Showing posts with label informed consent. Show all posts
Showing posts with label informed consent. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 12, 2019

Google’s ‘Project Nightingale’ Secretly Gathers Personal Health Data on Millions of Americans - Time to Refuse Use Of EMR's In Your Healthcare?

I have long written that leadership of EMR technology by the wrong people will create exceptionally adverse outcomes, clinically speaking. 

The same appears true socially.  In fact, adverse social outcomes (especially with regard to societal power structures) is one of the pillars of the domain of Social Informatics, the field that studies social impacts of new information & communication technologies (ICTs), about which I've taught and written.  (See http://www.dlib.org/dlib/january99/kling/01kling.html)

Now there's this stunning new story regarding clinical data trafficking. 

Original article is at the WSJ by Gerald F. Seib here: https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-s-secret-project-nightingale-gathers-personal-health-data-on-millions-of-americans-11573496790, but it's behind a paywall:

Google’s ‘Project Nightingale’ Secretly Gathers Personal Health Data on Millions of Americans

November 12, 2019

https://www.theepochtimes.com/googles-project-nightingale-secretly-gathers-personal-health-data-on-millions-of-americans_3143843.html

Google has been working with one of the largest healthcare systems in the U.S. to collect and analyze the personal health information of millions of citizens across 21 states, The Wall Street Journal reports.  The Tech giant reportedly teamed up with St. Louis-based Ascension, the largest non-profit health system in the country, last year, and the data sharing has accelerated since summer.

Code-named Nightingale, the project saw both companies collect personal data from patients, which included lab results, doctor diagnoses, and hospitalization records, as well as patient names and dates of birth.
Google said it plans to use the data to create new software that will improve patient care and suggest changes to their care.

First and foremost, the focus of this "project" is the hackneyed cybernetic miracle we've been promised for decades, the "Artificial Intelligence" that will "revolutionize" medicine. 

I view this concept as massively over-hyped and likely fraudulent, an effort to salvage the very same promises made of the entire EMR project on which has been spent hundreds of billions of dollars (more likely beyond the trillion range by now), while waiting for Godot. 

Those monies could have been better used to provide world-class healthcare for an entire population, especially considering the lack of evidence of the miracles promised.


   
CMS: "we do not have any information that supports or refutes claims that a broader adoption of EHRs can save lives."  [But let's spend hundreds of billions of dollars anyway.]  Click to enlarge.

... Patients and doctors were not notified that their data is being shared, and did not give their consent, according to the report.

One individual who was familiar with the project told the Journal that at least 150 Google employees already have access to much of the data on tens of millions of patients.
I have already written that the entire national EMR project is a mass human-subjects experiment without informed consent that can maim or kill patients in many different ways, including clinician distraction and IT error, among others.  I also note that as I've been involved in litigation support over the past decade, I've been exposed to what really happens without the filter of the press and the IT industry.  (The verdict in the last case in which I testified about Bad Health IT, for example, went to the deceased plaintiff's heirs - amounting to more than $16 million; others were in a lower but still multi-million dollar range.  Yet, you likely will never read about these in the HIT literature)

I believe this new account of clinical data trafficking is, more likely than not, true. It is a development I've fully been expecting for at least a decade now. (See my February 26, 2012 post "Proposed new Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights: Is It Too Late For Healthcare?" at https://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/02/proposed-new-consumer-privacy-bill-of.html and my Oct. 7. 2009 post "Health IT Vendors Trafficking in Patient Data?" at https://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/10/health-it-vendors-trafficking-in.html).

This new development would represent an invitation to massive deliberate or inadvertent abuse, and is likely a massive violation of the HIPAA Privacy Act, despite claims to the contrary.

Just hours after the secret project was revealed, the two companies announced the collaboration in a press release, in which they said the joint project would see Ascension’s data moved onto Google’s Cloud platform.
The statement said the joint project aims to “optimize the health and wellness of individuals and communities and deliver a comprehensive portfolio of digital capabilities that enhance the experience of Ascension consumers, patients, and clinical providers across the continuum of care.”

More cybernetic miracles promised for the true believers, expressed in the typical IT-magic phraseology.  Plenty of profits, too.

Eduardo Conrado, Executive Vice President of Strategy and Innovations at Ascension, said: “As the healthcare environment continues to rapidly evolve, we must transform to better meet the needs and expectations of those we serve as well as our own caregivers and healthcare providers.

The "transformations" needed are to scale back the IT and the bureaucracy that burdens good clinicians and consumes massive amounts of $, and the reduction of waste on worse-than-useless Bad Health IT (http://cci.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/):

Bad Health IT is IT that is ill-suited to purpose, hard to use, unreliable, loses data or provides incorrect data, is difficult and/or prohibitively expensive to customize to the needs of different medical specialists and subspecialists, causes cognitive overload, slows rather than facilitates users, lacks appropriate alerts, creates the need for hypervigilance (i.e., towards avoiding IT-related mishaps) that increases stress, is lacking in security, compromises patient privacy, lacks evidentiary soundness or otherwise demonstrates suboptimal design and/or implementation. 

More corporate mumbo-jumbo:

“Doing that will require the programmatic integration of new care models delivered through the digital platforms, applications, and services that are part of the everyday experience of those we serve.”
The partnership will also explore artificial intelligence and machine learning applications to help improve clinical quality, and effectiveness, patient safety and increase consumer and provider satisfaction, according to the statement.

The data collected by today's EMRs is subject to inaccuracy for multiple reasons mentioned at this blog, including perverse incentives, clinician harassment and cognitive overload, time limitations, forced entry of some data to move further on in the record, and others.  Further,  the Bad Health IT systems used to collect and display it exposes patients to risk and injury.  "AI" will not solve these "issues."

Tariq Shaukat, President of Google Cloud, added: “Ascension is a leader at increasing patient access to care across all regions and backgrounds, particularly those in disadvantaged communities. We’re proud to partner with them on their digital transformation.

"Digital transformation" is, quite frankly, the same BS as "IT revolutionizing healthcare" that I'd heard since at least the mid-1990s (see my post "Bill, Have You Lost Your Mind?" at https://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2006/07/bill-have-you-lost-your-mind.html where I reposted my earlier memorialization of such baldly overwrought and preposterous claims.)
 
“By working in partnership with leading healthcare systems like Ascension, we hope to transform the delivery of healthcare through the power of the cloud, data analytics, machine learning, and modern productivity tools—ultimately improving outcomes, reducing costs, and saving lives.”

More billions of dollars are to be transferred from patient care to the IT industry. 

These $ could be far better spent, IMHO, on care delivery, including to the disadvantaged and minorities, and in rethinking the current health IT morass.  (See my Jan,. 2018 post "The inevitable downgrading of burdensome, destructive EHRs back to paper & document imaging" at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2018/01/the-inevitable-downgrading-of.html).

I have passed the newly-released articles on this matter to attorneys with access to the national trial lawyers' listservs, where the merits of "Project Nightingale" can be considered from the perspective of non-toothless patient's rights advocates.

