Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2019: Political Corruption in the US Worsens, and Results are Largely Anechoic

Transparency International has just released its 2019 version of the Corruption Perceptions Index.  This version emphasized public sector corruption.  Once again, it appears the US has a worsening corruption problem.  Once again, the results are largely anechoic.

Summary of the 2019 CPI

Methods

Per the TI summary

The CPI scores 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption, according to experts and business people.

The CPI uses a scale from 0 to 100.  100 is very clear and 0 is highly corrupt.

Results

TI provides CPI results for 180 countries.

The US had a score of 69, tied with France for 23rd best.  The score has declined since 2015 (when it was 76).

TI designated the US as a country to watch, with the following explanation:

With a score of 69, the United States drops two points since last year to earn its lowest score on the CPI in eight years. This comes at a time when Americans’ trust in government is at an historic low of 17 per cent, according to the Pew Research Center.

The US faces a wide range of challenges, from threats to its system of checks and balances, and the ever-increasing influence of special interests in government, to the use of anonymous shell companies by criminals, corrupt individuals and even terrorists, to hide illicit activities.

While President Trump campaigned on a promise of 'draining the swamp' and making government work for more than just Washington insiders and political elites, a series of scandals, resignations and allegations of unethical behaviour suggest that the 'pay-to-play' culture has only become more entrenched. In December 2019, the US House of Representatives formally impeached President Trump for abuse of power and obstruction of Congress.

The report emphasized that many countries, including the US, had increasing problems with political integrity:

This year, our research highlights the relationship between politics, money and corruption. Unregulated flows of big money in politics also make public policy vulnerable to undue influence.

Countries with stronger enforcement of campaign finance regulations have lower levels of corruption, as measured by the CPI. Countries where campaign finance regulations are comprehensive and systematically enforced have an average score of 70 on the CPI, whereas countries where such regulations either don’t exist or are poorly enforced score an average of just 34 and 35 respectively.

Sixty per cent of countries that significantly improved their CPI scores since 2012 also strengthened their enforcement of campaign finance regulations.

In addition, when policy-makers listen only to wealthy or politically connected individuals and groups, they often do so at the expense of the citizens they serve.

Countries with broader and more open consultation processes score an average of 61 on the CPI. By contrast, where there is little to no consultation, the average score is just 32.

A vast majority of countries that significantly declined their CPI scores since 2012 do not engage the most relevant political, social and business actors in political decision-making.

Countries with lower CPI scores also have a higher concentration of political power among wealthy citizens. Across the board, there is a concerning popular perception that rich people buy elections, both among some of the lowest-scoring countries on the CPI, as well as among certain higher-scoring countries, such as the United States.

The Anechoic Effect Lives

At least the 2019 CPI got some attention in 2020, as did the 2017 version (look here).  I found articles briefly summarizing the US results in a few US media outlets: Bloomberg (behind a paywall), the Associated Press (here, via the New York Times), and Forbes. There was also one op-ed, again in the WaPo.

This was some improvement from how previous relevant results from TI research were covered earlier.   There was virtually  no coverage of a 2013 survey that showed 43% of US respondents believed that US health care was corrupt.

One could argue even so that the current coverage of the 2019 report was inadequate given the importance of the topic and the apparent worsening of the US corruption problem.  This lack of coverage inspired me to write this post, in the hopes of making the issue just a little less anechoic

Discussion

We have argued again and again that health care corruption is an important reason for US (and global) health care dysfunction.  As we wrote in 2019,  Transparency International (TI) defines corruption as

Abuse of entrusted power for private gain

In 2006, TI published a report on health care corruption, which asserted that corruption is widespread throughout the world, serious, and causes severe harm to patients and society.

the scale of corruption is vast in both rich and poor countries.

Also,

Corruption might mean the difference between life and death for those in need of urgent care. It is invariably the poor in society who are affected most by corruption because they often cannot afford bribes or private health care. But corruption in the richest parts of the world also has its costs.

The report got little attention.  Health care corruption has been nearly a taboo topic in the US, anechoic, presumably because its discussion would offend the people it makes rich and powerful. As suggested by the recent Transparency International report on corruption in the pharmaceutical industry,

However, strong control over key processes combined with huge resources and big profits to be made make the pharmaceutical industry particularly vulnerable to corruption. Pharmaceutical companies have the opportunity to use their influence and resources to exploit weak governance structures and divert policy and institutions away from public health objectives and towards their own profit maximising interests.

Presumably the leaders of other kinds of corrupt organizations can do the same. 

When health care corruption is discussed in English speaking developed countries, it is almost always in terms of a problem that affects some other places, mainly  presumably benighted less developed countries.  At best, the corruption in developed countries that gets discussed is at low levels.  In the US, frequent examples are the "pill mills"  and various cheating of government and private insurance programs by practitioners and patients.  Lately these have gotten even more attention as they are decried as a cause of the narcotics (opioids) crisis (e.g., look here).  In contrast, historically the US government has been less inclined to address the activities of the leaders of the pharmaceutical companies who have pushed legal narcotics (e.g., see this post). 

However, Health Care Renewal has stressed "grand corruption," or the corruption of health care leaders.  We have noted the continuing impunity of top health care corporate managers.  Health care corporations have allegedly used kickbacks and fraud to enhance their revenue, but at best such corporations have been able to make legal settlements that result in fines that small relative to their  multi-billion revenues without admitting guilt.  Almost never are top corporate managers subject to any negative consequences.

We have been posting about this for years at Health Care Renewal, while seeing little progress on this issue.  Now the problem appears to be getting worse in the US.  We have argued that a major reason is the miasma of corruption now surrounding the top of the US government, specifically the Trump administration (see again this 2019 post).

Now the TI discussion of its 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index points to increasing problems of public sector corruption in the US. Many of the issues it cites have been discussed on Health Care Renewal, including: problems in "campaign finance regulation" and "perception that rich people buy elections" (see our discussion of dark money); and "policy-makers [who] listen only to wealthy or politically connected individuals and groups" (see our discussion of the revolving door and regulatory capture).

The op-ed by Hough in the Washington Post included this parallel discussion:

First, successful anti-corruption policy centers on transparency and accountability. Reports such as this one by the UNDP make a strong case that clear lines of accountability improve the quality of governance, and sharpen attempts to fight corruption. Openness and transparency also need to be default settings. These are both areas where the U.S. could improve. The tone set by Donald Trump, whether by refusing to publish his tax returns or personally profiting from his position as president is indicative of a much broader problem. Neither transparency nor accountability are ever absolute, but analysts find plenty of scope for the U.S. to improve.

Second, the more opaque and complex the relationship between money and power, the more difficult it is to pinpoint and counteract corrupt relationships. Again, getting this right is not an exact science — and there’s no perfect system for funding political activity. But campaign finance, along with lobbying, are what corruption scholar Michael Johnston calls influence markets — areas where the wealthy can trade money for influence on policy outcomes. In other words, the rules and regulations let rich benefactors buy themselves a hearing. Yes, there are countries in worse positions, but that doesn’t hide the fact that the U.S. is also far from a model pupil.

And third, fewer Americans now trust either the politicians that rule them or indeed the institutions that help shape public life. Successful anti-corruption is built around integrity management, which requires public servants to act in appropriate ways — but also be seen acting in such ways. The highest ethical and moral standards — and transparency about potential conflicts of interest and recognizing when personal and public interests clash — would let U.S. citizens begin to believe that a cleanup of American government was underway.

