Part of the Solution, or Part of the Problem? - Health Care Corporate CEOs on Physician Burnout

Physician burnout is in the news again.  Late in 2015, an article by Shaneyfelt and colleagues in the Mayo Clinic Proceedings showed an increase in the proportion of physicians reporting at least one symptom of burnout to 54.4% in 2014(1), up from the 45.5% they reported in 2012(2).  A March 28, 2017, post in the Health Affairs blog based on the latest article warning about burnout and suggesting how to address it got considerable attention.

Background - Physician Burnout

However, physician burnout is hardly new.  As we wrote in 2012 about the predecessor the 2012 Shaneyfelt article, this is just the latest in a long series of studies showing physicians' growing angst, dissatisfaction, burnout, or whatever one calls it. In 1987, in an AMA survey of physicians over 40, 44% replied that were they given chances to do it all over again, they would not go into medicine.(3)  In a 2001 survey of Massachusetts physicians, 62.3% were dissatisfied with the practice environment.(4)  In 2002, a national survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation showed that 45% of physicians would not recommend that a young person should go into medicine.(5)   In a survey of primary care physicians in 2007, 38.7% were somewhat or very dissatisfied.(6)  I have a 6 inch thick set of paper files containing articles on the subject, although it is remarkable how many research studies reported only average scores on instruments, and hence did not report proportions of physicians who were burned out or dissatisfied. Yet the 2017 Health Affairs post garnered headlines  declaring physician burnout to now be a crisis.

Whether the current attention to burnout will lead to any real improvements is doubtful.  In particular, I am concerned that the Health Affairs blog post that sparked all the attention was at best misdirected. It avoided discussing more than a few of the most immediate, proximate causes of burnout.  It seemed more motivated more by concerns about money than about patients and the physicians that try to serve them.  It read like a top down diktat uninfomed by the concerns of physicians or patients, maybe because all of its authors were CEOs of large health care organizations, all but one large hospital systems.

I will venture to go through the issues point by point in the hope of sparking a discussion more focused on the physicians subject to or at risk of burnout, and ultimately the effects of their burnout on their patients.


For the Love of Money


While the blog post began with a nod towards improving the quality of, lowering the cost of, and improving access to health care, there was a subtext.  Consider some quotes, first, stating that one cause of burnout is,

profound inefficiencies in the practice environment

Also,

The experience from Atrius Health suggests that replacing a physician who retires early or leaves to pursue other career opportunities can cost between $500,000 and $1 million due to recruitment, training, and lost revenue during this time.

Also,

Professional satisfaction for physicians is primarily driven by the ability to provide high-quality care to patients in an efficient manner.

Also,

As leaders, we must recognize burnout in physicians and other health care workers as a serious problem and respond vigorously. This is especially true if we want to maximize the effectiveness, productivity, and longevity of clinicians.

Also,

More than words are needed. Leaders of health care delivery organizations must embrace physician well-being as a critical factor in the long-term clinical and financial success of our organizations. We must make both the prevention of burnout and the restoration of the joy of a career in medicine core priorities, and address this issue with the same urgent methods we would use to solve any other important business problem: commit to measurement, develop strategy and tactics, and allocate the resources necessary to achieve success.

To interpret these passages, note that the authors of the blog post were John Noseworthy, James Madara, Delos Cosgrove, Mitchell Edgeworth, Ed Ellison, Sarah Krevans, Paul Rothman, Kevin Sowers, Steven Strongwater, David Torchiana, and Dean Harrison (links are those supplied by the post.)  All but Dr Madara are CEOs of large, nominally non-profit corporate hospital systems.  Dr Madara is the CEO of the American Medical Association (AMA). 

I would suggest that to a business CEO, efficiency refers to a state in which goods and services are produced with a minimum of costs.  Furthermore, many business managers follow the business dogma first called the shareholder value theory, which seems mainly to be interpreted to mean managers should maximize short-term revenue as their first priority (look here).  This is part of the larger financialization of all spheres of life, including hospital systems.

The focus on relentless revenue maximization may be reinforced by large incentives for top managers, particularly CEOs, based on revenue and other financial, not clinical outcomes.  Such perverse incentives have resulted in huge increases in executive compensation for hospital CEOs.  For example, as we recently discussed,  author Dr John Noseworthy, CEO of the Mayo Clinic, received more than $2.3 million in total compensation in 2013, and was just reported to have received more than $2.5 million in 2015. Author Dr Delos (Toby) Cosgrove, CEO of the Cleveland Clinic, received more than $4.8 million in 2015 (look here). 

Thus, too a hospital CEO, efficiency might mean the ability to provide services as cheaply as possible, and such efficiency is likely to be a top priority.  The quotes above suggest that hospital CEOs mainly want to combat burnout to increase efficiency.  One quote above refers directly to the monetary costs, again presumably to the hospital, of losing physicians to burnout. One quote refers to burnout as hampering physician productivity, which to a hospital CEO might mean the ability to produce maximum billing, that is revenue, in the minimum amount of time.  Finally, one quote suggests that to the authors, burnout is a business problem, not a human problem, or a clinical problem.

Even stranger, two quotes suggest that the CEO authors believe  inefficiency might cause burnout. That would appear very strange to employed physicians who may be increasingly pressured by top management to be more efficient, and thus to increase revenue.  I would guess that many employed physicians would attribute their burnout to this relentless push for productivity and efficiency by top management. 


So reading not between the lines, but the lines themselves suggests that the CEO authors might be more interested in reducing burnout to increase hospital revenues, and thus their total compensation, rather  than to make physicians happier or more fulfilled, much to less improve patient care.  Such a focus on revenue might not be reassuring to burned out physicians, especially those who feel forced to shortchange time spent with individual patients to fuel revenue.  The repetitive discussion of efficiency and productivity in the Health Affairs blog post should worry any physician who feels his or her first responsbility is to take the best care of each individual patient. 


Hear No Evil,...

Proximal Versus Organizational, Leadership and Governance Causes of Burnout

Here is what the blog post said about the causes of burnout:

The spike in reported burnout is directly attributable to loss of control over work, increased performance measurement (quality, cost, patient experience), the increasing complexity of medical care, the implementation of electronic health records (EHRs), and profound inefficiencies in the practice environment, all of which have altered work flows and patient interactions.

We dealt with the curious citation of inefficiencies as a cause of burnout above.
 
The rest of the items seem more plausible.  However absent from the post is consideration of why physicians lost control over work, have been subject to performance measurement (often without good evidence that it improves performance, and particularly patients' outcomes), and have been forced to use often badly designed, poorly implemented EHRs.  Particularly absent was any consideration of whether the nature or actions of large organizations, such as those led by the authors of the blog post, could have had anything to do with physician burnout.

Contrast this discusion with how we on Health Care Renewal have discussed burnout in the past. In 2012, we noted the first report on burnout by Shanefelt et al(2).  At that time we observed that the already voluminous literature on burnout often did not attend to the external forces and influences on physicians that are likely to be producing burnout. Instead, burnout etc has been addressed as if it were lack of resilience, or even some sort of psychiatric disease of physicians. 

In fact, we began the project that led to the establishment of Health Care Renewal because of our general perception that physician angst was worsening (in the first few years of the 21st century), and that no one was seriously addressing its causes.  Our first crude qualitative research(8) suggested  hypotheses that physicians' angst was due to perceived threats to their core values, and that these threats arose from the issues this blog discusses: concentration and abuse of power, leadership that is ill-informed, uncaring about or hostile to the values of health care professionals, incompetent, deceptive or dishonest, self-interested, conflicted, or outright corrupt, and governance that lacks accountability, and transparency, . We have found hundreds of cases and anecdotes supporting this viewpoint.

We found some corroboration of these hypotheses from other research.  Written comments from the 2001 Massachusetts survey made similar points about the causes of dissatisfaction, for example: "too much emphasis on the bottom line.  Taken over by large corporations.  Quality of care and interaction now subsumed by productivity and profit," and "the once most noble profession has become a factory job with a facade of ethics"(4)  Pololi and colleagues' qualitative interviews of young medical faculty included anecdotes of angst due to academic leaders who put revenues ahead of patient care, teaching, and research; and who allegedly used deception for personal gain.(9)  (Also, see our comments on this paper.)(10)  Pololi and colleagues' large survey of US medical faculty showed that over half thought that managers were only interested in them because of the money they brought in.(11)   We were able to show in a preliminary analysis of data from a physician survey that an instrument meant to measure physicians' perception of the integrity of the leadership of their organizations, which incorporated questions about whether leaders supported core values, put patient care ahead of revenue, supported transparency about quality issues, put patient care ahead of self-interest, and displayed honesty strongly correlated (negatively) with stress, intention to leave the practice, and burnout.(12)

Yet at best most studies of physicians' burnout, angst, or dissatisfaction only vaguely allude to "system factors" and not greedy, money-focused, preversely incentivized, self-interested, or corrupt leadership, etc as its causes. "System factors" such as bad EHRs and performance measures suggested by the Health Affairs bloggers were more likely to have been imposed on physicians by bad organizational leadership than by the physicians themselves.  Of course, the CEO authors of the post likely would be made very uncomfortable with the notion that  bad health care leadership, including of hospital systems like their own, might be a major cause of burnout.