FINALLY:

I believe invasive healthcare data trafficking projects like this, with potential for massive abuses, provide reasonable justification for patients to REFUSE the use of EHR's in their care.  Paper works just fine.  In fact, when the IT goes down, it's what hospitals and doctors go right back to, and the PR always claims that "patient care was not compromised."

-- SS

11/15/2019 Addendum:

There is a whistleblower (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/14/im-the-google-whistleblower-the-medical-data-of-millions-of-americans-is-at-risk):

I didn’t decide to blow the whistle on Google’s deal, known internally as the Nightingale Project, glibly. The decision came to me slowly, creeping on me through my day-to-day work as one of about 250 people in Google and Ascension working on the project.

When I first joined Nightingale I was excited to be at the forefront of medical innovation. Google has staked its claim to be a major player in the healthcare sector, using its phenomenal artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning tools to predict patterns of illness in ways that might some day lead to new treatments and, who knows, even cures.

Here I was working with senior management teams on both sides, Google and Ascension, creating the future. That chimed with my overall conviction that technology really does have the potential to change healthcare for the better.

But over time I grew increasingly concerned about the security and privacy aspects of the deal. It became obvious that many around me in the Nightingale team also shared those anxieties.

After a while I reached a point that I suspect is familiar to most whistleblowers, where what I was witnessing was too important for me to remain silent. Two simple questions kept hounding me: did patients know about the transfer of their data to the tech giant? Should they be informed and given a chance to opt in or out?

The answer to the first question quickly became apparent: no. The answer to the second I became increasingly convinced about: yes. Put the two together, and how could I say nothing?
-- SS

Thursday, December 03, 2015

Drinking the Managerialists' Kool-Aid? - Why Did Medical Educators Launch Trials of Increased Sleep Deprivation of Physician Trainees Apparently in Violation of the Nuremberg Code?

It all seemed so bizarre.  In 2014, with little fanfare, two large trials that imposed longer work hours and sleep deprivation on physician-trainees (interns and residents), ostensibly to combat the problem of excess hand-offs of patients among physicians.  Both trials involved multiple academic medical centers, including some of the most prestigious in the US.  Within a year, the American Medical Student Association (AMSA) and Public Citizen called for a federal investigation of the trials, calling them "highly unethical."

This unprecented conflict between prestigious academic medical institutions and the largest organization of medical students and a respected watchdog group suggests either the former have serious ethical problems, or the latter have gone a little crazy.  The minimal media attention to the dispute did not explain what is going on.  My suspicion is that these events open a window on how respected medical academics are now in the thrall of the managerialist leaders of health care.

Background of the Studies

My Personal Experience on the Medical Housestaff

Let me start by disclosing the axe I am grinding.  I was an internal medicine intern from 1978-79 in a program known to be very arduous.  For much of the year, I worked up to 36 consecutive hours every fourth night, often without more than a few hours of sleep.  My on call shifts were extremely busy, involving admission of usually 4-5 complex and acutely ill patients, handling exacerbations and emergencies affecting my own patients already in the hospital, and three other interns' patients for about 12-15 hours of the shift.  The workload was augmented by a hefty amount of "scut," that is, tasks that either did not involve direct patient care, or could easily have been done by someone who was not a physician, e.g., paperwork and phone calls, other bureaucratic tasks, drawing blood, starting IVs, and even transporting patients.  As the shift dragged on into the evening, I knew my mind was getting fuzzier and my coordination was getting clumsier.

The notion that working 36 hours straight was educational, was good for my patients, or was good for me seemed nonsensical.  One reason I went into medical education was to improve the experience for future trainees.

Addressing Housestaff Sleep Deprivation

I was hardly the only person who thought the work requirements imposed on medical housestaff were nonsensical.  The first notable improvement was the advent of night float systems that allowed on-call housestaff to get at least some sleep.  Eventually, in part after the infamous "Libby Zion case," (see NY Times retrospective here,)  teaching hospitals were required to limit work hours.  In 2003, Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education limited the total work week to 80 hours, required one day off a week, and required call schedules no more frequent than every third night.  (Note that my old program fulfilled all but the first.)  In 2011, the rules were tightened further, limiting interns to shifts no longer than 16 hours.

Pushback Against Duty Hour Restrictions

Yet soon after the pushback began.  A 2014 MedPage today article that described the two studies noted,

The rule change elicited mixed reactions from residents and program directors of residency programs, who worried that increased hand-offs led to worse patient care and shorter hours reduced education opportunities. 


I agree that the increasing number of hand-offs could be problematic, and discuss that below.  On the other hand, the notion that sleep deprived housestaff could learn anything useful while in that condition seems bizarre.  There is plenty of evidence about the adverse cognitive effects of sleep deprivation, including affects on learning.  (See, for example, Durmer et al.)(1)

A brief discussion of one of the two trials, the iCOMPARE trial, put it this way:

Policy limiting duty hours in graduate medical education training programs has become a central point of debate amongst stakeholders. Evidence from human chronobiology and sleep science argues for shorter shifts, because fatigue leads to errors. Evidence from operations research argues for more continuity because patient handoffs also lead to errors, and may reduce the effectiveness of education necessary to produce independent clinicians for the nation’s future.


Poorly Conceived Study Question

The two controversial trials were thus designed to answer the question of whether allowing increased consecutive duty hours would lead to better hand-offs and better outcomes.   This question seems poorly conceived, and was not clearly justified.

The trials were apparently based on the idea that housestaff training programs can exist in only two possible states: allowing longer duty hours with fewer and better done hand-offs, or allowing shorter duty hours with more and badly done hand-offs.  Therefore, the only choice seems to be to maintain the current system (tighter duty hour restrictions) or go back to the old system (more relaxed restrictions).

However, these are not the only possible alternatives.  One can easily think of other choices.

Oddly, the spotty materials about the iCOMPARE trial available online did not include any consideration of why the more restrictive duty hour regulations may have led to bad handoffs.  Perhaps the current problem with hand-offs, while it may be real, may have not come about only due to a decrease in the consecutive hours housestaff were allowed to work.  Perhaps it came about because the consecutive hours regulation was imposed on the closed systems of housestaff training programs in which the clinical and non-clinical responsibilities of the housestaff were fixed.  So, cutting consecutive work hours without decreasing the number of patients that need to be managed, or the housestaff's total workload, including "scut," may have pushed individual residents to try to do more work in less time.  This could have had various detrimental effects, including increased numbers of hand-offs occurring under too much time pressure. 

That hypothesis suggests that measures other than allowing more consecutive work hours could address any unintended effects on hand-offs of the mandated consecutive work hour reduction.  It seems plausible that shorter duty hours combined with measures to decrease total housestaff workload, starting with offloading "scut" work, could produce as good or better results than simply going back to the old system.  

Nonetheless, the two trails were set up as if the only alternative to the current situation is to return to the old situation (longer work hours allowed).  Thus it seems that the reasoning underlying the trials was based on a false dilemma.     

Summary of the Studies' Methods

This apparently badly conceived study question led to trials whose design and implementation raised further concerns.  Per the 2014 Medpage article:

The Comparative Effectiveness of Models Optimizing Patient Safety and Resident Education (iCOMPARE) will compare the current duty-hour regimen (16-hour maximum continuous work period for interns) to what the trial calls a 'more flexible regimen' that eliminates the 16-hour cap.

