Showing posts with label MedStar Health. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MedStar Health. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 30, 2016

Medstar Health CEO basically admits EHRs are unnecessary after hackers take out its HIT

It's corporate spin, of course, but that's the plain meaning of what he says:

http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2016/03/29/medstar-paralyzed-as-hackers-take-aim-at-another-us-hospital/
For a second day, the region’s second-largest health care system deals with a crippling computer virus. MedStar Health says it is making progress, but WJZ is learning some patients are still feeling the effects.

... Despite the challenges affecting MedStar Health’s IT systems, the quality and safety of our patients remains our highest priority, which has not waned throughout this experience. Fortunately, the core ways in which we deliver patient care cannot be altered, manipulated or harmed by malicious attempts to disrupt the services we provide [that is, by taking down the EHRs -ed.],” Stephen R.T. Evans, MD, executive vice president, Medical Affairs and chief medical officer, MedStar Health. “Our ability to serve our patients and their families depends first and foremost on our caregivers, and their expert knowledge and compassion focused on each patient.”

He likely does not realize just how correct his spin actually is.

-- SS

3/30/2016 Addendum:

This is not the first time for EHR outages at MedStar.

As in my May 16, 2015 post "Another day, another EHR outage: MEDSTAR EHR goes dark for days" at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2015/05/another-day-another-ehr-outage-medstar.html, I cited Politico. 

The doctor's observation I highlighted below is of interest.

4/9/15
http://www.politico.com/morningehealth/0415/morningehealth17818.html

MEDSTAR EHR GOES DARK FOR DAYS: MedStar’s outpatient clinics in the D.C. and Baltimore area lost access to their EHRs Monday and Tuesday when the GE Centricity EHR system crashed. The system went offline for scheduled maintenance on Friday and had come back on Monday when it suffered a “severe” malfunction, according to an email from Medstar management that was shared with Morning eHealth.

“All of a sudden the screens lit up with a giant text warning telling us to log off immediately,” a doctor said. “They kept saying it would be back up in an hour, but when I left work Tuesday night it was still down.”

This doctor told us that the outage was “disruptive and liberating at the same time. I wrote prescriptions on a pad for two days instead of clicking 13 times to send an e-script. And I got to talk to my patients much more than I usually do.

But of course we didn’t have access to any notes or medication history, and that was problematic.” MedStar notified clinicians in the email that any information entered in the EHR after Friday was lost.

-- SS

Tuesday, March 29, 2016

Bad health IT at Medstar Health: FBI probing virus behind outage (And: ka-ching! ka-ching! EHR costs continue their upward spiral)

Once again, a definition of bad health IT:

Bad Health IT ("BHIT") is defined as IT that is ill-suited to purpose, hard to use, unreliable, loses data or provides incorrect data, is difficult and/or prohibitively expensive to customize to the needs of different medical specialists and subspecialists, causes cognitive overload, slows rather than facilitates users, lacks appropriate alerts, creates the need for hypervigilance (i.e., towards avoiding IT-related mishaps) that increases stress, is lacking in security, compromises patient privacy or evidentiary fitness, or otherwise demonstrates suboptimal design and/or implementation. (http://cci.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/)

I observed bad health IT leading to HIT compromise, hospital chaos and paying of a ransom demand at my Feb. 18, 2016 post "Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center: Negligent hospital IT leaders allow hacker invasion that cripples EHRs, disrupts clinicians ... but patient safety and confidentiality not compromised" at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2016/02/hollywood-presbyterian-medical-center.html.

It's happened again, at least with regard to publicly-disclosed stories (there is no requirement for hospital disclosure, more on that below).

FBI probing virus behind outage at MedStar Health facilities - AP
By JACK GILLUM, DAVID DISHNEAU and TAMI ABDOLLAH March 28, 2016 10:04 pm
http://wtop.com/consumer-tech/2016/03/fbi-probing-virus-behind-outage-at-medstar-health-facilities/


WASHINGTON (AP) — Hackers crippled computer systems Monday at a major hospital chain, MedStar Health Inc., forcing records systems offline for thousands of patients and doctors. The FBI said it was investigating whether the unknown hackers demanded a ransom to restore systems.

A computer virus paralyzed some operations at Washington-area hospitals and doctors’ offices, leaving patients unable to book appointments and staff locked out of their email accounts. Some employees were required to turn off all computers since Monday morning.

A law enforcement official said the FBI was assessing whether the virus was so-called ransomware, in which hackers extort money in exchange for returning a victim’s systems to normal. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because the person was not authorized to discuss publicly details about the ongoing criminal investigation.


