much money and control, and would oppose, possibly violently, any effort to challenge them.  If we do not challenge them in the US, however, not only will our health care continue to become ever more expensive, less accessible, and less beneficial to patients, but we will all cease to be citizens of one of the first real democracies, and end up serfs instead. 

The Push Back Continues: the Mayor of Pittsburgh Sues UPMC Claiming it is No "Public Charity"

There is another indication that push back against the power of large health care organizations is getting more significant.

In February, 2013, we noted that the Governor of the state of Connecticut publicly criticized lavish executive compensation at a small regional hospital system, compensation partially fueled by government funded health insurance payments, and in contrast to hospitals' claims that insufficient reimbursement was driving them to poverty.   

The Suit Challenging the Charitable Status of UPMC

Now the outgoing Mayor of Pittsburgh has launched a lawsuit challenging the status of huge, nominally non-profit health system UPMC as a public charity.  A summary of the arguments comes from an article in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.  First, in the state of Pennsylvania, a Supreme Court description set out a test to determine if a particular organization is a public charity, the status the UPMC currently claims:

The Supreme Court's 1985 ruling involving the Hospital Utilization Project (or HUP) set out a test that requires that a purely public charity must fulfill all five of the test's points that it: advances a charitable purpose; donates or renders gratuitously a substantial portion of its services; benefits a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity; relieves the government of some of its burden; and operates entirely free from private profit motive.

That ruling was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in April in a case involving an Orthodox Jewish summer camp in Pike County that was found to not deserve its property tax exemption.

The city's lawyer, E.J. Strassburger of Strassburge Mckenna Gutnick & Gefsky, argued that UPMC does not pass that test:

Mr. Strassburger wrote, first and most strongly, that 'it seems virtually certain that UPMC would fail to carry its burden of proving that it satisfies the fifth prong of the HUP test by 'operating entirely free from profit motive.''

He cited UPMC's nearly $1 billion surplus over the last two years and $3 billion in reserves as evidence of this, and that UPMC 'is carefully structuring its operations to prioritize profits-generation over charity.'

Also, 

In addition, Mr. Strassburger wrote that UPMC does not 'advance a charitable purpose' in part because UPMC 'maintains an 'open admissions policy' in name only' and it does not make all of its health care available to everyone, regardless of ability to pay.

Furthermore,

the review says UPMC fails to provide sufficient charity care, operates far-flung international operations that are losing money, and has closed operations in poor communities only to open or expand into richer ones.

But it also cites what it terms 'excessive' benefits of UPMC executives, including CEO Jeffrey Romoff's $5.9 million salary; the fact that more than 20 employees are paid more than $1 million; UPMC's corporate jet; Mr. Romoff's 'lavish'  Downtown headquarters (which it claims includes a private chef, chauffeur and private dining room).

The Post-Gazette also sought the advice of experts,

Nicholas Cafardi, dean emeritus and professor at Duquesne University's Law School, said he believes the argument that UPMC is not free from a private profit motive is the strongest one in Mr. Strassburger's review, in part because of how far-flung UPMC has become.

'The more they do that gets them away from their core purpose, the more they open themselves up to the argument that they aren't doing charity,' he said.

In addition, Mr. Cafardi said, UPMC's extensive advertising campaign --sometimes directly against rival Highmark -- makes it look like the organization is operating for profit.

'A lot of things like that make them look like they're operating for a private profit,' he said. 'You advertise because you're in competition. That's the private profit motive.'

Gary M. Grobman, former head of the nonprofit Pennsylvania Jewish Coalition and author of 'The Pennsylvania Nonprofit Handbook,' said UPMC would have a fight on its hands.

'Based on what [Mr. Strassburger] has written, which may or may not be true, it seems some staff at the hospital are paid quite well and some decisions are made based on achieving as much revenue as possible instead of providing as much charity as possible,' he said. 'And if all of that is true, they don't deserve their not-for-profit status.'

So the main issues brought up by the city are similar to issues we have raised about numerous nominally non-profit health care organizations.  We have shown that many particular organizations appear not to act like charities when they appear to put short-term revenue ahead of the organization's mission, a process sometimes called financialization, and put lavish compensation of top hired managers ahead of the organization's general financial well-being; and when their leadership appears to subvert the organization's mission.

The UPMC Response versus Anger in the Community

Of course, UPMC public relations disagreed with the premises of the lawsuit:

'We think the 13-page memo that a local law firm wrote for the City is very weak and reaches its conclusions entirely based on opinion, not fact,' UPMC spokesman Paul Wood wrote. 'Rather than responding to partisan politics and blatant union pandering by the Mayor, UPMC looks forward to demonstrating in a court of law that we meet all five prongs of the HUP test and that our hospitals easily qualify for the tax-exempt status they unquestionably deserve. Interestingly, by hiring an outside law firm the City is prepared to waste millions of dollars of taxpayer funds on an unsuccessful attempt to pursue this case.'

Note that the unsubstantiated allusions to "partisan politics" and "pandering" appear to be an appeal to ridicule, "a fallacy in which ridicule or mockery is substituted for evidence in an 'argument.'"  We have noted before how public relations flacks working for top executives of health care organizations seem to be very good at using such logical fallacies.

Mr Wood also scoffed at the naive notion that having a $1 billion surplus and $3 billion in reserves means the organization operates like a business:
 

Mr. Wood wrote that 'numerous people have tried to distort the meaning of that component to attain a political result.'

'It does not mean a nonprofit shouldn't strive to have a positive operating margin -- organizations that don't do that go out of business,' he added.

Note that Mr Wood seems to be arguing that the only alternative to a very large surplus and a very large reserve is a deficit.  By ignoring another obvious alternative, having a small surplus and a small reserve, his argument thus is derived from the logical fallacy known as the false dilemma.  He also seemed to be arguing that a deficit inevitably leads to bankruptcy.  Of course prolonged deficits might lead to bankruptcy, but a single deficit would not necessarily do so.  Thus he also employed the logical fallacy known as the slippery slope. 

On the other hand, a Post-Gazette columnist showed the depth of community concern over the role of UPMC:

Someone in power is taking official action against the biggest corporate bully in town. Can I get an Amen?

In fact, I can get many Amens, and that says a lot about the behavior of the region's dominant hospital system.

Has there ever been a 'charity' so disliked and mistrusted by the people it's supposed to serve and the people it employs? You rarely hear anyone say 'I cannot stand CARE,' or 'I despise Doctors Without Borders.' But you hear it all the time about UPMC, notwithstanding the jobs it creates, the medical innovations it advances, the life-saving care its doctors deliver and its commitment of $100 million for the Pittsburgh Promise scholarship fund. With all that to its credit it should be beloved, but the opposite is true.