A total of 59 residency programs are enrolled, including academic and community-based programs.

The 12-month study, led by investigators from the University of Pennsylvania, Johns Hopkins University, and Brigham and Women's Hospital, states that its goal is 'to provide evidence to help policymakers evaluate whether the current duty-hour standards should be changed.'

Measured outcomes will include 'patient safety and trainee education,' with data from Medicare claims, exam scores, and participant surveys.

The study comes on the heels of a similar year-long, randomized trial for surgical interns (Flexibility In duty hour Requirements for Surgical Trainees, or FIRST), which began in July 2014 and is currently underway.


Also

The programs in iCOMPARE's intervention arm will adhere to three rules, which are consistent with the ACGME's July 2003 duty hour regulations:
An 80-hour weekly limit
1 day off in 7
In-house call no more frequent than every 3 nights, averaged over 4 weeks


The Protest

In November, 2015, the complaints about the two trials were announced by AMSA and Public Citizen.  The main issues were summarized in a Huffington Post article by Dr Michael Carome of Public Citizen.   First he stated that on its face, making house staff work long hours, as they are in the intervention group, is dangerous.

The iCOMPARE and FIRST trials have allowed first-year medical residents to work shifts lasting 28 consecutive hours or more -- nearly twice the current maximum number of hours allowed by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) for such residents. The ACGME's awareness of the known harms to both residents and patients caused by excessively long work hours led the organization in 2011 to tighten restrictions on resident physicians' work hours, including limiting shifts for first-year residents to a maximum of 16 hours.

Substantial evidence shows that sleep deprivation due to excessively long work shifts increases the risk of motor vehicle accidents, needle-stick injuries and exposure to blood-borne pathogens, , and depression in medical residents. It also exposes their patients to an increased risk of medical errors, sometimes leading to patient injuries and deaths


The last statement cited seven references. I should note here that I could not find in the current media reports, or in the spotty documentation of the ICompare trial avaiable online any engagement with the evidence that sleep deprivation is bad for trainee physicians (and everyone else).

The next important point is that the housestaff who were research subjects of the trial, and their patients who also were at least indirectly research subjects did not give their informed consent for participation in the trial.

Among the many disturbing aspects of the trials is the researchers' failure to seek the voluntary informed consent of either the resident doctors or their patients who are forced to be part of these experiments.

According to a recent media report, the University of Pennsylvania's IRB -- the designated lead IRB that reviewed and approved the iCOMPARE trial -- incorrectly found that the trial involves only 'minimal' risk and therefore waived the requirements for obtaining informed consent for all subjects.

For the FIRST trial, the administrator of the IRB at Northwestern University, the lead institution for that trial, shockingly determined that the trial was not even 'research with human subjects' and, therefore, that IRB review and approval were not required. As a result, there was no opportunity for the IRB to discuss the risks of the research and the need for obtaining the voluntary informed consent of both the general surgery residents and their patients. This determination represents a colossal failure of Northwestern University's human subjects protection system. This same failure presumably occurred at many of the other institutions that participated in the FIRST trial.


An article in the business section of the Chicago Tribune added that Public Citizen claimed the failure to obtain informed consent was all the more serious because the house staff and patients were exposed to danger contingent on their trial participation.

It claimed the 'highly unethical' experiments, including the other led by the University of Pennsylvania and Johns Hopkins University, exposed doctors to an increased risk of making serious medical errors and suffering personal injury.

'Substantial evidence shows that sleep deprivation due to excessively long work shifts increases the risk of motor vehicle accidents, needle-stick injuries and exposure to blood-borne pathogens and depression in medical students,' according to the complaint. For patients, the long hours could lead to increased medical errors and death, the complaint said.


Furthermore, the trials apparently did not include mechanisms for house staff to refuse participation, or to stop participating.  An article in Medscape quoted Dr Karl Bilimoria, a professor of surgery at Northwestern who led the surgical trial,

Dr Bilimoria said that for first-year general surgery residents assigned extended hours at intervention-arm hospitals, the trial was no secret. 'They were told, because they had to monitor their hours,' he said. 'Residents knew which arm of the trial they were in.'

'This has been very public.'

Asked whether this process amounted to informed consent, he replied that if residents strongly disagreed with the prospect of longer hours, 'they could choose to work elsewhere.'


The news coverage of the controversy included several statements that the trials were particularly and severely unethical.  For example, a BMJ news article quoted

Charles Czeisler, professor of medicine and director of sleep medicine at Harvard Medical School [who] told the BMJ, 'I was shocked when I heard about this study assigning resident physicians to work marathon shifts.'  Czeisler said that even as little as one week of sleep deprivation was knwon to cause serious harms.


In Modern Healthcare,

Other ethics researchers found it difficult to understand how such a trial could be approved by an institutional review board.

'Because you're looking at deaths of patients as the major outcome, that makes it much more difficult ethically to support because patients may be harmed,' said Dr. Robert Klitzman, director of the master of bioethics program at Columbia University. 'If you find that twice as many patients died under anything but the current system, you could say they died unnecessarily.'


Apparent Violations of the Nuremberg Code



 [Photograph: Defendants in the dock at Nuremberg trials.  Link here.]

In fact, in my humble opinion, the two trials appeared to violate several major components of the Nuremberg Code, the set of principles for ethical research that was developed after Nazi atrocities visited in the course of supposed medical experiments were revealed during the Nuremberg Trials.  These principles include,

1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.

This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved, as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that, before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject, there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person, which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.


The two trials did not get true informed consent from the housestaff subjects. As trainees required to complete housestaff training to become surgeons or internists, informing housestaff that their program would be participating in the trial, and their only option if they did not want to participate would be to seek another program surely seems like any consent they provided was given under duress.  Furthermore, it is not clear that they were ever informed of "all the inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon" their "health or person[s]."

2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methds or means of study, and not random and unncessary in nature.


Again, if the major rationale for doing the trials was to mitigate the postulated effects of increasing hand-offs, there are many other ways one could try to do this which do not involve increasing duty hours and sleep deprivation.

3.  The experiment should be designed based on the results of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study, that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment.


Again, there is a considerable body of research that sleep deprivation is harmful to patient and humans in general.  Thus, the science suggests that increasing sleep deprivation will have unfavorable results, and thus the performance of a trial of increasing sleep deprivation  seems unjustified.

9. During the course of the experiment, the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end, if he has reached the physical or mental state, where continuation of the experiment seemed to him to be impossible.


Again, the housestaff could not easily opt out of further participation. At best, to do so, as one of the investigators said, they would have to quit their training programs, which could jeopardize their careers and entail major financial costs.

The Rebuttal

The main arguments of the trial proponents in response to the complaints seemed weak, and often appeared to be based on logical fallacies.

The ACGME and the IRBs Approved the Trials - Appeals to Authority

In the Chicago Tribune article:

But Northwestern said the council [ACGME] granted a waiver for the longer hours and helped fund the study.

'It was done with their approval,' Dr Karl Bilimoria, principal investigator for the trial ... said.