In summary, there is growing evidence of a worsening corruption problem in the US.  As of today, responses to it have been ineffective.  Political corruption, especially at the top of the US government, makes addressing health care corruption increasingly difficult.

So we welcome any additional attention to health care corruption, or the larger corruption within the US government that is making health care corruption even harder to address.

But even if we can take that step, when the fish is rotting from the head, it makes little sense to try to clean up minor problems halfway towards the tail. Why would a corrupt regime led by a president who is actively benefiting from corruption act to reduce corruption? The only way we can now address health care corruption is to excise the corruption at the heart of our government.

It is now over three years since Trump was inaugurated, and there has been no real progress.  The fish is still rotting, and so is health care.  What will it take to make something happen?

Who Owns, and Who is Accountable for the New US For-Profit Medical Schools?

Mysteries still abound in the not so wonderful world of health care dysfunction, so once again, quick, the game's afoot...

The current mysteries involve beneficial ownership.  Beneficial ownership questions are important to anti-corruption campaigners.  Beneficial ownership simply refers to "anyone who enjoys the benefits of ownership of a security or property, without being on the record as being the owner." (per Wikipedia). Concealing who really owns a company enables concealing sources of funds (as in money laundering), market power (when the owner also owns competitors), and sources of political influence, and enables those benefiting from the actions of the company to escape responsibility for their consequences.

We recently discussed the mystery of the beneficial ownership of a local pharmaceutical company, an issue that became more interesting when it was revealed it was owned by the Sackler family, the owners of the now somewhat infamous Purdue Pharma.  A while back we discussed the mysteries surrounding the ownership of several offshore medical schools (look here and here).

I was recently involved in a conversation about the rise of onshore, that is US based for-profit medical schools, four of which are now known to exist.  It turns out that their ownership is also rather unclear.

That for-profit medical schools now exist in the US is not widely known.  The best, and nearly only public discussion of the topic appeared in a 2017 article in JAMA [Adashi EY, Krishna GR, Grappuso PA. For-profit medical schools - a Flexnerian legacy upended.  JAMA 2017; 317: 1209-10.  Link here.]  It listed four such schools that were operating or in development.

Rocky Vista University College of Osteopathic Medicine

Rocky Vista was the first for-profit to open.  Its President is Clinton E Adams DO.  The university website is silent on its ownership.  Some searching reveals, however, that it, along with St Georges University in Grenada, is owned by Medforth Global Healthcare Education, whose CEO is Dr Andrew Sussman, who was "most recently Executive Vice President of Clinical Services at CVS Health."

However, who owns Medforth, and hence to whom Dr Sussman reports, is unclear.  We do know that in 2014, "Canadian private equity firm Altas Partners LP and pan Asia firm Baring Private Equity Asia have acquired a substantial stake in St George’s University," per Reuters.  A reference on the financial website Mergr suggested that Atlas and Baring targeted Medforth per se.  Who, in turn, actually owns Atlas and Baring, and to whom at those firms the leadership of Medforth, and thus ultimately the leadership of Rocky Vista report, is unclear.


Ponce Health Sciences University

The President of Ponce Health Sciences University is Dr David Lenihan.  According to his welcome statement,

Ponce was acquired by University Ventures Corporation in September 2014, to operate Ponce Health Sciences University and appoints Dr. David Lenihan. Dr. David Lenihan is used to taking risks. It is evidenced by his academic training in neuroscience, chiropractic and law. Also, his foray into the administrative side of science education. Recently, the greatest risk it has taken is the acquisition and transformation, through Arist Medical Sciences University, of the Ponce Health Sciences University. As the main academic officer of Arist, Lenihan guided the process of purchase and evolution of the School, a widely recognized institution with around 40 years of training professionals of excellence in the field of health in the south of Puerto Rico.

According to Bloomberg,

Arist Medical Sciences University, Public Benefit Corporation was founded in 2014. The company's line of business includes the operation of colleges and universities.

Arist Medical Sciences University is apparently part of Arist Education System.  Its website states

Arist Education System is an investment of Bertelsmann — a global media, services and education company.

Furthermore, it claims

Bertelsmann stands for entrepreneurship and creativity. This combination promotes first-class media content and innovative service solutions that inspire customers around the world. Bertelsmann’s supply of capital will support innovative graduate and professional health and human sciences programs that are making a positive impact.

So it appears that Ponce is now owned by Bertelsmann.  What a diversified global media company is doing running a medical school is not clear.

Nor is the identity to the person at Bertelsmann to whom the leadership of Arist, including Dr Lenihan, reports.  Although the Bertelsmann website lists the company's top executives, and the top managers of the Bertlesmann Education Group, the chain of command for the US for-profit medical school is not apparent.


California Northstate University College of Medicine

According to the university website, the president is Alvin Cheung, Pharm D.  The university has a board of trustees, but does not provide their biographies or explain their role.

The website provides no information about the ownership of the university, although a 2016 Sacramento Bee article stated "Backers raised more than $50 million to fund the school." I can find business listings for a California Northstate University LLC, eg here, stating it is a privately held business, but containing no information about ownership or if the business leadership is the same as the listed medical school leadership. Thus the ownership of California Northstate University LLC, and thus presumably of the medical school, is entirely opaque.


Burrell College of Osteopathic Medicine

The President is John Hummer MHA.  There is a board of trustees, chaired by Robert V Wingo, with biographies provided but whose role is not explained.

An article in the Las Cruces Sun-News from 2016 called it "a first-of-its-kind, privately funded U.S. medical school."  An Albuquerque Journal article from 2015 stated.

Burrell is entirely financed by private investors, led by Santa Fe businessman Dan Burrell in partnership with the Rice Management Co., which oversees Rice University’s $5.6 billion endowment fund. Although most public attention has centered on Burrell, a well-known real estate mogul, Rice Management is actually the majority investor in the project, estimated to cost a total of $105 million,

Other investors were not named.  Thus only some of the investors in, presumably therefore the owners of Burrell are known.  The rest are anonymous.

Discussion

The ownership of three of the four new US for-profit medical schools is unclear.  One is a private LLC whose ownership is entirely opaque.  One is partially owned by two private equity firms, whose investors are anonymous.  It may also have other, again anonymous owners.  One is owned by a group of investors, some local, some named, and some anonymous.

Anti-corruption campaigners have pushed to reveal the beneficial ownership of all corporate entities.  Transparency International's report on the problem of anonymous beneficial ownership (look here) states:

In the vast majority of countries, it remains legal for companies to hide the identity of their beneficial owners. Embezzlers use anonymously owned companies to move, launder and spend tainted money in the global financial system without being detected. Documents in the Panama Papers, for example, show how kleptocrats and their families used anonymous companies to secretly control state assets and purchase global real estate. Criminals including terrorists, human traffickers, sanctions-busters, drug dealers and tax evaders also use anonymous companies for the same reasons.

Thus anonymous ownership of any US medical school is highly troubling.  Physicians swear oaths to practice with honesty and integrity.  The institutions they train in should be above suspicion of wrong doing and corruption.  Hence medical schools should avoid practices associated with money laundering, fraud, and corruption.

Medical students, faculty, patients and accrediting boards should not trust medical schools who keep their ownership secret.