Furthermore, there clearly have been leadership problems at many of the blog post authors' institutions that could have made them more uncomfortable.  Cases involving some of the authors' institutions have appeared on Health Care Renewal.

Most recently we noted that Mayo Clinic CEO Dr Noseworthy had raised questions of mission-hostile management by suggesting that the Mayo Clinic should give some patients with commercial health care insurance priority over those with less well paying government health insurance (look here).   Not long ago we noted the controversy generated by Cleveland Clinic CEO Dr Cosgrove's lukewarm approach to the Trump administration's "Muslim ban," even though that ban had affected one of the Clinic's own house-staff, while the Clinic was planning a fund raising event at Mr Trump's Mar a Lago resort, raising yet more conflict of interest questions (look here).

We have also disccused issues occurring at the American Medical Assocation, and particularly its RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) (CEO Dr Madara), Sutter Health (CEO Ms Krevans), Johns Hopkins (CEO Dr Rothman),  Duke (CEO Mr Sowers), Partners (CEO Dr Torchiana), and Northwestern (CEO Mr Harrison).

Finally, several of the Health Affairs authors have "board level" conflicts of interest.  In 2006, we first blogged about a "new species of conflict of interest" which involved health care organizational leaders who were simultaneously members of the boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations or other corporations which could strongly influence health care.  We posited these conflicts would be particularly important because being on the board of directors entails not just a financial incentive, but also requires board members to "demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's shareholders" [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]

Two Health Affairs blog authors have such conflicts.  Dr Paul Rothman is on the boards of Merck and of Cancer Genetics, a biotechnology company specializing in DNA based testing. Dean M Harrison is on the board of Northern Trust, a wealth management firm. He was on the board of Ikaria Inc, a biotechnology company now part of Mallinckrodt, and incidentally is a special advisor to Merrick Ventures, a private equity firm (look here).

Thus, how can one regard as credible an article on physician burnout which ignores how large organizations' nature or actions might be the major cause of such burnout, and which was written by the top leaders of such organizations?


Corporate Employment as a Cause of Burnout

Finally, the Health Affairs post mention of "loss of control over work" deserves special attention.  It could represent a catch-all of more "system factors" as noted above.  However, the biggest cause of physicians' loss of control over work may be the rising power of large health care organizations, in particular the large hospital systems that now increasingly employ physicians, turning them into corporate physicians.

In the US, home of the most commercialized health care system among developed countries, physicians increasingly practice as employees of large organizations, usually hospitals and hospital systems, sometimes for-profit corporations.  The leaders of such systems meanwhile are now often generic managers, people trained as managers without specific training or experience in medicine or health care, and "managerialists" who apply generic management theory and dogma to medicine and health care just as it might be applied to building widgets or selling soap.

We have also frequently posted about what we have called generic management, the manager's coup d'etat, and mission-hostile management.  Managerialism wraps these concepts up into a single package.  The idea is that all organizations, including health care organizations, ought to be run people with generic management training and background, not necessarily by people with specific backgrounds or training in the organizations' areas of operation.  Thus, for example, hospitals ought to be run by MBAs, not doctors, nurses, or public health experts.  Furthermore, all organizations ought to be run according to the same basic principles of business management.  These principles in turn ought to be based on current neoliberal dogma, with the prime directive that short-term revenue is the primary goal.

Again, the authors of the Health Affaris post included some generic managers:  Mr Edgeworth, whose highest degree was an MBA, and who had a long career as a hospital manager; Ms Krevans, and MBA with an MPH, who also had a long career as a hospital manager; and Mr Harrison, an MBA, who also had a career in hospital management.  Doubtless all of the authors lead organizations whose upper management is frequently generic and managerialist.  It is likely that the hospital systems they lead increasingly employ physicians, who thus have become corporate.  So the Health Affairs blog authors might not be comfortable with the notion that a major cause of burnout may  physicians' new status as hired employees sometimes of their own hospital systems, rather than autonomous practitioners.

To repeat,  how can one regard as credible an article on physician burnout which ignores how large organizations' nature or actions might be the major cause of such burnout, and which was written by the top leaders of such organizations?


Summary

I am glad that physician burnout is getting less anechoic.  However, in my humble opinion, the last thing physicians at risk of or suffering burnout need is a top down diktat from CEOs of large health care organizations.  The CEOs who wrote the Health Affairs post may not have any personal responsibility for any particular physician's burnout.  However, the transformation of medical practice by the influence of large health care organizations run by the authors' fellow CEOs, particularly huge hospital systems, often resulting in physicians practicing as hired employees of such corporations likely is a major cause of burnout.  If the leaders of such large organizations really want to reduce burnout, they should first listen to their own physicians.  But this might lead them to realize that reducing burnout might require them to divest themselves of considerable authority, power, and hence remuneration.  True health care reform in this sphere will require the breakup of concentrations of power, and the transformation of leadership to make it well-informed, supportive of and willing to be accountable for the health care mission, honest and unconflicted.

Physicians need to join up with other health care professionals and concerned member  of the public to push for such reform, which may seem radical in our current era.  Such reform may be made more difficult because it clearly would threaten the financial status of some people who have gotten very rich from the status quo, and can use their wealth and power to resist reform.

Despite the fact that the current US president has stated he is for the "forgotten people" rather than the elites, do not expect such reform from him.  He has sought advice on health care policy from the same people who wrote the Health Affairs post, as per the Washington Post, December 28, 2016:

On Wednesday, his guests were health-care executives, many of whom represent companies or institutions that have a big stake in the outcome of Trump’s ambitions to dismantle the Affordable Care Act. According to a pool report, the group, all men, met with him at 11 a.m. at the Mar-a-Lago estate in Palm Beach, Fla. They included John Noseworthy of the Mayo Clinic, Paul Rothman of Johns Hopkins Medicine, David Torchiana of Partners HealthCare and Toby Cosgrove of the Cleveland Clinic.

We truly live in interesting times. 


References

1.  Shanafelt TD et al.   Changes in Burnout and Satisfaction With Work-Life Balance in Physicians and the General US Working Population Between 2011 and 2014. Mayo Clin Proc 2015; 90: 1600-1613. Link here.
2.  Shanafelt TD, Boone S, Tan et al. Burnout and satisfaction with work-life balance among US physicians relative to the general US population.  Arch Intern Med 2012; available online here
3.    cited in Schroeder SA. The troubled profession: is medicine's glass half full or half empty? Ann Intern Med 1992; 116:583-592.
4. Massachusetts Medical Society. Physician satisfaction survey (2001). Link here.
6.  Kaiser Family Foundation. National survey of physicians - part III: doctors' opinions about their profession.  Link here.
7.  Merritt Hawkins & Associates. 2007 survey of primary care physicians.  Link here.
8. Poses MD. A cautionary tale: the dysfunction of American health care. Eur J Int Med 2003; 14: 123-130. Link here.
9.Pololi L, Kern DE, Carr P, et al. The culture of academic medicine: faculty perceptions of the lack of alignment between individual and institutional values. J Gen Intern Med 2009; 24: 1289-95. Link here.
10. Poses RM, Smith WR. Faculty values. J Gen Intern Med 2010; 25: 646. Link here.
11. Pololi L, Ash A, Krupat E. Faculty values in the culture of academic medicine: findings of a national faculty survey. Link here.
12. Poses RM, Baier-Manwell L, Mundt M, Linzer M. Perceived leadership integrity and physicians’ stress, burnout, and intention to leave practice. J Gen Intern Med 2005; 20: S182. Link here.