An article from the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel and MedPage Today  quoted Dr Thomas Nasca, CEO of the ACGME,

He said institutional review boards at all the participating hospital reviewed the trial protocols and determined the patients did not need to be informed.


These arguments amount to assertions that the trials must have been ethical because external authorities said they were.  Thus they appear to be based on logical fallacies, appeals to authority

The Arguments and Evidence Supporting Duty Hour Restrictions are Weak - Burden of Proof

In an unfortunately misnamed ModernHealthcare article (it refers to medical students rather than housestaff) , Dr Bilimoria was again quoted,

The key piece is that we just have never had prospective, randomized high-level evidence to inform our decisionmaking....


Similarly, in a Medscape article  Dr Nasca, the ACGME CEO,

calls resident scheduling rules a work in progress, especially because only very small, single-institution studies have examined the effect of long hours on residents and patients.


On the other hand, there are no big randomized trials to suggest that longer duty hours or increased sleep deprivation is advantageous.  However, there are huge numbers of studies that show that sleep deprivation is bad for patients and people in non-medical settings, as well as medical trainees.

In any case, the supporters of the trials seem to be arguing that the burden of proof should be on those who want to limit duty hours, while it seems more reasonable that to justify a trial of increased sleep deprivation, the burden of proof was on those who proposed the trial.  Thus, this appears to be a version of the burden of proof logical fallacy.

Increased Hand-Offs are Bad, and the Only Alternative to Having Them is to Increase Duty Hours - False Dilemma

In trying to defend their work the advocates for these trials further corroborated my concerns above that the trials were conceived without any consideration that measures other than increasing duty hours (and consequent sleep deprivation) was the only possible alternative to the current situation.   For example, in the Modern Healthcare article.

'There's always a trade-off,' [senior RAND natural scientist Dr Mark] Friedberg said, noting the increased number of patient hand-offs that occur with shorter hours. These hand-offs reduce consistency of care and open patients up to more mistakes and miscommunication among providers. 'It's not clear-cut. That's why you have to do the science,' he said.


However, he did not argue that increased hand-offs are so bad that a trial of increasing duty hours and sleep deprivation to achieve fewer hand-offs could be justified.  He also did not consider whether there might be some way to mitigate the effect of increased hand-offs without causing sleep deprivation.

Similarly a New Haven Register article quoted Dr Thomas Balcezak, chief medical officer for Yale-New Haven, saying

one issue is that there are 'more handoffs between caregivers' when residents work shorter hours. 'There’s always a risk that important information could fall through the cracks' because of 'a lack of consistency or continuity.'

Again, that seems to be at best a theory, but not evidence based argument. Besides, the article quoted Dr Carome of Public Citizen on just one of many other possible approaches to mitigate the effects of increased hand-offs,

hospitals could overcome that problem by hiring doctors to work overlapping shifts.


There is no evidence that the people who were so concerned about hand-offs thought of any alternative ways to mitigate any problems the duty hour restrictions could have created.  This corroborates my concerns that the trials were fundamentally based on a logical fallacy, the false dilemma.

Managerialism and Tunnel Vision

So why would medical educators at some of the most prestigious US teaching hospitals launch trials to see if increasing housestaff sleep deprivation might benefit them and their patients, mandate partcipation of housestaff and patients in these trials without obtaining informed consent or allowing these subjects to opt out of the trials, thus seemingly violating the Nuremberg Code, and then defend their actions with logical fallacies?

I do not think they have gone mad.  I do suspect they are in the thrall of their managerialist hospital executives.

Recently we discussed the rise of managerialism in the leadership of health care organizations. Managerialism, which wraps up what we have called generic management, the manager's coup d'etat, and aspects of mission-hostile management into a very troubling but coherent package, was first  described for a medical audience in 2015 by Komesaroff in an article in the Medical Journal of Australia(2):

The particular system of beliefs and practices defining the roles and powers of managers in our present context is what is referred to as managerialism. This is defined by two basic tenets: (i) that all social organisations must conform to a single structure [defined by management theory and dogma]; and (ii) that the sole regulatory principle is the market. Both ideas have far-reaching implications. The claim that every organisation — whether it is a mining company, a hospital, a school, a professional association or a charity — must be structured according to a single model, conforming to a single set of legislative requirements, not so long ago would have seemed bizarre, but is now largely taken for granted. The principle of the market has become the solitary, or dominant, criterion for decision making, and other criteria, such as loyalty, trust, care and a commitment to critical reflection, have become displaced and devalued. Indeed, the latter are viewed as quaint anachronisms with less importance and meaning than formal procedures or standards that can be readily linked to key performance indicators, budget end points, efficiency markers and externally imposed targets.


Many of the prestigious teaching hospitals/ acacemic medical centers/ hospital systems participating in the two controversial trials may be led in the managerialist tradition.  We have shown numerous examples of such leadership that may put short term revenue and the continuing enrichment of top managers ahead of all other concerns, including good patient care and the integrity of academics, has been frankly mission hostile, and jump on the latest management bandwagons as solutions all problems.

I postulate that housestaff directors at such institutions tremble at the idea of challenging such leaders.  Yet to improve the handoff problem, teaching programs might have to do things that cost money.  Spending money that does not lead to immediate increases in revenue, and boosts in management pay, could be an anathema to managerialists.  Also, to improve the hand-off problem, programs might have to challenge management dogma, such as the worship of badly designed, time wasting electronic health records.  So I suspect the leaders of the two studies consciously or unconsciously eschewed trial designs that could assess any educational alternative that might have made management uncomfortable.  Thus boxed in, they wound up with an apparently indefensibly unethical research project.

I hope that the two studies create the degree of controversy they deserve, and that the federal government promptly starts investigating honestly and thoroughly.  I further hope that this unseemly episode causes medical educators to rethink the cozy or at least conflict averse relationships they have with their managerialist leaders.

True health care reform would restore health care leadership that understands health care and medicine, upholds the health care mission, is accountable for its actions, and is transparent, ethical and honest.

ADDENDUM (5 December, 2015) - This post was republished on the Naked Capitalism blog

References

1.  Durmer JS, Dinges DF.  Neurocognitive consequences of sleep deprivation.  Sem Neurology 2005.  25. 117-129.  Link here.

 2.  Komesaroff PA, Kerridge IH, Isaacs D, Brooks PM.  The scourge of managerialism and the Royal Australasian College of Physicians.  Med J Aust 2015; 202: 519- 521.  Link here.

Sunday, February 23, 2014

We're Sorry ... Our New EMR May Screw Up Your Care, But Don't Worry ... Patient Safety Has Not Been Compromised

A sign seen at a hospital system recently (name redacted):


We're Sorry for any "Delays" as we start using our new EMR system ... But as a patient, you'll notice many benefits.   As to risks, nothing to see here ... move along.   (Click to enlarge)




FirstNet is an EMR system for Emergency Departments.

What's missing here is this:

  • Potentially deadly EHR startup "issues" can number in the many thousands (as at this link);
  • If you don't want to subject yourself to these delays and/or glitches, you are free to select another hospital for your care. 
  • (If you are injured or die as a result of the "Delays", then ... we're Extra-Special With Sugar On Top Sorry?)