Not discussed is corporate accountability for deficient IT security.

“We can’t do anything at all. There’s only one system we use, and now it’s just paper,” said one MedStar employee who, like others, spoke on condition of anonymity because this person was not authorized to speak to reporters.

I note that if the cybernetic pundits were listened to, patients would now be considered at deadly risk due to paper records being used - not due to critical IT infrastructure being hacked and disabled.  Yet it's impossible to disable paper charts en masse.

MedStar said in a statement that the virus prevented some employees from logging into systems. It said all of its clinics remain open and functioning and there was no immediate evidence that patient information had been stolen.

These must be honest thieves.

Of course, we hear the "patient care has not been compromised" line once more (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Patient%20care%20has%20not%20been%20compromised).

Company spokeswoman Ann Nickels said she couldn’t say whether it was a ransomware attack. She said patient care was not affected and the hospitals were using a paper backup system.

The absurdity of this claim is that if patient care is not affected by returning to paper, then why did the hospital invest hundreds of millions on EHRs?

(Considering a increasing evidence base of clinician distraction and disaffection e.g., the Jan. 2015 Medical Societies letter to ONC as at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2015/01/meaningful-use-not-so-meaningul.html, EHR-related errors, many of which would likely not occur under a well-staffed paper system e.g., as at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/04/fda-on-health-it-risk-reckless-or.html, and plentiful security breaches e.g., the many posts at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/medical%20record%20privacy, I would also ask if patient care is in fact improved by the return to paper [1].)

When asked whether hackers demanded payment, Nickels said: “I don’t have an answer to that,” and referred to the company’s statement.

Dr. Richard Alcorta, medical director for Maryland’s emergency medical services network, said he suspects it was a ransomware attack. He said his suspicion was based on multiple earlier ransomware attempts on individual hospitals in the state. Alcorta said he was unaware of any ransoms paid by Maryland hospitals or health care systems.

The rather calmly-stated "multiple earlier ransomware attempts on individual hospitals in the state" suggests that

  • Hospitals are being targeted in an organized fashion, and
  • Costs to implement proper security will draw even more capital and resources from direct patient care and from real brick and mortar facilities, such as entire new hospital wings that would cost less than an EHR, to cybernetics of increasingly dubious value.  (Past projected cost benefits are certainly being proven even more naive.)

Terrorism or just plain old crime, the medical driector asks...

“People view this, I think, as a form of terrorism and are attempting to extort money by attempting to infect them with this type of virus,” he said.

God help us if true terrorists get in the act of cybernetically paralyzing hospitals.

Alcorta said his agency first learned of MedStar’s problems about 10:30 a.m., when the company’s Good Samaritan Hospital in Baltimore called in a request to divert emergency medical services traffic from that facility. He said that was followed by a similar request from Union Memorial, another MedStar hospital in Baltimore. The diversions were lifted as the hospitals’ backup systems started operating, he said.

It used to be that patient diversions were due to doctors and nurses having too many sick patients they are caring for.  Here it seems due to doctors having to many sick computers to deliver proper patient care.

MedStar operates 10 hospitals in Maryland and Washington, including the MedStar Georgetown University Hospital, along with other facilities. It employs 30,000 staff and has 6,000 affiliated physicians.

That's a lot of paralysis.

Monday’s hacking at MedStar came one month after a Los Angeles hospital paid hackers $17,000 to regain control of its computer system, which hackers had seized with ransomware using an infected email attachment.

Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center, which is owned by CHA Medical Center of South Korea, paid 40 bitcoins — or about $420 per coin of the digital currency — to restore normal operations and disclosed the attack publicly. That hack was first noticed Feb. 5 and operations didn’t fully recover until 10 days later.

Hospitals are considered critical infrastructure, but unless patient data is impacted there is no requirement to disclose such hackings even if operations are disrupted.

I won't even comment on why a US hospital is owned by a Korean medical center.  The statement "unless patient data is impacted there is no requirement to disclose such hackings even if operations are disrupted" implies yet another blind spot in the unregulated health IT industry.  Add that to the blindness towards close-calls and actual harms, and you have a field being pushed on the population under penalty by those somewhat deaf, dumb and blind to the downsides.


Computer security of the hospital industry is generally regarded as poor, and the federal Health and Human Services Department regularly publishes a list of health care providers that have been hacked with patient information stolen. The agency said Monday it was aware of the MedStar incident.

