Showing posts with label Siemens. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Siemens. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 13, 2016

Two recent stories of EHR un-exceptionalism, and a connection to prior HC Renewal posts including my own experiences

The following stories recently appeared in the press about the "un-exceptionalism" (or, I might more accurately state, the negative exceptionalism) of today's EHR technology.

Regarding each organization mentioned, I have had personal experience that, in retrospect, aligns with views I expressed about the organizations years ago.

First:

EHR safety goes to court
By Lisa Schencker
June 25, 2016
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160625/MAGAZINE/306259982

One patient's blood pressure plummeted dangerously after he was allegedly discharged with the wrong medications. In another instance, a physician couldn't place a pharmacy order for a newborn to receive vitamin K, which is given to babies to prevent serious bleeding.

On several other occasions, patients weren't accurately tracked, creating potential problems getting drugs to them.

Each of these alleged mishaps occurred at PinnacleHealth, a three-hospital system based in Harrisburg, Pa. PinnacleHealth blames each of the mishaps on its electronic health records vendor, Siemens; Cerner Corp. purchased Siemens' health IT business in February 2015.

The relationship between healthcare system and vendor devolved into this dueling lawsuit:

The incidents came to light as part of a breach-of-contract lawsuit Cerner filed against PinnacleHealth last year after the system, which had used Siemens as a vendor for 20 years, sharply curtailed its relationship and entered into a contract with a competing EHR vendor, Epic Systems Corp. PinnacleHealth related the incidents in its counterclaim; the counterclaim was filed in March of this year in state court in Pennsylvania, where it is seeking damages for Cerner's alleged fraud and breach of contract.

(I am cited in the article with respect to hold harmless clause-related issues not relevant to this blog posting.)

Cerner Corp. purchased Siemens' HIT business in Feb. 2015.  Prior to that, Siemens was an independent vendor of an EHR suite known as Soarian, deployed at PinnacleHealth as early as 2008.

See for instance http://news.usa.siemens.biz/press-release/customer-solutions/soarian-plan-care-assists-clinicians-developing-and-deploying-goal-

Soarian Plan of Care Assists Clinicians in Developing and Deploying Goal-Oriented Plans of Care
Monday, February 25, 2008

Siemens (http://www.usa.siemens.com/healthcareit) today announced that PinnacleHealth, a 750-bed, non-profit hospital and healthcare system serving Central Pennsylvania, and CentraState Healthcare System, a 272-bed, non-profit medical facility located in Freehold, N.J., have each signed on to serve as beta sites for Soarian® Plan of Care, a solution designed to support inter-disciplinary care teams in defining and helping to manage patient problems, interventions and expected outcomes, to provide care in order to achieve desired outcomes and to generate new knowledge at the point of care.

Notwithstanding my warnings on this blog and elsewhere that hospitals should NEVER be "beta testing sites" for experimental HIT software used on live patients without informed consent, that the relationship devolved to dueling lawsuits involving safety is not a surprise to me.

Relating to my own experiences as posted previously on this blog:

On August 20, 2009 I posted "Why Siemens Healthcare Fails" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/08/why-siemens-healthcare-fails.html).  In that post I noted regarding a job posting by Siemens for a "physician consultant" on HIT implementation:

... This [Siemens] job description might better be described as "glorified salesperson." It might be a good exit route for a "techie doc" (usually, someone who knows just enough about HIT to be destructive) who hates the current practice environment. It might also be good for managers who don't want knowledgeable experts pointing out their bad decisions and mismanagement, but I think a global company like Siemens should be setting its sights higher in such a crucial area as electronic medical records and clinical IT consultants.

I would not want such a physician advising or supporting complex HIT projects at my organization.

I also recalled my own Siemens face time:

... I spent time at Siemens Healthcare headquarters in Erlangen in 2000, and was offered gracious hospitality and a position overseeing the Soarian cardiology suite [as a result of my work in development of an extensive cardiology information system as CMIO at Christiana Care in Delaware from 1996-8]. The people I met in Erlangen then seemed extremely competent and informatics-savvy, but I turned the offer down through no fault of Siemens. I'd received a near-simultaneous offer (FAXed to my hotel in Erlangen, in fact) from pharma that involved a much stronger management role.