In other words, this glib, nonchalant signage is incomplete, and misleading on its face.

While I understand its purpose, it ignores patient rights to informed consent and knowledge of a potentially unsafe environment for care, which hospitals have to prevent as an ethical and legal obligation.

Of course, "please feel free to ask your caregiver if you have any questions" ... who may in fact be limited by contract or edict to only use "Words That Work" to further soothe unsuspecting patients (as at this link).

-- SS

Thursday, August 30, 2012

A Tacit Admission That National Health IT is a Gargantuan Experiment

In my post yesterday "The Scientific Justification for Meaningul Use, Stage 2" I wrote:

There's no truly robust evidence of generalizable benefit, no randomized trials, there's significant evidence to the contrary, there's risk to safety that this disruptive technology causes in its present state (but the magnitude is unknown, see quotes from 2012 IOM study here) that MU and "certification" do not address, there's a plethora of hair-raising defect reports from the only seller that reports such things, but CMS justifies the program [starting at p. 18 in the Final Rule for Meaningful Use Stage 2 at this link - ed.] with the line:


"Evidence [on benefits] is limited ... Nonetheless, we believe there are substantial benefits that can be obtained by eligible hospitals and EPs ... There is evidence to support the cost-saving benefits anticipated from wider adoption of EHRs."

I am deeply impressed by the level of rigorous science here.  We are truly in a golden age of science.  [That is obviously satirical - ed.]

The Final Rule for MU Stage 2, via the admissions made by it regarding limited evidence, is in fact a tacit admission that the whole national health IT enterprise is a huge experiment (involving human subjects, obviously).  It is likely the most forthright admission we will get from this government on that issue.

With neither explicit patient informed consent nor a formal regulatory process to validate safety, but merely based on a "we believe" justification from the government, hospitals and practices are leaving themselves wide open to liability in the situation of patient injury or death caused by, or promoted by, this technology.

(Parenthetically, I note that I've already seen a claim in a legal brief that "certification" implies safety and a legal indemnification, and that the federal HITECH act - that as in this report merely provides statutory authority to the incentive program - pre-empts common-law i.e., state litigation over health IT.  The judge dismissed the claims.)

-- SS

Aug. 30, 2012 addendum:

A commenter pointed out that experiments on minors without consent might constitute an even more egregious action, subject to even more stringent laws (and perhaps penalties, I add) than on adults.   I cannot confirm that, but it is an interesting observation.  If you are an attorney, please comment, anonymously or otherwise.

-- SS

Tuesday, June 05, 2012

Cart Before the Horse, Part 3: AHRQ's "Health IT Hazard Manager"

(Addendum: the AHRQ hazards manager taxonomy report can see seen at http://healthit.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/docs/citation/HealthITHazardManagerFinalReport.pdf.)

In a July 2010 post "Meaningful Use Final Rule: Have the Administration and ONC Put the Cart Before the Horse on Health IT?" and an Oct . 2010 post "Cart before the horse, again: IOM to study HIT patient safety for ONC; should HITECH be repealed?" I wrote about the postmodern "ready, fire, aim" approach to health IT:

In the first post, I wrote:

... These "usability" problems require long term solutions. There are no quick fix, plug and play solutions. Years of research are needed, and years of system migrations as well for existing installations.

Yet we now have an HHS Final Rule on "meaningful use" regarding experimental, unregulated medical devices the industry itself admits have major usability problems, along with a growing body of literature on the risks entailed.
For crying out loud, talk about putting the cart before the horse...

Something's very wrong here...

However, this situation is anything but humorous.

How more "cart before the horse" can government get?

In the second post, I wrote:

... So, in the midst of a National Program for Health IT in the United States (NPfIT in the U.S.), with tens of billions of dollars earmarked for health IT already (money we don't really have, but it can be printed quickly, or borrowed from China) the IOM is going to study health IT safety, prevention of health IT-related errors, etc. ... only now?

Here we go yet again.

The problem with the AHRQ (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, a division of HHS) announcement below of a webinar about a new tool for identifying, categorizing, and resolving health IT hazards, as I have written before, is putting the "cart before the horse" and throwing medical ethics to the wind.

If we've just developed a tool "for identifying, categorizing, and resolving health IT hazards", the magnitude of which others such as IOM admit are unknown to our detriment (e.g., Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems for Better Care, pg. S-2), then health IT is, it follows, an experimental technology.

If it is an experimental technology, AHRQ and others in HHS should probably be raising the issue of a slow down or moratorium on widespread rollout under HITECH until risk management and remediation is better understood.  At the very least they should be calling for patient informed consent that a device that will largely regulate their care is experimental, that a competency "gap" exists among healthcare practitioners within the "health IT environment" (meaning patients are at risk), and that patients should be offered the opportunity for informed consent with opt-out provisions.  The principals should not just be announcing a webinar:

Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 12:23 PM
To: OHITQUSERS@LIST.NIH.GOV
Subject: Register Now! AHRQ Health IT Webinar "Purpose and Demonstration of the Health IT Hazard Manager and Next Steps" June 11, 2:30 PM ET

Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality

Purpose and Demonstration of the Health IT Hazard Manager and Next Steps

June 11, 2012 — 2:30-4 p.m., EST

The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has identified a gap in a health care/public health practitioner’s competency within the health IT environment. This webinar is designed to increase practitioners’ competencies in several areas: improving health care decision making; supporting patient-centered care; and enhancing the quality and safety of medication management by improving the ability to identify, categorize, and resolve health IT hazards.

The Webinar will explore the Health IT Hazard Manager—a tool for identifying, categorizing, and resolving health IT hazards. When implemented, the tool allows health care organizations and software vendors alike to learn about potential hazards and work to resolve them, including the use of data to communicate potential and actual adverse effects. The session will discuss how the Health IT Hazard Manager was tested and refined as well as strategies and implications for deploying it. The target audience includes AHRQ grantees/researchers; health care providers, including physicians and nurses; consumers/patients; and health care policymakers.

... Webinar learning objectives include:

1. Describe the rationale for developing the Health IT Hazard Manager and how it evolved through alpha and beta testing.
2. Explain the process for identifying and categorizing health IT-related hazards.
3. Demonstrate how the Health IT Hazard Manager would be used [i.e., it's not yet in use, despite mandates for HIT rollout with penalties for non-adopters - ed.] within and across care delivery organizations and health IT software vendors.
4. Discuss policy and process implications for deploying the Health IT Hazard Manager via different organizations (i.e., AHRQ; Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT; Patient Safety Organization(s); Accrediting bodies; IT entities).

In effect, HHS seems to be saying "we're working on the HIT risk problem, but roll it out anyway; if you get harmed or killed, tough luck."  This seems a form of negligence.

Have we thrown out all we know about medical research and human subjects protections in face of the magical powers and profits of computers in medicine?

-- SS

Thursday, February 09, 2012

A Critical Review of a Critical Review of e-Prescribing ... Or Is It CPOE?