Not helping matters is its corporate public relations, which is increasingly tone deaf. In an emailed response to the mayor's announcement, UPMC spokesman Paul Wood said the lawsuit 'appears to be based on the mistaken impression that a non-profit organization must conduct its affairs in a way that pleases certain labor unions, certain favored businesses, or particular political constituencies.'

No, Mr. Wood. It's based on the correct impression that a nonprofit hospital's top priority should be the patients, not building a monopoly. And that a $10 billion system with a billion-dollar surplus and $2 billion to $3 billion in reserves should be taking care of many more indigent sick people than UPMC has been treating -- especially when it owns land that a Post-Gazette investigation valued at $1.6 billion, even as it enjoys a $20-million tax break every year, underwritten by the good citizens of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County. You can try blaming the SEIU organizing campaign or your arch-enemy, Highmark the insurer, or politics, but this is so much bigger than any of those things. And the public knows it.

Keep in mind that the current discussion of UPMC in the media focuses on very recent events.  On Health Care Renewal, we have posted frequently over the last eight years about problems with the leadership of UPMC.  We started in 2005 with their inability to prevent a fraud  perpetrated by some UPMC middle managers. In 2008, we discussed the apparent mismanagement of the highly touted UPMC liver transplant program.    Starting in 2009, and continuing through 2013, InformaticsMD chronicled how the leadership has presided over health care information technology so problematic that it has been blamed for patient deaths.  In 2009, we noted sanctions against UPMC's public relations.   In 2010, we noted conflicts of interest and apparent self-dealing and nepotism affecting the UPMC board of trustees and UPMC executives. 

Summary

For at least a generation, health care leaders and health policy makers have been pushing for consolidation of health care organizations in the name of efficiency.  We now have a health care system dominated by fewer, larger organizations, and whatever efficiencies have been produced mainly seem to have benefited organizational insiders.  Maybe now, though, some are beginning to remember that monopolists - starting at least with John D Rockefeller, I believe - have historically touted their ability to improve efficiency and rationality.  The results, however, have been higher prices and poorer results for everyone else. 

Hospitals and hospital systems have been particularly good at getting away with the efficiency argument despite the fact that health care prices in the US have been soaring ever since the "vertical integration" craze in the early 1990s.  I believe such organizations have been getting away with this nonsense because of their revered status within their communities.  Now, however, as huge hospital systems drive up prices and make their top executives rich, maybe we will remember Theodore Roosevelt's warnings about trusts and malefactors of great wealth.

There is no good evidence that large hospitals and even larger hospital systems take better care of patients, or provide better teaching and research.  Not only should we question whether huge hospital systems like UPMC are public charities, we should wonder how we ever let them get so big, and proceed to break up these new sorts of "trusts."

Blood Money at the Border - The Red Cross and a Local Blood Bank Fight Over Donors

Writing in our local Providence Journal, Felice Freyer reported on a story that becomes less bewildering when viewed in the context of how nominally not-for-profit health care organizations are now run. 

The Border Dispute

It seems that two such non-profits are having a border dispute:

Two local charities are fighting for your blood.

The Rhode Island Blood Center, long the sole blood-collection agency in the state, is objecting to incursions by the American Red Cross of Eastern Massachusetts, which recently started holding blood drives here.

A war of words has resulted, with the blood center accusing the Red Cross of a 'campaign of misinformation,' and the Red Cross calling the blood center 'hypocritical.' The Hospital Association of Rhode Island entered the fray with a letter to blood donors urging loyalty to the Rhode Island center.

The dispute might seem inconsequential to the typical blood donor, who is just trying to do a good deed and may not care or notice who collects the blood.

But the Rhode Island Blood Center argues that it matters a great deal. The competition, blood center officials say, is threatening a carefully calibrated system that ensures a steady, predictable supply of blood. The hospitals in Rhode Island all rely on the blood center for 100 percent of their blood supply.

The Red Cross says it just wants to give Rhode Islanders another way to support its mission. 'We are a humanitarian organization, a symbol of trust,' said spokeswoman Donna M. Morrissey.

The Red Cross’ Rhode Island chapter does not collect blood. A chapter based in Dedham, Mass., started collecting blood here last fall. Since then, the Red Cross has collected 138 units of blood in Rhode Island — a drop in the bucket compared with the 90,000 units of whole blood that the Rhode Island Blood Center collects each year.

High-Toned Missions

On its surface, the whole thing is bewildering. Here are two non-profit organizations ostensibly dedicated to providing worthwhile health services for people in need.

The American Red Cross' mission is to:

provide relief to victims of disaster and help people prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies.

The Rhode Island Blood Center's mission is:

to provide a safe, adequate and cost-effective blood supply for the patients and the hospitals we serve.

Why can't we all just get along? Why should these organizations be fighting, especially over what amounts to market share? Wouldn't they be able to better support their missions by cooperating? 

Where Does the Money Go?

I cannot give a definitive answer to those questions. However, there are some clues.

Let us look at the latest available (2008) US Internal Revenue Service form 990 from the Rhode Island Blood Center, and the latest available (2009) form 990 from the American National Red Cross, the parent of the eastern Massachusetts chapter.

The ProJo article stated that the RI Blood Center collected some 90,000 units of blood last year. The most recent form 990 for that organization revealed that the RIBC had $33,043,096 in program service revenue from sale of blood or blood components for its 2008 tax year. Assuming that its blood collections were the same then as the ProJo reported, that means it got $367 in revenue per unit of blood it supplied. Note further that program service revenue accounted for about 88% of its total $37,478,357 revenue in 2008, revenue sufficient to create a $558,169 surplus

So the sale of blood is lucrative. That may come as a big surprise to blood donors, who are unpaid, (and do not even get a tax-deduction for a charitable donation in the US).

Now of course it may not be cheap to collect, test, store and distribute blood, that is, the core functions of the RIBC. But note further that in 2008, it was also lucrative to be an executive for RIBC. That year, Lawrence F Smith, the CEO, got $430,650 in total compensation; Scott J Asadorian, the COO, got $331,736, and Carolyn T Young, the CMO, got $273,052. Six other managers got more than $100,000. That seems to be very good pay for managers of a relatively small, regional non-profit whose revenues depend on voluntary donations of bodily fluids.

There are parallels with the American Red Cross, parent organization of the local Massachusetts chapter. It got a whopping $2,219,161,636 in program service revenue from "biomedical products & services" in 2009, which was about two-thirds of its total revenue of $3,587,775,430, and which generated a $233,597,985 surplus.

Being an executive of the American Red Cross was much more lucrative. In 2009, then CEO Gail McGovern received over a million in total compensation, $1,032,022 to be exact. Its President for Biomedical Services got $850,489. Its Executive VP for Biomedical Services got $596,309. Twelve other executives got more than $250,000. Of those, ten got more than $350,000.