The people accountable for all four new for-profit medical schools' conduct and operations are likewise unclear. While the schools' hired managers cannot escape responsibility, it is the owners who are ultimately accountable.  But since some of the owners of three of the four new for-profit US medical schools are anonymous, some of the people actually accountable for those schools are also anonymous.


Maybe Sherlock Holmes could help...

but in his absence, medical students, faculty, patients and accrediting boards should not trust medical schools who keep the identity of those accountable for them secret.

Finally, a note about the one school which is apparently now a subsidiary of a publicly held German-based corporation.  Ultimately, the board of directors and top management of that corporation should be held accountable for that school.  However, even in this case, it would inspire more confidence of the exact lines of reporting from medical school to corporate leadership were more clear.

As Adashi et al noted, "the very notion of a for-profit medical school, anathema to generations of medical educators, is still the subject of mixed reviews."  The authors were optimistic that the higher standards for medical schools put in since the Flexner report led to the abolition of proprietary medical schools, and perhaps the supposed greater transparency of the modern era would make it possible for the new proprietary medical schools to educate students well.

However, the current for-profit schools' opacity should lead to great skepticism.  Flexner wrote:

[I]t is universally conceded that medical education cannot be conducted on proper lines at a profit, - or even at cost

His words may very well still be right.

Finally, what we now know about the new for-profit US medical schools suggests we must reexamine our fascination for "market based" approaches to health care, when almost nothing about any part of health care resembles, or could resemble a free market (see this post).  We need to make health care more transparent, and shine more sunshine on the nooks and crannies, like for-profit, anonymously owned US medical schools. 

ADDENDUM (14 January, 2020) - This post was re-posted on the Naked Capitalism blog here.

Making Abusive Contracts Great Again - Non-Disclosure Agreements, Which Have Bedeviled Employed Physicians, Go From Anechoic to Viral Courtesy Omarosa

Introduction: Confidentiality Clauses, Non-Disclosure Agreements, Non-Disparagement Clauses

In 2016, Dr Wally Smith and I published an article on how contracts employed physicians sign may threaten their patients and professionalism.(1)  At the time, we wrote,

clauses in the contracts that physicians sign with their employers or that their employers sign with third parties may be part of a growing class of subtle but protean and pernicious restrictions on employed physicians' professionalism and autonomy.  These provisions may financially benefit employers and their management. No clear arguments that they benefit patients or support physicians' professionalism have been made.

The first such provision we listed was the worst one, in our opinion.

The most pernicious threats created by employed physicians' contracts may arise from blanket confidentiality clauses. For example, a hospital system subjected physicians to an 'ironclad confidentiality clause' under which 'the doctors could not publicly discuss their situations or, for that matter, anything else of significance about the corporation' that employed them....

These were particularly troubling because

Such clauses do not obviously benefit physicians or patients; instead, they may bury evidence of poor quality or safety problems, choke whistleblowers, or conceal mismanagement and malfeasance.

The clauses had a self-referential aspect

Because these clauses [themselves] are confidential, they have rarely been discussed in public, and corporate managers have never been called to justify their existence.

Finally,

Blanket confidentiality clauses could also hide other obnoxious contract provisions.

Up to 2016, obnoxious clauses in physicians contracts were, as noted above, quite anechoic, if not mostly totally secret.  I am afraid our article did not have many echoes.  But in our brave new political era, things have changed.

Donald Trump's and Associates' Use of Confidentiality Clauses, aka Non-Disclosure Agreements

By July, 2016, it became clear that the Trump campaign was requiring staffers to sign non-disclosure agreements similar to the blanket confidentiality clauses described above.  An Associated Press article stated that the campaign meant to enforce such agreements,

Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump is seeking $10 million in damages from former senior campaign consultant Sam Nunberg, alleging that Nunberg leaked confidential information to reporters in violation of a nondisclosure agreement.

Furthermore,

Trump requires nearly everyone in his campaign and businesses to sign legally binding nondisclosure agreements prohibiting them from releasing any confidential or disparaging information about the real estate mogul, his family or his companies. Trump has also said he would consider requiring such agreements in the White House.

That prediction proved to be correct.  In March, 2018, Washington Post editor Ruth Marcus started by quoting an interview Trump had given to Post reporter Robert Costa in 2016,

Costa: 'One thing I always wondered, are you going to make employees of the federal government sign nondisclosure agreements?'

Trump: 'I think they should. . . . And I don’t know, there could be some kind of a law that you can’t do this. But when people are chosen by a man to go into government at high levels and then they leave government and they write a book about a man and say a lot of things that were really guarded and personal, I don’t like that. I mean, I’ll be honest. And people would say, oh, that’s terrible, you’re taking away his right to free speech. Well, he’s going in.'

Reader, it happened. In the early months of the administration, at the behest of now-President Trump, who was furious over leaks from within the White House, senior White House staff members were asked to, and did, sign nondisclosure agreements vowing not to reveal confidential information and exposing them to damages for any violation. Some balked at first but, pressed by then-Chief of Staff Reince Priebus and the White House Counsel’s Office, ultimately complied, concluding that the agreements would likely not be enforceable in any event.

The nondisclosure agreements, said a person who signed the document, 'were meant to be very similar to the ones that some of us signed during the campaign and during the transition. I remember the president saying, ‘Has everybody signed a confidentiality agreement like they did during the campaign or we had at Trump Tower?’ '

Again, this implied that Trump and his business associates had long had a policy of requiring non-disclosure agreements (confidentiality clauses) of most if not all employees..

In addition, the agreements apparently were supposed to be valid in perpetuity.

Moreover, said the source, this confidentiality pledge would extend not only after an aide’s White House service but also beyond the Trump presidency. 'It’s not meant to be constrained by the four years or eight years he’s president — or the four months or eight months somebody works there. It is meant to survive that.'

The provisions were extremely broad, blanket if you willl .

It would expose violators to penalties of $10 million, payable to the federal government, for each and any unauthorized revelation of 'confidential' information, defined as 'all nonpublic information I learn of or gain access to in the course of my official duties in the service of the United States Government on White House staff,' including 'communications . . . with members of the press' and 'with employees of federal, state, and local governments.' The $10 million figure, I suspect, was watered down in the final version, because the people to whom I have spoken do not remember that jaw-dropping sum.

It would prohibit revelation of this confidential information in any form — including, get this, 'the publication of works of fiction that contain any mention of the operations of the White House, federal agencies, foreign governments, or other entities interacting with the United States Government that is based on confidential information.'

These agreements were apparently required even though they appeared to be blatantly unconstitutional.

Unlike employees of private enterprises such as the Trump Organization or Trump campaign, White House aides have First Amendment rights when it comes to their employer, the federal government. If you have a leaker on your staff, the cure is firing, not suing.

'This is crazy,' said attorney Debra Katz, who has represented numerous government whistleblowers and negotiated nondisclosure agreements. 'The idea of having some kind of economic penalty is an outrageous effort to limit and chill speech. Once again, this president believes employees owe him a personal duty of loyalty, when their duty of loyalty is to the institution.'

A New York Times article again from March suggested that these agreements were required not just from White House staff, but from journalists who embarked on official administration trips.

Mr. Trump’s White House has also broken with convention in trying to impose written nondisclosure agreements in other instances. A small group of journalists scheduled to travel on a trip to Afghanistan with Vice President Mike Pence were instructed in December to sign a confidentiality agreement before they would be given the details of the trip, for security reasons.