In PLoS medicine, the following article was recently published by researchers at the University of New South Wales in Australia:

Westbrook JI, Reckmann M, Li L, Runciman WB, Burke R, et al. (2012) Effects of Two Commercial Electronic Prescribing Systems on Prescribing Error Rates in Hospital In-Patients: A Before and After Study. PLoS Med 9(1): e1001164. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001164


The section I find most interesting is this:

We conducted a before and after study involving medication chart audit of 3,291 admissions (1,923 at baseline and 1,368 post e-prescribing system) at two Australian teaching hospitals. In Hospital A, the Cerner Millennium e-prescribing system was implemented on one ward, and three wards, which did not receive the e-prescribing system, acted as controls. In Hospital B, the iSoft MedChart system was implemented on two wards and we compared before and after error rates. Procedural (e.g., unclear and incomplete prescribing orders) and clinical (e.g., wrong dose, wrong drug) errors were identified. Prescribing error rates per admission and per 100 patient days; rates of serious errors (5-point severity scale, those ≥3 were categorised as serious) by hospital and study period; and rates and categories of postintervention “system-related” errors (where system functionality or design contributed to the error) were calculated.

Here is my major issue:

Unless I am misreading, this research took place in hospitals (i.e., "wards" in hospitals) and does not seem to focus (if even refer to) discharge prescriptions.

I think it would be reasonable to say that what are referred to as "e-Prescribing" systems are systems used at discharge, or in outpatient clinic/offices to communicate with a pharmacy selling commercially and not involved in inpatient care.

From the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), for example:

E-Prescribing - a prescriber's ability to electronically send an accurate, error-free and understandable prescription [theoretically, that is - ed.] directly to a pharmacy from the point-of-care

I therefore think the terminology used in the article as to the type of system studied is not well chosen. I believe it could mislead readers not experienced with the various 'species' of health IT.

This study appears to be of an inpatient Computerized Practitioner Order Entry (CPOE) system, not e-Prescribing.

Terminology matters. For example, in the U.S. the HHS term "certification" is misleading purchasers about the quality, safety and efficacy of health IT. HIT certification as it exists today (granted via ONC-Authorized Testing and Certification Bodies) is merely a features-and-functionality "certification of presence." It is not like an Underwriter Labs (UL) safety certification of an electrical appliance that the appliance will not electrocute you.

(This is not to mention the irony that one major aspect of Medical Informatics research is to remove ambiguity from medical terminology, e.g., via the decades-old Unified Medical Language System project or UMLS. However, as I've often written, the HIT domain lacks the rigor of medical science itself.)

I note that if this were a grant proposal for studying e-Prescribing, I would return it with a low ranking and a reviewer comment that the study proposed is actually of CPOE.

That said, looking at the nature of this study:

The conclusion of this paper was as follows. I am omitting some of the actual numbers such as confidence intervals for clarity; see the full article available freely at above link for that data:

Use of an e-prescribing system was associated with a statistically significant reduction in error rates in all three intervention wards. The use of the system resulted in a decline in errors at Hospital A from 6.25 per admission to 2.12 and at Hospital B from 3.62 to 1.46. This decrease was driven by a large reduction in unclear, illegal, and incomplete orders. The Hospital A control wards experienced no significant change. There was limited change in clinical error rates, but serious errors decreased by 44% across the intervention wards compared to the control wards.

Both hospitals experienced system-related errors (0.73 and 0.51 per admission), which accounted for 35% of postsystem errors in the intervention wards; each system was associated with different types of system-related errors.

I note that "system related errors" were defined as errors "where system functionality or design contributed to the error." In other words, these were unintended adverse events as a result of the technology itself.

The authors conclude:

Implementation of these commercial e-prescribing systems resulted in statistically significant reductions in prescribing error rates. Reductions in clinical errors were limited in the absence of substantial decision support, but a statistically significant decline in serious errors was observed.

The authors do acknowledge some limitations of their (CPOE) study:

Limitations included a lack of control wards at Hospital B and an inability to randomize wards to the intervention.

Thus, this was mainly a pre-post observational study, certainly not a randomized controlled clinical trial.

Not apparently accounted for, either, were potential confounding variables related to the CPOE implementation process (as in this comment thread).

In that thread I wrote to a commenter [a heckler, actually, apparently an employee of HIT company Meditech] with a stated absolute faith in pre-post studies that:

... A common scenario in HIT implementation is to first do a process improvement analysis to improve processes prior to IT implementation, on the simple calculus that "bad processes will only run faster under automation." There are many other changes that occur pre- and during implementation, such as training, raising the awareness of medical errors, hiring of new support staff, etc.

There can easily be scenarios (I've seen them) where poorly done HIT's distracting effects on clinicians is moderated to some extent by process and other improvements. Such factors need to be analyzed quite carefully, datasets and endpoints developed, and data carefully collected; the study design and preparation needs to occur before the study even begins. Larger sample sizes will not eliminate the possible confounding effects of these factors and many more not listed here.

The belief that simple A/B pre-post test that look at error rate comparisons are adequate is seductive, but it is wrong.

Stated simply, in pre-post trials the results may be affected by changes that occur other than the intervention. HIT implementation does not involve just putting computers on desks, as I point out above.

In other words, the study was essentially anecdotal.

The lack of RCT's in health IT are, in general, one violation of traditional medical research methodologies for studying medical devices. That issue is not limited to this article, of course.

Next, on ethics:

CPOE has already been demonstrated in situ to create all sorts of new potential complications, such in at Koppel et al.'s "Role of Computerized Physician Order Entry Systems in Facilitating Medication Errors", JAMA. 2005;293(10):1197-1203. doi: 10.1001/jama.293.10.1197 that concluded:

In this study, we found that a leading CPOE system often facilitated medication error risks, with many reported to occur frequently. As CPOE systems are implemented, clinicians and hospitals must attend to errors that these systems cause in addition to errors that they prevent.

CPOE technology, at best, should be considered experimental in 2012.

In regards to e-Prescribing proper, there's this: Errors Occur in 12% of Electronic Drug Prescriptions, Matching Handwritten and this: Upgrading e-prescribing system can bump up error risk to consider; in other words, the literature is conflicting, confirming the technology remains experimental.

This current study confirmed some (CPOE) errors that would not have occurred with paper did occur with cybernetics, amounting to "35% of postsystem errors in the intervention wards."

In other words, patient Jones was now subjected to a cybernetic error that would not have occurred with paper, in the hopes that patients Smith and Silverstein would be spared errors that might have occurred without cybernetic aid.

Even though the authors observe that "human research ethics approval was received from both hospitals and the University of Sydney", since patient Jones did not provide informed consent to the experimentation with what really are experimental medical devices as I've written often on this blog [see note 1], I'm not certain the full set of ethical issues have been well-addressed. It's not limited to this occasion, however. This phenomenon represents a pervasive, continual world-wide oversight with regard to clinical IT.

Furthermore, and finally: of considerable concern is another common limitation of all health IT studies, which I believe is often willful.

What really should be studied before justifications are given to spend tens of millions of dollars/Euros/whatever on CPOE or other clinical IT is this:

The impact of possible non-cybernetic interventions (e.g., additional humans and processes) to improve "medication ordering" (either CPOE, or ePrescribing) that might be FAR LESS EXPENSIVE, and that might have far less IT-caused unintended adverse consequences, than cybernetic "solutions."