Summary

This is all too reminiscent of a dispute we noted briefly here, which involved threatened litigation by the large Susan G Komen For the Cure foundation against other charities that dared to use the word "cure" in their own campaigns to fight cancer.

The current example does seem a bit more tawdry because the organizations in question depend for their revenue and to support their executives' posh pay on voluntary donations, not just of money, but of blood.  (And it is not the first example we have found that raises questions about non-profit blood banks, look here.)

We have gone on at great length about how health care organizations have been infected by the prevailing "greed is good" culture of US (and world) businesses. Some of the worst examples have come from for-profit companies, but nominally non-profit companies (NGOs, outside of the US) have become part of the epidemic. Instead of cooperating to do good works, some have taking to fighting over market share. We have shown numerous examples in which the leaders of health care non-profits got incentives unrelated to the degree they uphold their institutions' high-toned missions, (here is a recent example) and seem happy to do what it takes to keep their compensation high.

So, once more with feeling.... health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.

What Is to Be Done?

Based on our ever enlarging file of cases on compensation of the top hired managers of non-profit health care organizations, let me make some concrete suggestions, based on my humble opinion.

A step forward would be to make the finances and compensation arrangements of health care non-profit organizations at least as transparent as those of large public for-profit organizations. So my big idea is:

Non-profit health care organizations above a reasonable threshold size should provide prompt, public, annual reports analogous and very similar to the reports required by the US Securities and Exchange Commission of public, for-profit companies.

These reports should include, at a minimum, a summary of financial and operational status, an audited financial report, an explanation and accounting for any for-profit subsidiaries and any interlocking non-profit organizations, the compensation given to the CEO and some minimum number of the top-paid officers and employees, a detailed explanation and rationale for the pay of these individuals, and a listing of other affiliations and all conflicts of interest affecting them.

If the need to supply such information causes non-profit health care organizations' hired executives and boards of trustees some cognitive dissonance, that would be a good thing.

The Restless Shade of AHERF and the Return of Merger Mania: Highmark Tries to Buy Another Insurance Company, a Hospital System, a Medical School, and Physicians' Practices

Starting in the 1990s, as US health care became more commercialized, a wave of mergers lead to super-sized hospital systems, insurance companies, and pharmaceutical companies.  Not all those mergers, especially involving hospitals, prospered.  Although the mergers were justified as drivers of increased efficiency, health care has become decreasingly accessible, increasingly expensive, and of no better quality.  However, now a whole new wave of mergers seems to be upon us. 

The Proposed Highmark Blue Cross/ West Penn Allegheny Health System Merger

The latest example to get national attention is the proposed combination of already large non-profit health insurer Highmark Inc, a Blue Cross Blue Shield plan, and non-profit hospital system Allegheny Health System.  The national attention was in a Wall Street Journal article by Anna Wilde Matthews, which described the proposed transaction:

Pittsburgh insurer Highmark Inc. struck a deal to acquire the second-largest hospital chain in its region, an ambitious, controversial step that would further blur the lines between those who pay for medical care and those who provide it.

Under the tentative plan, nonprofit Highmark will pump as much as $475 million into the five-hospital West Penn Allegheny Health System, which has been operating in the red for the past five years.

If state and federal regulators sign off on the plan, Highmark officials say the deal will allow them to move away from traditional fee models that reward providers for providing unnecessary procedures and services.

Instead they would pay salaries to doctors, offering them incentives to achieve quality and efficiency goals. The integrated model would also rely on primary-care doctors to coordinate patients' care and focus on preventive efforts.

Highmark officials said the deal is the best way to keep West Penn in business. 'It brings our expertise as an insurance company into the provider system,' said Kenneth R. Melani, Highmark's chief executive.

This deal is unusual because it would unite a health care insurance company/ managed care organization with a hospital system.

The Context: An Already Concentrated Health Care Environment

The deal appears in the context of and may be in response to an already concentrated health care environment.  Per the WSJ:

The newly combined Highmark-West Penn will face off against the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, which is officially known by its acronym, UPMC. The prestigious $8 billion,19-hospital network employs 2,881 doctors and has about 56% of the inpatient market share in Allegheny County. It also owns a health plan with about 1.6 million members.

UPMC's current contract with Highmark runs out next June. Paul Wood, the hospital system's vice president for public relations, said the network won't sign a new one after the acquisition. 'In effect, Highmark expects UPMC to subsidize our competitor,' he said.

UPMC has had its issues, too, as discussed in posts here. 

The deal is also more extraordinary because it was accompanied by several other proposed deals that would create quite a sprawling health care entity.

The Extended Scope of the Merger

First, and as noted in the WSJ article, the proposed deal would involve physicians' practices:

Highmark may also buy or invest in other providers, including doctor practices, Dr. Melani said.

However not noted in the WSJ article, or in a contemporaneous Pittsburgh Post-Gazette article, was that since 2010 there has also been a proposal on the table for Highmark to merge with a non-profit Blue Cross Blue plan in neighboring Delaware. The latest discussion of this deal can be found on DelawareOnline, and was just noted in a Philadephia Inquirer commentary.

In Delaware, a bill that would remove a major obstacle to Highmark's proposed affiliation with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Delaware sailed through the legislature, passing the Senate unanimously Tuesday and the House, 34-5, Wednesday.

That is not all. It seems that while pursuing the merger with Highmark, West Penn Allegheny Health was also pursuing an arrangement with Temple University to set up a branch of its medical school in Western Pennsylvania. As noted by the Pittsburgh Tribune Review:

West Penn Allegheny Health System leaders expressed optimism on Friday about their partnership prospects with Highmark Inc. as they announced plans with Temple University to establish a four-year medical school campus in the North Side.

So it appears that lined up against the UPMC behemoth could be another behemoth combining a large Pennsylvania insurance company, a Delaware insurance company, a good-sized hospital system, physicians' practices, and a branch of a medical school.  So we see a new effort to divide the health care supposed "market" among a few large, vertically-integrated health care systems.

The Eerie Shadow of AHERF

Maybe all these simultaneous deals, which would apparently create a conglomerate of Highmark Blue Cross, Delaware Blue Cross Blue Shield, West Penn Allegheny Health System, Temple University Medical School, and possibly a large group of doctors' practices, were all being discussed separately because of how they could be seen as a strange shadow of the spectacularly failed Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation (AHERF) of the late 1990s.

As discussed here, AHERF was a large integrated health care system formed out of multiple mergers.  AHERF which went bankrupt in 1998, leading to massive layoffs, hospital closures, and the near dissolution of a medical school (which ended up taken over by Drexel University). The former AHREF CEO, whose high compensation (for the time) was accompanied by an autocratic management style, ended up in the local jail on a plea bargain. Note that West Penn Allegheny Health System was formed from some of the pieces of the failed AHERF, and seems to have never fully recovered from its previous troubles.