I understand through conversations over the past few years with current and ex-Siemens personnel that most of the Siemens personnel I'd met in Germany in 2000 are no longer with the company. I was told they'd performed suboptimally after the acquisition/merger with Shared Medical Systems (SMS) in Malvern, PA. (I do not find that credible, and would find it far easier to accept that the problems were on the American side, but that is a personal opinion.)

I'd informed my German hosts in 2000 that they'd better be very, very careful about acquisition of an American HIT company due to my experiences with a number of such companies, which I found highly political and highly ignorant of EHR quality issues.

Then, in my Feb. 2016 post "Plaintiff's Lawyers Are The Cause of EHR Problems?" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2016/02/himss-2016-presentation-plaintiffs.html) I recounted further experience with Siemens:

... an anecdote regarding the health IT Industry in the U.S.: the cardiology information system I developed, linked to above in the 2nd bullet point, was seen in 2000 by German engineers at Siemens Healthcare Erlangen as exemplary, and they offered me a position to further develop it, that I declined due to a simultaneous superior offer from Merck Research Labs.  However, in 2007 when I again spoke to Siemens, this time to Americans at the former Shared Medical Systems in Malvern, PA that had been acquired by Siemens, they found a system that actually produced clear, detailed outputs in a critical care area and was in use at the time in a major healthcare system in the region "impractical" - and never followed up with me.  Pearls before....)

 Finally, Siemens seems to have ignored a well-qualified informatics internal expert on explicit EHR safety warnings, as in my Feb. 8, 2010 post "A Lawsuit Over Healthcare IT Whistleblowing and Wrongful Discharge: Malin v. Siemens Healthcare" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/02/lawsuit-over-health-it-whistleblowing.html):

  • Siemens Medical's physician internal consultants (skilled anesthesiologists/informatics specialists), apparently in writing and including a remediation plan, opined that an IT system developed for critical care had numerous severe flaws, of sufficient seriousness that in their opinion the systems could harm or even kill patients if deployed;
  • These were warnings of defects and flaws in IT in the worst possible medical environment, critical care with the sickest and most vulnerable of patients, not some ambulatory clinic or primary care office;
  • Allegations were raised that the warnings were ignored, with at least one of the physicians, Dr. Malin, who was strongly concerned and vocal about the risks then being told his position was being eliminated. [It is not a surprise to note this rings alarm bells about the possibility of wrongful discharge based on retaliation and/or "greasing the skids" to eliminate potential whistleblowers or "non-team players" who could delay release of the software and affect revenue - ed.];
  • The company possibly ignored the remediation plans of their own clinician/informatics experts;
  • There were allegations of company misrepresentations about the new system to the FDA;
  • There were allegations of decision making on these issues by non-clinician IT managers lacking healthcare or healthcare informatics expertise.
  • A wrongful discharge complaint and then lawsuit were filed by Dr. Malin on the basis of violation of the whistleblower protection provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A ("Civil action to protect against retaliation in fraud cases - Whistleblower Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded Companies");
  • The suit was dismissed on the apparent technicality that Siemens Medical in the U.S. is not subject to the provision in the SOX Act as is the publicly-traded corporate parent, Siemens AG; from document #4, pg 15:
... Health Services is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Siemens Med ... Siemens Med is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Siemens Corporation, which is indirectly owned, through two intervening layers, by Siemens AG, a German company that is publicly traded as defined by § 1514A of SOX ... Of these entities, only Siemens AG is a publicly-traded company. While both Health Services and Siemens Med are incorporated in Delaware and located in Malvern, Pennsylvania, they are separately incorporated entities.
  • Siemens Medical in their response to the suit denied the most severe allegations regarding the IT defects, but this issue was not followed up upon due to the lawsuit's dismissal on SOX issues despite the obvious potential public hazards the allegations of IT defects could represent;
  • In fact a US District Judge in the case, Peter J. Messitte, in the period after allowing Malin to prove the validity of SOX towards his case, opined that "No other discovery will be permitted, including but not limited to the alleged safety problems of Defendants’ product", document 4 above, Judge Messitte opinion, US District Court Maryland, pg. 25. [While perhaps understandable from a legal perspective, injured or dead patients don't really care about what legal precedents got them into the injured or dead state - ed.]
  • Siemens Medical admitted in their responses to the suit that some of the software in question, actually put in use in hospitals, was in fact "beta" software, i.e., experimental (per Item 38 in 'Siemens Answer to Complaint' document).