Instead, pre-post studies are used to justify expenditures of millions (locally) and tens or hundreds of billions (nationally), with results sometimes like this affecting an entire country.

There is something very wrong with this, both scientifically and ethically.

-- SS

Note:

[1] If these devices are not experimental, why are so many studying them to see if they actually work, to see if they pose unknown dangers, and to try to understand the conflicting results in the literature? More at this query link: http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Healthcare%20IT%20experiment


Addendum Feb. 10, 2012:

An anonymous commenter points out an interesting issue. They wrote:

The study was flawed due to its failure to consider delays in care and medication administration as an error caused by these experimental devices.

Delays are widespread with CPOE devices. One emergency room resorted to paper file cards and vacuum tubes to communicate urgency with the pharmacy. Delays were for hours.

I agree that lack of consideration of a temporal component, i.e., delays due to technology issues, is potentially significant.

I, for example, remember a more than five-minute delay in getting sublingual nitroglycerin to a relative with apparent chest pain due to IT-related causes. The problem turned out to be gastrointestinal, not cardiac; however, in another patient, the hospital might not be so lucky.

Addendum Feb. 12, 2012:

A key issue in technology evaluation studies is to separate the effects of the technology intervention from other, potentially confounding variables which always exist in a complex sociotechnical system, especially in a domain such as medicine. This seems uncommonly done in HIT evaluation studies. Not doing so will likely inflate the apparent contribution of the technology.

A "control ward" where the same education and training, process re-engineering, procedural improvements, etc. were performed as compared to the "intervention ward" (but without actual IT use) would probably be better suited to pre-post studies such as this.

A "comparison ward" where human interventions were implemented, as opposed to cybernetic, would be a mechanism to determine how efficacious and cost-effective the IT was compared to less expensive non-cybernetic alternatives.

-- SS

Friday, June 19, 2009

Synthes Indicted

Last month, we posted about a legal settlement in which device manufacturer Synthes agreed to stop creating conflicts of interests by paying physicians who performed its trials with company stock. Synthes is back in the news, and not in favorable terms. As reported by the Philadelphia Inquirer,

A Swiss company with major operations in West Chester illegally tested its bone cement on about 200 people, three of whom died, according to a 52-count indictment issued yesterday by the U.S. attorney in Philadelphia.

Synthes Inc., a producer of orthopedic products that employs about 1,400 in Chester County, did not tell any of the patients that they were participating in experimental surgeries, the indictment said.

Federal prosecutors also accused Synthes executives of lying to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration about whether they had tested the product for uses that the agency had not approved.


Particularly striking were allegations that the company's CEO was directly involved in the decisions.

The FDA had approved Norian XR to fill bony voids or defects in some parts of the body, but not in the spine. The agency insisted that Synthes conduct clinical trials, which are lengthy and expensive and require FDA oversight, if it wanted to expand the uses of Norian XR to treat spinal fractures.

But, a company executive identified in the indictment as 'Person No. 7' decided not to conduct clinical trials. Instead, the person said the company should 'get a few sites to perform 60-80 procedures and help them publish their clinical results,' according to the indictment.

The report never explicitly identifies 'Person No. 7,' but says he was the chief executive officer and a large shareholder. A company spokesman identified Hansjörg Wyss as the CEO while the tests occurred.

Forbes Magazine lists Wyss, a Swiss citizen, as a West Chester resident and the Philadelphia area's wealthiest person, with a net worth of $5.7 billion. Last year, Wyss gave the largest amount from a single source in Harvard University's history when he donated $125 million to create a bio-engineering institute.

Wyss owns about 40 percent of outstanding Synthes stock. The company, which had about $805 million in first-quarter sales this year, specializes in orthopedic devices, including plates and screws.


The Inquirer article included more detail about how the company allegedly disregarded risks to patients as it pushed the surgeons to try Norian XR on them, without disclosing that its use was experimental,

Instead of conducting trials with FDA oversight, Synthes executives convinced about 50 surgeons to test Norian XR in people with spinal fractures. Synthes sales representatives often were in the operating room during the surgeries, including those where patients died, prosecutors said.

When company executives began these surgical tests in 2002, they knew that Norian XR caused blood clots in test tubes and that clots became lodged in the lungs in tests with pigs, the indictment said.

Synthes continued the experimental surgeries even after two patients died on the operating table, prosecutors said. The company stopped the tests after a third patient died in January 2004.


Again, it seems that the current leaders of health care all too often put more priority on personal profits than on protecting patients' health and safety. So instead of all the talk about reforming how health care is financed, maybe the conversation should be about reforming how health care is lead, and finding ethical, honest leaders who put patients' welfare ahead of their own wealth.

Wednesday, November 19, 2008

Look Who's In The Operating Room

At an article today entitled "Medtronic Says Device for Spine Faces Probe" (Wall St. Journal, Nov. 19, 2008, subscription required) the WSJ reports another major medical device manufacturer, Medtronic, faces a probe for promoting unapproved uses of its technologies, which is improper:

Doctors can deploy FDA-approved drugs and products any way they see fit, but companies aren't permitted to promote off-label applications or to pay doctors inducements to do so.

"While the law establishes that doctors can prescribe any approved treatment, but off-label promotion by manufacturers is not allowed, there's growing concern that the line is being crossed, and a Justice Department review is the right kind of response to those questions," said Sen. Charles Grassley (R., Iowa) who has been looking into whether inducements by Medtronic have led doctors to use its products off-label.

This type of story is common at Healthcare Renewal, and the blog leaves quite a rich trail of search engine-available information, since the healthcare blogs are relatively immune to the anechoic effect. I see numerous hits from governmental agencies in the U.S. and overseas, for example, on search engine queries regarding malfeasance or incompetence at specific companies and organizations. I will not comment on the ethics of the Medtronic/nonapproved promotion issue any further here.

I do want to comment, however, on an item in the WSJ article that caught my eye:

Depositions in a malpractice lawsuit brought by Laurie DeNeui, of Rushmore, Minn., focused on off-label Infuse use and Medtronic salesman Curt Messler's relationship to her spinal surgeon, Bryan J. Wellman of Sioux Falls, S.D. Mr. Messler said in his depositions in the case that he was with Dr. Wellman in the operating room "a lot" when he used Infuse. He also said he considered Dr. Wellman a friend and said the men saw each other socially.

... About four days after her October 2005 operation to fuse cervical vertebrae, Ms. DeNeui said in an interview, her neck swelled up, she had trouble swallowing and she started choking on food. Soon, she said, she started having difficulty breathing. Ms, DeNeui, 46, said the problems prevented her from returning to work as a teacher and baffled several specialists. Steroid treatment helped ease the breathing and gagging problems, but caused her to gain weight and contract diabetes.

Dr. Wellman denies any malpractice. In a deposition, he said Mr. Messler encouraged him to use Infuse in cervical spine operations, and that he has done more than 100 such procedures with the product. Dr. Wellman said he discussed with Mr. Messler the right dosage of the Infuse material to use in the surgeries but determined the dosage on his own.