All I can hear is "ka-ching! ka-ching!" as the costs to fix the poor computer security in the hospital industry accrues. 

How much will patient care suffer as a result of the diversion of yet more resources to cybernetics?

As I've written before, stories like this support a serious rethinking of the entire healthcare IT hyper-enthusiast movement to whom the considerable downsides (even patient death) are just an unfortunate "bump in the road" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/doctors-and-ehrs-reframing-modernists-v.html), or perhaps more accurately, the healthcare IT hyper-enthusiast religion.

-- SS

[1] I've written that paper for many clinical settings, including highly specialized forms as I implemented highly successfully in invasive cardiology (http://cci.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=Cardiology%20story), needs reconsideration, relieving clinicians of clerical work and employing data entry clerks to enter the data.  This would be supplemented by far less expensive document imaging systems for 24/7 availability, and computerized lab results retrieval - the latter with appropriate humans on the receiving end to prevent the "silent silo" syndrome of lab results returned to a computer silo but missed by clinicians due to being very busy and due to unreliable/fatiguing cybernetic alerting.  A lot of workers can be paid for by saving $50 or $100 million on software.

3/30/2016 Addendum:

This is not the first time for EHR outages at MedStar.

As in my May 16, 2015 post "Another day, another EHR outage: MEDSTAR EHR goes dark for days" at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2015/05/another-day-another-ehr-outage-medstar.html, I cited Politico. 

The doctor's observation I highlighted below is of interest.

4/9/15
http://www.politico.com/morningehealth/0415/morningehealth17818.html

MEDSTAR EHR GOES DARK FOR DAYS: MedStar’s outpatient clinics in the D.C. and Baltimore area lost access to their EHRs Monday and Tuesday when the GE Centricity EHR system crashed. The system went offline for scheduled maintenance on Friday and had come back on Monday when it suffered a “severe” malfunction, according to an email from Medstar management that was shared with Morning eHealth.

“All of a sudden the screens lit up with a giant text warning telling us to log off immediately,” a doctor said. “They kept saying it would be back up in an hour, but when I left work Tuesday night it was still down.”

This doctor told us that the outage was “disruptive and liberating at the same time. I wrote prescriptions on a pad for two days instead of clicking 13 times to send an e-script. And I got to talk to my patients much more than I usually do.

But of course we didn’t have access to any notes or medication history, and that was problematic.” MedStar notified clinicians in the email that any information entered in the EHR after Friday was lost.

-- SS


Wednesday, May 06, 2015

Another day, another EHR outage: MEDSTAR EHR goes dark for days

At my March 2, 2015 post "Rideout Hospital, California: CEO Pinocchio on quality of patient care during hospital computer crash" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2015/03/rideout-hospital-california-ceo.html) I highlighted a stunning example of when the light shone through the corporate B.S. about health IT outages, thanks to a letter to the editor by a family member of an affected patient:

Letter: Re: Rideout Hospital computer problems

http://www.appeal-democrat.com/opinion/letter-re-rideout-computer-problems/article_4a408cc0-be47-11e4-9b7b-93c22da930d4.html 

Friday, February 27, 2015 

I am writing in regard to comments made by the CEO of Rideout Hospital regarding its recent computer crash. 

He said quality of care for patients had not been compromised during this incident. He is lying.

My spouse went to Rideout almost two weeks ago and had a Lexiscan of her heart when the computer system went down. The hospital doctor released her and assured her that if anything were wrong, the radiology department would spot it and she would inform us.

Here it is two weeks later and now they are saying because of the computer problem the entire test didn't get to her cardiologist until today. They think she may have had a minor heart attack and needs further cardiac intervention.

 Is this the new "open and improved" truths we are getting from this hospital? Rideout CEO Robert Chason misinformed us all. 

I am sure my spouse, who has fallen through the cracks during this inexcusable lapse in Rideout's technical policies, is not the only patient suffering similar situations. 

Shame on Chason for minimizing the effects of this catastrophe at our local hospital. 

Edward Ferreira 
Yuba City

I am aware of another major EHR outage via Politico.com:

4/9/15
http://www.politico.com/morningehealth/0415/morningehealth17818.html

MEDSTAR EHR GOES DARK FOR DAYS: MedStar’s outpatient clinics in the D.C. and Baltimore area lost access to their EHRs Monday and Tuesday when the GE Centricity EHR system crashed. The system went offline for scheduled maintenance on Friday and had come back on Monday when it suffered a “severe” malfunction, according to an email from Medstar management that was shared with Morning eHealth.