Despite the fact that the AHERF bankruptcy was the second largest US bankruptcy up to its time, this vivid case was notably anechoic. The lack of echoes it originally produced made it prototypical of the anechoic effect.

The link to AHERF was briefly noted in the Post-Gazette article:

'They are well-capitalized, and we're not,' said David L. McClenahan, WPAHS board chairman, speaking of Highmark. 'That's putting it mildly.' In the decade since the collapse of the Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation, whose bankruptcy eventually bore the West Penn Allegheny Health System, WPAHS has been persistently starved for capital, he said.

So far, however, the ominous implications of that previous debacle have not been publicly discussed.

How Some Executives Would Gain

Perhaps the executives rushing to make a deal are being distracted by the potential for personal gain. The DelawareOnline article noted that current executives of Delaware Blue Cross Blue Shield may be able to pull the ripcords of their golden parachutes if its proposed merger with Highmark goes through:

Seven executives at Blue Cross Blue Shield of Delaware, for example, are due a combined $6 million in severance pay -- equal to about three years of salary -- if they lose their jobs.

Details of Blue Cross severance payout packages have attracted attention recently because top executives at Delaware's largest health insurer are busy pressing for a merger with Pittsburgh-based insurer Highmark Inc., which could mean the elimination of some top positions.

Highmark has pledged that Blue Cross President and CEO Tim Constantine will keep his job after the merger's closing, if the deal is approved by state regulators. But Constantine, who has an annual salary of $420,000, would be due a $1.6 million payment if he were to lose his job.

Six other top executives, who earn between $245,000 and $330,000 annually, have potential payouts equal to about $4.3 million. Highmark has not discussed the fate of those officers, who range in position from the company's general counsel to its chief medical and financial officers.

That article further noted:

Some observers worry that the prospect of large severance payments could cloud the judgments of executives working to close the deal.

Considering the size of the Blue Cross payouts in relation to annual salaries, the payout promises deserve attention, said Ethan Rome, executive director of Health Care for America Now, a Washington consumer advocacy group. Severance agreements are typically in place to provide a cushion between jobs, he said. 'Three years is a long time,' Rome said. 'Three years is not a severance. It's a substantial payout.'

One wonders which other executives involved in these potential deals may also have prospects for either larger compensation or golden parachutes. This could include executives in particular current executives of West Penn Allegheny.  One also wonders whether the creation of this new conglomerate will produce rationales for big raises for the current executives of all the organizations involved who get to work for the new merged entity.  Perhaps someone should ask them.

Further Implications

Of course the various mergers were touted as productive of new efficiencies, as attempts to obtain increased market power usually are. As reported by the Post-Gazette:

While the short-term goal of this partnership is to preserve a 'fragile' Pittsburgh hospital system, the long term goal, said Highmark CEO and President Kenneth Melani, is the creation of a new model of health care, one that is outcomes based, with an integrated delivery and financing system.

;Health care services are becoming less affordable,' he said. 'It's important to have choice. It's important to have a second system.'

And, as we discussed here, the former CEO of AHERF pledged "new forms of organization that are more flexible, more adaptive, and more agile than ever before." But common sense and history suggests that increasing market domination will be good mainly for the market dominators, not their customers, or in this case, their patients, clients and students.

As Dr Westby Fisher asserted about how the new conglomerate will likely own physicians' practices:

So doctors lose more professional independence and autonomy and have even more chance that clinical decisions will be compromised by bureaucratic dictates. Yet ask patients who they want steering the boat when they get sick: their doctor.

It continues to be clear who the winners and losers are as health care reform unfolds. But when doctors lose autonomy, patients lose autonomy.

It’s that simple.

To argue that the only way to control the health care dollar is to bloat the bureaucratic levels of our system is a fool’s game. However, bureaucrats promote bureaucrats – it’s always been this way. Until doctors and the public speak up, there’s simply nothing to stop this train.

So I wonder if this complex merger will get more scrutiny than the many mergers that have preceded it in the last 30 years. Someone who is more likely to get answers than I am should be asking:
- What evidence is there that this merger will lead to any benefits to individual patients or to the public health?
- How will any efficiencies achieved benefit anyone other than the organizations' current and future managers?
- What sorts of management layers will the complexity of the multiple mergers proposed necessitate between current Highmark executives and current management of its new acquisitions?
- If the current problem is existing market concentration, why will these mergers be a better solution than a direct approach to that concentration?
- How will the current leaders of all the organizations involve personally benefit from this merger?

Meanwhile, increasing concentration of power in health care continues to benefit the leaders of the enlarging health care organizations, while reducing the choice of individual patients and the autonomy of health care professionals.

The Rise of the Corporate Physician - the End of the (Health Care) World As We Know It?

In discussing how concentration and abuse of power threatens health care professionals' values and professionalism, we have discussed how ostensibly academic institutions value faculty more for their earning power than their academic abilities.  We have discussed how financial relationships between physicians and drug, biotechnology, device and other companies risk abuse of entrusted power.  But up to now, I have been comforted by the hope that physicians in small independent practices who do not have such conflicts of interest are trying to uphold their professional values, even as they were buffeted by the perverse incentives imposed by managed care organizations/ health insurance companies and government insurance (e.g., US Medicare whose payments are controlled by the RUC).

However, a recent article in SmartMoney suggests that the end of the independent physician is nigh:

Remember the solo family doctor? In places like Springfield, it has become increasingly likely that she's collecting a paycheck from a large regional hospital—and practicing medicine according to the hospital's strict playbook. The experience in Springfield is just a needle prick compared with what's going on nationwide. At least one in six doctors—more than 150,000 nationwide—now works as an employee of a hospital system. And with about half of recent medical school graduates deciding to work for hospitals and many established doctors looking to unload their practices amid the tough economic climate, what was a trickle of change has turned into a torrent. Jim Pizzo, a Chicago-area hospital consultant, says the blistering pace of these mergers is leading some colleagues to joke that there are two types of physicians today: 'Those employed by hospitals and those about to be.'

So we are seeing physicians who practiced solo or in physician-lead, physician-run group practices becoming employees of large health care organizations. And here on Health Care Renewal, we know how most large health care organizations are run.

This appears to be an unintended consequence of our recent US health care "reform" law:

But hospital executives also believe that buying doctors' practices could yield a big payday, thanks to a different provision in the health care law. The law will encourage doctors and hospitals to share some payments when treating each patient; as collaborative teams, they could earn bonuses for holding down costs and meeting quality markers. 'The real question for everyone is how that pie—that money—is going to get split up,' Goertz says; hospitals think they'll have the upper hand if they employ the doctors that they're sharing their banana crème with. And that's touched off a flurry of mergers everywhere—from Seattle to Roanoke, Va.