The issue of blanket confidentiality agreements now being used in government despite Constitutional free speech guarantees caused a brief ripple in the force, but that soon faded away, until Omarosa, that is.

Omarosa's Case Puts Non-Disclosure Agreements in the Headlines

This month it seemed impossible to avoid the saga of Omarosa Manigault Newman whose tell-all book about the president and his administration was just published to great tumult.  Ms Manigault Newman was the former reality television villain of Trump's Apprentice program.  She became a campaign aide (and somewhat infamously warned us that all Trump's critics would be forced to bow down to him, look here), then a White House aide with unclear duties, only to leave abruptly.  The story was everywhere in the media, and soon involved her allegations that she was pushed to accept "hush money" not to reveal goings on in the White House.  In fact, it became apparent that a blanket confidentiality agreement was one means Trump meant to use to keep her quiet.

On August 12, 2018, per Politico, KellyAnne Conway, erswhile WH drug czar (look here) said in an interview

'It is typical, and you know it, to sign an NDA … in any place of work,' Conway, counselor to the president, said to host Jonathan Karl on ABC’s 'This Week.' 'I’d be shocked if you didn’t have one at ABC.'

'I’m told she signed them when she was on 'the Apprentice,’ certainly at the campaign. We’ve all signed them in the West Wing,' she added. 'And why wouldn’t we?'

Again, Ms Conway did not seem to recognize that there should be any differences in what goes on in the government and in a private business.  Furthermore, the implication was that non-disclosure agreements, or blanket confidentiality agreements, are now standard practice in private business, and are worthwhile and objectionable.  Of course, she did not give any reasoned justification for their use in business, much less any explanation how their use in the executive branch was not a blatant violation of the First Amendment.  But onward,...

Just to underline the similarity with practices were originally discussed in 2016, the White House agreements were required of everyone, and were self-referential in that they made their own existence secret.  On August 14, 2018, the Weekly Standard reported

President Trump’s escalating digs at ex-aide Omarosa Manigault Newman over her gossipy new tell-all have brought new scrutiny to this White House’s unconventional—and, arguably, unconstitutional—policy of requiring staffers to sign non-disclosure agreements to prevent them disparaging the president.

The rule extended not just to those public-facing West Wing regulars, like Apprentice star Manigault Newman or former press secretary Sean Spicer—but also to lower-level recruits less likely to shop a White House memoir.

'We had to sign them when we went into the building,' said one former White House and former Trump campaign staffer, who described the practice as just a part of this president’s modus operandi going back many years.

Furthermore, one staffer stated,

'When we all got onboarded one of the things we had to do for our official ethics briefing was sign an NDA,' the staffer said—but they could not keep a signed copy for themselves. 'Everything got taken away as soon as we signed it.'

Just as in the case of the contracts handed to physicians, Trump's White House confidentiality agreements made their own existence a secret.

Summary and Discussion

In 2016 we published an article decrying the requirement that employed physicians sign contracts containing confidentiality clauses as well as other obnoxious provisions in order to practice.  We asserted the confidentiality clauses, also known as non-disclosure agreements, did no good for physicians or their patients, but did allow the managers of the physicians' corporate employers to hide embarassing information, poor quality care, and malfeasance.  At the time we urged physicians to carefully review their contracts and get legal advice before signing.  But we worried that little could be done to stop the use of exploitive contracts without wholesale changes in health care, which would probably require the organization of employed physicians.  Our concerns were inspired not a little by the lack of recognition of exploitive contracts as a problem.

Now the phrase "non-disclosure agreement" is frequently in the headlines.  The confidentiality clauses in contracts that Donald Trump has forced his private employees, then his campaign workers, and now White House staffers to sign are apparently very similar to those physicians had to sign.  They are extremely broad in what they make confidential.  They make their own existence, and other obnoxious contract provisions secret.

What is to be done?  Maybe the new publicity surrounding this problem will embolden physicians to address the issue in their own bailiwick.  Maybe it will suggest that blanket confidentiality clauses, and other obnoxious contracts provisions we had discussed should be rigorously regulated, if not outlawed by state and the US governments.  However, as long as we have the confidentiality clause imposer-in chief in charge of the US government little is likely to be done.


Reference

1. Poses RM, Smith WR. How Employed Physicians' Contracts May Threaten Their Patients and
Professionalism.  Ann Int Med 2016; 165: 55-57.  Link here.

Reminder: Frontline trailer that includes Omarosa's "bow down" warning

The Combating Corruption in Health Care and Pharmaceuticals Symposium

Health Care Corruption

Corruption is now a term that has become much more prevalent in the US media, particularly as a description of the actions of our new president elect, for example look here, here and here.  So it is fitting that health care corruption may become a less taboo topic.  

As we have discussed before, Transparency International (TI) defines corruption as

Abuse of entrusted power for private gain

In 2006, TI published a report on health care corruption, which asserted that corruption is widespread throughout the world, serious, and causes severe harm to patients and society.

the scale of corruption is vast in both rich and poor countries.

Also,

Corruption might mean the difference between life and death for those in need of urgent care. It is invariably the poor in society who are affected most by corruption because they often cannot afford bribes or private health care. But corruption in the richest parts of the world also has its costs.

The report did not get much attention.  Since then, health care corruption has been nearly a taboo topic in the US.  When health care corruption is discussed in English speaking developed countries, it is almost always in terms of a problem that affects benighted less developed countries.  On Health Care Renewal, we have repeatedly asserted that health care corruption is a big problem in all countries, including the US, but the topic remains anechoic.

Yet somehow, a substantial minority of US citizens, 43%, seemed to believe that corruption is an important problem in US health care, according to a TI survey published in 2013 (look here).  But that survey was largely ignored in the media and health care and medical scholarly literature in the developed world, and when it was discussed, it was again in terms of results in less developed countries.  Health Care Renewal was practically the only source of coverage in the US of the survey's results.

But the message that health care corruption is an important problem is gradually leaking past the barriers meant to contain such uppity talk.  Earlier this year, Transparency International's new Pharmaceuticals and Healthcare Programme came out with two reports, one on corruption in the pharmaceutical sector, and one on diagnosing health care corruption.  

The Symposium on Combating Corruption in Health Care and Pharmaceuticals

This week, I was fortunate to be able to attend a symposium on Combating Corruption in Health Care and Pharmaceuticals (look here) put on by the WHO Collaborating Centre for Governance, Accountability and Transparency in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  That was the first meeting expressly and exclusively on health care corruption that I had ever heard about (although the center did put on an earlier meeting on Corruption in the Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Sector: Global Policy and Structural Issues, look here, which I missed.) 

The slides from the meeting presentations will hopefully soon be available online, but let me present a few important ideas from some of the speakers that relate to some things we have posted here, but enlarge upon them.

Jillian Clare Kohler, director of the WHO Collaborating Centre, provided a brief introduction to the field.  She noted, as we have, that health care corruption has largely been a taboo topic.  In fact, those at the WHO who are concerned about corruption found that public discussion of the solutions to corruption, particularly, the notions of good governance (a term used somewhat differently in global health circles than it is here in the US, look here), particularly including transparency and accountability may be allowable as long as corruption as the need for these solutions is just implied.

Marc-Andre Gagnon addressed "Tackling the Corruption of Pharmaceutical Markets," and made the following points:

-  Markets, which are systems (socially, politically) constructed rules may not align with the public good.

