Another Key Opinion Leader Confesses

The Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel published another story in their series on physicians' entanglements with health care corporations. This one tells the story of a single university faculty member who was seduced by pharmaceutical companies, then eventually became disillusioned.

[Dr James] Stein, now a professor at the University of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, was a 29-year-old cardiology fellow in Chicago in 1994 when his faculty mentor asked him to fill in for him at a drug company-funded lecture to a large group of doctors.

It would be his first taste of life as a drug company speaker and consultant.

Stein got first-class airfare to Dallas. A limousine took him to a luxury hotel for the talk.

He walked off the stage, and a doctor from the conference handed him an envelope containing a $500 check.

'I got a pat on the back and he said, 'There's more where that came from, son.' I had no idea what that meant, but I went home and paid off part of my student loans,' Stein said in a presentation at UW this month.

Stein's first drug company talk led to more than a decade of work for drug companies before he gave it up for ethical reasons. Now he is speaking out.

Over the years, many of the big names in the drug industry would hire Stein to give speeches or serve as a consultant, eventually leading to fees of $2,000 to $3,000 per talk.

About a month after his first talk in 1994, Stein was asked by another drug company to give a lecture on cholesterol at a small hospital in Chicago, just as blockbuster statin drugs were coming on the market.

'I was really flattered because over and over again I was told that I was a future thought leader,' he said. 'I did my talk. I got a $750 honorarium and I was hooked.'

Stein said he now realizes that the speech at the hospital was just an audition.

'They wanted to know what I would say and how I would deliver,' he said. 'And I think they also wanted to know what I would say about their product.'

He joined speakers bureaus for several drug companies. It was a kind of badge of honor, he said. The more companies a doctor spoke for, the more highly he or she was regarded.

Stein, now 44, came to UW in 1996. Over the years, he would give talks and do other work for many of the top names in the pharmaceutical industry.

For instance, in 2005 Stein did work for six drug makers, according to a disclosure form filed with UW. That year, Pfizer paid him between $10,000 and $20,000 for four days of work as a speaker and advisory board member.

LipoScience, a firm that markets a cholesterol test, paid him $10,000 to $20,000 for four days of similar work.

Another firm, Schering-Plough, paid him about $12,000 for two days as a lecturer.

Although he said he had concerns about the propriety of his work, Stein said he was assured by his superiors there was nothing wrong with it as long as he did it on his own time. Indeed, they said it enhanced the reputation of the university.

And, he said, he considered himself an educator, not a salesman.

He said he tried to manage any conflicts of interest by disclosing who paid him, controlling the content of what he said and doing the work on personal time.

Things started to change rapidly beginning several years ago.

Drug companies began referring to the talks as promotional. They wanted him to use their slides; he refused. Then, medical journals and the lay press began printing articles questioning the ethics of the relationships.

A 2006 article in a Madison newspaper listed Stein as being among the UW doctors who reported the most money from the drug industry. Stein said he was embarrassed.

But, he said, he continued to try to manage his relationships with drug companies. He sent letters to patients disclosing his ties to industry. As of December 2006, he donated all the money from his talks to charity.

Why didn't he just stop doing the work?

He said he believed he could save more lives lecturing than by working in the emergency room. Stein said he saw no harm in being paid. But he admitted that giving the talks also made him feel important.

At the same time, new scientific articles suggested that it is impossible for doctors to be unbiased when they receive gifts or payments from drug companies.

'I have learned that human beings, physicians included, are incapable of recognizing bias in themselves, and even when you try not to be biased it is impossible to avoid it, especially when money is involved,' he said.

He said he came to realize that drug and medical device firms were no longer trustworthy partners in medical education.

He also said it has become obvious that patients have the least power and drug companies have the most power.

'I was wrong,' he said.

Stein said he stands by what he taught.

But, he added, 'I was naïve to think I was not influenced by the money and power of the drug and device companies.'

As of last December, he said, he stopped all drug company speaking and consulting other than bona fide research.

It is nice that a few commercially paid "key opinion leaders" have realized what they were really doing. Maybe, Dr Stein will follow in the footsteps of Dr Daniel Carlat, and try to atone for his previous role in drug marketing disguised as education. (See Dr Carlat's excellent blog here, and his now classic article, "Dr Drug Rep.")

This compelling narrative reinforces some points about relationships among physicians and health care corporations.

Health care corporations do not pay for nothing, and are not charitable organizations. If a company pays a physician to give talks, it is almost certainly because those talks will help market company products or services.

Pharmaceutical and device companies have argued that they only pay the best and the brightest physicians as speakers and consultants. But this story (and others, e.g. here) suggest that they recruit young physicians who seem to be malleable and likely to go along with the company line, and groom them to do marketing in the guise of education.

The company's money thus helps mold "key opinion leaders." Worse, at many medical schools, being a commercially supported speaker or consult was a badge of honor. Thus, faculty chosen by commercial firms as most tractable and sympathetic to the companies' viewpoints, came to be regarded as the best and the brightest.

Why getting money from commercial firms was regarded as indicative of honor and intelligence, rather than gullibility, naivete, or worse, is not clear. I wonder whether it correlated with increasing alignment of the leadership of medical schools with commercial interests, and domination of the very top leadership, that is, the universities' board of directors, by those formerly regarded as Masters of the Universe (but now often seen as stupid, arrogant, greedy, or even corrupt. See posts about how the boards of Dartmouth, Harvard, and Yeshiva were disproportionately populated by leaders of [faux] finance).

At any rate, this is truly a cautionary tale of seduction of academia into hucksterism.

Hat tip to Margaret Soltan at University Diaries.

ADDENDUM (30 April, 2009) - See also the comments by Dr Daniel Carlat on the Carlat Psychiatry Blog.

Shut Up, They Explained (to Ezetimibe Critics)

One of our scouts alerted me to a remarkable editorial just published by Harrison, Brown and Raggi on the ezetimibe controversy [Harrison DG, Brown WV, Raggi P. Enhanced hype. Am J Cardiol 2008; 102: 368-369. Link here, requires subscription.]