The name of these supposedly collaborative organizations, which are turning out to simply be hospital systems which have purchased physicians' practices and now employ physicians, is "accountable care organizations," which now appears ironic at least.

The article detailed some of the adverse effects to be expected when accountable care organizations become hospital systems with employed physicians providing patient care.

Increased Costs with Decreased Care

Ruth Taylor, a 44-year-old woman in Bozeman, Mont., started seeing Robert Hathaway as her doctor during college, and she stuck with him through everything from routine blood tests to a kidney transplant. Taylor, a professional nurse with warm blue eyes, describes Hathaway as a 'classic small-town doctor' who knew all his patients by name and socialized with them at local basketball games; he was accessible and thorough—even catching a health problem of hers that other doctors had missed. But after Hathaway sold his practice to the local hospital, Taylor says, things began to sour. She was more likely to be assigned to see the physician assistant rather than Hathaway himself. And when she went in for a comprehensive physical (also run by the assistant) in late 2008, she was charged $360, more than double what she'd paid for a workup in previous years.

Imposition of Dysfunctional Health Care Information Technology

On this blog, Dr Scot Silverstein frequently posts about how poorly designed and implemented commercial health care information technology may have harms that outweigh any benefits, and how these systems are rarely objectively evaluated. Employed physicians are likely to be required by their new executive overlords to use commercial health care IT that benefits the managers and their strategies, but may not benefit patient care:

Last spring Hospital Sisters tried to shift all of its Springfield medical offices to electronic medical records simultaneously. But there wasn't enough tech support to deal with all the problems physicians ran into on day one, and wait times spiked at the system's walk-in locations. Nenaber, a soft-spoken 64-year-old with wire-rim glasses, sounds acquiescent about the situation. 'We're getting the hang of these things,' he says slowly, sitting at his desk overlooking a gas station and a strip-mall parking lot. But his practice is still waiting for its electronic payoff

Increasing Prices by Providing Care in the Hospital

Now that the acquisition spree is in full swing, some experts worry that price increases could become the dominant narrative for patients. When hospitals run medical practices, federal law allows them to add substantial 'facility fees' to patients' bills to cover overhead expenses. The new bosses also often rip equipment like X-ray machines and MRIs out of the physician's office, preferring to have patients get those tests from radiologists at the hospital. That, too, can cost patients. A consumer with a high-deductible Aetna plan, for instance, would pay up to $1,400 for an MRI of her back at the University Medical Center at Princeton, N.J., according to data that the insurer makes available to its members. The same scan would cost about a third as much at nearby Radiology Affiliates of New Jersey, a nonhospital facility. Based on a review of insurance databases and state regulatory records, that's a fairly typical price gap

Increasing Prices by Market Domination

Price increases also have the potential to bleed outward—affecting not only the patients of the absorbed doctor, but also the cost of health care citywide. That's because when hospitals sit down at the bargaining table with insurers, they're almost always able to negotiate higher payment rates for their big groups of doctors than a lone physician with little bargaining power

Despite the usual spin provided by the would-be monopolists:

Fast-growing hospital systems, including Hospital Sisters and Bozeman Deaconess, say that their growth will eventually make care more efficient and bring costs back down, since they'll be able to cut back on unnecessary care and duplicate tests

I am sure that the 19th century robber barons made the same pitch about increasing efficiency. Of course, the efficiency mainly benefits the insider managers.

By the way, of course, the hospital systems own public relations machines and lobbyists are now busy attacking any restrictions on such concentrations of power, while the hospital managers figure out how to game the system to increase their market domination before the regulators notice:

As more patients face such disruptions, regulators are taking notice. In October, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Health and Human Services met with doctors, insurers and other health officials to discuss the referral and pricing problems that could arise from 'accountable-care organizations'— those new groups of hospitals and doctors that will share financial incentives. The Federal Trade Commission will offer guidelines on what's permissible by midyear. But hospitals are already lobbying for accountable-care groups to be exempt from antitrust and antifraud rules, even as they scoop up more and more medical practices. Under current regulations, officials in Washington must green-light all mergers involving companies valued at more than $63 million. But by buying up tiny medical practices one at a time, critics say, hospitals stay below the threshold and avoid getting much attention. And by the time regulators settle on more-formal legal guidelines, those mergers may be hard to undo, says Cory Capps, a Washington economist specializing in health care antitrust issues.

Excess and Unnecessary Utilization via "Leakage Control"

With big hospital systems now owning physician practices, and practicing physicians directly answering to executives, the push will be on to maximize use of the most lucrative services. Once the hospital systems have made employees out of the physicians, it is easy to pressure their own employed physicians to refer patients to the hospital units that can bill most lucratively:

By their own admission, most hospitals are eager to keep patient referrals under the same corporate umbrella, to save on costs and share medical records but also to boost revenue. The hospitals say they wouldn't force an internist, for example, to refer a patient with heart problems to their own cardiologists, but critics say there's certainly financial pressure. Under a little-noticed regulation that took effect in 2007, hospitals are allowed to pay doctors less if they don't do enough internal referrals.

Doctors in Bozeman and Springfield who granted interviews said they didn't feel pressure to be 'team players' with referrals. But some of those who've left large health systems tell a different story, including Mark Callenberger, an orthopedist in Merritt Island, Fla. Callenberger says that the hospital group where he used to work urged him to direct more patients to the MRI machine owned by the hospital. The doctor preferred a more advanced machine at a private practice that he says offered clearer pictures. But after he ignored the recommendations, Callenberger says, the hospital told his office manager to schedule patients at the hospital's MRI anyway, leaving him to perform surgery using 'crummy images.' (The hospital declined to comment on Callenberger's case but says its doctors can use whatever facilities they choose.) Patients may never know about these power struggles, because doctors aren't required to disclose how they choose specialists. And while patients who ask can always see a specialist outside the network, in practice few are likely to challenge their doctors' judgment, says Bruce A. Johnson, a Denver health care lawyer. 'Face it, when we're really sick,' says Johnson, 'if the doctor tells us to jump off a roof, we'll probably consider doing it.'

Note that we discussed (here and here) the example of a for-profit hospital system with a large number of physician employees pushed to choke off "leakage" of patient referrals outside the system.

Summary

The overarching problem is that employed physicians now must answer to managers and executives who may put financial goals, and their own enrichment, ahead of physicians' values, and specifically will choose increased revenue over providing the best possible care to individual patients:

. Executives here are also hoping to push the needle further—standardizing everything from how long patients wait on hold to the ease of parking at the doctor's office (valets, luxury-restaurant style, are one solution under consideration).