-  Markets are distorted by ghost management, which is meant to shape narratives to increase corporate revenue, even as it encourages the production of ignorance.

-  Pharmaceutical, and by implication, other health care corporations do better when they promote the "right" medical discourse rather than the (often minimal) effectiveness of their products.

-  Health care markets are subject to various kinds of "capture," not just regulatory capture, but scientific, professional, technological, market, media, and civil society capture.

Conclusions

As I have said before, and now once more with feeling... if we really want to reform health care, in the very little time we may have before our health care bubble bursts (which appears imminent in the US), we will need to take strong action against health care corruption.  Such action will really disturb the insiders within large health care organizations who have gotten rich from their organizations' misbehavior, and thus taking such action will require some courage.  Yet such action cannot begin until we acknowledge and freely discuss the problem.  The first step against health care corruption is to be able to say or write the words, health care corruption.

ADDENDUM (12 December, 2016) - the slides from most of the presentations are now available.  Specifically, the slides for the presentation by Prof Gagnon as discussed above are available here. 

Time to "Look for the Union Label?" - "First US Doctors' Strike in Decades," at University of California Student Health

The First US Doctors' Strike in Decades

A few news media outlets in California have reported on what has been up to now a very rare event - a strike by physicians.  An initial summary was in an article in the San Diego Union - Tribune, whose title was

First U.S. Doctors' Strike in Decades

A handful of doctors providing medical services to students at UC San Diego — and their colleagues at nine other University of California campuses — went on strike Tuesday.

It's the first time in 25 years that fully licensed doctors are picketing a U.S. employer, according to the Union of American Physicians and Dentists, which represents the physicians at the UC schools.

The work stoppage began at 7:30 a.m. and is scheduled to last one day. It involves 150 health center doctors who manage the primary care and mental health needs of students.

A second article in the Union-Tribune suggested that the point of contention between the union and the University of California administration was not primarily wages,

Collective bargaining has not gone smoothly for UC student services doctors who voted to join the Union of American Physicians and Dentists in November 2013. The two sides have not been able to agree on a contract. Union members voted for the one-day strike after accusing the university system of refusing to provide key financial information that would aid their negotiations.

An article in the East Bay Express clarified that, 

The central unfair labor practice complaint centers on the university's refusal to disclose basic financial data to doctors as part of the negotiations, according to Dr. Jeff Nelson, a UC Berkeley physician and a member of the bargaining team.

'We have asked UC for financial information as to where their funding sources are and what kind of finding they have, and they're not giving that, even though as a public institution, they're required to,' Nelson told me this morning at a rally outside the Tang Center where UC Berkeley students receive health services. Citing the $3.1 billion fundraising campaign UC Berkeley completed last year, he added: 'They have an awful lot of money.'

Without the financial statistics the union has requested, UAPD can't fairly negotiate and settle a contract, said Sue Wilson, a UAPD spokesperson. 'We have a right to certain information that we need in order to bargain a contract.' For example, she said, the union has sought information about the recently approved 20 percent salary increases for chancellors, but hasn't had any luck getting the details it requested. Wilson said the union has also filed an unfair labor practice charge regarding UC's recent decision to require UAPD doctors to contribute more money to their pensions, despite the fact that university officials originally said they would make those changes through the contract negotiations. 'It shows a lack of respect,' she said.

Apparently, the striking doctors want more money not for salaries, but to improve services to patients, as discussed in the second Union-Tribune article,

Dr. Amol Doshi, one of the staff physicians who didn’t report to work Tuesday, said his decision to join the union and to strike came down to disagreements with management over how student health services is run. 

He said only about 15 minutes is provided for each patient, regardless of whether that student has one or several medical issues that need to be addressed.

'We feel like our professional autonomy is being compromised in how we can take care of our patients. We feel that the number of patients that we’re asked to see, many of whom have mental health concerns, require more time and more staffing,' Doshi said.

The East Bay Express noted the UC administration's response did not deal with the substance of these issues,

Reached for comment today, a UC Berkeley spokesperson referred me to the UC Office of the President. Shelly Meron, a spokesperson for that office, dismissed the union's complaints in a phone interview this morning.'"They say this is about unfair labor practice charges. We believe this is simply a negotiation tool.'  Meron said the president's office does not comment on the specifics of unfair labor practice charges and declined to answer questions about the union's claims regarding financial disclosures and the pension policy.

Note that so far this story has been reported nationally only in one small item by Reuters.

Unions as One Method to Address the Plight of the Corporate Physician

So, to summarize, a small group of unionized physicians employed by the student health services of the University of California called a one day strike to protest infringements of their autonomy, particularly requirements that they see patients too quickly for what they believe to be the patients' good, and failure to provide budgetary information relevant to the university's financial capacity to provide better services.  The physicians suspect the university has sufficient money to do so, especially given generous raises given to university managers.

The issues these physicians seem to be facing are familiar aspects of the plight of the American corporate physician.  To recap the background, decades ago, most US physicians worked as solo entrepreneurs, or for small, physician owned groups.  Those few who were employed worked for small non-profits, like the local teaching hospital, or local or US government.  That has all changed.

Now increasing numbers of physicians are employed by increasingly large non-profits, such as hospital systems, or for-profit corporations. A 2013 Medscape article reported that the then current rate of employment was over 50%.

As such these physicians often report ultimately to managers, administrators, bureaucrats, and executives (MABEs).  Many of the people they report do may not be physicians or health care professionals.  Instead, they are likely to be generic managers, trained in business and management schools, with no direct experience in health care, and unclear commitment to its value.  (The 2013 Medscape article cited above included results of survey suggesting the top complaint of employed physicians was being "bossed around by less-educated admins.")

Worse, many generic managers have bought into the primacy of short-term revenue over all other considerations, including patients' and the public's health.  Examples of mission hostile management in health care thus now abound.

In parallel, most top corporate leaders have received increasingly generous compensation, far more generous than non-management employees, including health care professionals get, and that compensation seems to rise regardless of the quality of health care their organizations provide, or even their organizations' financial performance.  (For example, see this post.) 

In the media, and even the medical and health care literature, the rise of the employed, corporate physician has been celebrated, or at least accepted as inevitable. For example, see this post on a Forbes blog by a non-physician pundit with the title, "Physicians want employment, not Marcus Welby MD," implying that choice was completely voluntary.   This attitude may be a product of the long domination of market fundamentalism in the US, in which markets are seen as the solution to all social problems, so neither the outcomes of the "free market" or corporate management are to be questioned. 

However, one would think that contemporary employed physicians are increasingly in a predicament, caught between their professional oaths to put individual patients first, and their generic manager bosses pushing to increase revenue no matter what.  Yet for the corporate physician, protest might jeopardize their livelihood, or worse.  Such physicians may feel captive of the restrictive clauses, such as confidentiality agreements and non-disparagement clauses, in the contracts they signed, possibly often under pressure and without adequate legal counsel.  For example, a 2013 Medscape article was entitled, "Can you speak out without getting fired or being labeled a troublemaker?"  The answer was at best, only sometimes. 

Even in the limited coverage of the California student health doctors' strike, there were references to some of these issues.  These included  what could be mission-hostile management (shrinking visit times regardless of patient needs), and excess compensation to top management (particularly, the Chancellors' pay raises.)   The anechoic nature of the strike, that is, the lack of media coverage so far, seems to reflect the now prevailing market fundamentalist dogma that is generally hostile to workers' rights and organization. 