We have posted before (as have many others,) about problems with the ENHANCE trial of ezetimibe (Zetia, by Schering-Plough, and one component of Vytorin, by Merck), and how the trial seemed to be designed and implemented so as to increase the likelihood of a favorable result for the sponsors' interests. Particularly controversial was the sponsors' decision to change the definition of the trial's outcome variable after the data was collected, (later reversed after it was publicized.) It also turned out that the supposedly "independent" panel responsible for that decision included a majority of members who had previous financial ties to Merck and/or Schering-Plough.

The ENHANCE trial was not meant to determine whether ezetimibe had any effects on clinical outcomes, that is, whether it made patients feel or function better, avoid morbid events, or live longer. Its focus was on whether the drug reduced the thickness of arterial walls in patients with very high cholesterol levels. The study failed to show even this effect.

Since no previous study had shown that ezetimibe leads to symptom reduction, functional improvement, prevention of morbidity, or extension of life, it was surprising that the American College of Cardiology and the American Heart Association rushed to the drug's defense, counseling physicians not to take patients off it. Why continue to give patients a drug that has never been shown to provide clinical benefit? In this post, we wondered whether this enthusiasm unsupported by clinical research evidence had to do with undisclosed conflicts of interest affecting the defenders of ezetimibe.

Since then, in the continuing absence of evidence about the benefits of ezetimibe, there has been continuing controversy over its use. Harrison, Brown and Raggi continued in this vein. They clearly sided with the American College of Cardiology's statement that physicians should not take patients off ezetimibe, which they contrasted with what they characterized as

hysterical coverage from Web sites, news organizations, and cardiologists who seem to seek high visibility.

So the "hype" and hysteria, according to Harrison, Brown and Raggi, were criticisms of attempts to manipulate the ENHANCE trial, and observations about the lack of clinical evidence supporting the use of ezetimibe. What made their article remarkable, however, was its suggestion that purveyors of "hype" and "hysteria" as defined by Harrison, Brown, and Raggi, should just shut up. First the three authors wrote,

Strong statements regarding guidelines or policy in the use of this drug by cardiologists (with little background in lipid research and atherosclerosis biology) are inappropriate and certainly premature.

Then,

unsupported premature claims regarding a drug’s effectiveness or lack thereof should be conveyed properly, as in the case of the American College of Cardiology’s official statement. There seems to be a recent love affair with the issuance of headline-grabbing statements to the press, and this should be discouraged. When done in haste without proper study and thought, they appear to be self-aggrandizing, and at worse, they are very misleading.

So this editorial is noteworthy not because it defended ezetimibe, or belittled its critics, but because it seemed to question the right to criticize the established dogma.

Obviously, the authors of the editorial have no legal authority to censor those whose views offend them. But even veiled questioning of the right to express dissent are contrary to the core values of science and medicine. For science to advance, open discussion and criticism of methods, results and interpretations is vital. For physicians to take the best possible care of patients, they must have access to the best possible evidence from clinical research, even if that evidence offends the powers that be or those with vested interests.

A clue as to why the authors took such an extreme position may be found in the last sentence of their article,

In the case of ezetimibe, we are concerned that this drug or its makers will be eliminated on the basis of hyperbole, misinformation....

Why would they be so worried as to raise the hyperbolic concern that the controversy over ENHANCE could cause ezetimibe, and even Merck and Schering-Plough to be "eliminated?" A quick Google search revealed disclosed that the authors collectively have multiple relevant financial relationships that they did not disclose.

• Dr David G Harrison is on the scientific advisory board of Atherogenics, Inc.
• Dr W Virgil Brown, according to a financial disclosure statement provided by the National Lipid Association, on whose board he sits, "has advisory relationships" with AstraZeneca, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Merck, Merck Shering Plough, Pfizer, Reliant, Kos, Lilly; has "research relationships" with AstraZeneca, Lilly, Kos, Pfizer, Takeda; has "educational relationships" with Abbott, Lilly; and has "speakers' bureau relationships" with AstraZeneca, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Merck, Merck Shering Plough, Pfizer, Reliant, Kos, Lilly, Abbott, Takeda, Kos.
• Dr Paolo Raggi, according to disclosure statements provided by HDCN for a 2001 meeting, "received grant support and honoraria from Genzyme Therapeutics and is a stockholder in Pfizer Inc;" and according to disclosure statements provided by the Office of Continuing Education for Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine for a 2007 meeting, received an honorarium from Amgen, and received grants, consulting fees, and speakers' honoraria from Genzyme.

Perhaps the authors' financial identification with Merck and Merck Schering-Plough, and with the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries in general lead to such exaggerated concern. In any case, the authors should have revealed these financial relationships, and allowed readers to decide whether they might have affected their views. Nonetheless, while conceivably such relationships could have somewhat explained the authors' partiality to censorship, it does not excuse it.

As documented on the FIRE web-site, it is now commonplace for academic administrators to try to silence those who disagree with the prevailing campus dogma. This impulse to censor those who provide inconvenient opinions or facts now seems to be extending to the scholarly medical literature. It is ironic that those calling for censorship simultaneously seem loathe to reveal their financial relationships with those with vested interests in maintaining the status quo.

The inconvenient truths that we censor or hide surely will return to afflict us.

ADDENDUM (3 August, 2008) - See also comments by anonymous blogger "PM" on Gooznews.

BLOGSCAN - Throwing Money at Zetia Marketing

On the Question Authority blog, Dr Peter Rost takes some time off from having fun discussing the Emperors Club VIP, i.e., the organization which NY Governor Eliot Spitzer allegedly patronized, to his downfall, to address Schering-Plough's alleged new marketing campaign for Zetia. He has a great anonymous post from someone who may be a Schering-Plough drug rep, "throwing money at a problem is not the way to fix things - it will only make matters worse. Have the company come clean about the study, give us some good (or even not so good) evidenced based medicine - and let us earn back the business the right way." Hear, hear.