There's that "beta-software" issue again.

So, the acquirer (Cerner) of a product of an American Siemens HIT subsidiary that appeared to have what I consider defective HIT talent management practices (as exemplified by the aforementioned JD); bizarre views about successful, high-quality EHR software (seen by their German counterparts a few years prior as exceptional); and that appears to have not been very happy about its own employee warning explicitly of beta ICU software being so bad it could kill patients is now embroiled in litigation regarding safety by a former customer.

None of this is surprising to me at all.  Incompetence can only go so far in healthcare before things blow up.

An unanswered question, of course, is whether patients were harmed or killed as a result of Siemens software, including its beta tests on unsuspecting patients.

---------------------------------

Here is a second story of EHR un-exceptionalism with a personal twist, this article in the Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association (JAMIA):
Comparison of accuracy of physical examination findings in initial progress notes between paper charts and a newly implemented electronic health record, June 28, 2016
http://jamia.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/06/28/jamia.ocw067

Introduction There have been several concerns about the quality of documentation in electronic health records (EHRs) when compared to paper charts. This study compares the accuracy of physical examination findings documentation between the two in initial progress notes.

Methodology Initial progress notes from patients with 5 specific diagnoses with invariable physical findings admitted to Beaumont Hospital, Royal Oak [Michigan, near Detroit -ed.], between August 2011 and July 2013 were randomly selected for this study. A total of 500 progress notes were retrospectively reviewed. The paper chart arm consisted of progress notes completed prior to the transition to an EHR on July 1, 2012. The remaining charts were placed in the EHR arm. The primary endpoints were accuracy, inaccuracy, and omission of information. Secondary endpoints were time of initiation of progress note, word count, number of systems documented, and accuracy based on level of training.

Results The rate of inaccurate documentation was significantly higher in the EHRs compared to the paper charts (24.4% vs 4.4%). However, expected physical examination findings were more likely to be omitted in the paper notes compared to EHRs (41.2% vs 17.6%). Resident physicians had a smaller number of inaccuracies (5.3% vs 17.3%) and omissions (16.8% vs 33.9%) compared to attending physicians.

Conclusions During the initial phase of implementation of an EHR, inaccuracies were more common in progress notes in the EHR compared to the paper charts. Residents had a lower rate of inaccuracies and omissions compared to attending physicians. Further research is needed to identify training methods and incentives that can reduce inaccuracies in EHRs during initial implementation.

Apparently not covered in the article was the issue of patient harms that might have occurred (and could still occur) due to the "significantly higher rate of inaccurate documentation" in the EHR.   

"Beaumont Hospital" caught my eye, as I had interviewed for the CMIO role there in 2007 or early 2008.  My experiences are memorialized in an anonymized post at my Drexel informatics site which I reproduce in part here (the full essay is at http://cci.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=an_expert_says):
Sure, the experts think you shouldn't ride a bicycle into the eye of a hurricane, but we have our own theory

A medical informaticist who formerly held a “Director of Informatics” role a number of years ago in a very large hospital system, and who left the role due to a toxic management environment and lack of authority commensurate with responsibility, was seeking applied Chief Medical Informatics Officer (CMIO) positions once again.  ... He makes the following observations after completing two full rounds of interviews at a prestigious hospital system similar in size to his erstwhile employer, in a very competitive environment, that recently experienced a decline in its clinical quality stats. The organization feels the quality stats themselves were inaccurate, in part due to lack of good healthcare IT.

From what the informaticist was able to gather, their leadership was displeased. Board members were seasoned executives from a heavy-manufacturing industry that is extremely dependent on information technology and concurrent supply chain data. These executives apparently recommended that the organization move quickly on implementing EHRs.

The organization is thus planning to implement EHRs for thousands of physicians, most of whom are not employed by the hospital but are independent private practitioners, and likely to be skeptical or concerned about time impact and “grading” that could affect their livelihoods.  The hospital leaders also wanted to create integrated systems drawing on EHR data to automate quality reporting to regulatory agencies, as well as to support ongoing, funded clinical drug and device trials.