Nonetheless, the doctors of the University of California student health services did organize, and now they have taken the unheard of step of calling a strike.  That this did not happen sooner is a testament to the enormous power, enforced by billions in public relations and marketing, of the dogma of market fundamentalism.  However, given that most physicians are now employees, and have not been having an easy time of it, this strike may be just the beginning.

In any case, organization of employed workers, collective bargaining, and even strikes, while being anathema to market fundamentalists, may be much better for society than even more radical responses to the ongoing plight of workers.  Remember, it was robber baron capitalism not much different from today's market fundamentalism, that inspired not only the rise of trade unions, but unfortunately, the rise of Marxism and ultimately Communism.

So maybe we should start looking for the "union label" more often in health care.



ADDENDUM (2 February, 2015) - See also post entitled, "Why Physicians Must Unionize" on the On Health Care Technology blog.

What Big Drug and Biotechnology Companies Will Not Tell Us - Transparency International on Corporate Reporting

Drug companies are entrusted to provide pure, unadulterated medicines.  Increasingly drug companies are now entrusted with doing research, including experimental studies, on human beings, and providing education to doctors and patients.  Ordinarily, trust requires confidence in transparency. However, a new report suggests that large multinational drug and biotechnology companies are not very transparent.

Transparency International just released a report on the transparency, or lack thereof, of the 124 biggest multinational corporations.  The report detailed how well these companies disclosed their internal anti-corruption programs, their subsidiaries, affiliates, and joint ventures, and their financial data broken down by the countries in which they operate.  In summary, the overall results for disclosing anti-corruption programs were mediocre, and for disclosing organizational structure and country-by-country financial data, they were dismal.

The report is highly relevant to health care.  It included the biggest multinational health care corporations, all drug and/or biotechnology companies: Abbott Laboratories, (based in the US), Amgen (US), AstraZeneca (UK), Gilead Sciences (US), GlaxoSmithKline (UK), Johnson and Johnson (US), Merck and Co (US), Novartis (Switzerland), Novo Nordisk (Denmark), Pfizer (US), Roche Holding (Switzerland), Sanofi (France), Teva Pharmaceutical Industries (Israel).

The report has so far received little media coverage.  In the US, several news services provided brief  summaries.  Somewhat more substantial articles came from Reuters, the Wall Street Journal's Risk and Compliance Journal, and CNBC.  None gave specifics about health care.  Coverage from other countries, e.g., Germany by Deutsche Welle, and the UK by the Guardian, was more detailed but also did not specifically mention health care.

Therefore, I will summarize the rationale and assessment methods used by Transparency International for its three dimensions of transparency, and then show results from the 13 health care corporations.

Disclosure of Anti-Corruption Programs

The rationale for addressing this area was:

Global companies have legal and ethical obligations to conduct their business honestly. This requires
commitment, resources and the ongoing management of a range of risks – legal, political and reputational – including those associated with corruption. The implementation of a comprehensive range of anticorruption policies and management systems is fundamental to efforts to prevent and remediate corruption within organisations.

Transparency International believes that public reporting by companies on their anti-corruption programmes allows for increased monitoring by stakeholders and the public at large, thereby making companies more accountable

Evaluation of disclosure of anti-corruption programs was

based on 13 questions, which are derived from the UN Global Compact and Transparency International Reporting Guidance on the 10th Principle against Corruption. This tool, based on the Business Principles for Countering Bribery, which were developed by Transparency International in collaboration with a multi-stakeholder group, includes recommendations for companies on how to publicly report on their anticorruption programmes.

Note that the project addressed only reporting of anti-corruption programs, not their implementation or effectiveness.

For this and the other two dimensions of transparency, responses were converted into a 0% to 100% scale, with 100% being the best possible result.

Organizational Transparency

The rationale was:

As many of the recent corporate scandals have shown, acts of corruption are very often aided by the use of opaque company structures and secrecy jurisdictions.  But the use of offshore companies and their lack of transparency are posing increasing risks for global companies as well as for their shareholders, employees and local communities.

So,

Companies can mitigate the risks posed by lack of transparency and ownership arrangements by shedding more light on their corporate structures and by making basic financial information public on a country-by-country basis. This allows stakeholders to have a clearer understanding of the extent of a company’s operations and makes the company more accountable for its activities in a given country, including assessing whether it contributes financially in a manner appropriate to its level of activity.

The measurement strategy was,

Transparency International researchers consulted publicly available documents such as annual reports and stock exchange filings for information about company subsidiaries, affiliates, joint ventures and other holdings. The information sought included corporate names, percentages of ownership by the parent company, countries of incorporation and the countries in which the companies operate.

Country-by-Country Reporting

The rationale included:

The importance of country-by-country reporting was first recognised in the extractive sector as a way to ensure that revenues from natural resources are used to foster economic and social development rather than line the pockets of kleptocratic elites.

So,

country-by-country reporting ... [is] a recognised building block for corporate transparency and as a tool for countering tax avoidance.

In addition, country-by-country reporting provides investors with more comprehensive financial information about companies and helps them address investment risk more effectively.

The items measured were disclosure of revenue/sales, capital expenditures, pre-tax income, income tax, and community contribution in each country in which the company operated.

Results for Health Care Corporations

Company                      Total  Anti-Corruption P  Org Structure  by-Country

Abbott Laboratories    40             81                           38                3
Amgen                          37             85                           25                0
AstraZeneca                37             88                           19                3
Gilead Sciences           26             54                           25                0
GlaxoSmithKline          52            96                           50               11
Johnson and Johnson  26           65                           13                0
Merck and Co               42           77                            50                0
Novartis                        38            77                           38                1
Novo Nordisk               39            81                           38                0
Pfizer                             35            92                           13                0
Roche Holding              33            62                           38                1
Sanofi                            38            77                           38                0
Teva Pharmaceutical  35            85                            19                0

Again, only one company, GlaxoSmithKline, achieved an overall score of barely better than 50%.  All the others had lower scores.  Only two companies achieved a 50% score on disclosure of organizational structure, and only one achieved a score of better than 10% for disclosing country-by-country results.  The Transparency International report noted that the health care companies got particularly bad scores for disclosing organizational structure, averaging 31%, the third worst performance by economic sector.


Summary

 The drug and biotechnology companies generally did a fairly good job disclosing what their anti-corruption programs were supposed to do.  However, note that the Transparency International report did not assess how well these programs were implemented or enforced.  That this concern is not academic is underscored by some of these companies disreputable track records.  Some have long histories of legal actions, including billion dollar plus legal settlements, some of which were of allegations of fraud or kickbacks, and some have been convicted of crimes.  See the records of, for example: Abbott Laboratories (look here and here), Amgen (here), AstraZeneca (here), GlaxoSmithKline (here), Johnson and Johnson (here), Merck (here), Novartis (here), Novo Nordisk (here), Pfizer (here), Roche (here), Sanofi (here), and Teva (here).

Moreover, the companies did not do a good job disclosing their organizational structures, and hardly any bothered to report any financial results broken down by country.