Lawyers to have cholesterol feast: lawsuits target Vytorin's makers - and, who is responsible for the "confusion?"

In today's news we find that Merck and Schering Plough are coming under lawsuits as a result of the ezetimibe/Vytorin controversy. This was perhaps to be expected:

Lawsuits target Vytorin's makers
Plaintiffs contend the firms knew the drug didn't work.
Sat, Jan. 26, 2008

By Karl Stark
Inquirer Staff Writer

First came the negative publicity, then the lawsuits.

Merck & Co. and Schering Plough Corp., makers of the cholesterol-lowering combination drug Vytorin, are getting hit with a wave of lawsuits asserting the companies knew its product didn't work and delayed telling the public about it.

At least 10 lawsuits have been filed in federal courts, with half the filings in New Jersey, where both parent companies are based. Other federal suits have landed in California, New York, Ohio and Colorado.

The drugmakers "reaped billions of dollars in profits" by failing to release negative results, asserted a class-action complaint filed by a Philadelphia firm on behalf of Lionel D. Galperin of Washington state. The companies also caused patients to spend more money on Vytorin, which sells for more than $100 for 30 pills, compared with a lower-cost generic, the suit alleges.

Here is where I step off the alleged "anti-pharma" bandwagon ... sort of.

While I have criticized Merck's and Schering's mammoth marketing campaign for these drugs here ("Merck and Vytorin ... Who, Exactly, is Confused?") and here ("Full page ads in major newspapers: Does pharma really spend twice on marketing what it spends on R&D?"), I believe lawsuits with the slant of "Bush lied, people died" (i.e., the firms knew the drug didn't work but withheld the information) are both unmerited and especially unhelpful to those attempting to advance medical science.

This claim is in part based on the following:

The companies completed the [Enhance] study [on these drugs] in April 2006 but did not release preliminary results until a press release was issued on Jan 14 [2008]. That was more than a month after congressional investigators had written to company executives, asking about the delay and demanding documents.

The implication is that actual knowledge of the results were withheld from the public to protect the drug. I do not believe this to be the case. I recall genuine excitement at Merck about Zetia's cholesteral-lowering effects, and great confidence that it was a true breakthrough drug that would generate much needed revenue after multiple drug failures and patent expirations. Clinical medicine, however, is full of surprises.

While such excitement could motivate a company to withhold negative new information, I have a different interpretation of why such delays occurred. Pharma is in a state of downsizing. At Merck, a company that carried on a succcesful business for over 100 years without downsizing, the mass downsizing that began in Nov. 2003 and continues to this day was a major cultural "hammer over the head."

Such social changes tend to sink morale very severely. While Catbert the Evil HR Director might find this amusing, most productive poeple do not. It's also something that cannot be "massaged away" with HR propaganda and "employee appreciation days." As I noted in "Happy Accidents in pharma doubtful: Tax Break Used by Drug Makers Failed to Add Jobs" here, the stress of losing a job is like the stress of a death in the family or a divorce, and the stress of fear of losing a job is also pretty darn bad. As the Alaska state government piece on "surviving a layoff" cited in the above posting states, "remaining employees become overworked, burned out, extremely unhappy and put in a position of fear and uncertainty." It doesn't exactly take a rocket scientist to realize this.

Anecdotally, I reside in a Merck community and hear as much about morale from my local car dealer, haircutter, family medicine physician, restaurant waiters, and others. In fact, I don't believe clinical trials information was withheld deliberately. I believe morale is low, departments are understaffed, and people are playing "CYA" like their lives depended on it (as their careers and ability to pay mortgages and support families depends on their jobs, this is actually not unwise).

Taking morale issues into account, and adding in the three late-stage pre-launch drug failures of 2003, resulting cultural shift to mass layoffs, and the Vioxx debacle, extra long "CYA" to make sure the data and conclusions are correct is understandible in context.

In such an environment, where overworked, stressed out people basically give themselves (effectively speaking) hourly pay raises via doing less per hour, and return to seeing jobs as a value-for-value proposition where an employee in a mirrorlike fashion gives a company what it has earned (i.e., deserves) in terms of their committment and willingness to make sacrifices, long delays in handling complex clinical trials results sets - this study, of course, being just one of many - is not at all surprising.

In addition, politics being what they are in any corporate layoff, many good people (the movers and shakers) get laid off, and other good people can't stand the environment and leave for greener pastures. This leaves behind many less capable colleagues to pick up the slack. I believe the cause of the delays in data release are more likely to be found attributable to low morale, a lesser % of "stars" among the workforce than necessary for optimal effectiveness, dysfunctional self protection-style politics, and resultant lowered productivity.

As an aside, it would not surprise me if recent chemical spills of "liquid mustard gas" into the creeks in my community had at its roots a similar cause:

Pharmaceutical giant Merck has agreed to pay $20 million in assorted fines, environmental improvements and cleanup costs to make up for killing untold fish, fouling drinking water supplies and spoiling a season of recreation on the Wissahickon Creek in Pennsylvania with a toxic "liquid mustard gas," the Philadelphia Inquirer is reporting. The massive impact came from an old-school problem: Dumping toxic chemicals down the drain at a vaccine plant, from which they reacted with chlorine disinfectants and washed into the creek, wreaking havoc downstream for miles.

I do not believe the company would deliberately withhold clinical trials data, and therefore do not believe a "deliberately withheld" charge is reasonable with regard to the ENHANCE clinical trial results on ezetimibe (Zetia) and ezetimibe-Zocor(Vytorin) . If there is a good basis for a lawsuit, perhaps the people who should be sued are those in management and in consulting organizations that recommended layoff strategies and stole the soul of such a once-stellar company.

The newspaper also notes the following:

...The drugmakers aren't the only ones facing scrutiny. Both the American College of Cardiology, which represents most cardiologists, and the American Heart Association echoed the companies' assurances and urged patients on Vytorin not to panic after a major test of Vytorin was released on Jan 14. But their stands have drawn criticism from congressional investigators and others because both groups take in substantial sums from pharmaceutical firms.