The informaticist was interviewed by the usual mix of clinician eager adopters, clinician skeptics, knowledgeable executives, skeptical executives who knew little about clinical IT, IT personnel who seemed overconfident given the enormity of the tasks at hand, and those who were clearly frightened by the prospect of being held accountable for a project of this magnitude. In the end, the informaticist did not get the position due to the organizational leaders being adamant the incumbent CMIO needed to also practice medicine.  The informaticist had explained on the first round that he believed a leadership role in a project of such magnitude and challenge called for the highest levels of executive presence and freedom from distraction, thus he did not intend to practice medicine (he had not practiced in his former Director of Informatics role for the same reasons).

He’d thought this issue had been settled after the first round of interviews, leading to the invitation for round two. This line of questioning was revisited, however, in round two in a group interview setting. The group interview was attended by a number of people with whom he’d already discussed this issue via individual meetings in round one. This suggested his time was being wasted and was rather annoying, especially considering that the informaticist had flown cross-country not once but twice to an organization not in consensus about a very basic hiring requirement
... It is not as if the organization had a doctor shortage, or that such a role would have ample free time where the incumbent would be idly sitting at their desk unless this time was absorbed seeing patients in the clinic. 

The stated reason for the organization’s wanting the CMIO to practice medicine was “to have credibility with the doctors.”  The informaticist explained that he’d found this not to be the case, that physicians being put “under the gun” of using EHR’s were generally more concerned that the CMIO had the executive authority to best represent their interests and understood medicine from training and practice at some point, not necessarily concurrently with the CMIO role.  Interestingly, there is no empirical research on this point, so the issue was the informaticist’s experience vs. the hospital’s ‘second-guessing’ a seasoned expert.

Ironically, the informaticist was told during his interviews that a CMIO they'd hired a few years ago had left, in part due to being overextended.  He was also told that some of the clinical IT problems he'd solved as a CMIO in the past Director of Informatics position were problems this organization had not been able to solve during the same time frame.

... Regarding underestimation, this organization appeared to have little idea of the difficulties they were getting into

... The informaticist had observed another indication that this organization ‘didn't know what they didn't know.’  He was informed that the organization had selected their EHR vendor prior to seeking a medical informatics expert. This implies they really did not understand what a medical informatics specialist does and can do, which is far more than being a tactical "EHR implementation assistant." ... The informaticist had been there, and had done that in his past role. He found it unrewarding then and actually had decided not to take the risk again, rejecting the new position, even before the organization decided they wanted an (effectively) part-time CMIO who also saw patients.

It was clear this organization, who the informaticist tried to “take to school” based on hard-earned expertise and extensive references on social issues in health informatics (e.g. on this website), felt they were the experts on what was best regarding CMIO background.   This may have been a dysfunctionality satirist Scott Adams once described like this:

Ignoring the Advice of Experts Without Good Reason
Example: Sure, the experts think you shouldn't ride a bicycle into the eye of a hurricane, but I have my own theory.

As I recall, an informatics physician much younger than I and with less experience was hired.  I do not know his fate.  However, I believe that my expertise at that time in EHR issues, and my no-nonsense stance on EHR safety and excellent management, might have averted or minimized the "inaccuracy" problems.

Therefore, it is also no surprise to me that the organization now relates the EHRs were causing significant charting inaccuracies.  It would also not surprise me if close calls and harm occurred. They apparently rode their bicycle into that hurricane, and doing so will usually produce a less than optimal outcome.

In summary, two recent articles on EHR-related lawsuits and operational problems, in my own personal experience, have potentially relevant "backstories" that may help provide context.  Those backstories relate primarily to what I've called "HIT amateurism" (e.g., faulty expertise evaluation) as well as HIT mismanagement (e.g., ignoring explicit internal warnings of dangers.)  I believe my experiences, and that of other such as Dr. Malin, are symptomatic of widespread health IT industry dysfunction.

I also believe that if this industry is ever to learn from its mistakes, it will only occur in the courtroom.  Being that the defense side is usually fierce, however, I am not sanguine needed learning will occur any time in the near future.