We have frequently discussed health care corporations' deceptive marketing, induction of conflicts of interest, including those of supposed "key opinion leaders" who often are marketers in academic or professional clothing, and manipulation and suppression of clinical research.  There has been an ongoing procession of legal settlements involving health care corporations, often involving allegations of, and sometimes convictions for fraud, kickbacks, bribery, or other crimes.  There have even been some cases in which drug companies have failed to assure that their products are pure and unadulterated, their most basic mission.  Thus many are distrustful of drug and biotechnology companies, and large health care organizations in general.

So, as Transparency International's report noted, to rebuild trust,

integrity must be central to these efforts. Those efforts, in turn, can only become fully credible if they are undertaken with a sustained commitment to ethical behaviour and transparency across companies’ operations.

In my humble opinion, a basic premise of true health care reform would be that health care organizations become sufficiently transparent to restore basic trust in them. 

American Board of Internal Medicine Quietly Discloses Some Conflicts of Interest

We recently discussed the American Board of Internal Medicine's exceedingly weak conflict of interest policy.  This came to light after the board's previous president was revealed to have simultaneously served for years on the board of directors of a privately held for-profit hospital purchasing organization.

The susceptibility of ABIM leadership to conflicts of interest is particularly important because the board, in its role as the de facto sole source of credentialing for all US internists and internal medicine sub-specialists, sets what these physicians need to know to pass the certifying examinations. Conflicts of interest raise doubts about whether the examinations may be used to further commercial agendas and similar vested interests.

Furthermore, the ABIM has been willfully expanding its scope into "maintenance of certification," that is, into requiring physicians to engage in ABIM educational and evaluation activities to maintain their previously obtained certification.  They have been criticized in particular (e.g., here and here) for pursuing maintenance of certification in the absence of clear evidence that it improves physician performance or patients' outcomes.  Conflicts of interest affecting MOC raise further doubts that this "innovation" may also be about furthering commercial interests.

ABIM Begins Conflict of Interest Disclosure

Now it appears that the ABIM is beginning to disclose more about its leadership's conflicts of interest.  One of our scouts notified me that the ABIM web-site now provides disclosures for the members of its board of directors and officer, council, and executives.

There seem to be limits to these disclosures.  As far as I can tell,They do not reflect a change in the preexisting ABIM conflict of interest policy, which still calls for conflicts to be disclosed, but only to ABIM leadership, while they are otherwise kept confidential.  Nor were these disclosures accompanied by any further explanation that I can find.  The disclosures include multiple categories, consulting relationships, peer educational activities, promotional activities, grants, intellectual property, stock/option, gift/ donations, expert witness, leadership in professional organizations, and other, which are not otherwise defined.  It was not clear, however, whether the disclosures covered services on corporate advisory boards or boards of directors, or service as executives or founders of companies.  The time course of the disclosed relationships were not clear.  Finally, ttere are no disclosures about members of exam writing committees of sub-specialty board members

Nonetheless, the disclosures do give an idea of the scope of conflicts of interest affecting ABIM leadership.  Because the disclosures have not otherwise been publicized, I thought it would be worthwhile to summarize them here.

Prevalence of Conflicts

Of the 12 officers and directors, 8 disclosed relationships with for-profit health care corporations

Of the 15 council members (one of whom is also a director), 9 revealed conflicts.

Of the 12 executives, 5 revealed conflicts.

Thus, a majority of ABIM physician leadership, and nearly a majority of  ABIM executives disclosed conflicts of interest.

Nature of Conflicts

The conflicts were predominantly consulting relationships, grants, holdings of patents, or of stocks or options.  The conflicts of the officers, directors and council members primarily involved pharmaceutical, biotechnology and device companies.  Several officers, directors and council members had two kinds of relationships with the same company, for example, consulting relationships and grant funding.




It was striking that 15 companies had multiple relationships with officers, directors and council members.  All were large pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and device companies.  They were

AbbVie (1 consulting relationship 2 grants)
Amgen (1 consulting, 1 grant, 2 stock holdings)
AstraZeneca (3 consulting, 1 grant)
Bristol-Myers-Squibb (2 consutling, 2 grants, 1 stocks)
Celgene (2 consulting, 1 grant)
Gilead (1 consulting, 2 grants, 1 stocks)
Johnson and Johnson (1 consulting, 2 grants [one through Janssen], 2 stocks)
Eli Lilly (1 consulting, 1 grant)
Medtronic (2 consulting, 1 grant)
Merck (2 consulting, 2 stocks)
Novartis (2 grants, 1 stocks)
Pfizer (1 consulting, 1 grant, 2 stocks)
Roche (1 consulting, 2 stocks)
Teva (1 consulting, 1 stocks)
Millennium (1 consulting, 1 grant)

The officers, directors, and council members additionally had relationships with a vast number of companies, including in attempted alphabetical order: Abbott Laboratories, Agios, Allos, AllScripts, Arrowhead, Biocontrol Medical, Cephalon, Cephied, CorAssist, Cornovus, CVRx, Covidien, Dr Redy's Labs, Emergent Biosolutions, Express Scripts, Genentech, Gen-Probe, Hologic, Human Genome Sciences, Incyte,  ION(?), miRNA Therapeutics, Peluton Therapeutics, Pharmacyclics, Regeneron, Repros Therapeutics, Research to Practice (owned by AmerisourceBergen) Prime Healthcare, Rigel, Seattle Genetics, Sunesis, TG Therapeutics, UnitedHealthcare, Value Capture, Viamet, Ventrigen, Vertex, XCenda,  and ZS Pharma.

Thus, the conflicts of interest were extensive, and involved major health care corporations.

Summary

The American Board of Internal Medicine is to be congratulated for taking steps towards more transparency and honesty about conflicts of interest affecting its leadership.  However, the steps were baby steps.  Lacking still are definitions and time courses of the relationships disclosed, assurances of the completeness of disclosure of all relevant relationships, assurances that disclosure is now the policy going forward, and disclosures for members of committees and sub-specialty boards who are also very influential in constructing examinations and maintenance of certification activities.  These ought to be addressed.

The disclosures reveal that the conflicts of ABIM leadership were extensive.  While disclosure is good, disclosure does not assure physicians and the public that certification and now maintenance of certification are not influenced by marketing needs and other commercial interests.  In my humble opinion, the ABIM now ought to phase out, as quickly as possible conflicts of interest affecting those who make its policy, write its exams, and conduct its other activities that can influence physician behavior, decisions made for patients, and health policy.  Also, in my humble opinion, the ABIM ought to suspend its efforts to promote maintenance of certification until it has greatly reduced the conflicts of interest that may affect this effort.

American Board of Internal Medicine Policy Condones Keeping Conflicts of Interest Secret

The latest complication of the CareFusion/ Dr Denham/ NQF/ Dr Cassel/ ABIM case was the revelation that the current president of the NQF, Dr Christine Cassel, after resigning her position on the board of directors of for-profit publicly held group purchasing organization Premier Inc, was found to have been on the board of for-profit privately held predecessor of Premier Inc since 2008 (see post here).  Before Dr Cassel was CEO of NQF, she had been the president and CEO of the American Board of Internal Medicine for 10 years.  So apparently she was on the board of the predecessor of Premier Inc for about five years while she was leading the ABIM.

This relationship appears to be as serious a conflict of interest for Dr Cassel in her previous role as leader of the ABIM as it was for her current role as leader of the NQF.  Since she had this conflict for so long as leader of the ABIM without public disclosure, it seems logical to ask whether she was a long-term violator of ABIM policy, and hence sort of a long-term rogue CEO?