I'm not going to comment further on this other than to say "that sounds familiar", as the conflict of interest issue affecting medical professional societies has been well addressed by my Healthcare Renewal colleagues.

I will, however, comment on this:

W. Douglas Weaver, president-elect of the cardiologists, echoed those concerns. "We really had huge numbers of patients calling physicians' offices and not knowing how to interpret this information," Weaver said. "People were discontinuing statins because of the confusion."

The unstated but not-so-subtle implication (to those who understand marketing and "spin") appears to be that the big, bad, "anti-pharma" zealots and their allies in the media have gotten the poor public all confused, and the public is stopping their lifesaving meds as a result.

Having been involved in drug nomenclature activities at Merck as well as being familiar with the work of groups such as the Institute for Safe Medication Practices, one major goal in drug naming is to prevent confusion regarding the drug's nature and purpose. One creates drug names to assure that one drug is not confused for another, by healthcare professionals, patients, and others. Information scientists and others work very hard to select names for drugs that do not "resemble" others in spelling, phonetics, etc.

Now, just who is responsible for the confusion among patients "discontinuing statins because of the confusion?"

It seems to me the brainiacs who came up with the marketing scheme of giving a combination drug consisting of a newly-generic drug and a newly-approved one an entirely new name to milk more income out of a drug going generic -- and effectively discourage doctors/patients from simply prescribing/taking two pills (the generic and the new one) -- are largely responsible.

How many patients really understand that their wonder drug has two parts, one old, one new, that they could purchase and take separately likely for less cost than the combination, and that only the "new" part has come under scrutiny? How many understand that if the statin part of the new combination drug doesn't agree with them, they would have to discard the drug instead of simply replacing the statin? In addition, do busy general practice physicians understand this? One wonders.

It therefore seems the marketing folks as well as the drug naming approval organizations and the FDA carry significant blame for the "confusion." Perhaps this is a case of the unexpected (or should I say the predictable but undesired?) happening that provides evidence drug combinations should not be given snappy new names or approved as expensive "new" drugs.

Finally, I cannot but think it ironic that just as VIOXX and other similar drugs may have caused platelets and/or blood vessel walls to become more "sticky" and create vascular side effects, so ezetimibe might cause cholesterol and/or blood vessels to be more "sticky" for reasons not yet understood and negate some of the cholesterol lowering effects. It would be ironic indeed, as the newspaper article suggests by the observation "the combination drug failed to provide any benefit and even performed slightly worse than Zocor alone", if long term studies show ezetimibe to create more harm than good.

However, clinicians, the company and the regulators should be prepared if this occurs to get the data out ASAP when it is available fron ongoing studies - low morale or not.

-- SS

BLOGSCAN - The Sorts of People Who Get to Run Large Health Care Organizations

Back blogging on BrandweekNRX, Dr Peter Rost just posted about the sort of people who now run Schering-Plough, the company that, with Merck Inc, just got a lot of unfavorable publicity after it was involved in delaying the release of results from the ENHANCE trial of ezeimibe (see our last related post here.)

According to Rost, "Sean McNicholas is now Schering-Plough's Senior Vice President, responsible for ZETIA and VYTORIN, reporting directly to [Schering-Plough President] Carrie Cox, who dumped $28 million SGP stock last year." Previously, "Sean McNicholas was Vice President Marketing, Endocrine Care, Pharmacia, responsible for Genotropin marketing until the year 2001." But, "Pharmacia entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the Government for its illegal promotion of Genotropin for such 'off-label' uses as anti-aging, cosmetic use and athletic performance enhancement...."

Furthermore, "Carrie Cox was Vice President, Women's Health Care at Wyeth, responsible for marketing of Prempro and for Pondimin and Redux, two slimming products.... In September 1997, the FDA requested the withdrawal of Pondimin and Redux [parts of the fen-phen weight loss drug combinations] and Wyeth ended up paying well over $20 billion in class action settlements to women who alleged heart valve damage."

It makes one wonder about the sorts of people who get to run big health care organizations, especially in an environment where there seem to be no negative consequences when top leaders make poor decisions.

Why Should Patients Continue to Take Ezetimibe?: More Fallout from the ENHANCE Trial

We have posted before (as have many others, see below) about problems with the ENHANCE trial of ezetimibe (Zetia, by Schering-Plough, and one component of Vytorin, by Merck), and how the trial was designed and implemented seemed meant to increase the likelihood of a favorable result for the sponsors' interests. Particularly controversial was the sponsors' decision to change the definition of the trial's outcome variable after the data was collected. That decision was then reversed. Later, it turned out that this decision was at the behest of a supposedly "independent" panel, but one which included a majority of members who had previous financial ties to Merck and/or Schering-Plough.

Under intense media pressure, the results of this study were just released. As summarized by theHeart.org, they showed no statistically significant improvement in the thickness of arterial walls for patients who received ezetimibe, and no statistically significant decrease in the rates of revascularization, stroke, myocardial infarction (heart attack), or cardiovascular death in the group of patients given the drug. (The study was not big enough to have much statistical power to detect such an improvement, but the rates of all these outcomes except stroke were actually greater in the ezetimibe group.)

Up until the the release of these results, no study had shown that ezetimibe produces any clinical benefit, e.g., prevents heart attacks or strokes, prolongs life, etc. And the long-delayed results of the ENHANCE trial again showed no such benefit. Thus, why should any patient take this drug? Perhaps there is an argument that patients with pre-existing coronary artery disease with elevated cholesterol and who cannot tolerate a "statin" could use ezetimibe as a last resort, and with caution even then.

So it was surprising to see two major organizations dedicated to fighting heart disease so quickly rush to defend the use of ezetimibe. First, as posted by Ed Silverman on the PharmaLot blog, the American College of Cardiology (ACC) issued a statement that mainly warned physicians not to take patients off ezetimibe nor make "major clinical decisions" based upon the new study.