-- SS

Tuesday, August 06, 2013

Can Digital Disappearing Ink (An EHR "Glitch") Kill Patients? Part 2

At "Another Health IT "Glitch" - Can Digital Disappearing Ink Kill Patients?" just yesterday, on August 5, 2013, I wrote about a Siemens EHR "glitch" worse than any paper records system problem.  Typed order changes in the medication reconciliation process on patient discharge are disappearing into thin air, unknown to the clinicians typing the orders.  This is likely due to an issue such as some programmer forgetting to put in a statement to write the text to disk, complicated by software testing problems that missed the defect.

I noted:
... "Glitch" is a banal term used by health IT extremists (those who have abandoned a rigorous scientific approach to these medical devices as well as basic patient protections, in favor of unwarranted and inappropriate overconfidence and hyper-enthusiasm).  The term is used to represent potentially injurious and lethal problems with health IT, usually related to inadequate software vetting and perhaps even "sweatshop floor in foreign country directly to production for U.S. hospital floors" development processes (this industry is entirely unregulated).
 
Paper records may have illegible writing that would generally cause the reader to make a phone call or otherwise contact the writer, but those events are one-offs.  EHR defects potentially affect hundreds of installations and thousands of patients, en masse.  (If patients are not dying en masse from such errors, then the whole argument against paper and for IT on the issue of vastly improved safety goes out the windows, but that's an argument for another time.)

Siemens has just released another "glitch" announcement, this time with CPOE (computerized order entry):


(Medication orders "glictch" safety complaint.  Click to enlarge, text below)

Text is as follows:

August 2, 2013

Safety Advisory Notification

Soarian® Clinicals Medication Orders, Safety Complaint ID# EV06643783

Dear Customer:

This notification is to inform you that the Soarian Clinicals Medication Orders may not be operating properly in some cases in Soarian Clinicals 3.3 Service Pack 6 and above.

I note that "glitches" are not uncommon after software patches and upgrades.  See examples at the query link http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/glitch.   This reflects inadequate vetting of the patches.

I also note that "medication orders not operating properly" is a very, very serious matter.

Although this may affect only some customers, we are taking a conservative approach and are alerting you to this potential problem. As such, please forward this notification to appropriate personnel as soon as possible.

"May only affect some customers?" (I suspect from this double-indefinite that who is affected is not rigorously known).  "Taking a conservative approach?"  I ask:  what would a non-conservative approach entail?

This letter is being sent as a precautionary measure as there have been no adverse events reported from customers.

Again, they mean "yet."

When does this issue occur and what are the potential risks?

The issue occurs while placing medication orders. In certain cases, when users select orders from predefines or personal favorites and make changes on the order detail forms, the changes are correctly saved and displayed on the forms but the Order As Written (OAW) is not refreshed to reflect the changes. The incorrect OAW is displayed in Siemens Pharmacy in the Order As Written window but the discrete order details are correct. As a result dispensing or administering relying solely on the OAW prior to pharmacy validation may result in error.  [Putting patients directly in harm's way, patients who never consented to the use of these experimental and unvetted medical devices - ed.]  Once the order is validated the OAW in Soarian is updated correctly.

This problem - manually changed data apparently not written to disk - seems similar to the "digital disappearing ink" med reconciliation bug in the aforementioned Aug. 5, 2013 post.

Immediate steps you should take to avoid the potential risk of this issue:

To prevent this issue from occurring at your facility, dispensing or administering of unvalidated order should rely on the order details displayed. Secondly, any deviations from the predefined or personal favorites should be phoned in to pharmacy as a verbal order. During validation, if the pharmacist sees a discrepancy between the order detail and the OAW, verbal follow up with the ordering physician is required.

Again, a workaround.  How many times will this workaround be forgotten, compared to issues of illegibility in a paper record resulting in a phone call to the writer?

Steps that Siemens is taking to correct this complaint:

We are diligently working to develop a correction and will test and deliver it as soon as possible.

Perhaps they should have been working more diligently to detect the "glitch" before it went live.

Also, perhaps the touted power of EHRs to reduce medical errors needs to be re-examined.  Considering bugs like these - creating en-masse problems far worse than possible with paper (another en-masse example at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/lifespan-rhode-island-yet-another.html) - then, if the EHRs are so essential to safety, one would expect significant morbidity and mortality from these defects.

If one is to believe patients are not being injured by "glitches", then the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars for these systems on the basis of "error reduction" compared to paper is likely a waste of money and resources.

--  SS


Monday, August 05, 2013

Another Health IT "Glitch" - Can Digital Disappearing Ink Kill Patients?

Yes, it can.

There's been yet another "glitch" in the world of health IT (see http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/glitch for more examples).

"Glitch" is a banal term used by health IT extremists (those who have abandoned a rigorous scientific approach to these medical devices as well as basic patient protections, in favor of unwarranted and inappropriate overconfidence and hyper-enthusiasm).  The term is used to represent potentially injurious and lethal problems with health IT, usually related to inadequate software vetting and perhaps even "sweatshop floor in foreign country directly to production for U.S. hospital floors" development processes (this industry is entirely unregulated).

This from Siemens Healthcare:



Click to enlarge.  Text below.

Text of this "Safety Advisory Notification":

August 1, 2013

Safety Advisory Notification
Soarian® Clinicals Medication Reconciliation EV06736602

Dear Customer:

This notification is to inform you that Soarian Clinicals Medication Reconciliation 3.3 may not be operating properly in some cases.

Although this may affect only some customers, we are taking a conservative approach and are alerting you to this potential problem. As such, please forward this notification to appropriate personnel as soon as possible.
This letter is being sent as a precautionary measure as there have been no adverse events reported from customers.

They mean "no adverse events reported - yet."  And if such events had been reported, Siemens would most certainly not make them public.  (Why should they, when there are no regulations?)

When does this issue occur and what are the potential risks?
This issue occurs when a user moves a free text in-house order from the current and home medications side (left side) to the discharge medication side (right side), and then modifies the continued free text in-house order in discharge reconciliation prior to saving the discharge reconciliation list. After the modification of the continued free text medication order, the changes to the free text medication order are not recorded in the saved discharge medication list.  [In other words, the changes to medication orders the user just typed disappear into thin air.  I note that medication reconciliation failures are among the most common causes of medical error - ed.]

The health IT extremists would invoke the "Leaned Intermediary" doctrine that lays all blame for errors on the user.  It seems the only way to avoid such liability would be after every "enter" or "save" action (or perhaps every keystroke?), users then verify what was saved or entered...

The "fix" to this "glitch" is not too far off from that:

Immediate steps you should take to avoid the potential risk of this issue:

To prevent this issue from occurring at your facility, instruct users not to modify continued free text in-house orders on the discharge medication list. Users may be instructed to enter free text in-house orders manually by selecting the add prescription action button and entering the order.

This is known as a "workaround."  Anyone who believes this edict can and will be 100% reliably followed in often chaotic medical environments, by users from medical students to nurses to physicians, is truly cavalier.

Steps that Siemens is taking to correct this complaint:

We are diligently working to develop a correction and will test and deliver it as soon as possible.

Perhaps FDA and Joint Commission need to inquire about exactly what testing and QC was done on the current code, testing that (if actually performed) did not detect this glaring and Siemens-admitted safety-risk "glitch."

-- SS

Monday, February 08, 2010

A Lawsuit Over Healthcare IT Whistleblowing and Wrongful Discharge: Malin v. Siemens Healthcare

"Any sufficiently advanced incompetence is indistinguishable from malice." - Grey's law

At an Aug. 2009 post "Why Siemens Healthcare Fails" I described medical informatics talent management issues that were apparent in a job posting at Siemens Medical Solutions, a company that a decade ago seemed to value medical informatics expertise. (They in fact wanted to hire me then, an offer former employees tell me I was fortunate to have rejected due to a better offer from pharma).

I now note a July 2007 healthcare IT-related lawsuit against the same company (and its summary dismissal) of which I was unaware when I wrote the above post.

A physician, Murray Malin, MD [note: I do not know this person and have never had contact with him - ed.], working for Siemen's medical IT subsidiary filed a July 2007 lawsuit for wrongful termination after raising safety issues with Siemens HIT designed for critical care.

The action initially began in late 2005 as a complaint against Siemens Health Services USA and Siemens Medical USA (which I shall refer to in this post as "Siemens Medical" for the sake of simplicity) to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of the Department of Labor. This was done under the whistleblower protection provisions of Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).

The OSHA complaint was followed by a pro se lawsuit in federal court. The lawsuit's specifics are covered in the following four court documents (PDF). The events described could quite possibly serve as a true poster example of all that's wrong in the too-often perverse world of health IT.