“All of a sudden the screens lit up with a giant text warning telling us to log off immediately,” a doctor said. “They kept saying it would be back up in an hour, but when I left work Tuesday night it was still down.”

This doctor told us that the outage was “disruptive and liberating at the same time. I wrote prescriptions on a pad for two days instead of clicking 13 times to send an e-script. And I got to talk to my patients much more than I usually do.

But of course we didn’t have access to any notes or medication history, and that was problematic.” MedStar notified clinicians in the email that any information entered in the EHR after Friday was lost.

I do not know if corporate issued the standard "patient safety was not compromised" line, but can almost predict it was uttered somewhere along the line.

MedStar is a big healthcare system.  An outage for several days at its outpatient clinics is disruptive and will lead to harms in the short term, but also in the long term, that cannot be effectively tallied, due to lost information. 

That includes information put on backup paper that fails to get entered when an EHR goes back up, as well as outright computer data loss as occurred here.

Note the doctor's comments about the "liberating" aspect of being freed from health IT.  He/she could actually practice medicine, not computer babysitting.

How many harms will come of this "major malfunction?"  There is no way to know.  However, hospitals cannot have it both ways.  If these systems are touted as improving safety, then safety is affected when they are down and emergency measures are put into place, resulting in chaos; and certainly when information simply goes to the "bit bucket."

The answer?  Either far more redundancy, or far less reliance on "paperless" systems.

There also needs to be mandatory reporting of EHR outages and root cause analysis so the incidence and the reasons can be studied, at the very least.

-- SS

Friday, January 16, 2009

Throwing The National Research Council Report On Health IT Under The Bus, Part 1: MedStar Health

I wrote about the just-released National Research Council report on HIT at the post "Current Approaches to Health IT Insufficient ... and Other Master of the Obvious News."

Critiques on the National Research Council report are to be expected. It will likely have a major impact on the HIT industry and those with special interests in that industry. There will be critique, I expect, to a significant degree, unfortunately up to and including in today's political climate ad hominem attacks on its authors, I'm afraid. (I am definitely not implying the latter is the case below, however.)

The following critique, seen at the HISTalk industry-sponsored gossip site here, has me scratching my head a bit.

I'm scratching my head at the following commentary on HIT and the NRC report by an official at MedStar Health, Peter Basch, MD, Medical Director of Ambulatory Clinical Systems.

Points that leave me wanting are as follows:


... in spite of this clear support for funding and continued development of HIT, some media headlines have painted this report as harshly critical of the potential of HIT in general and EHRs in particular. This media misinterpretation resulted primarily from two faults inherent to the report:

(1) the NRC’s mislabeling of their recommendations as a change from what health IT leaders are advocating for; and

(2) the NRC’s inappropriate assignment of blame to EHRs as being the cause of dysfunction rather than their understanding that EHR functionality and implementation deficits are a result of a dysfunctional reimbursement system, which is based on volume of episodic care and verbosity of documentation.


My comments:

Did the NRC mislabel their recommendations for improving HIT as a "change" from what health IT leaders advocate? For example, I haven't heard many industry based health IT leaders advocating for -- or generally supporting with money - studies of interdisciplinary research in biomedical informatics, social science, or healthcare engineering, for example.

In fact, at the
Government Health IT Conference & Exhibition 2008 in Washington, the plenary session leaders and many attendees, including the "experts" from large HIT management consulting organizations, seemed to have little idea what I was talking about when I mentioned the study of social factors. They largely blamed doctors for HIT's ills, until I gave some examples where that was decidedly not the case, and the plenary members then agreed there might be other "unknown" issues at play. Interestingly, the attendees from the VHA knew precisely what I was talking about.

I believe the NRC recommendations are indeed "change we can believe in" compared to the usual and customary HIT industry chatter. I also believe the media reported accurately on the current state and potential of HIT under its current design and management paradigms (note the latter point; I am an HIT advocate, but only if done right.)


Did the NRC "blame" EHR's as the cause of dysfunction, or as a symptom of some deeper issues? The latter seems the case.

Are implementation and functionality deficits a sole result of the reimbursement system? Doubtful, see below regarding HIT in the UK and Australia.
While I agree we have a dysfunctional reimbursement system here in the U.S. that makes quality HIT harder to achieve (my own organization had to sue AllScripts over a malfunctioning E&M module, for example, see civil complaint PDF here), I believe there are far more fundamental issues at play in HIT failure.