Musical Diversion

"For the Love of Money" by the O'Jays, used as the opening theme for (now President) Donald Trump's Celebrity Apprentice

The Troubles at Cooper Continue, Lately Gruesomely, But Will Its Leadership and Governance Change This Time? - Part I: Historical Background

Allegations of Murder-Suicide by a Hospital System CEO

This will be a hard series of posts to write. It wa triggered by the latest, and perhaps most gruesome chapter in the troubled history of the leadership of Cooper Health, the largest hospital system in southern New Jersey (known locally as South Jersey).  As reported by the Philadelphia Inquirer on March 28, 2015,

Cooper University Health System CEO John P. Sheridan Jr. stabbed his wife to death, set their bedroom on fire, and then took his own life, authorities have concluded, closing a six-month investigation into the deaths that shocked New Jersey's political and civic communities.

The Somerset County Prosecutor's Office announced its results in a news release Friday, citing forensic evidence and a lengthy probe that included more than 180 interviews.

But it offered no conclusive motive to explain why Sheridan, described by family and friends as mild-mannered, would brutally stab his wife and kill himself.

'Many possible scenarios and theories were considered,' the prosecutor's office said in a statement after months of virtual silence. The evidence 'supports the conclusion that John Sheridan fatally stabbed Joyce Sheridan, set the fire, and committed suicide.'

The Story in Context: a Long History of Leadership and Governance Problems 

We have often discussed bad leadership of health care organizations, and written a lot about the contrast between the munificent compensation paid to non-profit hospital CEOs and the lack of evidence justifying such pay.  However, a murder-suicide allegedly perpetrated by the CEO of a large non-profit hospital system is way at the tail of the curve of questionable managerial behavior.

But it turns out that Cooper Health System has a very long record of leadership and governance troubles.  The current chapter is the latest, and possibly most gruesome, in this sorry series.  However, the context of this history has been lacking in the recent coverage, which has been so far limited to local media.  The history deserves a more complete discussion, and maybe then it could lead to some reconsideration at least of this one institution's leadership and governance, and perhaps the larger troubles in leadership and governance in health care.

Thus this post will summarize the history that I could find up to 2005.  A second post will summarize more recent history up to and through the terrible deaths of John and Joyce Sheridan.  

In the interests of full disclosure, I started my faculty career at what was then Cooper Hospital - University Medical Center, the main teaching hospital for the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ) - Robert Wood Johnson Medical School (RWJMS) branch at Camden, NJ.  During my four years there, 1983-87, I was impressed with the dedication of the physicians, nurses and other health care professionals there.  However, even given my naivete at a young faculty member, the leadership of the institution, which was one of the early adapters of the generic management model,  seemed strange.  Little did I know how strange it was.

In the late 1990s, when I became seriously concerned about what I know call leadership and governance problems in health care, I ran into some folks from South Jersey who told me that Cooper had a tumultuous history since I left.  I got around to researching it, leading to an article in our local American College of Physicians newsletter.  The article, to which I had linked here, is no longer available on the internet.  So I have reposted it below, with some minor modifications, put in square brackets .  Again, the history is of major problems with leadership and governance at Cooper that had inspired no reconsideration by 2005.

The Curiously Quiet Case of Cooper’s Corrupt CFO

Embezzlement by Top Management

    In 1994, two powerful executives at Cooper admitted their guilt in an elaborate embezzlement scheme.  In 1978, John H. Crispo, the owner of Financial Management Corporation Inc., to keep his contract with the hospital, began paying monthly kickbacks of $2500-$10,000 to John M. Sullivan, the Cooper Executive Vice President for Finance.  Sullivan then referred delinquent hospital accounts for collection to a new company Crispo set up.  In turn, Crispo repaid him $340,000 in more kickbacks.  Sullivan recruited Cooper’s Controller, P. John Lashkevich, and the three devised a scheme to defraud the hospital using fabricated bills, established a fictitious company to launder money, and falsified tax returns.  A prosecutor claimed “Mr Sullivan blew this money on wine, women, parties, and a lavish lifestyle,”which included trips with girlfriends to the Plaza Hotel, and jewelry shopping at Tiffany’s.  Sullivan had driven a Porsche, and lived in a $700,000 house.  The conspirators also bought cars, boats, and racehorses.

    Other conspirators were also found and prosecuted.  Helene Weinstein admitted to helping establish a shadow company as a conduit for Sullivan to send money from the hospital to his estranged wife, Elarba Pagan.  Pagan was accused of receiving money sent by Sullivan from Cooper to another firm.  Weinstein testified that Pagan carried “briefcases of cash from the hospital to shop in New York for $1500 shoes.”  Also, Cooper’s Vice President for Finance, Robert Schmid Jr, admitted embezzling money from Cooper to pay for home improvements. Finally, Thomas J. Damadio admitted helping launder up to $600,000 stolen from Cooper, and evading income taxes.  

    Sullivan was sentenced to 55 months in federal prison, Lashkevich, 25, Pagan, eight, Weinstein, three years of probation, Damadio, six months of house arrest.  Crispo died before serving prison time.

The Internal Report, and the Murder Conviction of One of Its Authors

    After these stories became public in 1994, Cooper’s Board of Trustees established a special committee to investigate its financial operations, which included Peter E. Driscoll, Chairman of the Board, Kevin G. Halpern, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and a local Rabbi, Fred Neulander.  The hospital pledged to make its investigation public, but then fought to keep it secret.  Its report was finally released in 1998, after a discovery motion in a civil lawsuit.  Prior to then, the Philadelphia Inquirer had revealed numerous financial conflicts of interest affecting Board members,  including those on the special committee.  For example, Cooper paid the law firm of Archer & Greiner, of which Driscoll was a senior partner, $2.1 million over three years from 1993-96.

    The report revealed that the conspiracy had bilked the hospital of at least $21.8 million from 1987 to 1994, while “Cooper has been the victim of a massive crime wave.”  It stated Sullivan, Lashkevich, and Crispo “had unrestrained and absolute control of virtually all the important financial functions at Cooper and they took full criminal advantage....” It also noted that “employees who became suspicious and questioned the accounting practices or tried to alert management were intimidated, transferred, or dismissed by the high-ranking executives.”  Furthermore, it suggested “the ability to bypass or defeat controls grew from an institutional culture that delegated and outsourced too much responsibility, without developing effective controls....” The report also raised questions about how the internal investigation was conducted.  It noted that Driscoll and Halpern “often locked horns with [the other] committee members....”  Driscoll had objected when other board members called for an independent investigation.  Halpern and Driscoll resigned their positions within days of the forced release of the report.


    One member of the special committee became particularly notorious.  Soon after the internal investigation was set in motion in 1994 Rabbi Neulander’s wife had been murdered.  Soon after, Neulander had failed a polygraph test when questioned about it.  He then resigned his clerical position after his extramarital affairs with members of his congregation were revealed.  In September, 1998, he was charged with hiring the “hit men” who committed the murder.  In 2002, he was convicted  and sentenced to life in prison.

The Aftermath, Financial Woes and Impact on Patient Care

    By 1997, Cooper was in financial trouble, although none of its managers ever admitted a connection to the conspiracy and resulting losses.  However, during a related civil lawsuit, Cooper officials alleged “the hospital’s general operating fund was depleted” by the conspiracy.  Cooper began merger discussions with several partners, including AHERF, although none were ultimately successful. Physicians started leaving in 1997, when all but one full-time cardiologists announced their resignations.  Cooper revealed a $16 million loss for 1998, the largest ever incurred by a New Jersey hospital.  Its bonds were down-graded to junk. The hospital then announced that it would stop accepting uninsured patients for elective treatments, departing from its historic mission of charitable care.  Losses continued in 1999, again totaling $16 million, leading to additional budget cuts.  [CEO Halpern and Chairman of the Board Driscoll resigned within days of each other in 1999, both denying their actions were related to the report.]  By 2000, the hospital had cut its work-force to 3100, from 4000 in early 1999. and had closed various clinical sites and units.  Only thereafter did Cooper began posting budget surpluses.  [By 2002, more physicians quit Cooper en bloc, and the hospital was on its second new CEO since Mr Halpern.]

 The Lurid Stories Remain Anechoic

    The only published reaction to Cooper’s woes came from the related legal proceedings.  The prosecutor in Sullivan’s trial claimed that his thefts were so big that they “threatened the financial stability of the hospital,” and “hurt the image of the city as a whole.”  At Pagan’s sentencing hearing, Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez stated “society could not tolerate a system in which hospital executives ‘rake millions off the top’ that were intended for medical care for the poor.”

    It does seem likely that Cooper’s scandals had major effects on its patient care and academic missions.  Yet, I could find nothing  published about such effects.  Despite the luridness of this case, I also found no reaction from local or national medical groups, from academic organizations, accrediting groups, or government agencies.

Summary

In 2005, I wrote,...  The case of Cooper’s corrupt executives can be viewed as the forerunner to the even more massive bankruptcy of AHERF [Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation, see posts here].  One can only speculate that learning the lessons of the Cooper case could have mitigated the AHERF disaster.  However, as noted in my last article,  the lessons from AHERF are also not widely known.  Yet, as George Santayana wrote, “Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”

As I will address in another post, events at Cooper after 2005 also generated few echoes, up to the latest tragedy.  These events did not suggest much had been learned from the events through 2005. 

So the unfortunate, and sometimes terrible case of Cooper Health has become one of the longest running examples  - starting in 1978 - of the troubles with leadership and governance of large health care organizations, the bad effects of these problems on health care and the values of health care professionals, the lack of public attention to and discussion of these problems and their effects, and the failure of organizations to address on their own their problems with leadership and governance.

True health care reform, as we have said endlessly, requires governance that is accountable, transparent, true to the organization's mission, and honest, ethical, and without conflicts of interest; and leadership that understands health care, upholds its values, is honest, ethical, and without conflicts of interest, is transparent and open, and is willing to be accountable and subject to appropriate incentives. 

References

Embezzlement....

Lewis L. Former official gets jail term for bilking Cooper: John M. Sullivan was sentenced to 55 months - the scheme netted $4 million.  He spent his take lavishly. Philadelphia Inquirer, April 26, 1996.

Graham M. New panel at Cooper plans review: embezzling of $3.8 million by two former top aides and a vendor prompted the study. Philadelphia Inquirer, July 27, 1994.

Lewis L. Ex-hospital executive gets 2 years: he helped steal $4 million from Cooper Hospital - his lawyer said the investigation was going to spread.  Philadelphia Inquirer, November 9, 1996.

Graham M, Turcol T. Inquiry widens into finances at Cooper Hospital: a federal grand jury subpoenaed several officials this month - the inquiry was spurred by testimony from two former Cooper executives indicted for fraud. Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 1996.

Lewis L. Woman admits role in bilking Cooper Hospital. Philadelphia Inquirer, September 6, 1996.

Lewis L. Ex-hospital executive admits theft: Robert Schmid Jr. pleaded guilty to embezzling about $50,000 from Cooper Hospital. Philadelphia Inquirer, September 24, 1996.

Lewis L. More charged in theft at hospital: six people have now been indicted in the embezzlement at the Camden facility. Philadelphia Inquirer, December 12, 1996.

Lewis L. Ex-wife of jailed Cooper Hospital official sentenced in scam: Elarba Pagan bought $1,500 shoes with medical center money, her business partner said. Philadelphia Inquirer, July 2, 1998. P. B5.

Lewis L. Business owner pleads: Thomas J. Damadio said he helped Cooper Hospital executives launder stolen money.  Philadelphia Inquirer, January 18, 1997.

The Internal Report...

Anonymous. Cooper forms committee. PR Newswire, July 26, 1994.

Graham M. FBI is probing Cooper Hospital for violation of securities laws. Philadelphia Inquirer, April 3, 1997.  P. A1.

Hollreiser E. Cooper urged to release audit results. Philadelphia Business Journal, May 30, 1997.

Graham M. Hospital gives state its audit: Cooper complied after the state threatened to withhold funding - the report will be kept secret.  Philadelphia Inquirer, May 14, 1997, P. B1.

Graham M. N.J. finds nothing amiss at Cooper: the Attorney General’s office reviewed an internal hospital audit - no criminal wrongdoing was uncovered. Philadelphia Inquirer, July 11, 1997. P. A1.

Graham M, Cusick F. Listing Cooper’s board deals: companies associated with the hospital’s trustees have gotten some of its largest contracts. Philadelphia Inquirer, June 15, 1997. P. A1.

Anonymous. Report says Rabbi failed polygraph on wife’s death. The (Bergen County) Record, September 5, 1996.

Burney M. Rabbi charged in wife’s killing. Associated Press State & Local Wire, September 10, 1998.

Mulvihill G. Judge declares mistrial in case of Rabbi charged with arranging wife’s murder. Associated Press State & Local Wire, November 13, 2001.

Bell T. Rabbi found guilty of murder in wife’s 1994 death. Associated Press State & Local Wire, November 20, 2002.

Mulvihill G. Jury spares life of rabbi in wife’s murder; faces life in prison.  Associated Press State & Local Wire, November 22, 2002.

The Aftermath...

Uhlman M. Cooper talks with Allegheny: the Camden hospital wants a partner, and the Pa. chain plans a further push into South Jersey. Philadelphia Inquirer, May 20, 1997. P. C1.

Gerlin A. Philadelphia hospital raids New Jersey system’s cardiology staff.  Philadelphia Inquirer, September 27, 1997.

Kastor JA. Governance of Teaching Hospitals: Turmoil at Penn and Hopkins. Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins Press, 2004. P. 41.

Goodman H. As Cooper suffers loss, it says care won’t suffer. Philadelphia Inquirer, February 11, 1999.

Rizzo N. Cooper Hospital announces cuts in staff. Associated Press State & Local Wire, March 18, 1999.

Goodman H. Cooper Health system cuts 103 employees: financial problems were cited - about 400 jobs could be lost this year, and uninsured care will be curtailed. Philadelphia Inquirer, March 19, 1999. P. A1.

Anonymous. As losses mount, Cooper Hospital’s debt rating falls. Associated Press State & Local Wire, April 16, 1999.

Goodman H. Cooper’s debt rating tumbles as losses rise: the 1998 figure is twice as bad as estimated - the poor rating means the hospital must pay more to borrow. Philadelphia Inquirer, April 16, 1999. P. B1.

Kent B. In Camden, a hospital finds itself seriously ill: Cooper, the city’s biggest employer, has ‘heavy losses.’  New York Times, May 9, 1999.

Anonymous.  Cooper Hospital announces more cuts in staff.  Associated Press State & Local Wire, May 20, 1999.

Anonymous.  Camden hospital posts $16 million loss: president sees turnaround.  Associated Press State & Local Wire, February 23, 2000.

Kiely E.  Cooper Hospital to forgo charity-care payments - the state will not reimburse the Camden facility for uninsured patients for four months - the reason: the beleaguered hospital received the money from the state in advance last year.  Philadelphia Inquirer, April 11, 2000. P B1.

Anonymous.  Cooper Hospital president quitting.  Philadelphia Business Journal, January 15, 2002.

Anonymous.  Hospital company sues six departing surgeons.  Associated Press State & Local Wire, July 4, 2002.

The Continuing Mystery of the Fugitive Founder and Missing Money - What it Says About the Opacity of Offshore Medical Schools

The next chapter in the bizarre tale of the fugitive founder of an off-shore (from the US and Canada) Caribbean medical school, and his now convicted spouse, do not solve any mysteries, but raise larger concerns about the accountability, or lack thereof, of leaders of important health care organizations.

Introduction: the Fugitive Founder and Convicted Spouse

As we posted in October, 2013, drawing an amazing for us number of comments, the couple who founded two Caribbean medical schools which catered almost entirely to US and Canadian students ran into significant legal trouble.  Founder David Leon Fredrick and his wife, Dr Patricia Lynn Hough were indicted for tax evasion for failing to report income from the two medical schools they allegedly owned, and later sold.

The schools were Saba University School of Medicine, on Saba, and the Medical University of the Americas, on Nevis.  The initial legal proceedings revealed that while Saba University School of Medicine was apparently first set up by a non-profit foundation (or NGO) run by the couple, somehow it became for-profit owned by Mr Fredrick and Dr Hough, and Saba and the Medical University of the Americas were subsequently sold to a private equity group, Equinox Capital.

Before jury selection started, Mr Fredrick disappeared.  Dr Hough was eventually convicted of defrauding the US Internal Revenue Service, and income tax evasion, after trial testimony to the effect that the couple concealed money in a Swiss bank, got $36 million from the sale of the schools, and bought an airplane, two houses, and a condominium.

Left mysterious at that time were Mr Fredrick's whereabouts, where the money that the couple derived from the sale of the medical schools went, and how a school that began as a non-profit organization became a for-profit corporation owned by the couple.  The case should have lead to some concerns about the leadership and governance of the off-shore medical schools that now train increasing numbers of would be US and Canadian physicians.

However, after Dr Hough was convicted, there was little public discussion of these issues, at least until Dr Hough's recent sentencing.  (There were some interesting comments made on our blog post, many from anonymous erswhile defenders of Saba University and/or Mr Fredrick and Dr Hough.  While they expressed some interesting opinions, in my humble opinion they did not add any substantive facts to the discussion.)

Latest Developments in the Case

In the past few weeks the case got a little more public notice in terms of reporting of the legal proceedings leading to the sentencing of Dr Hough   They brought to light some additional contentions by the prosecution, which deserve some attention because after all, they won their case.

The Amount of Money the Couple Made


As reported by the Sarasota (FL) Herald-Tribune,  Dr Hough was sentenced to two years in federal prison, three years of supervised release, and to repay $15 million to the IRS.  In addition,

 Prosecutors say Hough and Fredrick sold the schools and associated real estate in April 2007 for more than $35 million. An IRS agent testified last Thursday that Hough also made more than $12 million in income from the two schools from 2003 until 2007.

How much Mr Fredrick made was not discussed since it was not relevant to Dr Hough's sentencing. 

The Effort that Went into the Plot

According to Bloomberg,

'Hough’s crimes were neither impulsive nor isolated but required sophisticated transactions, coordination with foreign bankers, annual lies to the federal government, and by her own admissions, trips to Switzerland,' prosecutors wrote in a sentencing memo on April 14. 'Hough made calculated decisions to cheat, over and over again.'

Also,

Prosecutors accused the couple of crafting their scheme with UBS AG (UBSN) banker Dieter Luetolf and Swiss financial adviser Beda Singenberger, both unindicted co-conspirators.

Singenberger, who was separately charged with helping 60 U.S. clients hide $184 million in offshore accounts, hasn’t responded in federal court in New York.

In more detail,

Prosecutors said the couple used an array of accounts in the names of businesses to hide their money and employed 'e-mails, telephone calls and in-person meetings to instruct Swiss bankers and asset managers to make investments and transfer funds from their undeclared accounts at UBS.'

The Mysteries Remain



Where Did the Money Go?

As noted above, the sale of the two medical schools netted Mr Fredrick and Dr Hough about $35 million.  Where that went is still unclear.

How Did Mr Fredrick and Dr Hough Become Owners of a Previously Non-Profit Medical School?

As noted above and in our previous post, Saba University School of Medicine began as a non-profit managed by Mr Fredrick and Dr Hough.  Somewhere along the way, the couple assumed ownership of the school.  There seems to be no record and no discussion of how this happened.  In the US, a conversion of a substantial non-profit, like a medical school, to a for-profit, ordinarily would require some regulatory approval and public discussion.  Furthermore, in most cases, non-profit conversions to for-profit would require some sort of protection of the assets of the former non-profit, often leading to a spin-off of a new non-profit foundation.   None of this apparently happened in this case (which admittedly did not occur in the US.)  How did Mr Fredrick and Dr Hough just take over a non-profit, sell it, and keep all the money involved?

Where is Mr Fredrick and Why did He Flee?

We need Sherlock Holmes for this. 


What Does This Case Say About the Leadership and Governance of Offshore Medical Schools?

So the latest details revealed suggest a fairly intricate plot by the American couple who founded two Caribbean medical schools.  The plot allegedly netted them millions, and now resulted in one of the couple remaining a fugitive, and the other convicted of federal crimes.

The biggest issue raised by this case, in my humble opinion, is not about financial crimes, tax-evasion, or the hiding of assets in Swiss banks.  It is about the leadership and governance of offshore Caribbean medical schools, and by extension, of academic medicine and health care.  In 2010, Eckhert documented that the number of offshore medical schools, "for-profit institutions whose purpose is to train U.S. and Canadian students who intend to return home to practice," but not to train physicians to practice in the countries in which these schools are located, was rapidly growing.(1)  By 2010, there were 33 such schools, 20 of which were new since 2000.

These offshore medical schools are not accredited in the US or Canada, and such accreditation is currently not required for individual graduates of such schools to be admitted to US house-staff programs or for US licensure.  So perhaps it is not surprising that little is known about these schools.

How they choose students, the qualifications, or even names of their faculty, their curriculum, how they supervise clinical training (which is mostly done by affiliated North American hospitals), and what happens to their graduates are boscure.  Eckhert attempted to describe what is known, but noted "variability exists in the availability of information on faculty; where data exists, it is noted that most of the permanent on-site basic science faculty are internationally trained, many have no documented medical education experience in the United States, and it is not uncommon for them to be OMS [offshore medical school] alumni."

Even less is known about who leads these schools, who if anyone is responsible for their stewardship, and even who owns them.  The current case suggests that Saba University School of Medicine was run by couple who mysteriously assumed ownership of the school after leading it as a non-profit organization, then sold it to private equity for millions in a transaction that eventually left one a convicted criminal and the other a fugitive.  Yet none of this came to light until the federal government launched an investigation not of offshore medical schools, but of offshore money laundering and happened to catch the couple in the investigational web. No regulatory process, no watchdog organization in the US or Canada, or on Saba apparently found this out until it was revealed in an investigation by the US federal government that had nothing specifically to do with health care or offshore medical schools.  This suggests that offshore medical schools now can be lead and run by anyone, qualified or not, honest or criminal, without any oversight or accountability.  

For example, even today little is known about the leadership of Saba University School of Medicine.  The school currently provides only minimal biographical information on its administration.  Its President is listed as Joseph Chu MD MPH, who appears to have the same educational credentials (MD from Georgetown, MPH from University as Washington) as one Joseph Chu who is apparently a Clinical Associate Professor of Epidemiology at the University of Washington.   Dr Chu's specialty and previous experience are not apparent.  Whether the Dr Chu at University of Washington is the same as the President of Saba is unclear.  If they are the same, how Dr Chu holds down these two jobs is not clear.

For comparison, most US schools provide extensive information about their leadership.  Just as an example, see the introductory page on the Dean of the University Washington medical school.

Even less is known about the stewardship or governance of Saba University School of Medicine.  Many US medical schools have their own boards of trustees who are supposed to provide stewardship. For example, the UW board is here.  Their membership is generally known.  Furthermore, most US medical schools report to university leadership, again whose identity is known, and are subject to governance by a university board of trustees.  We have certainly criticized the leadership and governance of US academic medicine.  At least, however, it is possible to find out the names of the people responsible. 

However, while Saba University School of Medicine is still apparently owned by Equinox Capital according to the latter's website, to whom Dr Chu reports at Equinox Capital is unclear.  Whether Saba has a board of trustees, or any such similar stewardship mechanism, is unclear.  So who is ultimately accountable for Saba is unclear.  Probably just as unclear is who leads, who stewards, and who is accountable for the leadership of most other offshore medical schools.

While Eckhert wrote in 2010 that the increasing presence of offshore medical graduates in the US "obligates U.S. medicine to take a closer look at these educational programs," no such scrutiny has occurred since then.  While offshore medical schools account for the training of an increasing proportion of US (and presumably Canadian) physicians, we know next to nothing about their leadership and governance.  This seems to be just another part of the decreasing accountability of the leadership of US health care, and the increasing opacity of the governance and stewardship of US health care organizations.  True US health care reform would make leadership transparent and accountable.         

Reference
 1.  Eckhert NL.  Private schools of the Caribbean: outsourcing medical education.  Acad Med 1010; 85: 622-630.  Link here. 

A Sewage-Laden Cruise Ship, Burning Aircraft Batteries, Neo-Nazi Factory Security - Will Jaw Dropping Cases Prompt the Public to Demand Better Leadership?

The dysfunction of modern health care likely arises from larger trends within the economy and the society.  We frequently discuss how poor leadership and governance within health care and other organizations exist in a context of focus on short-term revenue above all else (financialization); perverse incentives, particularly leading to excess executive compensation unrelated to leaders' actions or performance; deception, especially in marketing and public relations coupled to suppression of internal dissent and whistle blowing;  lax regulation and law enforcement, in a climate of regulatory capture and by governments afflicted with the revolving door allowing conflicts of interest and corruption, etc, etc.

I was thinking of this last weekend while like many Rhode Islanders we were shivering in an unheated house.  A big but not unprecedented snow storm had apparently caused the failure of multiple high-voltage electrical transmission lines and substations, which should be designed to resist such conditions.  (National Grid says cause still unknown for failure of high-voltage lines serving East Bay, Aquidneck Island.)

Poor leadership and governance under these circumstances likely lead to threats to public health and safety.  Focus on cost-cutting and current revenue to drive executive compensation may lead to bad design, manufacture, and maintenance of critical systems.  So maybe we should not be surprised at a recent barrage of cases involving threats to health and safety by well-known corporations:

Walmart in Supply Chain Crackdown after Bangladesh Factory Fire

Apple Vows to Eradicate Child Labour from Workforce

HSBC Got Away with Murder: the Bank Laundered Money for Drug Traffickers and Terrorist Groups...

Probe of Boeing 787 Battery Fire Expands

Sewage-laden Carnival Cruise Ship Docks in Mobile, Alabama: Passengers Finally Disembark from Vacation Vehicle Turned Smelly Nightmare

Amazon 'used neo-Nazi guards to keep immigrant workforce under control' in Germany


Those were just the cases I could easily recall.  Readers are invited to add more to the comments section.


At least, I don't think I can blame poor leadership and governance for a huge exploding meteor:




But maybe a society less dominated by top insiders skimming off more and more money would be better prepared for the next meteor strike.

One can only hope that this onslaught of increasingly jaw-dropping cases that threaten health and safety that would have been unimaginable a short time ago might lead the public to demand accountable, transparent, mission-focused, honest leadership of the big organizations, for-profit, non-profit and governmental, that now control our lives.

Pfizer's Pfourteenth Settlement - a Small Reminder of Continuing Impunity

Well, that did not take long.  Less than a month after its last legal settlements were announced, Pfizer had to settle again.

The Details of the Settlement

This case, involving charges filed by the Texas Attorney General, was only reported locally, e.g., here in the Houston Business Journal:

The state of Texas will receive more than $36 million from two civil Medicaid fraud settlements with Pfizer Inc and Endo Pharmaceuticals,  Attorney General Greg Abbott said Friday.

Both companies will pay $18.17 million to the state, plus attorney fees and relator shares. The federal government is also entitled to a share of the total settlement, Abbott’s statement said.

As usual, the settlement was about deceptions:

 State and federal law requires drug companies disclose to the Medicaid program the prices they charge pharmacies, wholesalers and distributors for their products. Texas’ lawsuits claimed the companies misreported the price of various generic drugs and overcharged Medicaid for certain products.

As usual, Pfizer had excuses:
 

In the Pfizer settlement, the state’s investigation originally targeted entities that are now wholly owned subsidiaries of Pfizer.

In making the settlements, neither company is admitting to any wrongdoing.

New York-based Pfizer released a statement saying the safety of its subsidiaries’ products was not an issue of the investigation and Pfizer was not a target or subject of the case.

'Pfizer’s subsidiaries are resolving this investigation to avoid the further time and cost of litigation,' the company said in its statement. 'The majority of the Texas investigation focused on reporting that took place prior to the subsidiaries being acquired by Pfizer. The company remains committed to providing accurate pricing information to the Texas Medicaid program and providing quality pharmaceutical products to the citizens of Texas.'

 Of course, Pfizer acquired the companies (which were listed in the settlement document as ESI Lederle, Lederle Labs, and Pharmacia) in order to make money from them.  Furthermore, in acquiring the subsidiaries, Pfizer assumed responsibility for them and their actions.

As usual, there was no hint in the minimalist coverage of this settlement of any sort of negative consequences for anyone who authorized, directed, or implemented the relevant behavior, which did involve deception upon the government of Texas.

Nobody Held Responsible, Even After 14 Settlements

As is also usual, there was no mention in the media coverage, or the settlement document that Pfizer has made numerous other settlements in the recent past.   By my best count, the total was up to thirteen from the beginning of the 21st century to the present, as most recently tabulated here, and listed in the Appendix below.  (There may easily have been more that I missed.)

At the time of the twelfth and thirteenth settlements, we wondered whether the sheer volume of documentation of Pfizer's actions, and the sheer number of legal actions against it would finally lead to the end of the impunity of Pfizer's leaders.  After all, one would think that if the town drunk showed up in court for his fourteenth drunk driving charge, the book would be figuratively thrown at him.  Instead, at best, Pfizer had a wet noodle thrown at it.  The costs of this settlement, and even the cumulative costs of all the previous ones over time just added up to costs of doing business.  And these costs were not paid by the people who profited the most from the bad behavior, but were diffused among all stock-holders, employees, patients, and payers. 

Of course, leadership and governance of Pfizer is by some very fancy people indeed, and our society has not been good lately at holding such fancy people to any standards whatsoever.

 The sorts of practices discussed in Pfizer's multiple settlements have added to the revenue that have helped a lot of people live in the style to which they have become accustomed.  Pfizer has had some very, very well paid executives.  In 2011, according to the company's 2012 proxy statement, its CEO, Ian Read, got more than $25 million, that is to repeat more than twenty-five million dollars, count them, in total compensation.  All the rest of its named executive officers got more than $5 million in total compensation.  That 2012 report justified this other worldly munificence in part because

 We continued to improve our reputation in society through engagement with our customers, our shareholders, and the investor community.

Really, after now 14 settlements? 

The issue of the impunity of leaders of large organizations has finally made it to the big time.  For example, a New York Times editorial called the latest US government settlement with the large banks whose exploitative mortgage practices helped to usher in the global financial collapse or great recession "another slap on the wrist."  Writ large, continuing impunity is the sort of problem that indicates a degree of societal corruption that can destroy particular civilizations.

I am just a simple country doctor and can only do my small part to keep the barbarians outside the gate, but at least those who care about what has gone wrong with health care ought to be calling for vigorous, impartial law enforcement that holds leaders of health care organizations accountable for wrong-doing, and in general, changes that make leaders of health care organizations broadly accountable for their actions.

There are some luminaries from health care and academia on the current Pfizer board, like  Dennis A. Ausiello, M.D.,
Jackson Professor of Clinical Medicine at Harvard Medical School and Chief of Medicine at Massachusetts General Hospital;  Frances D. Fergusson, Ph.D., President Emeritus of Vassar College; Helen H. Hobbs, M.D., Investigator of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute since 2002, is a Professor of Internal Medicine and Molecular Genetics and Director of the McDermott Center for Human Growth and Development at the University of Texas (UT) Southwestern Medical Center; and Marc Tessier-Lavigne, Ph.D., President of The Rockefeller University since March 2011. Maybe some people at their base institutions ought to be asking them about Pfizer's multiple ethical lapses and what they are doing to make its leadership more accountable. 

APPENDIX - Pfizer's Settlements

In the beginning of the 21st century, according to the Philadelphia Inquirer, Pfizer made three major settlements,

October 2002: Pfizer and subsidiaries Warner-Lambert and Parke-Davis agreed to pay $49 million to settle allegations that the company fraudulently avoided paying fully rebates owed to the state and federal governments under the national Medicaid Rebate program for the cholesterol-lowering drug Lipitor.

May 2004: Pfizer agreed to pay $430 million to settle DOJ claims involving the off-label promotion of the epilepsy drug Neurontin by subsidiary Warner-Lambert. The promotions included flying doctors to lavish resorts and paying them hefty speakers' fees to tout the drug. The company said the activity took place years before it bought Warner-Lambert in 2000.

April 2007: Pfizer agreed to pay $34.7 million in fines to settle Department of Justice allegations that it improperly promoted the human growth hormone product Genotropin. The drugmaker's Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. subsidiary pleaded guilty to offering a kickback to a pharmacy-benefits manager to sell more of the drug.

Thereafter, Pfizer paid a $2.3 billion settlement in 2009 of civil and criminal allegations and a Pfizer subsidiary entered a guilty plea to charges it violated federal law regarding its marketing of Bextra (see post here).  Pfizer was involved in two other major cases from then to early 2010, including one in which a jury found the company guilty of violating the RICO (racketeer-influenced corrupt organization) statute (see post here).  The company was listed as one of the pharmaceutical "big four" companies in terms of defrauding the government (see post here).  Pfizer's Pharmacia subsidiary settled allegations that it inflated drugs costs paid by New York in early 2011 (see post here).   In March, 2011, a settlement was announced in a long-running class action case which involved allegations that another Pfizer subsidiary had exposed many people to asbestos (see this story in Bloomberg).  In October, 2011, Pfizer settled allegations that it illegally marketed bladder control drug Detrol (see this post). Finally, in August, 2012, Pfizer settled allegations that its subsidiaries bribed foreign (that is, with respect to the US) government officials, including government-employed doctors (see this post).

In December, 2012, Pfizer settled federal charges that its Wyeth subsidiary deceptively marketed the proton pump inhibitor drug Protonix, using systematic efforts to deceive approved by top management, and settled charges by multiple states' Attorneys' General that it deceptively marketed Zyvox and Lyrica (see this post).  

Question for the New Year: Why is There Next to No Reaction to the Gilded Age of Health Care?

For the New Year, it is time to ponder- why is there still no organized outrage over the ongoing incompetent, uncaring, self-interested, conflicted, and often outright corrupt leadership of health care organizations we have documented incessantly on Health Care Renewal?

For example, just a few days ago, we documented a series of cases in which large US and multinational health care organizations settled cases alleging they deceptively marketed drugs so as to exaggerate their benefits and conceal their harms, bribed doctors and officials  outside of the US, gave kickbacks to US doctors, defrauded the US government, and monopolized markets for drugs, yet few leaders, and no top leaders of the companies involved suffered any negative consequences for authorizing, directing, or implementing these activities.  We have discussed many previous legal settlements involving similar bad behavior and similar impunity by the leaders of the organizations involved.   Again and again we have discussed how large organizations, often but not always drug, biotechnology and device companies, have manipulated the scientific literature (e.g., see examples of manipulation of clinical research, suppression of clinical research, and specific practices such as ghost-writing of apparently scholarly articles to benefit vested interests.)   We have discussed overblown compensation that made top managers and other organizational insiders rich without any rationale other than their ability to take such money off the top.  Yet in the US, despite ever rising costs presumably provoked by such leadership, without corresponding improvements in quality or access, there is still no organized movement for change.

The problems in US health care, however, seem to parallel problems in the larger society, and the world at large.  We have discussed parallels with bad leadership of financial firms, including the firms that drove us into the global financial collapse/ great recession, and to continuing income stagnation, recession, austerity, and decreasing opportunity for the poor and middle class around the world.

Yet parallel questions are just beginning to be asked about larger related political economic problems.  Recently, historian Brad DeLong attempted to address the question, "why next to no reaction to the second gilded age?"  (See this.).  Unfortunately, while he could demonstrate two powerful political movements that opposed the first Gilded Age, he was completely at a loss to explain why there has been no similar organized outrage about the second Gilded Age in which we exist today.  Despite incompetent, uncaring, self-interested, conflicted, and often outright corrupt leadership of many large corporations, non-profit organizations, and government agencies only a few voices, often bloggers like us, have objected.

Economist Mark Thoma then took up the question, but the best he could do was suggest that outrage has been moderated because of the existing, if frayed, social safety net, and because many people nonetheless saw the last two decades as a time of increasing economic opportunity. (See this. )   He did not address how this view may have been wrong, since the last two decades were a time of obviously worsening income inequality.

Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism finally offered some insight (see this) by noting the importance of "propaganda," corresponding, I think, to the widespread deceptive marketing and public relations, and the use of covertly paid key opinion leaders to further both that we frequently discuss.  Finally she suggested that people feel powerless because they see themselves as "atomized individuals," even though they many are currently being treated as interchangeable parts by the leaders of large organizations who can control the actions of large number of employees to further their self-interest.

There must be more reasons.  There ought to at least be some organized discussion of these reasons.  After that there needs to be some organized action to promote real reform.  I conclude the often miserable 2012 with a plea for those who are interested and concerned to come together to create real solutions.

ADDENDUM (1 January, 2013) - see comments by Dr Howard Brody on the Economism Scam blog.

Dartmouth's Governance and Wall Street

While the money spent on health care in the US continues to increase, care becomes less accessible and its quality becomes more dubious.  Most public health care discourse seems at a loss to explain how we can keep spending more to get less.

Of many possible explanations, one that has become more credible is continuing erosion of health care stewardship.  The boards of trustees of health care organizations, those charged with their stewardship, seem increasingly preoccupied with self-interest rather than the health care mission.  As more information about how such boards currently operate sneaks into public view, the problems appear more serious and salient.

New information about the governance of Dartmouth College, an issue we have followed since 2007, is illustrative.

The Case So Far

The problems at Dartmouth were notable because in many ways its governance was superior to that of many US higher educational and health care institutions.  At the time we first stumbled on these problems, Dartmouth was unusual in that nearly half of its board of trustees were elected by alumni, rather than being self-appointed.  That made its governance both more representative  and more accountable. 

In 2007, however, a dispute was ongoing about the extent that the institution's board of trustees ought to represent the alumni at large, or instead, ought to be a self-elected body not clearly accountable to anyone else.  The unelected, or "charter" board members were pushing to increases their numbers.  In 2007, what really got our attention was the stated rationale for this push towards less representative and accountable governance. Mr Charles Haldeman, then the chairman of the board of trustees, announced a smaller proportion of elected trustees would ensure that the board "has the broad range of backgrounds, skills, expertise, and fundraising capabilities needed," and that the board members would possess "even more diverse backgrounds."  However, despite his appeal to diversity, Mr Haldeman seemed most intent on reducing "divisiveness," especially dissent that challenged his own authority.  At the time, we thought his argument for more diversity to reduce dissent and increase his own authority seemed Orwellian.

Yet when we examined the backgrounds of the self-appointed trustees, we found that they exhibited little diversity. Furthermore, rather than resembling followers of Ingsoc, they resembled more the group that the radical left traditionally reviled.  Remarkably, three-quarters (6/8) were leaders of the finance sector, of what is popularly called "Wall Street." In 2007, they seemed not very diverse, but why the majority should be in the financial sector, and what implications that had, was then obscure.

After the fall of Lehman Brothers and the onset of the global financial collapse/ great recession, the implications of this Wall Street majority on the board of an institution of higher education became more troubling.  Since 2008, growing concerns about the extent that finance is driven by a "greed is good" culture increasingly suggest that domination of university, medical school, or hospital boards by leaders in the finance sector may increasingly divorce boards from the missions which they are supposed to uphold.

Yet in 2008, the unelected "charter" members of the Dartmouth board succeeded in increasing their numbers, and hence their proportion of total board seats.  The new board was no more diverse.  Of its 13 charter members, 9 were from finance, and one more was the CEO of a corporation with a major finance subsidiary.  (Look here.)  By 2009, the charter board members had succeeded in ousting a dissident alumni-elected member, labeling him a member of a "radical cabal," and rewriting a board loyalty oath apparently to discourage further dissent.  (Look here.)

All this spoke to the increasing power of the culture of finance among members of the board.  Perhaps, though, there were reasons that the financial majority on the board wanted to suppress dissent other than to make themselves more comfortable with their own dominant culture,  In 2010, as the global financial crisis continued, "Educational Endowments and the Financial Crisis: Social Costs and Systemic Risks in the Shadow Banking System," published by the Center for Social Philanthropy, Tellus Institute, focused on how prominent educational institutions, including Dartmouth College, came to invest much of their endowments in risky, illiquid "alternative" investments, the sort provided by the "shadow banking system."  (See this post.)  The report noted extensive conflicts of interest on the Dartmouth board involving trustees who were also leaders of finance.  Their firms, it turned out, were managing a substantial fraction of the money in the college's endowment.  Half of the charter trustees were also being paid to manage the finances of the institution for whose stewardship they were responsible. 

Trustees of non-profit organizations are supposed to exhibit a duty of loyalty, that is, they "must give undivided allegiance when making decisions affecting the organization."  (For a summary of their duties, look here.)   In 2010, I noted, "letting a board member's firm manage millions of dollars worth of the institution's endowment portfolio seems an obvious violation of the duty of loyalty."  So, "these sorts of conflicts of interest may be another 'missing link' explaining why the leadership and governance of health care organizations has gone so far astray."  I then posited, "as disclosure continues, maybe enough outrage will ensue so that improved leadership and governance will become possible.

The Friends of Eleazar Wheelock Charge Corruption

Now there seems to be more outrage.  Last month, the dissident Dartblog broke the story of a letter sent in February, 2012 to the New Hampshire Attorney General by an anonymous group called the "Friends of Eleazar Wheelock."  (Wheelock was the founder of the college.)  To the the letter was appended a report that included an even more extensive list of conflicts of interest affecting Dartmouth trustees, the college's Finance Committee and Investment Committees, and their friends and relatives. 

The letter also added

The mismanagement extends beyond the investments and endowment. 1) Over a period of seven years The College engaged Lehman Brothers in six 'interest rate swaps' totaling $550 million dollars. The current value of these 'swaps' is now in excess of two hundred million dollars. That is what Dartmouth owes on these bets. These losses are not reported in the College’s financial statements. 2) The College’s 'cash' was invested in six hedge funds. Up to 40% of it was lost. Again, this was not reported. This comprises grant money for research, advances to faculty, and other working capital which should have been invested in the safest of money market instruments. 3) over 50% of the endowment is invested with Trustees, Investment Committee members, or their friends.

The report summary stated,

The pattern that the Dartmouth trustees and members of the Endowment/Investment committee have engaged in for decades is clear. That pattern is that a donor/investment manager’s pledge to support Dartmouth is reciprocated with an investment of ever increasing proportions in the donor’s firm, lending the credibility of an Ivy League institution to the firm. The investment returns are of little import; most of these alum/donor/investment manager returns are average to poor.

It rhetorically asked how the college came into

the grip of a club of investment manager alums who have invested almost six hundred million dollars in their very own funds and directed over one billion dollars to their friends? And who have taken almost one hundred million dollars in fees to manage the endowment, often with poor results culminating in the twenty three per cent loss in 2008 and the worst performance of all the Ivies in 2011?

The letter charged that there has been a

quiet takeover of this great College by a cabal of external, wealthy alumni/ae of the college. They have mortgaged the College’s future through borrowing heavily in the tax exempt marketplace under NH HEFA (Health and Education Facilities Authority). They have simultaneously directed the College’s three billion dollar endowment to themselves, their firms, and their friends. They have furthered their own self-interest at the expense of the College and the Upper Valley. They have abused the non-profit status of Dartmouth College. They have enriched themselves through managing and directing Dartmouth’s three billion dollar endowment. In all cases they have taken gargantuan fund management fees through 'Private Equity', 'Venture Capital', and 'Hedge Funds' investments which they, themselves, manage and are the owners of.

Summary

A post on the American Thinker blog noted that the letter alleged "corruption." It is impossible to tell whether these expanded allegations will result in any charges, much less convictions. The state Attorney General is currently looking into this (see Reuters). Certainly, the allegations are at least of ethical corruption as it is defined by Transparency International, "abuse of entrusted power for private gain."

The revelations since 2007 (and I could argue beginning with my finding that the majority of the supposedly "diverse" charter trustees were leaders of finance) first raised questions whether Dartmouth governance's was attentive to the mission, then, whether it was conflicted, and now, whether it is corrupt.

That these questions can be credibly raised about one of our most prestigious institutions of higher education and health care demonstrates the depth of our health care crisis. It also demonstrates how the health care crisis seems inextricably linked to the financial crisis, and to a fundamental crisis about our society and its commitment to democracy and fairness.

A fair and thorough enquiry about the mess at Dartmouth, resulting in clear actions to uphold the institution's mission and ethics, and, if applicable, the law, would start us down the path of true health care reform.

However, if this just gets swept under the rug, we will not have reached the bottom of our descent.

ADDENDUM (2 June, 2012) - Note that Dartmouth's most recent President, Jim Yong Kim, who was appointed by and served under the Trustees in question above, is now President of the World Bank (see this LA Times article.)

See also comments in the University Diaries blog.

Wall Street Journal Defends Hired WellPoint Executives' Lack of Accountability to the Company's Owners

The lack of accountability of the hired managers (or executives or bureaucrats) of health care organizations came into sharper focus thanks to a bizarre, in my humble opinion, Wall Street Journal editorial from last week. 

Background: Shareholder Campaign for Oversight of Hired Executives Use of Corporate Money for Political Purposes

In the background is the campaign by some of the owners, that is, shareholders of giant publicly held for-profit insurance company WellPoint to make its executives' attempts to involve the company in politics more transparent and accountable.  (See our previous post here.)  As noted more recently in Fortune (by way of CNN),

shareholders and major U.S. companies have been meeting behind the scenes to discuss improvements in oversight and disclosure practices. 'Companies need to remember that shareholders have a right to know how their money is being spent,' wrote Eric Sumberg, spokesperson for New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli, representing the New York State pension fund, in an email. 'Transparency and full disclosure will help to deter high risk political spending that could hurt shareholder value.'

Aetna and WellPoint are two companies contending with shareholder proposals on political spending disclosure this year.

The Center for Public Accountability (CPA) rates the disclosures at Aetna and WellPoint as having 'room for improvement.' Both WellPoint and Aetna have disclosure practices that 'leave significant room for serious misrepresentation of the company's political spending through trade associations,' according to the Center's Political Accountability and Transparency Reports. According to the Center reports, both companies gave money to AHIP (American Health Insurance Plans). And $86 million in funds from AHIP were allegedly funneled to the Chamber of Commerce to lobby against health care reform, according to reports from Bloomberg and the National Journal.

Note that this money was supposedly used by WellPoint executives to undermine the Obama administration's health care reform proposals while the company was publicly supporting aspects of these proposals.

The Wall Street Journal Says Hired Executives Not Accountable to Shareholders

The Wall Street Journal's editorial page's denunciation of this campaign by corporate owners to assert their rights, and the accountability of hired managers opened thus,

The campaign to intimidate companies from exercising their free-speech rights is in high gear as shareholder proxy season arrives, and the most prominent early target is health-insurer WellPoint. The arc of this attack will be one of the election year's political leitmotifs, and it should be on the radar of every corporate boardroom.

In the favored new tactic of the left, unions and activists are using politicized shareholder resolutions to send a message to corporations: Drop support for free-market and conservative causes, or you'll take a political beating.

The Journal conveniently ignored that the campaign is not from outside the corporation, but from its very owners, and that the people they are supposedly trying to intimidate are actually supposed to be responsible to them.  In addition, it begged the question of how political spending by hired corporate bureaucrats unaccountable to the people who own the company could possible have anything to do with free markets.

If some owners do not think that executives should be spending company money on political causes (especially presumably causes that the executives favor, or that reflect the executives' self-interest), they have a perfect right to think so, and to act on their thoughts.


Then the  Journal went on to assail the shareholders' challenge to some members of the WellPoint board of directors.  After first defining Change to Win as a "union front group," -

Change to Win is now targeting WellPoint's annual meeting on May 16 when it will demand that shareholders vote against board members Julie Hill and Susan Bayh (wife of former Indiana Democratic Senator Evan Bayh) because the company has refused to disclose or stop all of its political spending. Among the company's crimes? Corporate funding of, you guessed it, ALEC.

Now let us back up a minute. This is about a campaign by stockholders, that is, people who are owners, albeit fractional owners of WellPoint. It is some shareholders who want to vote against the particular board members.  WellPoint directors are supposed to have a fiduciary duty to represent the stockholders', that is, the owners' financial interests. If stockholders think members of the board of directors are not representing the stockholders' interests, the stockholders have a perfect right to vote against them. 

However, the Journal fulminated,

The union attack on WellPoint is notable for targeting two board members by name and the effort to make extra hay out of Susan Bayh's political profile. (Added frisson: Evan Bayh has worked as a consultant to the Chamber.) The ad hominem attack is right out of the Saul Alinsky playbook and is intended as a warning to other corporate directors that their personal reputation will be damaged if they don't force companies to stop donating to industry groups.

Note further that all stockholders are owners, whether they are also union members, or have green hair. Note further that the owners again have a perfect right to criticize or vote against board members who they believe are not properly exercising their fiduciary responsibilities to stockholders, that doing so has nothing to do with the ad hominem fallacy, and that this right is not nullified for stockholders with particular political opinions, or stockholders whom the Wall Street Journal does not like.

Summary

So we see the Wall Street Journal, supposed defender of capitalism, attacking a fundamental part of capitalism, the right of ownership, corporate ownership in this case. Instead, presumably, the Journal editorialists thinks that hired corporate executives ought to be completely unaccountable to the stockholders, and able to do whatever they want, including to do what is in their self-interest but not the owners' interests.

So this is how far the coup d'etat by hired executives/ managers/ bureaucrats has progressed. Supposed defenders of capitalism are now defending the rule of hired corporate insiders, completely disregarding the rights of owners. All we are lacking is a catchy name for rule by the hired managers/ bureaucrats/ executives. I am open to suggestions.

We have long criticized leaders of health care organizations who are ill-informed, unaware or hostile to health care professionals' core values, self-interested, or even corrupt.  We have discussed how bad leadership has advanced as leaders have become less accountable.  It appears that the lack of accountability of health care leaders, and their tendencies to put their own interests first, is part of a larger problem.  This is the take-over by most of society's important organizations by the managers, bureaucrats, and executives who were hired to run them.  For profit corporate hired leaders have become unaccountable to the corporations' owners.  Non-profit organizations' hired leaders have become unaccountable for the mission, or for their organizations' stakeholders. 

If we want health care, and democratic society to survive, we need to counter the managers' coup d'etat and make leaders accountable once again.