Soon after the ACC statement was released, Ed Silverman also blogged that the American Heart Association issued its own statement. In it, AHA president Dr Daniel W Jones also warned against precipitously stopping ezetimibe (again, despite a complete lack of evidence that the drug does patients any good.)

Why were both reports so concerned with keeping patients on a drug that had never been shown to be of benefit? The answer is not clear.

However, Ed Silverman also noted that the ACC report "was drafted by an unnamed group of ACC leaders and so-called prevention experts, and approved by the ACC president. Among those involved was Roger Blumenthal, a professor of medicine at Johns Hopkins University, who chairs the ACC’s committee on prevention of cardiovascular disease. However, Blumenthal is also on the speaker’s bureau for Merck and Schering-Plough, and has received unspecified research grants from Merck." There is also evidence that the ACC at least was previously supported by Merck. The Center for Science in the Public Interest reported that the ACC Foundation received $500,000 - $749,999 from Merck in 2002. (So far I have not been able to find any newer information about corporate sponsorship of the ACC or its foundation, one way or the other.)

Furthermore, not acknowledged in the AHA statement was Dr Jones' previous financial ties to Merck. He disclosed in the 2003 JAMA publication of the JNC 7 report that he was a consultant for the company. [Chobanian AV, Bakris GL, Black HR et al. The seventh report of the Joint National Committee on Prevention, Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Pressure: the JNC 7 report. JAMA 2003; 289: 2560-2572. Link here.] Furthermore, the American Heart Association receives substantial current funding from Merck and Merck/Schering-Plough. In its 2007 report, both corporations were listed as donors in the $1,000,000 -4,999,999 range.

So this case has many lessons. It is yet another reminder of the pervasive web of conflicts of interest that entangles so many physicians, medical academics, physicians' organizations, and other health care non-profit groups.

For the final words, let me quote Dr Stefan Kertesz, who was commenting on the pervasiveness of conflicts of interest affecting the 2004 National Cholesterol Education Panel guidelines that suggested drastic lowering of cholesterol for patients with heart disease and diabetes. (Hat tip for this to DB's Medical Rants.) These controversial guidelines may be one reason physicians feel compelled to use drugs to lower cholesterol which have, like ezetimibe, no proven independent benefits for their patients.

I'm not suggesting that these experts have opinions for sale. The problem is that when data are conflicting, wishful thinking and commercial interests may supplant a rational consideration of the facts.

To protect patients we need to do two things:

We should demand entirely public disclosure of the financial ties for any expert who helps define the standards for quality in health care. And we should demand that at least some of our experts come from outside the industry, altogether.

The point is this: The science of drug development and the science of quality in health care represent two very different enterprises. If we continue to let the drug developers have such a strong hand in defining quality, we will continue to fall prey to conjecture, to wishful thinking and hype. It would be best for our health to keep these two enterprises separate.

Who Decided to Change the Outcome Variable of the ENHANCE Trial of Ezetimibe?

We have posted before (as have many others, see below) about problems with the ENHANCE trial of ezetimibe (Zetia, by Schering-Plough, and one component of Vytorin, by Merck), and how the trial was designed and implemented seemed meant to increase the likelihood of a favorable result for the sponsors' interests. Particularly controversial was the sponsors' decision to change the definition of the trial's outcome variable after the data was collected. That decision was then reversed.

Today, Matthew Herper, writing in Forbes, described how the decision to change the outcome variable was made. First, the decision was made apparently entirely without any involvement by the ostensible principle investigator of the study.

Forbes has learned that the lead investigator charged with conducting the study, John J. P. Kastelein of the University of Amsterdam, was not even present when the companies made the controversial decision to change its goals, an unusual circumstance in such situations.

It's 'shocking' that Kastelein would not be party to discussion of the ENHANCE trial, says Harlan Krumholz, a cardiologist at Yale University. 'There should be a scientific committee that's independent running a study. He should be taking a leadership role.'

Asked about Kastelein not being present, Lee Davies, a Schering-Plough spokesman, said only, 'I will confirm that this was an independent expert panel.' Kastelein could not be reached for comment Wednesday or Thursday, but in the past he has said he disagreed with the company's decision to change the endpoint of the trial. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal in December, he said he breathed a 'sigh of relief' when it was changed back.

Next, Herper listed the members of the supposedly independent panel.

The list of those on the panel, obtained by Forbes, is filled with well-regarded experts in the field and should satisfy critics left wondering who was behind the recommendation to change the goals. It's not a wide-ranging committee of experts on clinical trials, but instead a group with expertise on studying the arteries with imaging technology. Four are top experts in the field of using ultrasound to take pictures of artery plaque. David Orloff, as a former Food and Drug Administration official, has expertise in exactly what regulatory challenges might be posed by changes to a clinical trial.

The panel: J. Robin Crouse and Gregory W. Evans of Wake Forest University, who conducted a study using Crestor, a rival cholesterol drug from AstraZeneca; David G. Orloff, medical director of Medpace, a company that conducts clinical trials for drug firms and the former head of the FDA division that handled the approvals of Zetia and Vytorin; Michiel L. Bots of the Julius Center for Health Sciences and Primary Care University Medical Center Utrecht, Netherlands, who has worked on similar studies and James H. Stein of the University of Wisconsin, who has conducted studies on the treatment of heart disease in patients with HIV and how various substances affect artery walls.