Mr. Messler, who isn't a physician, has a degree in criminal justice, and his prior work history included owning a bar and jobs with New York Life Insurance Co. and Procter & Gamble Co. In his depositions, Mr. Messler denied encouraging Dr. Wellman to use Infuse for unapproved applications or discussing how much to use.

This is the typical I said-he said scenario. That issue's adjudication will also not be discussed here. While the article also states this patient signed a consent to permit Medtronic representatives to be in the operating room, I have several questions of a very fundamental nature.

In background to these questions, when I was fifteen years old I attended the summer NSF-funded Advanced Preceptorship Training Program (ATP) at Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital back in the early 1970's. It was a program designed to introduce high school students to biomedicine (ironically Hahnemann's former medical college is now part of Drexel University, where I teach healthcare informatics). I was assigned back then to watch surgery under the surgical team of Drs. Pearce, Ulin and Weinstein, permitted to scrub in and hold retractors, and in one case to actually saw through a femur in a leg amputation for diabetes-related gangrene. I also made rounds with the surgical team. While today this practice would probably not be permitted on privacy and malpractice concerns, I can honesty admit I offered no advice on surgical procedures or other interventions. I simply didn't have the background.

In the Medtronics situation of reps in the O.R., I thus ask the following questions:

  • Were patients and others in the O.R. aware of the lack of the Medtronic sales representative's medical credentials?
  • Are such consents sought and signed routinely for allowance of medical device company reps in the operating theater?
  • What, exactly, was the purpose of having a nonmedical person in the O.R.? What, exactly, could such a person contribute?
  • Why would any patient want a nonmedical person in the O.R. with the potential for that person to give advice or affect the procedure in some manner?
  • What were patients told to convince them to sign the consent?
  • If advice was given of any kind to any clinician the O.R., would that not constitute the practice of medicine without a license?
  • What were the rep's obligations if they witnessed anything they thought could be misuse of the device, or any other practice they thought improper?
  • Did the rep follow the surgical team around in postop care?
  • Why couldn't Medtronic actually hire people with medical backgrounds for such roles, instead of a former bar owner and P&G sales rep? Could such people be afforded?
  • Might people with medical credentials and experience actually be better suited to make valid scientific observations in the O.R. setting?

These are just some of the questions that come to mind in the seemingly inexhaustible cornucopia of nonmedical people either leading healthcare organizations or performing roles perhaps better performed by people who actually have a medical background, and actually know at a very detailed level what they're doing.



-- SS

Saturday, September 27, 2008

Update on the NIH “Trial to Assess Chelation Therapy”

(Some of the following is identical to a post on Science-Based Medicine dated 9/26/08.)

A few days ago, while gathering information for a post on Science-Based Medicine about intravenous hydrogen peroxide, I noticed this:



ACAM Supports NIH Decision to Suspend TACT Trial

September 3, 2008, Laguna Hills, Calif. — The American College for Advancement in Medicine, ACAM today announced its support for the National Institute for Health’s (NIH) decision to suspend patient accrual of the Trial to Assess Chelation Therapy (TACT) Trial until allegations of impropriety can be proven false. ACAM believes that the TACT trial represents a important milestone in assessing the role of chelation therapy in modern healthcare and respects the decision of the NIH.

ACAM continue to work with Dr Tony Lamas to answer the unfounded allegations of impropriety.

“We believe that the Office of Human Research Protection (OHRP) will find that the allegations are of a political nature. To serve the best interests of participants enrolled in the TACT trial and all patients and their physicians who seek answers about chelation therapy, we call for a swift end to the moratorium and resumption of the trial,” said Jeanne Drisko, MD, President of ACAM.


I alerted a few others, including Stephen Barrett of Quackwatch, who queried the news room of the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute (NHLBI: the joint sponsor, along with the NCCAM, of the trial) and got this reply:




The investigators and institutions performing the Trial to Assess Chelation Therapy (TACT), in conjunction with their Institutional Review Boards, have temporarily and voluntarily suspended enrollment of new participants in the study. NIH has not issued any announcement or press release about this action. To contact the Office for Human Research Protections’ (OHRP) press office, call Pat El-Hinnawy, (202) 253-0458.

The “allegations of impropriety” mentioned in the ACAM press release had been made by my co-authors and me in a comprehensive article previously introduced on Health Care Renewal here. The article is available in its entirety here. In June, we made a formal complaint to the federal Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP), citing that article and additional information posted on Science-Based Medicine here. That our complaint was the instigating factor for the recent “decision to suspend patient accrual” is suggested by an email that I received last week:



I would like to know who is paying you guys off. Finally we have a chance to assess Chelation therapy and put the issue to rest and to find out whether or not it really works and you bozos screw it all up. I know that the trial was stopped and it is your fault. What are you afraid of? Why are you not decrying all of the injuries caused by medications and unnecessary surgeries? Why are we the citizens of the US deprived of a trial of EDTA so that we can judge for ourselves?

Anyone who is a thinking man, can only be disappointed in you. [sic]

Binyamin Rothstein, D.O.




Rothstein, unlike many of his fellow ACAM members, does not appear to be a TACT investigator. Like them, however, he touts chelation, intravenous hydrogen peroxide, and other baseless and dangerous treatments. He has harmed patients, his protestations nothwithstanding. His medical license was revoked in 2005, but that hasn’t hindered him from using smoke and mirrors in his relentless pursuit of profit from nonsense. He’s even managed to promote himself to the public without revealing key items from his resumé—one of the many reasons that even the most diligent regulation can’t always protect the public from scoundrels.

At least two reporters have recently covered the story (here and here). They mostly get it right. The AP report, however, states that chelation "is mainly used to treat lead poisoning." That is not technically false, but is misleading because disodium EDTA (Na2EDTA), the drug used in the TACT, has never been approved for lead poisoning and is considerably more dangerous than calcium EDTA, the drug that is so approved. Ironically, one of our objections to the TACT is that its literature---including protocols, consent forms, and subject recruitment pitches---conflates the two drugs so as to make the study drug appear safer than it is.

Indeed, the FDA has recently withdrawn its approval of Na2EDTA, citing "important safety information" and the possibility that it may be confused with the less dangerous CaEDTA:



As noted in the January 16, 2008, Public Health Advisory, there have been cases where children and adults have died when they were mistakenly given edetate disodium instead of edetate calcium disodium (calcium disodium versenate) or when edetate disodium was used for indications other than those approved by FDA.



Readers might remember that we at HCR have previously discussed the important distinction between the two EDTA salts, after a 5-year old boy was killed in Pennsylvania when a quack administered Na2EDTA to him as a treatment for autism. At the time a CDC expert was so surprised that anyone would infuse Na2EDTA that she concluded, erroneously, that it must have been a drug error: "a case of look-alike/sound-alike medications." The PA medical board's investigation subsequently confirmed that the practitioner had intended to give Na2EDTA, exactly as we had predicted.

The TACT should now be stopped altogether. Contrary to the ACAM press release, our objections to the TACT are scrupulously documented and not “of a political nature.” They are of a scientific and ethical nature. They will not be proven false, because the evidence for them is overwhelming.