To answer that, one needs to review the ABIM conflict of interest policy.

What Sort of Conflicts of Interest Does the ABIM Ban?

The official wording is:

It is the policy of the Board that Directors, Subspecialty Board and Committee members, consultants and other individuals involved in developing ABIM products will not be employed (as staff or as a consultant) at greater than fifty percent by a commercial entity, except in such instances where explicit exceptions to the policy have been made by the Board. Unless a compelling reason is presented for granting an exception, such individuals will be asked to resign their position of service to the Board.

Let us parse that a bit.  The policy applies to the leadership of the ABIM, Directors, Subspecialty Board and Committee members, consultants, and individuals involved in developing products, so it applies broadly.

However, conflicts are only banned when they exceed a 50% time commitment.  But the time commitments required by many sorts of relationships among physicians and health care corporations are ill-defined.  For example, in the initial public offering prospectus for Premier Inc, the public document that announced her membership on the new public company's board, there is no information about the time commitment required by this position.

Also, physicians can earn large amounts of money for relatively small investments of time.  For example, not only can members of boards of directors make hundreds of thousands of dollars for ill defined time commitments unlikely to approach 10% full time equivalent, but also, key opinion leaders acting as primarily marketing consultants can also earn hundreds of thousands of dollars for undocumented time commitments, and physicians can earn hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars from royalty payments from patent holdings that require no current work (look here for example).  So a physician could easily earn hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars from health care corporations without approaching a nominal 50% time commitment.  I suspect that this ban would apply to almost no one other than a full-time corporate employee.


Furthermore, the policy is not absolute.  Exceptions can be made for "compelling reasons," which are not further defined. 

This is thus a very weak element of the policy 

How are Conflicts of Interest that are Not Banned Managed?

The policy states,

Given that prohibition of all financial interest in commercial entities would excessively restrict the pool of eligible candidates for Board membership, the Board's policy to regulate conflicts of interest consists of disclosure, self-monitored (and Chair-overseen) abstention from participation in decision-making that relates to the conflict, and adjudication of potential conflicts of interest situations by the Conflict of Interest Committee of the Board of Directors.

Individuals (non-staff) involved in developing ABIM policy and products — ABIM Directors, Subspecialty Board Directors and Committee members, consultants, the President and relevant staff members will be requested at the time of their appointment and annually thereafter to execute a disclosure.

I would note that the rationale is highly questionable.  One often hears from apologists for conflicts of interest that all competent doctors are conflicted because health care corporations identify all the most expert doctors and hire them as speakers, consultants, etc (look here for example).  We have shown examples on this blog of some less than stellar individuals with extensive financial involvements with health care corporations.  For example, we have posted (here, here, and here) about physicians dubbed key opinion leaders by pharmaceutical companies who lacked board certification, had been subject to sanctions by state medical boards, had received warnings from the FDA, had lost hospital privileges, and had been convicted of crimes. On the other hand, there probably are quite a few smart, dedicated, expert physicians who eschew major financial involvement with health care corporations.

The policy goes on to state that for some individuals, the management would be recusal from participation in relevant decisions,

 Test Committees and other policy committees will be expected to discuss the conflict of interest policy, and to share relevant disclosures, with the expectation that committee members will disclose any significant actual or perceived conflicts and abstain from discussion where such conflicts exist. In the event that a potential conflict of interest situation arises about which explicit policy does not exist, the Conflict of Interest Committee of the Board will hear and judge the appeal.

Note that recusal may be inadequate management.  Committees tend to learn to get along with each other.  The views of committee members who have to recuse themselves may be well known, and may be supported by their fellow members even when their recused colleagues are not in the room.

Worse, the policy says nothing about whether higher level ABIM leaders even need to recuse themselves.  The recusal policy apparently only applies to committee members.  There seems to be no policy about management of conflict affecting

So the management of conflicts of interest proposed by the ABIM document seems to be rather minimalist.


Who Makes Decisions about ABIM Conflicts of Interest?

The policy states that disclosures will be made to,

• President and Chair of the Board;

• The chairs of the relevant Subspecialty Boards, Test-Writing Committees, and other Committees of the Board, members who serve on the relevant Boards and Committees, and staff working with the respective committees;

• The Conflict of Interest Committee members and Conflict of Interest Committee staff,

As noted above,

adjudication of potential conflicts of interest situations[would be] by the Conflict of Interest Committee of the Board of Directors.

However, again it is not clear whether they can adjudicate conflicts affecting anyone other than test and policy committee members.  Furthermore, whether anyone oversees conflicts affecting members of the Board of Directors is not clear.

Thus it is not clear who, if anyone, manages conflicts of interest affecting the top ABIM leaders, particularly the CEO and members of the board of trustees.  This aspect of the policy seems ambiguous.

How are Conflicts of Interest Publicly Disclosed?

The short answer is they are not.  The relevant wording is:

Information that is disclosed will be kept confidential except to the

• President and Chair of the Board;
• The chairs of the relevant Subspecialty Boards, Test-Writing Committees, and other Committees of the Board, members who serve on the relevant Boards and Committees, and staff working with the respective committees;
• The Conflict of Interest Committee members and Conflict of Interest Committee staff,

except as required for the purposes of continuing medical education.

Let me reiterate, conflicts of interest are NOT PUBLICLY DISCLOSED.  They are kept confidential, secret, hidden, opaque.  Only the insiders listed above may know about them.

We have been discussing the prevalence and severity of conflicts of interest affecting health care professionals and policy-makers, and institutional conflicts of interest affecting health care organizations for years.  Based on the principle that sunlight is the best disinfectant, many now agree that disclosure of these conflicts of interest is a necessity, although there is considerable discussion about whether the current movement to make conflicts of interest public will reduce their effects.  However, in my humble opinion, concealing conflicts of interest is inherently dishonest.   Yet that is the policy of the American Board of Internal Medicine.

Summary

So, while it appears that the former president and CEO of the ABIM had a severe conflict of interest generated by her membership on the board of directors of a privately held for-profit group purchasing organization, her failure to disclose it publicly did not violate ABIM policy.

The reason is that the ABIM policy on conflicts of interest appears to be extremely weak and ambiguous.  Worse, it condones keeping conflicts of interest secret, which to me appears inherently dishonest and unethical.

This is very disturbing given that the ABIM has great influence on medical practice and health policy, previously was regarded as prestigious and trustworthy, and has been expanding the scope of its activities to make it even more influential, e.g., by now requiring physicians to participate in periodic ABIM sanctioned or sponsored activities and take repeated ABIM exams to "maintain" their board certification.

In my humble opinion, if the ABIM wants to continue to be trusted as it has been in the past, it needs a wholesale revision of its conflict of interest policies, and meanwhile needs to completely make public in detail the conflicts of interest affecting individuals who lead it, make its policy, write its examinations, construct its educational and maintenance of certification activities, and produce its other "products."  The ABIM ought to consider suspending attempst to expand its influence, e.g., by intensifying its requirements for maintenance of certification, until it has disclosed all relevant conflicts and improved its conflict of interest policies.

As we have said again and again, the web of conflicts of interest that is pervasive in medicine and health care is now threatening to strangle medicine and health care.  For patients and the public to trust health care professionals and health care organizations, they need to know that these individuals and organizations are putting patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain.