Vested Interests and Their Influence on Physicians- New Understanding from Cognitive and Social Psychology

Evidence-based medicine proposes patient care decisions based on the best evidence from critically reviewed clinical research, knowledge of biology and the biopsychosocial context, and patients' values and preferences.  Yet physicians often fail to make evidence-based decisions, despite many efforts to educate, or incentivize them to do so.  We used to think that the main reason was physicians' lack of knowledge and understanding of EBM, and human cognitive limitations that make such evidence-based thinking difficult.  However, now we realize that physicians are deluged by  attempts to influence their decisions so as to favor vested interests, whether or not that is good for patients.

We have discussed various kinds of deception used in marketing meant to increase physicians' prescriptions for drugs, and recommendations for devices and health care services.  Physicians have not proved to be very resistant to these methods.

Now a new article provides a different perspective on how marketers use cognitive and social psychology to manipulate physicians.(1)  Sunita Sah's and Adriane Fugh-Berman's introduction stated,

Physicians often believe that a conscious commitment to ethical behavior and professionalism will protect them from industry influence.  Despite increasing concern over the extent of physician-industry relationships, physicians usually fail to recognize the nature and impact of subconscious and unintentional biases on therapeutic decision-making. Pharmaceutical and medical device companies, however, routinely demonstrate their knowledge of social psychology processes on behavior and apply these principles to their marketing. 

The article then listed a number of findings from social (and cognitive) psychology that marketers may use to their advantage on naive physicians.

Psychological Mechanisms Promoting Acceptance of Conflicts of Interest and Dubious Marketing Ploys

First, marketers may take advantage of cognitive biases and psychological mechanisms that allow physicians to accept marketing maneuvers while denying the effect of marketing on their decision making.

Confidence and Over-Confidence

People are strongly influenced by messages delivered with confidence and do not take the trouble to ascertain the accuracy of these messages if doing so requires effort or money.

I would add that many humans, including physicians, are also over-confident in the accuracy of their own judgments.  (In 1989 we showed  that physicians often were excessively confident in their judgments of patients' outcomes, in particular, about survival of critically ill patients.)(2)

Of course, marketers often state their messages with great confidence regardless of their accuracy.

So physicians need to try to restrain their own over-confidence, and be more skeptical of the confidence of others. Maybe this would just be an exercise in simple humility.

Self-Serving (or Ego) Biases

People tend to believe that the results of their decisions, or of their groups' decisions, are better than average.  This can be called the Lake Wobegon effect (from Garrison Keilor's fictional town in which all the children are above average.)

We and others have shown that physicians may be overly optimistic about the outcomes of their own (versus others') patients, or their clinical units' (versus others') outcomes, again in the context of predicting survival of critically ill patients.(3)  We have also posted about how corporate boards of directors seem to almost always think that their hired executives are better than average, at least when determining their executive compensation.

Similarly, Sah and Fugh-Berman wrote,

Physicians believe that their own prescribing behavior is unaffected by industry influence, although they concede that other physicians are susceptible to such influence.

Furthermore,

Social psychology research confirms that people have a 'bias blind spot,' namely, they are more likely to identify the existence of cognitive and motivational biases in other than in themselves.

But, as Dana and Lowenstein wrote,

It cannot both be true that most physicians are unbiased and that most other physicians are biased.

So, to put it bluntly, physicians ought to be more humble about their own ability to resist outside influences and the resulting biases. Again, some simple humility might help.

Cognitive Dissonance

Sah and Fugh-Berman pointed out that

While articulating and believing in the importance of scientific objectivity, physicians' biases to accept industry gifts create cognitive dissonance; that is, discomfort that arises from discrepancy between conflicting beliefs, or between beliefs and behaviors.

So,

Cognitive dissonance theory specifies three methods - not mutually exclusive - by which people manage or reduce dissonance.  Changing one of the dissonant beliefs, opinions or behaviors (possibly a difficult or painful process that requires sacrificing a pleasurable behavior or treasured belief); Lowering the importance of one of the discordant factors which can be accomplished by denial - forgetting or rejecting the significance of one or more of the conflicting cognitions; and adding consonant elements that resolve or lessen the dissonance (this may involve rationalizations to buffer the dissonance between conflicting cognitions.)

Physicians may use denial and rationalization to reduce cognitive dissonance caused by their concurrent desire for relationships with marketers and others with vested interests on one hand, and their professionalism and its obligation to put patients' needs first on the other hand.  Sah and Fugh-Berman cited Chimonas and colleagues,

Denial included (a) avoiding thinking about the conflict of interest; (b) rejecting the notion that industry relationships affect physician behavior, and (c) disavowing or universalizing responsibility for problems that arose from conflicts of interest ('there's always a conflict of interest...').  Rationalizations included (a) asserting techniques that would help maintain impartiality and (b) reasoning that meetings with drug reps were educational and benefited patients.

We have discussed various public justifications for accepting conflicts of interest by physicians and other health care decision makers that employed a variety of logical fallacies along these lines.

So physicians need to re-examine their treasured beliefs and the gratification they get from relationships with industry (as opposed to those with patients, colleagues, friends and families).  They could remember the advice that no one can serve two masters.

Sense of Entitlement

Physicians' sense of entitlement, especially given the increasing stress upon them, may be used to rationalize relationships with drug, device and biotechnology companies since these corporations seem to be among their few friends (versus insurance companies, government agencies, and sometimes hospital administrations whom physicians feel may be more burdensome.).  So, in one study,

Implicitly reminding physicians of the burdens of medical training and their working conditions more than doubled reported willingness to accept gifts....

So physicians need to reconsider that to which they feel entitled.  This is the third instance in which some humility might help. 

Principles of Influence Used by Marketers

Markets seem to also be well acquainted with the six principles of influence and persuasion identified by Cialdini and colleagues.

Reciprocity

The norm of reciprocity - the obligation to help those who have helped you - is one of the guiding principles of human interaction

This is the foundation of the effect of relatively small conflicts of interest, such as giving of small gifts.

Physicians pay off industry gifts through changes in their practice

Furthermore,

Gifts associated with a subtle implicit request may be more likely to achieve compliance than gifts that call for explicit reciprocation. 

So physicians need to be wary of Greeks, or anyone else bearing gifts, even those less conspicuous than wheeled horses.

Commitment and Consistence

Consistency is highly valued in our society and associated with rationality and stability.  After committing to a decision or opinion, people justify that choice or opinion by remaining consistent with it.

So marketers try to get physicians to make small commitments to leverage larger ones.  This is

why drug reps, ask, for example, 'will you try my drug on your next five patients?'

So physicians should remember there is no virtue in commitment to erroneous beliefs.  "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds." - Ralph Waldo Emerson

Social Proof

This is basically the deliberate deployment of the logical fallacy of the appeal to common practice.

Social proof, also referred to as social validation or conformity, is the practice of deciding what to do by looking at what others are doing.

So,

If accepting industry gifts is a cultural norm in medicine, physicians will continue to do so.  The opinions of colleagues are often used by industry representatives to sway physicians to adopt a particular therapy. 

This may be why industry works so hard to sign up health care academics.

Trainees in an institution, for example, are affected by the institution's stated policies but also - and sometimes more so - by what they see their mentors do.

So physicians, who often pride themselves on independence, need to be skeptical about the need to follow the crowd.

Liking or Rapport

The more you like someone, the more you are apt to follow their advice, even if your feelings towards them have been manipulated.

This is obviously why drug representatives, for example, are so nice to physicians.

Physicians often feel overworked, underpaid, and unappreciated [ed note -  and their is plenty of evidence, some of which we have discussed on this blog, that this is not unreasonable.]  Drug reps dispense sympathy, flattery, food, gifts, services and income-enhancing opportunities and seek to ask nothing in return but scholarly consideration of the benefits of drugs.

So physicians need to reconsider who really are their friends, and be skeptical of "friends" with something to sell. 

Authority and Security

This is basically the deliberate deployment of the logical fallacy of the appeal to authority.  The best example is industry's efforts to recruit key opinion leaders, that is health professionals who are perceived as authority figures, but have really been hired to market.

From an industry perspective, the best KOLs radiate status and authority while successfully convincing their peers (and perhaps themselves) of their illusory independence and lack of bias.

Note that

KOL speakers not only influence audience members' prescribing behavior, but also - as predicted by cognitive dissonance theory - become more convinced themselves of the benefits of the products they endorse.

So physicians need to be skeptical of those claiming to be authorities, especially when they are connected with people who have something to sell.

Summary

We used to strongly believe (and Dr Wally Smith and I used to teach a course to the effect that) the major barrier to true evidence-based practice was the cognitive limitations that physicians share with all humans.  We thought in terms of cognitive biases and the inappropriate use of cognitive heuristics leading physicians to inaccurately judge the probabilities of diagnoses and medical outcomes, and thus make less than optimal decisions.

Now it seems apparent that the deliberate influencing of health professionals' judgments and decisions by external actors, mainly those interested in selling more products and services, but sometimes by those with ideological or political motives, is currently a much more important challenge to evidence based practice.  It looks like the influencers may be very knowledgeable about human cognitive limitations and how social psychology influences judgment and decisions, and may use this knowledge to pursue their vested interests, at the financial and physical expense of patients, and ultimately the public.

 True health care reform would encourage professional education designed to increase resistance to external influences that put self-interest ahead of patients' and the public's health, and careful regulation that would decrease some of the more dangerous practices used.  Of course, much more resistance might be achieved if physicians used a little more common sense when dealing with people who are obviously trying to sell them on goods, services, or ideas.  A good proportion of the deceptive methods discussed above could be countered by remembering the usefulness of humility, skepticism, and a few simple aphorisms.   

Again, as we have written repeatedly, not only should all conflicts of interest be disclosed for the sake of honesty, but physicians and other health professionals ought to consider repudiating most of all of them, maybe at some personal expense, but in the interest of re-establishing their commitment to putting the patient, not their own self-interest, or the vested interests of others, first.  
 

References

1.  Sah S, Fugh-Berman A. Physicians under the influence: social psychology and industry marketing strategies.  J Law Med Ethics 2013; 14:  . Link here:

2. Poses RM, Bekes C, Copare F, Scott WE.  The answer to "what are my chances, doctor?"  depends on whom is asked: prognostic disagreement and inaccuracy for critically ill patients.  Crit Care Med 1989; 17: 827-833.  Link here.

3. Poses RM,  McClish DK, Bekes C, Scott WE, Morley JN. Ego bias, reverse ego bias, and physicians' prognostic judgments for critically ill patients. Crit Care Med 1991; 19: 1533-1539.  Link here.

A Conference on the Psychology of Deception and Unethical Behavior

The Deception, Incentives and Behavior Conference at the Rady School of Management, University of California - San Diego, was attended by over 100 people, including me, indicating that there is real interest in studying deception and unethical behavior in the real world. 

Several presentations had implications for health care, summarized below by theme (titles of presentations follow entries in parentheses).

Context

Several presentations discussed how context affects peoples' inclination to be honest or dishonest. 

Alexander Cappelan,  Norwegian School of Economics, showed evoking a market context, that is, asking people to think about buying or selling something, increased dishonesty, while a personal or intuitive context decreased dishonesty (When do people tell white lies?).

John List, University of Chicago, USA, gave the first plenary talk, suggesting that simply reminding charity fund raisers about the mission of their organization decreased their likelihood of stealing contributions.

Shahar Ayal, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel, suggested that when people can present themselves as ethical, sometimes extremely, maybe harshly ethical in one context, they may then act unethically in another context. (Moral cleansing strategies for ethical dissonance.)

Erin Krupka, University of Michigan, suggested that the availability of voluntary regulation may increase cheating: those who do not cheat may volunteer for regulation, while those who do cheat may point to the availability of regulation. (License to cheat: voluntary regulation and ethical behavior.)

Chen-Bo Zhong, University of Toronto, Canada suggested that being able to delegate increases the likelihood of deception (Deception: an unintended consequence of delegation.)

Keith Murningham, Kellogg School of Management, suggested that priming people by asking them to perform mathematical calculations increases lying, while priming them by reminders about social awareness or family values does not. (The social and ethical consequences of a calculative mindset.)

Incentives

Several  presentations suggested various ways in which incentives may affect honesty.

David Cooper, Florida State University, USA, suggested that the need for long-term credibility may decrease lying.  (Managing credibility: an experiment in leadership and coordination.)

Jan Potters, Tilburg University, Netherlands, suggested that increasing size of incentives to advisors increases the likelihood of their dishonesty when giving advice. (Disclosing advisors' interests neither helps nor hurts.)

Anastasia Danilov, University of Cologne, Germany, suggested that people who get incentives as part of a team who identify most strongly with the team are more likely to lie.  (The dark side of team identity: expermiental evidence from financial service professionals.)

Bill Nielson, University of Tennessee, USA, suggested that people will respond to short-term incentives even at the cost of long-term outcomes. (Temptation, learning and backward induction in sequential decision tasks.)

Michael Vlassopoulos, University of Southampton, UK, suggested that people who get random bonuses, that is, whose incentives are not clearly tied to particular outcomes, are more likely to cheat employers.  (The impact of bonuses on effort provision and cheating.) 

Lisa Ordonez, University of Arizona, USA, suggested that basing incentives on achievement of short-term goals (pay for performance) increases lying about performance. (The impact of goals on ethical behavior.)

Conflicts of Interest

Two presenations discussed conflicts of interest and its effects.

Jan Potters (see above) also found that disclosure of payments to advisors did not not lead them to give more honest advice.

Miriam Mezger, University of Cologne, Germany, presented a poster that suggested that when people must make decisions based on a mixture of advice from unbiased lay-people and conflicted individuals who do not disclose their conflicts, addition of advice from unbiased experts leads to better decisions.(Can experts reduce the impact of deceptive ratings on the internet? - an experiment on product choice with recommendations by managers and experts.)

Summary

The enthusiasm and level of intellectual engagement at the meeting suggested the importance of this field.  However, it was disappointing, but not surprising that the attendance at this meeting did not suggest this topic is yet of concern in health care.  Although the opening remarks by the Dean of the Rady School included a call for participation by people from health care, and other fields such as environmental science, I may have been the only person attending with a health care affiliation. 

Health care could benefit from increased attention to deception, dishonesty and unethical conduct in the field, how it happens, and what can be done to prevent it.  However, as we have often suggested, discussion of such topics is often anechoic because its capacity to offend or threaten those who most benefit from the status quo in health care. 

It was striking that presentations suggested that many practices in our current US commercialized, business-focused health care system may be leading to increased dishonesty and other unethical behavior.  These include thinking about health care in business and quantitative contexts, not in the context of the health care mission to help patients and the public, focus and incentives based on short-term goals, often revenue, and acceptance of conflicts of interest as inevitable and necessary to increase innovation.

Of course, these particular ideas may not make many of our current health care leaders happy.

They do suggest that we could improve honesty and ethics in health care by reminding peole with decision-making authority of the centrality of the health care mission, and the need to improve patients' and the public's health, and to de-emphasize focus and incentives on short-term goals, particularly financial ones.  We also ought to try to minimize, not just tolerate and "manage" conflicts of interest.

Courses and Conferences on Health Care Ethics, Corruption, Marketing

Two courses and two conferences of interest to Health Care Renewal readers are coming soon.

Short Course: Why Do Physicians Not Make Rational, Evidence Based Decisions?


A full-day course at the 14th Biennial European Meeting of the Society for Medical Decision Making on Sunday, 10 June, 2012 in Oslo, Norway. Taught by bloggers Dr Roy Poses and Dr Wally Smith, the course will address both the effects of cognitive psychological limitations and of external influences by vested interests leading to less than optimal decisions.

A full description of the course is here.
 
Online Course: Corruption in the Health Sector

A 30 hour online course given by the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center, offered in collaboration with the Boston University School of Public Health.  The course is "on causes and consequences of corruption in the health sector; vulnerabilities in drug supply systems, informal payments, and strategies to minimise the problems." 

A full description is here. 

Conference: Deception, Incentives and Behavior

A two-day conference given by the Rady School of Management, University of California - San Diego, on 20-21 April, 2012 in San Diego, California, USA.  This will be a multidisciplinary meeting to facilitate "research of deception and related unethical behavior in the fields of economics and psychology/judgment and decision making (JDM)."

The conference web-site is here. 

Conference: Third Annual PharmedOut Conference on How Patient Harms May Result from Industry Promotion

A two-day conference given by PharmedOut at Georgetown University in Washington, DC on
14-15 June, 2012.  The conference will focus on the how industry promotion may lead to under-use, over-use, or mis-use of drugs and devices.

The conference web-site is here.

A New Perspective on Evaluating the Effects of Financial Conflicts of Interest on Research

I just posted about an article from the August issue of the Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health (link here, requires subscription.) Health Care Renewal readers may want to peruse this issue, which has some very interesting articles on conflicts of interest and related issues in research.

In particular, an article by Prof Sander Greenland offers a fresh discussion based on perspectives from epidemiology, statistics, and cognitive psychology of the effects of financial conflicts of interest (COI) on (clinical, epidemiological, and health services) research (Greenland S. Accounting for uncertainty about investigator bias: disclosure is informative. J Epidemiol Community Health 2009; 63: 593-598. Link here, requires subscription.)

Since only subscribers can easily get this article, and because of its importance, let me summarize its main points and provide appropriate quotations.

Financial COI as Causing One Type of Investigator Bias

Greenland views financial conflicts of interest as a source of one kind of investigator bias, defined as "the biasing of study results towards results expected or desired a priori by the investigators." He believes that this is a particularly important kind of bias, "the pool of reported study results may be affected seriously by prejudices and vested interests of investigators and sponsors. Such incidents suggest that investigator bias can be larger than any other bias, and may often encourage adoption of dubious or even deadly treatments."

Focus on Effects of the Bias, Rather than Intent

Greenland posited that the issue here is not intent,

Investigator bias may be intentional or subconscious, may be of venal or noble origin, and may manifest in outright fraud or in subtle fallacies held true by the investigator. It may reflect no more than the influence of sincere wishes or beliefs of the investigator or their research community on the way findings are interpreted, or it may represent premeditated attempts to mislead.

The danger is that raising the issue of intent may lead to emotional arguments rather than sober thinking about what effect conflicts of interest should have on interpreting study results,

here we encounter an emotional minefield of indignation driven by fears of prejudice in and abuse of such priors [that is, beliefs about the effects of investigator bias due to conflicts of interest.] Similar objections meet proposals to down-weight studies that produce results favourable to sponsors or other parties with financial ties to the investigators.

Rather, the issue is that conflicts of interest may indicate a high risk that a study is biased, and obviously, biased in a certain direction, "we expect investigator bias, if present, to fall in the direction favouring their or their sponsor’s financial interest."

An Approach to Evaluating the Effects of Investigator Bias due to Financial COIs

Greenland pointed out that it may be difficult to account for the effects of investigator bias due to COIs by just being careful in the evaluation of the report of a given research study, "incomplete documentation of ad hoc design and analysis decisions makes investigator bias especially difficult to detect and deal with." Furthermore, "one cannot detect unreported biasing judgements without having the data and the time to reanalyse it."

Thus, the challenge is to get accurate information about COIs, and then use it to accurately evaluate a particular study. The realities of life in the often conflicted world of medical academia means that conflicts of interest may generate a large amount of bias. Greenland suggested that this

reflects a harsh reality. In research funded or conducted by parties with a direct financial stake in the results, there may be an implicit threat of funding withdrawal (or worse) if results presented do not favour the sponsor’s interest or conform to their perceived needs for marketing and litigation.

Furthermore, he noted,

Sponsored investigators have been sued by their corporate sponsors in efforts to block publication of undesirable results. Investigators with no corporate ties have faced interference from corporations upset with their findings. Not all investigators choose to fight such pressure, which leaves them the option to either not publish unfavourable results or else not produce such results. Some go so far as to guarantee their sponsor that the results of their proposed study will be helpful.10 Meanwhile, unfavourable results from research conducted within a company may languish as in-house memos that can be obtained only via litigation, and then only if the court orders their release.

However, information provided about COIs may not be complete or accurate.

Once we accept the reality that disclosure data contain relevant statistical information, we can turn to the quality of information ascertainable from available reports.

There are reports of investigators disclosing only a small fraction of their financial support from industry, even when required to give a full account by university and granting-agency rules. There is little reason to expect more thorough disclosure in journal articles. Full disclosure is often evaded via technicalities, such as payment of non-descript consulting fees that are not explicitly earmarked for the article and thus not deemed reportable, even when they may be for time spent on the database from which the article is generated. If reported at all, such funds may be described only by phrasing such as 'author X has served as a consultant (or expert) for company Y', not that the payments for such services were made with the understanding that they would support time spent on the study being reported.

The frequency of under-reporting and deceptive reporting is far from known. Most incidents come to light only when investigation or litigation occurs, and those discoveries are not always reported in public venues. Other devices for undermining disclosure requirements include funds channelled through innocuously titled foundations or institutes set up specifically to conceal the ultimate funding source. Detecting such events and devices may demand investigative effort beyond the resources of almost all readers.

However, while there may be considerable false negative information about COIs, false positive are unlikely, "In contrast, it is hard to imagine that many articles report funding from a financial stakeholder when in fact there was none, so that misreporting may be limited to under-reporting."

Conclusions and Future Directions

Greenland concluded that investigator bias is very important.

Investigator bias has the potential to overwhelm all other biases. It can become the dominant force in contexts (such as expert reports and testimony for litigation) in which the restraints imposed by editors and peer review are absent. Thus, because of its importance, investigator bias should not be dismissed as unapproachable, any more than we should give up research on what seem to be hopelessly mysterious diseases.

He reminded us that not all investigator bias is due to financial COIs, although that should not be used to deny the importance of bias due to financial COIs,

Although I have focused on distortion from financial input, I have no doubt that ideological commitment can be just as distortive. Indeed, dealing with ideological and other psychological sources of bias (such as commitment to earlier methods and conclusions) deserves to be on the research agenda for bias analysis.

He suggested some directions for the future,

In approaching these problems scientifically, I suspect aid will be needed from those branches of psychology that deal with distorted thinking among normal individuals and groups.

Openness of journals to unpopular research and strenuous debate remains the primary line of defence against information abuse and distortion. Such openness is not universal, and thus it seems likely that proposals to deal with investigator bias will raise a hornet’s nest of objections and questions. Perhaps the essential first step (if not major hurdle) is getting used to the idea that there may be good arguments for including the possibility of investigator bias in an uncertainty assessment. The demand for thorough financial disclosure may then seem no different from demanding hard ('objective') details of design and analysis to aid assessments. Like other psychological constructs, ideological biases will be far more difficult to evaluate but may nonetheless have hard correlates that signal their presence if not magnitude, such as attempts to suppress or boycott opposing views.

I highly recommend that those with access to this journal read Prof Greenland's article in full, and see the other related articles in this issue. In particular, Prof Greenland's article, and the article from the German chapter of Transparency International provide some clear thinking as a counter to the illogic that is now appearing as the backlash by the conflicted against the "pharmascolds" intensifies.

A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Conflicts of Interest

My colleague Prof. Joachim Krueger, from the Psychology Department at Brown, recently reviewed a book on conflicts of interest that may help inform the discussion of conflicted leadership in health care.

Joachim wrote: "Many items posted on this blog have been concerned with conflicts of interest in the medical field. I recently came across a volume edited by Moore, Cain, Loewenstein, and Bazerman that brings together relevant research from several behavioral sciences. One section of the book is dedicated to conflicts of interests faced by physicians and medical researchers. Because the book also contains sections on conflicts of interests in other domains, as well as the role of psychological processes and organizational responses, it does a lot to put the current discussion in a broader context."

His review, entitled "And Lead Us Not Into Temptation," will be available on PsychCRITIQUES - Contemporary Psychology, although a subscription is required. The book is entitled Conflicts of Interest: Challenges and Solutions in Business, Law, Medicine, and Public Policy.

Piecing together quotes summarizing Joachim's main points:

Conflicts of interests, or COIs, arise when personal motives, especially of a financial nature, are at odds with professional obligations. Many academics are only dimly aware of such conflicts, as when they sign the yearly disclosure form for their employing institution or when they sign a contract for a publisher. This dimness of awareness might result from the lowness of the stakes.
The damage potential is greater when the stakes are higher, a situation most likely faced by powerful players. When this power goes unchecked, the temptation to abuse it must be terrific.
Conflicts of interests pervade the professional world. They play out in individual minds, thereby making large swaths of psychological research relevant. They also unfold in institutional arrangements and policy, thereby creating a need for interdisciplinary study.
The tenor of the book, though not unanimous, is that COIs are more widespread than casual observation suggests, that basic psychological processes contribute to and exacerbate COIs, and that many of the standard remedies backfire, resulting in some 'perverse' effects.
The point is that the line separating corruption from regular COIs is very fine indeed.
COIs do not necessarily lead to corruption, but they might.
To the psychological readership, the question of why people succumb to COIs is the most interesting. The simple answer, given by Dawes, Messick, and especially Chugh et al. and MacCoun, is that people are selfish and irrational. According to this view, the mind either by its own limitations or by its devious design inflates the self, diminishes concern for others, shuts out inconvenient information, and rationalizes unethical action.
Tyler and Dana propose that people can reason about COIs at two levels. At one level, thinking is controlled by self-interest and its attendant calculations of benefits and risks; at another level, thinking is concerned with generic (i.e., 'selfless') social norms and procedural justice. These two levels of thinking need not be in conflict.
Tyler notes that people will not act selfishly if they construe a situation as one that mandates moral behavior. Dana notes that people may act morally, not necessarily out of a deep-seated personal sense of morality, but because they understand that moral rules apply and that their own behaviors will be judged against these rules.
What should be done about COIs? disclosures are not only ineffective, they can be counterproductive. Cain et al. argue that disclosure can heighten egotism by undercutting moral self-control. Lowenstein observes another perverse effect when control is passed from conscience to law. Redefining a formerly immoral behavior as illegal, transgressors are tempted to redefine the fine as an added cost (and bear it if they can).
After so many votes of no confidence on consequentialism, a more categorical 'thou-shalt-not' approach has some appeal. This approach has been around for a long time, even foreseeing critical psychological pitfalls. 'Don’t take bribes, for bribery blinds the sighted and distorts the words of the righteous' (Exodus 23:8). For such exhortations to work, they must enter the conscience of individuals and corporations. Tyler’s work on procedural justice, Dana’s work on the modified dictator game, and Loewenstein’s review of professional identity suggest that conscience matters.

The review is worth reading in its entirety, and much of this book may be of interest to Health Care Renewal readers.

The final point is of particular interest. Physicians swear oaths when they graduate medical school, and are exposed to codes of conduct promulgated by medical organizations. However, non-physician leaders of health care organizations are not often subject to such rules, and few health care organizations display their codes of ethical behavior. Maybe it's time for a change.