Sen. Grassley, take note.

Here are the court documents:

1. The Complaint: Complaint_Malin_vs_siemens_medical.pdf (3.3 Mb PDF)

2. Siemens Answer to Complaint: Complaint_answer_Malin_vs_siemens_medical.pdf (148 Kb PDF)

3. Memorandum Opinion: Memorandum_opinion_Malin_vs_siemens_medical.pdf (22 Kb PDF)

4. Judge Messitte opinion, US District Court Maryland: MalinvSiemensMedicalOpinion&Order07cv1896.pdf (97 Kb PDF)


(I have written about health IT problems extensively on this blog and at my academic website on HIT failure. These include but are not limited to: medical informatics specialists ignored by nonclinician IT personnel [the link is to another case involving critical care]; inverted and paradoxical organizational structures where IT facilitators become HIT project leaders and clinical leaders become HIT project facilitators; ill-conceived and poorly implemented mission hostile health IT; perverse and in fact clinically cavalier IT "politics"; failure to obtain patient informed consent as if health IT is an elite world not subject to the same ethical obligations as medicine; probable violations of Joint Commission safety standards and hospital executive fiduciary obligations, and numerous others.)

Here is a synopsis of why I think this 2007 lawsuit against Siemens Medical may be a sentinel case with regard to dysfunction in the healthcare IT industry, based upon the information in the court documents (read them yourself at the links above):

  • Siemens Medical's physician internal consultants (skilled anesthesiologists/informatics specialists), apparently in writing and including a remediation plan, opined that an IT system developed for critical care had numerous severe flaws, of sufficient seriousness that in their opinion the systems could harm or even kill patients if deployed;
  • These were warnings of defects and flaws in IT in the worst possible medical environment, critical care with the sickest and most vulnerable of patients, not some ambulatory clinic or primary care office;
  • Allegations were raised that the warnings were ignored, with at least one of the physicians, Dr. Malin, who was strongly concerned and vocal about the risks then being told his position was being eliminated. [It is not a surprise to note this rings alarm bells about the possibility of wrongful discharge based on retaliation and/or "greasing the skids" to eliminate potential whistleblowers or "non-team players" who could delay release of the software and affect revenue - ed.];
  • The company possibly ignored the remediation plans of their own clinician/informatics experts;
  • There were allegations of company misrepresentations about the new system to the FDA;
  • There were allegations of decision making on these issues by non-clinician IT managers lacking healthcare or healthcare informatics expertise.
  • A wrongful discharge complaint and then lawsuit were filed by Dr. Malin on the basis of violation of the whistleblower protection provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A ("Civil action to protect against retaliation in fraud cases - Whistleblower Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded Companies");
  • The suit was dismissed on the apparent technicality that Siemens Medical in the U.S. is not subject to the provision in the SOX Act as is the publicly-traded corporate parent, Siemens AG; from document #4, pg 15:
... Health Services is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Siemens Med ... Siemens Med is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Siemens Corporation, which is indirectly owned, through two intervening layers, by Siemens AG, a German company that is publicly traded as defined by § 1514A of SOX ... Of these entities, only Siemens AG is a publicly-traded company. While both Health Services and Siemens Med are incorporated in Delaware and located in Malvern, Pennsylvania, they are separately incorporated entities.

  • Siemens Medical in their response to the suit denied the most severe allegations regarding the IT defects, but this issue was not followed up upon due to the lawsuit's dismissal on SOX issues despite the obvious potential public hazards the allegations of IT defects could represent;
  • In fact a US District Judge in the case, Peter J. Messitte, in the period after allowing Malin to prove the validity of SOX towards his case, opined that "No other discovery will be permitted, including but not limited to the alleged safety problems of Defendants’ product", document 4 above, Judge Messitte opinion, US District Court Maryland, pg. 25. [While perhaps understandable from a legal perspective, injured or dead patients don't really care about what legal precedents got them into the injured or dead state - ed.]
  • Siemens Medical admitted in their responses to the suit that some of the software in question, actually put in use in hospitals, was in fact "beta" software, i.e., experimental (per Item 38 in 'Siemens Answer to Complaint' document).