Still, Mikell acknowledges, 'doctors don't want follow-the-directions, cookbook medicine.' And for many physicians, the idea of following new rules triggers a much larger unease at giving up their independence—a feeling of loss, both for the businesses they built and for their patients. Back in Bozeman, Blair Erb, the sole cardiologist in town, is a picture of resignation as he prepares to sign a contract with Deaconess. 'I feel defeated,' Erb says, looking around at the office furniture he and his wife, Liz, chose from a catalog years ago. The weathered ranchers and bundled-up women that come through his door mostly express disbelief when they hear that this frank-talking Tennessee native will sell his practice. His staffers say they're not looking forward to the questions the hospital's medical records system will soon prompt them to ask patients. (Do you wear a bike helmet regularly? Do you have a smoke detector?) 'We'll try to retain as much professional independence as possible,' Erb says, gazing at the hospital building, whose bulk he can see through his window. 'But the fact of the matter is, we'll have a new master.'

So I for one do not welcome our new executive overlords.

We have posted about numerous examples of health care organizational leaders who put their own enrichment ahead of the mission. Now even ostensibly non-profit hospital systems are increasingly competing against for-profit systems. We have seen, as noted above, an example of a for-profit system that seems to betting everything on a business strategy to reduce "leakage" of patient referrals.  We can expect that non-profit hospital systems will have to act more like for-profit systems, and the perverse financial incentives given the managers of all hospital systems will lead to pressure on physicians to forgo their responsibilities to provide the best care to individual patients in favor of actions that will bring in the most money in the shortest time.

We seem to be witnessing the rise of the corporate physician, the rise of a physician who must first answer to managers who never committed to putting patient care first, who may have no sympathy for physicians' core values, who may receive huge incentives to maximize short-term revenue no matter what. Such a rise of corporate physicians would be unprecedented in the US, and I believe in any developed country.

The rise of the corporate physician would require patients to put their trust in corporations, rather than individual doctors, in the era of the global financial collapse, in the new gilded age.

We may be seeing the end of health care world as we know it. The upcoming brave new world of health care may be worse that we can imagine.

What is to be done? - I rarely have ventured into specific policy suggestions, but I think that the consequences of the well-intended "accountable care organization" blunder may be so severe that I must so venture now. We must derail the movement towards "accountable care organizations." Any movement to make organizations more accountable cannot do so by making most professionals into employees answering to the sorts of ill-informed, incompetent, self-interested, conflicted or even corrupt leaders that we have been writing about for more than six years on Health Care Renewal.  We need to make it impossible for for-profit companies to employ physicians to take care of patients.  Maybe we need to think about making it impossible for for-profit companies to provide patient care at all, and for for-profit companies to sell health insurance.  Meanwhile, we need to ensure the accountability, integrity, transparency, and honesty of leaders of health care organizations.

If we do not reverse the current trends, anyone who wants good health care may have to look for it somewhere other than in the US.

ACO = Arrogant Clinical or Aggressive Care Oligopoly?

In the 1970s, it was managed care organizations.  In the 1990s, it was vertically integrated health care systems.  In the 2010s, the fashionable concept for improving health care, apparently beloved by left-wing policy wonks and right-wing health care executives is the "accountable care organization." (ACO).  Development of the ACO is funded by the recently passed US health care reform legislation.  The official definition of ACO from the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services is: 

An Accountable Care Organization, also called an 'ACO' for short, is an organization of health care providers that agrees to be accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care of Medicare beneficiaries who are enrolled in the traditional fee-for-service program who are assigned to it.

Oddly enough, that seems like it could also describe a 1970s managed care organization, or a 1990s vertically integrated health care system. The only real difference is the idea that the ACO would be paid fees for service. All these similar concepts embody the notion that health care needs to be highly organized into big, bureaucratic organizations to improve quality and access while controlling costs.

Back in August, we warned:

There seems to be a strange and increasing alliance between politically- correct academic theorists and proponents of raw economic power. The theorists' notion of "accountable care organizations" seems to have become a great foil for would-be monopolists, yet the theorists have done nothing to show how their creation would really bring "power to the people." Meanwhile, maybe 'ACO' should stand for 'aggressive care oligopoly.' Meanwhile, be extremely skeptical of the latest health care fad, especially when it is supported both by academics and CEOs.

I am not sure you really heard it here first, but you did hear it here early. Now, three months later, our doubts have become main-stream.

Revisiting Sutter Health

n California, National Public Radio continued to document the increasing market dominance of the Sutter Health system (which we discussed in August here) as it marches toward becoming an ACO:

Through new construction and expanding its doctors' groups, Sutter Health is enhancing its position as one of the most dominant hospital systems in California. In addition, Sutter is further ahead of many competitors in fashioning itself into a so-called accountable care organization, responsible for coordinating care between hospitals, specialists and primary doctors.

A companion article gave examples of how this emerging ACO is becoming increasingly oligoplistic:

Hospital prices in the Sacramento region are among the highest in California, driven in large part by the negotiating clout of the hospital chain Sutter Health.

Over the last decade and a half, Sutter has gradually accumulated hospitals and amassed a roster of doctors who contract exclusively with the company. Sutter is now one of the largest hospital chains in California with 24 acute care hospitals.

'In this Roseville market, which is a big suburban area, the hospital is Sutter,' says John Murray, a veteran insurance broker. 'It's a lock right now. Because Sutter dominates the market, major insurance companies, like Blue Cross and Aetna, can't sell policies that exclude Sutter hospitals and doctors. That dependence means the hospital chain can dictate high prices.'

Concerns about Sutter's market dominance are also increasing:

'As Sutter gets bigger,' says Anthony Wright, executive director of Health Access California, a nonprofit advocacy group based in Sacramento, 'it can dictate higher prices and is less accountable for ensuring good quality because it has a lock on certain markets.'

Doubts in the New York Times

In the New York Times, Robert Pear reported:

When Congress passed the health care law, it envisioned doctors and hospitals joining forces, coordinating care and holding down costs, with the prospect of earning government bonuses for controlling costs.

Now, eight months into the new law there is a growing frenzy of mergers involving hospitals, clinics and doctor groups eager to share costs and savings, and cash in on the incentives. They, in turn, have deployed a small army of lawyers and lobbyists trying to persuade the Obama administration to relax or waive a body of older laws intended to thwart health care monopolies, and to protect against shoddy care and fraudulent billing of patients or Medicare.

Consumer advocates fear that the health care law could worsen some of the very problems it was meant to solve — by reducing competition, driving up costs and creating incentives for doctors and hospitals to stint on care, in order to retain their cost-saving bonuses.

'The new law is already encouraging a wave of mergers, joint ventures and alliances in the health care industry,' said Prof. Thomas L. Greaney, an expert on health and antitrust law at St. Louis University. 'The risk that dominant providers and dominant insurers may exercise their market power, individually or jointly, has never been greater.'

Skeptical Liberals and Libertarians
Amazingly, while ACOs seem to be supported by many left-wing policy wonks and right-wing health care executives, they have also rapidly engendered skepticism from both liberals on the left and libertarians on the right, and from within government and the private sector. For example, at the end of the NY Times article we find:

Dr. Donald M. Berwick, the administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, hails the benefits of 'integrated care.' But, Dr. Berwick said, “we need to assure both patients and society at large that destructive, exploitative and costly forms of collusion and monopolistic behaviors do not emerge and thrive, disguised as cooperation.”

Dr Berwick is a well-known advocate of innovative approaches to improve the quality of care, but was tarred as a raving left-winger when he was nominated to his current position.

On the other hand, in the New York Post was an op-ed by Dr Scott Gottlieb:

I warned that the creation of 'accountable care organizations,' which put hospitals in control of all the doctors in their outlying areas, would lead to concentrated power over the provision of medical care -- turning physicians into salaried employees and reducing consumer choices.

Furthermore, he wrote:

Since the ACOs will have local monopolies, they'll also have little incentive to compete for more patients in an open marketplace. Yet this is the only incentive that would spur an ACO to truly innovate and improve its delivery of medical care and offer better services.

Private health plans vie to contract with the best doctors and hospitals, creating market prices for services and competition to improve outcomes. If the ACOs squeeze out this competition, the result will be a de facto 'single payer': Every market will be controlled by a single ACO,....

Dr Gottlieb writes frequently about health care and policy issues, and is a "resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute."

Missing the Main Point: Doctors vs Business Executives as Leaders
At least it did not take long this time for the fundamental flaws in the latest fashionable health care reform effort to get attention. It is really striking that this time around, skepticism is coming from both liberals and libertarians.  Maybe we all have learned something from the failures of managed care and of vertically integrated hospital systems.

A Washington Post op-ed by Steven Pearlstein hinted at one fundamental problem with the ACO concept.

Most reformers believe ...that the best way to deliver affordable quality care is through organizations such as the Mayo Clinic, which coordinate physician and hospital services under one roof and are paid not on the basis of how many procedures they do but on the quality of the care they provide. These organizations tend to rely on salaried doctors, make extensive use of electronic medical records and evidence-based 'best practices,' and, in effect, take on much of the risk traditionally borne by insurers. Several provisions of the new health-care reform law encourage the formation of such 'accountable care organizations.'

Somehow, however, the supposed health care reformers seemed to have overlooked a crucial fact about the Mayo Clinic they are using as a model. The Mayo Clinic traditionally was basically a large physician group practice. It was run by physicians. Even now, the Mayo Clinic's CEO is a physician (Dr John H. Noseworthy) who had a substantial clinical and academic career. The CAO is a nurse, and the three top Vice Presidents are physicians.  I submit the fact that the organization was run by physicians, physicians who once swore to put their patients' clinical care ahead of all other considerations, was crucial to the Clinic's success in taking care of patients as well as maintaining its finances.

However, nearly all of the would-be ACOs we hear about now are centered on big hospital systems, run by business executives who have never taken care of patients, and never swore to put patient care ahead of anything. For example, the most advanced degree possessed by the CEO of Sutter Health is a Master's in Health Administration (see here). Sutter Health does not make biographical information about its top executives particularly easy to find, but according to the most recent (2008) 990 form posted on Guidestar, of its 19 top executives, only 2 had MD degrees. As we have seen time and again on Health Care Renewal, such executives have become extremely good at becoming rich in their jobs. (For example, according to the 2008 990 form, of those 19 executives, all had total compensation greater than $200,000, 16 had compensation greater than $500,000, and 9 had compensation greater than $1 million.) When things go wrong, these royally paid executives may take their golden parachutes and open the exit door, and jump on the slide.

The advent of ACOs reminds me of the advent of managed care. The original managed care organizations, exemplified by Kaiser - Permanante, were also not-for-profit large group practices run by physicians. However, the "managed care organizations" that evolved out of the 1970s law, favored by our glorious former President Nixon, were for-profit corporations run by business executives. Somehow, when legislators seek to promote better health care, the legislation they right often get the crucial details wrong.

The one good thing about ACOs seems to be that they have galvanized liberals and libertarians alike to worry about big, collective, bureaucratic health care organizations run by executives with no clear commitment to putting care of individual patients first.

ADDENDUM (26 November, 2010) - See also comments by David Williams on the Health Business Blog.

More on Hospital Market Dominance, Enabled by Secret Pricing

This week two more articles appeared describing how large hospital systems use market dominance to charge more.  Naturally, both were in news publications, not scholarly health services research journals.

San Francisco

Kaiser Health News (via the Contra Costa [CA] Times) discussed hospital market dominance in the San Francisco area.  The article documented how particular systems can command higher prices. Consider the example of John Muir Health vs San Ramon Medical Center:

Often, a hospital's dominance in an area helps determine how much it can charge, experts say. Consider John Muir Health, a two-hospital nonprofit system in the East Bay. With campuses in Concord and Walnut Creek, John Muir has the biggest footprint in the local hospital market, accounting for 54 percent of all the acute care inpatient stays in 2009, more than any other hospital group, according to state data.

The hospital with the weakest market penetration is San Ramon Medical Center, a Tenet-owned, for-profit hospital, with 10 percent of the acute care inpatients.

The least the insurer Aetna paid John Muir for an outpatient colonoscopy was $3,185, according to Aetna's website, which tracks two years of payments. Aetna paid $1,483 to San Ramon Regional Medical Center for the same service. The least Aetna paid John Muir for an uncomplicated birth was $7,722, while its lowest price for a birth at San Ramon was $5,278.

Yet on broad quality measures, John Muir's hospitals generally score no better than San Ramon's, according to the California Hospitals and Reporting Taskforce, a nonprofit that produces hospital report cards published at Calhospitalcompare.org.

San Ramon ranks equal to John Muir's Walnut Creek campus in most major measures, including mortality rates in the intensive care units, overall patient satisfaction and maternity care. John Muir's Concord campus ranks below San Ramon on several measures, including mortality rate and patient experience, though John Muir was rated better in avoiding complications for patients on ventilators.

Then there is Sutter Health:

[Stanford University associate vice president for Benefits Les] Schlaegel says so many employees like to see doctors at the Palo Alto Medical Foundation, a doctors' organization affiliated with Sutter with a clinic near the Stanford campus, that the university feels obliged to keep offering insurance networks that include Sutter.

'Sutter basically has a stranglehold on Northern California,' says Schlaegel. 'They are strategically situated, both for hospitals and medical groups. They know purchasers need them. When you are strategically located, you can say 'this is our price and you can pay it.''

Secret Pricing
The ability of dominant hospitals to charge higher prices is facilitated by secrecy in which hospital pricing is cloaked

The hospitals haven't made it easy for consumers to comparison shop. State law requires hospitals to reveal their charges for specific services. But those charges don't reflect the lower negotiated rates insurers actually pay - rates hospitals usually insist be kept secret. The California Hospital Association has opposed legislation to ban such 'gag clauses'; the most recent of these bills died in the state Assembly in August.

Hospitals have also resisted a four-year campaign by the Pacific Business Group on Health, an employer coalition, and CalPERS to create a 'hospital value initiative' that would allow hospital comparison based on cost and quality of care.

Summary

In many cases, hospitals are able to keep raising prices beyond inflation because their sizes or reputations give them clout in negotiating rates with insurers, researchers say. Yet high prices don't always equate with superior care.

Quality measures for some of the Bay Area's most prestigious hospitals, including Stanford and John Muir, show that in some instances, less expensive competitors perform as well or better in their basic responsibilities, such as avoiding infections and high death rates for patients in intensive care.

'Some hospitals are able to charge higher prices than the market normally would bear, even without providing higher quality,' says Dr. R. Adams Dudley, a professor of medicine and health policy at the University of California, San Francisco. 'That means they're getting those higher prices without really offering more to patients or the rest of society.'

New York City


Meanwhile, a long feature story in New York magazine about the demise of St Vincent's hospital (see our post here) also discussed the market power of its competitors as one factor in its decline:

The city’s largest and most powerful hospitals, which are crucial to an insurer’s customers, exert their leverage to secure deals that are believed to pay well above the average margin; smaller hospitals, which are often located in low-income neighborhoods, have little choice but to accept the dismal rates dictated by insurers if they want to remain in the insurers’ plans. 'When the big players take their cut, there are only scraps left for everyone else,' says the CEO of an outer-borough hospital. “'United HealthCare couldn’t care less about having my hospital in their network. They tell me to take it or leave it.

Secret Prices

Like in California, market dominance is enabled by secret pricing:

the rates negotiated between hospitals and insurance providers are withheld from public scrutiny—even state health and insurance regulators are denied the information

Free Markets?

Secret prices determined by market power hardly sound like characteristics of a free market. Yet in New York, at least, they seem partially to be the result of the free market ideology of previous political leaders:

Then George Pataki took office in 1995, determined to allow hospitals to test their mettle in the free market by negotiating their own terms with insurers. It turned out to be an exercise in shock-therapy capitalism. Inexperienced at the bargaining table, hospitals engaged in intramural rivalry with each other, cutting unfavorable deals with insurers in order to hold on to patients in the short term. With their already thin margins pared down further by deregulation, many hospitals soon built up paralyzing debt loads. Even the largest and seemingly least vulnerable facilities decided that their best hope for survival was to get bigger. A flurry of mergers and buyouts ensued, and by the end of the nineties, the hospital system began to assume its current bewildering patchwork of partnerships and affiliations. Columbia Presbyterian and New York Hospital, both attached to elite medical schools, joined forces. NYU and Mount Sinai forged a deal (it later came undone). On the eastern edge of the city, North Shore hospitals merged with nearby Long Island Jewish, staking out an enormous swath of the hospital market on Long Island, Queens, and Staten Island. Beth Israel and St. Luke’s–Roosevelt, debt-ridden and left on the sidelines by the major academic hospitals, decided to try making a go of it together. It was unclear if bigger was actually better—for patients or the bottom line—but size seemed to offer hospitals a buffer against collapse.

By 2005, less than a decade into its dalliance with free enterprise, the city’s hospital system had taken on something of a post-Soviet tinge, with winners ruling the roost like oligarchs and losers reduced to a state of grim dependency. A pecking order emerged, with elite academic centers at the top, well-regarded independent hospitals like Lenox Hill in the middle, and community hospitals on the bottom.

Summary

We have previously written (for example, here and here) about how increasing market dominance by large, sometimes strategically located, and sometimes politically well-connected (e.g., see here) hospital systems run by conflicted leaders. This seems like another unintended consequence of the "free markets solve all problems" ideology, possibly fueled by conflicts of interest that has done so badly in our financial arena (see here). What some of these free market enthusiasts seem to forget, their forgetfulness perhaps fueled by payments received from the large corporations that have profited from this movement, are that true free markets are hard to maintain. This is particularly so in health care, in which knowledge is asymetric, outcomes are uncertain, and sick and anxious patients have trouble making cool, rational choices (as per Arrow, see this post.)

But if the free market enthusiasts really believe in free markets, why have they not been out campaigning to prevent the "unfree" characteristics, like secret pricing, of current health care markets?  Of course, ending secret pricing might compromise the ability of their financial sponsors to keep earning their millions

"Trouble Coming Every Day" as Discussed by our Fellow Health Care Skeptics

With apologies to the late Frank Zappa... even though we are going through the dog days of summer, the parade of health care troubles in the news is never ending, so I thought I would recap some of the more interesting issues discussed by some of my fellow health care skeptic bloggers.

We have discussed the ongoing decline of primary care. On DB's Medical Rants, Dr Robert Centor takes on the topic: "The system has, without consciously meaning to, held primary care in contempt." The result is a "quiet rebellion: of primary doctors.

We have discussed whether the currently fashionable idea of "accountable care organizations" (ACOs) might turn out to be a cover for health care oligopolies. See what Paul Levy, CEO of the Beth Israel/ Deaconess Medical Center said about them in his blog, Running a Hospital.

We frequently talk about the manipulation or suppression of clinical research studies by those with vested interests in the results pointing in a particular direction. On the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog, Dr Howard Brody wondered why the FDA will not even reveal the identities of the clinical researchers who did the studies on which it based its decision to approve the Infuse bone growth enhancement device.

Prof Carl Elliott has done an outstanding job investigating commercially funded and implemented clinical research. Dr Brody reviewed his new book, White Coat, Black Hat.  In the Carlat Psychiatry Blog, Dr Daniel Carlat reviewed Prof Elliott's new article in Mother Jones on how a pharmaceutical company sponsored drug trial went badly awry.

We asked whether the former CEO of a for-profit hospital chain who resigned after the company paid a > $1.7 billion penalty to settle charges of fraud would be a proper candidate to be governor of Florida. After Rick Scott won the Florida Republican primary, Maggie Maher, writing in the Health Beat blog, took on Scott's dubious past as prologue to a worrisome future.

Well I'm about to get sick
From watchin' my TV
Been checkin' out the news
Until my eyeballs fail to see
I mean to say that every day
Is just another rotten mess
And when it's gonna change, my friend
Is anybody's guess

So I'm watchin' and I'm waitin'
Hopin' for the best
Even think I'll go to prayin'
Every time I hear 'em sayin'
That there's no way to delay
That trouble comin' every day
No way to delay
That trouble comin' every day
- Frank Zappa