Another point made in the HISTalk posting:

... While it is true many early adopter systems believed (at the time) that merely switching off paper medical records to EHRs would lead to improved and safer care , nobody has believed that, or has advocated that position in years

My comments:

"Nobody has advocated EHRs would lead to improved and safer care in years?"
... What about
the statement "To improve the quality of our health care while lowering its costs, we will make the immediate investments necessary to ensure that within five years, all of America's medical records are computerized" by the President-elect on Jan. 8, 2009 as just one example?

That's an ambitious timeline indeed for a technology our National Research Council tells us is not yet ready to provide such benefits without significant rethinking and rework. It certainly send a clear message to the public that HIT in 2009 is a magic bullet, a panacea towards better healthcare quality. It suggests the new administration has absorbed that view through ill informed HIT industry and pundit wishful thinking, and perhaps purposeful disinformation.

I can easily find myriad quotes expressing the same point of view, that EMR ipso facto equals better healthcare quality, on a google search "EMR improves care" or similar search engine query. I think those in informatics should be educating on the dangers in that view, not denying it exists.

A third point in the HISTalk posting:

... The NRC faults current EHR build as not supporting the cognitive support necessary to optimize care. This deficiency is obvious and abundantly clear to veteran EHR and HIT users – many of whom work on their own or with vendors on new and better functioning clinical decision support. However, let’s be fair as to the root cause of this deficiency. It is neither lack of vendor vision nor limitation of IT technology; it is lack of a market.

My comments:

"The root cause" of misdesign of HIT, its glaring deficiencies towards its users' needs after 40+ years of trying, is simply - market forces?

Are any of the sociotechnical ("people and their interactions with technology") issues at my website here or at other sites by those studying social-IT issues and misalignment of the business IT paradigm towards clinical computing relevant? Or, should such issues simply be thrown under the bus since under government stimulus a better market will magically appear?

Is the entire discipline of social informatics (
the study of information and communication technologies in social, cultural and institutional contexts) irrelevant?

What about the problems with the UK's massively government funded national HIT program (see here), and the problems in Australia (see here)? Were the reimbursement system and the market a cause of the problems there? Doubtful. Here's what the UK national program's former leader Richard Granger had to say:

"Sometimes we put in stuff that I'm just ashamed of ... Some of the stuff that Cerner has put in recently is appalling ... Cerner and prime contractor Fujitsu had not listened to end users ... Failed marriages and co-dependency with subcontractors ... A string of problems ranging from missing appointment records, to inability to report on wait times ... Almost a dozen cancelled go-live dates ... Stupid or evil people ... Stockholm syndrome - identifying with suppliers' interests rather than your own ... A little coterie of people out there who are "alleged experts" who were dismissed for reasons of non-performance."

How familiar to Medical Informatics experts that all is.

In summary, are the market and the reimbursement system the major causes of HIT's disappointing track record as claimed in the critique? Hardly.

Perhaps there are other far more fundamental "root causes" for HIT dysfunction that this critique of the NRC report is leaving out, including the issues above as well as additional factors mentioned in my posting here.

We as clinicians, especially those who are biomedical informatics professionals, cannot improve the situation by making ill informed, wishy-washy excuses for the HIT vendors. While the latter, as in pharma, might treat us, as well as CIO's and IT hospital personnel to nice perks, promote us in speaking engagements as key opinion leaders (KOL's), give grants, etc., they have produced mediocre to very poor products for the most part for decades. This wastes resources that healthcare can ill afford, ultimately harms or at best does not help patients, and needless to say makes reports such as the NRC report and Joint Commission Sentinel Event Alert necessary.

I am aghast at the stories I hear even today of HIT products such as EHR's and CPOE's with cryptic user interaction design
that inundate, confound and insult clinicians, force clinicians to "drink information from a firehose", or have other issues that waste time and create new opportunities for error.

To be quite frank, the IT industry spends exponentially more time and expense on design and debate over trivial and arcane features in computer operating systems (to ensure a "better user experience", the fluffy marketing-ish industry buzzword du jour for what used to be called "efficient interaction") than on HIT.

As in medicine itself, we cannot cure this situation by failing to recognize or by ignoring the symptoms, signs and features which are right before our eyes.

Ironic note - While
I do not know the author of the critique, a few of the case studies of HIT dysfunction and difficulty at the above referenced sociotechnical issues website here involved a high level person now at MedStar. I can assure readers that the issues then had nothing to do with "reimbursement" and "lack of a market" and very much to do with "lack of vendor vision" as well as "lack of hospital management and IS department vision" in the prior organization.

-- SS