But is this panel really so independent? Using PubMed, I searched for conflict of interest disclosures made by its members. Guess what - you can see this one coming, can't you -

• J. Robin Crouse - "Dr Crouse reported receiving grant or salary support from Merck, Merck-Schering Plough, Pfizer, AstraZeneca, and Kos Pharmaceuticals; and giving lectures for Merck, Merck-Schering Plough, Pfizer, AstraZeneca, Abbott, and Kos Pharmaceuticals." (1)
• Gregory W. Evans - "Mr Evans reported receiving grant support and honoraria from AstraZeneca, Organon, and Pfizer; and being a consultant to AstraZeneca and Pfizer."(1)
• David G. Orloff - "David G. Orloff, MD, serves as a consultant to Amylin, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Glaxo-SmithKline, ISIS, Merck & Co., Inc., Novo Nordisk, Pfizer Inc, Roche, Takeda Pharmaceuticals, Vivus, and Wyeth; and owns stock in Abbott Laboratories Inc., Amgen, Genentech, Genzyme, Johnson & Johnson, Eli Lilly, Merck & Co., Inc., Pfizer Inc, and Wyeth."(2)
• Michiel L. Bots - "Dr Bots reported receiving study grants for studies on carotid intima-media thickness and/or honoraria for professional input on carotid intima-media thickness issues from AstraZeneca, Icelandic Heart Foundation, Organon, Pfizer, the Netherlands Heart Foundation, the Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and Development, Servier, and Unilever."(1)
• James H. Stein - " Dr Stein has received research or grant funding from AstraZeneca, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Kos, LipoScience, PreMD, and Sanofi-Aventis, in addition to serving as a consultant to or on the speakers’ bureau for Kos, LipoScience, Merck, Pfizer, Schering-Plough, and Takeda."(3)
  

I presume that all the panel members were paid by Merck or Schering-Plough for their service on it. But all five panel members had other financial arrangements with multiple pharmaceutical companies, and three had other financial arrangements with Merck, or both Merck and Schering-Plough. So this panel may have been independent of the principal investigator of the study, but it did not seem independent of the two corporate sponsors of the study.

Thus, the case of the ENHANCE trial of ezetimibe appears to be an even stronger example of how commercial sponsors of clinical research may try to manipulate studies in ways likely to produce results favorable to their products and vested financial interests. We have posted frequently about cases in which a sponsor manipulated the design, implementation, analysis, or dissemination of clinical research to increase the likelihood that the results would favor the sponsor's product (e.g., recently here and here). One important study showed the contractual basis for such manipulation when studies are done in academic medical environments (see post here). In extreme cases, sponsors have attempted to suppress the research results entirely when they turn out to be unfavorable to their interests (e.g., see recent post here). Such manipulation, of course, is bad for patients and doctors, since it impedes their ability to make decisions about tests, treatments etc based on the best clinical evidence. It also betrays the trust of people who volunteer to participate in research thinking that the goal is to improve health care and advance science.

Although this case is striking, and has received considerable attention in the media and the blogsphere, it has been largely ignored in the health care and medical literature, the dominant source of information for physicians and health care professionals. On the Scientific Misconduct Blog, Dr Aubrey Blumsohn cataloged how extensively this case has been discussed on blogs, listing 35 related posts in the top 100 medical blogs since November. But he could find not a single mention of it in the best known English language medical journals, the British Medical Journal, Lancet, JAMA, or the New England Journal of Medicine. He asked, "One wonders how long our key medical journals will retain any credibility as honest impartial portals for discussion of science and the principles of good medicine." Thus this case also seems to be yet another example of what we have called the anechoic effect, the failure of stories about questionable ethics or bad leadership in health care to create the echoes one might expect (see post here).

See also coverage on the PharmaLot blog, updated here.

References

1. Crouse JR, Raichlen JS, Riley WA, Evans GW, Palmer MK, O'Leary DH, Grobbee DE, Mots ML, for the METEOR Study Group. Effect of rosuvastatin on progression of carotid intima-media thickness in low-risk individuals with subclinical atherosclerosis: The METEOR Trial. JAMA. 2007;297:1344-1353. (Link here.)

2. Orloff DG. Regulatory considerations in the development of high-density lipoprotein therapies. Am J Cardiol 2007; 100[suppl]: 10N-14N.

3. Keevil JG, Cullen MW, Gangnon R, McBride PE, Stein JH. Implications of cardiac risk and low-density lipoprotein cholesterol distributions in the United States for the diagnosis and treatment of dyslipidemia: data from National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey 1999 to 2002. Circulation. 2007;115:1363-1370. (Link here.)

Data About Ezetimibe Adverse Effects Suppressed?

Here we go again. Last week, an article by Alex Berenson in the New York Times reported that Merck and Schering-Plough conducted trials of ezetimibe (Zetia, by Schering-Plough, and a component of Vytorin, by Merck) "that raise questions about its risks to the liver," but never publicly reported their results.

Partial results of the studies, alluded to in documents on the Food and Drug Administration’s Web site, raise questions about whether Zetia can cause liver damage when used long term with other cholesterol drugs called statins.

A Schering executive, when asked by a reporter about the unpublished studies, confirmed their existence. But the executive, Dr. Robert J. Spiegel, said the companies had not considered the studies scientifically important enough to publish their findings. Some may eventually be published, he said.

The unpublished Zetia studies, devised as safety tests, would not prove the drug’s effectiveness. But they would give the public more information about Zetia’s potential risks. All the unpublished studies covered periods at least one year in length and were intended to show whether long-term use of Zetia might pose dangers that short-term use did not.

Most of the studies about Zetia in which Merck and Schering have published the results covered periods of only 12 weeks — not enough time for liver problems to develop in most patients.

The unpublished studies, conducted from 2000 to 2003 according to the F.D.A. documents, were not listed on the industry Web sites where companies are supposed to register the results of all drug trials that were ongoing after October 2002. The New York Times discovered references to the studies in briefing papers on the F.D.A. Web site.

Together those studies cover several thousand patients who took Zetia along with statins for one to two years. The statins include Lipitor and Crestor, as well as Zocor, which is usually prescribed generically as simvastatin and is the statin used in the Vytorin pill. Doctors often add Zetia to a low dosage of a statin, because Zetia reduces cholesterol in a different way than the statins do and leads to deeper overall cholesterol reductions.

'We’re pretty comfortable that people don’t have trouble tolerating Zetia,' said Dr. Spiegel, the chief medical officer of the Schering-Plough Research Institute, Kenilworth, N.J.