This latter admission also raises numerous questions. The answering of these questions seems imperative on the grounds of public interest in a rigorous and safe healthcare IT industry, an industry that, in effect practicing medicine by machine proxy, should respect patient rights and the Hippocratic Oath:

  • Were patients asked to give informed consent for the beta software's usage in their critical care?
  • Were clinicians informed of the fact that the software was experimental?
  • Were "hold harmless" clauses demanded from the customers?
  • Did hospital executives violate their fiduciary and Joint Commission safety standards obligations by purchasing this beta software, either willfully, or inadvertently due to Siemens' possible concealment of the defects their own specialists wrote up?
  • Would the use of beta-version software in critical care areas with possible known defects represent a human rights violation?

What is not clear in these court documents is whether any patient harm was attributed to these HIT systems. This is not the important issue, however. The issue is risk and risk mitigation through rigor. One should not depend on good fortune to avoid predictable patient harm, especially when those predictions are from internal experts and are explicit.

I therefore believe that the potential HIT safety issues raised in this case and the vendor's responses to internal warnings merit further investigation, especially regarding the specialist's concerns about the harmful defects in the software.

These medical concerns and whether they were improperly dismissed were apparently never investigated impartially, due to the lawsuit's rejection by the court on technical grounds of SOX inapplicability. See the attached court documents.

It is my personal opinion upon reading these court documents, and knowing this industry, that Dr. Malin was shafted. What is legal is not always just.

One can only wonder how many other cases like this exist v. Siemens or other healthcare IT vendors. Perhaps the investigation being conducted by Sen. Grassley will shed more light on this.

Finally, I note with sad irony, if these allegations are true, the doppelganger of a German-named company dismissing the concerns of an apparently Jewish physician about medical experiments possibly killing people.

-- SS

Friday, February 09, 2007

Siemens Medical Solutions USA Pleads Guilty to Obstruction of Justice

The giant German company Siemens AG has been under investigation in Europe for corruption. Now its US medical subsidiary, Siemens Medical Solutions USA Inc has pleaded guilty to a charge of obstruction of justice. Per the Chicago Sun-Times,


A subsidiary of international giant Siemens AG admitted in federal court Thursday that it lied to Cook County officials to win a $49 million hospital contract in 2000 then lied in court during a lawsuit to cover it up.

The subsidiary, Siemens Medical Solutions USA Inc., pleaded guilty Thursday to one count of obstruction of justice and is expected to pay a $1 million fine and more than $1.5 million in restitution to the county, according to a plea agreement the company reached with federal prosecutors. The company would also have to show its plea agreement to all government agencies it is currently doing business with, including the Department of Health and Human Services and the Defense Logistics Agency.

The guilty plea is the latest mark against a company that has been embroiled in controversy around the world regarding its corporate behavior.

The company admitted in its plea agreement to lying to Cook County officials that it was setting up a joint venture with a minority business as a true partner to provide radiology equipment to John Stroger Hospital. In fact, instead of cutting the business, Faustech Industries, into the deal with a share of the profits, Siemens Medical had agreed to pay a much lower flat fee to the company to lend its minority status to the deal.

A Siemens Medical manager called the joint venture nothing more than "a shell," according to the plea agreement.

Siemens Medical acknowledged failing to tell county officials about the arrangement because Siemens Medical officials believed their bid would not have been accepted if the county knew the truth.

In 2000, a rival bidder on the radiology equipment contract sued Cook County, challenging its award of the deal to the joint venture, and Siemens Medical repeatedly produced misleading documents and false testimony in court to cover up the true nature of what it was doing, according to the plea agreement.

Note that we first discussed this story back in 2005, and again in 2006.

Well, was it Jimmy Durante who said, "everybody has got to get into the act?" It seems like every kind of health care organization has got to get into the shady business practices act.

How many of these stories will it take for health care professionals and health policy makers to admit we have a systemic problem with the leadership and governance of health care organizations?

We clearly need to admit we have a problem. We need to develop watch-dogs and oversight mechanisms beyond a few people in the blogsphere. We need new regulatory mechanisms adapted to the brave new world of health care, rigorous enough to root out the leaders who would line their pockets at the expense of their organizations' missions, and even more outright corruption, yet flexible enough to allow innovation and progress. It won't be easy, but it won't begin to happen until we can at least admit we have a systemic problem.