I agree more with this response by Dr Harlan Krumholz, from Yale.

We keep telling people we want to practice evidence-based medicine, and what we keep finding out is that much of the evidence is obscured.

There is important evidence, but it’s not in public view. It’s hidden from investigators.

As I have noted now it seems ad infinitum, to make the best decisions about patient care, physicians and patients need access to the best relevant evidence from clinical studies. Concealing evidence about, say, the toxicities of a particular drug may lead to bad decisions, specifically, prescribing the drug when its possible harms outweigh its risks.

In addition, suppressing the results of clinical research betrays the trust of human research subjects who were participating because they thought the research might advance science and/or patient care. Obviously, suppressed research can do neither.

This is one more anecdote suggesting that either clinical research sponsored by the companies who make the products the research is meant to evaluate needs much stronger regulation, or such research should be taken entirely out of the hands of the companies who stand to benefit if its results turn out a certain way.

See also comments in the Clinical Psychology and Psychiatry Blog, the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog (with clinical and clinical epidemiologic background), the Medical Evidence Blog (suggesting a boycott of ezetimibe), and the Scientific Misconduct Blog (warning, contains adult language.)

Manipulation of ENHANCE Reversed

We, and many others have written about problems with the ENHANCE trial of ezetimibe (Zetia, by Schering-Plough, and one component of Vytorin, by Merck), and how aspects of it seemed meant to increase the likelihood of a favorable result for the sponsors' interests. Particularly controversial was the sponsors' decision to change the definition of the trial's outcome variable after the data was collected. After considerable public discussion, and the threat of a US congressional investigation, things have changed, as Ron Winslow reported in the Wall Street Journal,

The lead researcher of a long-delayed drug study says he regrets not standing up to Merck & Co. and Schering-Plough Corp. when they first told him last month that they planned to alter the statistical analysis of their jointly sponsored trial.

Under mounting criticism, the companies last week reversed the earlier decision to change the primary measure to evaluate the drug.

John P. Kastelein, a cardiologist at Academic Medical Center, Amsterdam, and principal investigator of the study, said he breathed a 'sigh of relief' when the companies told him last week they were reversing course.

'It's never, ever right to change the primary endpoint of a study,' especially after all the data are in, he says. 'It is statistically not good and it gives the wrong impression to the outside world.' He says he initially went along with the plan but now regrets not firmly resisting it from the outset.

He says the episode was the culmination of a long-running battle over the conduct of the trial and the companies' worries that some deficiencies in the data would jeopardize a good result.

We have posted frequently about cases in which a sponsor manipulated the design, implementation, analysis, or dissemination of clinical research to increase the likelihood that the results would favor the sponsor's product (e.g., recently here and here). One important study showed the contractual basis for such manipulation when studies are done in academic medical environments (see post here). In extreme cases, sponsors have attempted to suppress the research results entirely when they turn out to be unfavorable to their interests (e.g., see recent post here). Such manipulaton, of course, is bad for patients and doctors, since it impedes their ability to make decisions about tests, treatments etc based on the best clinical evidence. It also betrays the trust of people who volunteer to participate in research thinking that the goal is to improve health care and advance science.

So this case is unusual, in that an early public outcry resulted in at least some of the clinical research manipulation being reversed. There may be hope yet.

Is it (Clinical) Research, or is it (Pharmaceutical) Marketing? - the ENHANCE Trial of Ezetimibe

The story of the delay in reporting results of the ENHANCE trial of ezetimibe (Zetia, by Schering-Plough, and one component of Vytorin, by Merck) was reported by Matthew Herper in Forbes, Alex Berenson in the New York Times, and theHeart.org and MedScape. Then several prominent skeptical bloggers, including Howard Brody on the Hooked: Ethics Medicine, and Pharma blog, Dr Aubrey Blumsohn on the Scientific Misconduct Blog, and Dr Scott Aberegg on the Medical Evidence Blog analyzed the situation. Therefore, I need not post a lot of detail.

Basically, although ezetimibe has been shown to reduce LDL ("bad") cholesterol, it has never been shown that using the drug to do so produces any clinical benefit, e.g., prevents heart attacks or strokes, prolongs life, etc. The ENHANCE trial was designed to determine whether the drug at least reduced arterial obstruction, thought to be a good predictor of bad clinical events. After reporting of the trial's results was delayed, it became evident that:

• The trial's Principal Investigator had no access to the trial's original data, and no control over how the data was analyzed.
• The data was owned and analyzed by the drug companies that nominally "sponsored" the trial.
• The same drug companies decided to change the trial's endpoint after the trial was implemented and the data was collected.
• The companies justified the decision as coming from an expert panel they convened (and presumably paid for.) However, they did not reveal who was on the panel.

As Doctors Brody, Blumsohn, and Aberegg pointed out, this trial is just the latest poster child for how pharmaceutical manufacturers (and other health care corporations) can manipulate the design, implementation, analysis, and reporting of clinical research they sponsor so as to make their products look as good as possible. Is it (clinical) research, or is it (pharmaceutical) marketing?

My main addition to the expert commentary already made about this trial is that not only does the control of clinical research by organizations with vested interests in having the research turn out a certain way challenge the research's validity. It also is an affront to the research subjects who thought they were participating in a study meant to advance science and possibly health care.

Pay for Malfeasance?

"Pay for Performance" (P4P) is the current fashion in health care management. It is claimed that P4P will improve quality and reduce costs. The burden of most P4P efforts falls squarely on physicians, especially primary care and other "cognitive" physicians, groups who are already faltering under considerable external stress. We most recently posted about P4P here, here and here.

Yet although "pay for performance" is an attractive concept, all things being equal, it hardly reflects how things work in the rest of the global >$2 trillion health care system.

Take, for example, the recent case of Schering-Plough (see our post here). The drug company just settled civil and criminal charges for about $435 million. Yesterday, the Wall Street Journal provided some additional coverage (here, but requires subscription).

According to the Journal, penalties in the recent settlement were divided. "Schering-Plough, of Kenilworth, N.J., will pay $255 million to settle related civil accusations. Its Schering Sales unit will pay a $180 million criminal fine." In addition, "Schering Sales agreed to plead guilty to one count of criminal conspiracy for making false statements regarding its price for Claritin as negotiated with a health plan and for lying to the Food and Drug Administration about its promotion of Temodar and Intron A. Except for that plea, Schering-Plough neither admitted or denied other wrongdoing alleged in the settlement." So, "'With this agreement, we are putting issues from the past behind us,' Brent Saunders, senior vice president of global compliance and business practices, said in a statement." The Journal noted, "A company's criminal conviction or guilty plea can often be fatal. But in its health-care cases, the government has repeatedly reached settlements that exact a guilty plea while avoiding the direst consequences. The guilty plea from Schering Sales means it can no longer sell drugs to the government, but its marketing functions have been taken over by other parts of the company, which are permitted to continue doing business with Medicaid and Medicare. Schering Sales 'is an entity whose sole purpose is to plead guilty in these matters,' said Mr. Saunders. 'Schering-Plough takes responsibility for the actions of the past while not putting patients in a position where they can't get important medications,' he said.

I certainly understand the public's interest in continuing the production of beneficial pharmaceuticals. But what is striking about this case is that no individual at Schering-Plough took responsibility for the company's admittedly criminal conduct.

A search revealed that the former CEO of the company, Richard Jay Kogan, did retire early in 2002 after a variety of allegations about the company's conduct surfaced. But as far as I can tell, he paid no other penalty, presumably getting to keep all his retirement benefits, stock options, etc. After Kogan left, the new CEO, Fred Hassan, made many management changes, so presumably other top managers retired early, or were even fired. However, I could find no record of anyone paying a clear penalty for the company's admitted criminal behavior, or for the losses that it incurred due to that behavior. Of course, it's possible that relevant law-suits are pending.

Some commentators have said that executive pay has gotten so ridiculous, and has so little relationship to any measure of performance, that it should be called "pay for pulse." (For example, see this commentary on the "5 lousy CEOs who got fabulous pay," including one famous pharmaceutical company CEO.)

So what would you call the failure of companies to apply negative incentives to executives who have presided over criminal behavior: "pay for perpetration?" "Pay for malfeasance?" I'll take some suggestions.

I am aghast at the hypocrisy that touts pay for performance for primary care doctors as a solution to all our problems, while silence reigns about pay for malfeasance by health care executives.

WHAT YOU CAN DO? - If you own stock in a public for-profit health care company that has recently admitted to misconduct or has had to make a huge financial settlement in response to civil litigation (see the Health Care Renewal archives for examples), demand changes in your company's governance such that negative incentives apply to the leaders responsible for these problems.

If you are a physician, demand that P4P must apply to the whole health care system if it is to apply to physicians.

And maybe everyone should write their congresspeople demanding better regulation of the leaders of health care organizations, at least sufficient to hold people responsible for their worst decisions.

Schering-Plough Settles, Again, Again

'Tis the season to settle, so it seems...

Multiple media sources just reported that Schering-Plough has settled civil and criminal charges. Representative coverage is by the Boston Globe, and AP via the Houton Chronicle. The essence, quoted from the AP, follows:

Schering-Plough Corp. on Tuesday agreed to pay $435 million and plead guilty to conspiracy to settle a federal investigation into marketing of its drugs for unapproved uses and overcharging Medicaid for certain drugs.

Kenilworth, N.J.-based Schering-Plough said it will pay $255 million to resolve civil aspects of the previously disclosed investigation. A subsidiary, Schering Sales Corp., will pay a criminal fine of $180 million and plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to make false statements to the government. The agreement is subject to court approval.

Schering-Plough said the settlement resolves an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney's Office in Boston that began before a new management team took over at the company in April 2003.

'With this agreement, we are putting issues from the past behind us,' said Brent Saunders, senior vice president for compliance and business practices.

The agreement comes two years after Schering-Plough agreed to pay $346 million to settle charges that it paid a kickback to a big health insurer to protect the market for its allergy drug, Claritin.

U.S. Attorney Michael Sullivan, who announced Tuesday's settlement in a news conference in Boston, said health care corruption 'erodes public confidence, compromises the patient/physician relationship and adds costs to important government programs.'

Investigators found evidence that Schering-Plough marketed drugs for so-called 'off-label' uses.... One such drug was Temodar, which the Food & Drug Administration in 1999 approved to treat anaplastic astrocytoma, a type of brain tumor, in patients who hadn't responded to other drug regimens. Sullivan said Schering promoted the drug to treat several other types of brain cancers and cancer that spread to the brain from elsewhere, which the FDA had not approved.

Saunders said the company has agreed to plead guilty to making false statements in marketing Temodar, related to its sales people promoting the drug to doctors for uses other than the approved one.

Investigators said they also found evidence of unapproved promotion of Intron A for the treatment of cancer on the surface of the bladder.

Drug manufacturers are required to report their best price on drugs provided to commercial customers, including HMOs, to the Health Care Financing Administration and to pay rebates to the Medicaid program to make sure Medicaid obtains the benefit of that low price.

Prosecutors said that from April 1998 through 1999, Schering Sales reported a false best price to HCFA to avoid paying millions of dollars in additional rebates to Medicaid.

The investigation also found evidence of pricing manipulation involving K-Dur, used to treat stomach conditions.

Notet that this was the second biggest settlement by Schering-Plough in two years. According to the Globe, it was the third big settlement in five years. The total that the company will pay out from all will be "about $1.3 billion."

It all is becoming so familiar, almost wearisome, yet the questions remain. Why do the mainly monetary penalties seem mainly to come out of the hides of stock-holders and consumers, rather than the people who actually made the decisions that lead to the offenses? And after all the indictments, prosecutions, settlements, and convictions involving large health care organizations, when will academics, policy makers and politicians, much less company CEOs and other organizational leaders admit we have a systematic problem here?