Showing posts with label academic medical centers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label academic medical centers. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 22, 2015

How Managerialists Turned Housestaff Training into a Zero-Sum Game: the Continuing Saga of the FIRST and iCompare Studies

A ongoing controversy about two controlled trials (FIRST and iCompare) meant to test the bizarre hypothesis that sleep depriving medical housestaff (that is, physicians in training) would improve health care provided new evidence that academic medicine has been captured by managerialists.  

Background: the Controversy about the FIRST and iCompare Housestaff Sleep Deprivation Trials

In early December, 2015 we posted about two clinical trials, FIRST and iCompare, designed to test the hypothesis that  increasing housestaff sleep deprivation would improve care continuity, and thus somehow improve housestaff their performance and their patients' outcomes.  Not only did the studies' hypothesis seem strange, but the studies seemed to violate fundamental rules of research ethics.  Study investigators proceeded without obtaining formal informed consent from their house staff or patient research subjects, and did not allow any research subjects to opt out without penalty (e.g., house staff would have to quit their programs and find new ones to opt out).  Finally, after Public Citizen and the American Medical Student Association (AMSA) complained about the studies, study defenders based their arguments on logical fallacies.

Why would distinguished medical educators behave so strangely?  I hypothesized that medical educators could not imagine a way to improve care continuity without worsening trainees' sleep deprivation because all logical methods to do so would cost money.  However, the managerialist executives to whom medical educators are now beholden shrink from increasing costs, other than their and their cronies' own compensation.

Two Psychiatric Residents Write about the Zero-Sum Game of Housestaff Training

Of course, the controversy, and particularly the complaints from AMSA and Public Citizen have been largely anechoic.  But recently, the Washington Post published a commentary by two psychiatric residents on these issues.  The authors, Jeffrey Clark and David Harari, confirmed many of my concerns about the sleep deprivation trials.  They personally verified that the studies were done without informed consent from the research subjects.

The two of us and our patients were not provided informed consent before being enrolled in the iCompare trial.

The also confirmed that the trial investigators assumed they were working in a zero-sum framework.

We already know that extended shifts are dangerous. While many people rightfully suspect that current duty-hour limits aren’t improving outcomes, these studies err in assuming that the dangers of sleep deprivation must be traded for the dangers of shared patient care. Such a zero-sum framework won’t help us improve patient care or ensure the well-being of resident physicians.

To elaborate, the big problem with the duty hour restrictions is that while limiting the consecutive hours interns were supposed to work, this was not accompanied by any diminution of the total workload of housestaff at any one institution.

The standards published in 2011 by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education still allow hospitals to put residents through blistering 80-hour work weeks, while setting maximum shift lengths of only 16 hours for interns and 24 hours for more senior residents. Interns simply work shorter but more-frequent shifts. Doctors hand off patients to each other more regularly but without the training needed to manage these transitions effectively. And, by and large, hospitals have not responded to the changes with larger workforces, leaving residents no choice but to compress their daily work into shorter time periods.

It appears that housestaff were formerly sleep deprived not by their own choice, but because they were required to accomplish enormous amounts of work.  The new duty-hour limits rearrangde their work into shorter shifts, without diminishing their total responsibilities.  This does not seem like much of an improvement.  The FIRST and iCompare trials were designed to test whether removing the new duty-hour limits, and thus increase sleep deprivation, would somehow help, which ignores the reason  the new duty-hour restrictions were enacted.  But simply shortening shifts accomplishes little as long as total workload remains the same.

Stimulants, An Even Worse Solution

So Clark and Harari confirmed my concerns about the FIRST and iCompare trials.  But they added a new and in some ways even more dire concern.  They uncovered an even more troubling response by medical academics to the zero-sum game which the managerialists ensure they are playing.

Adequate sleep is a fundamental physiological need. No amount of caffeine, prescription stimulants (as some physician leaders have advocated for) or 'alertness management strategies' can adequately compensate for acute and chronic sleep deprivation.

In an aside, Clark and Harari suggested the medical educators were advocating that housestaff use prescription stimulants to counteract the effects of sleep deprivation.  This seems astonishing.

Yet a brief search revealed many informal accounts of medical students and housestaff using psychoactive prescription drugs to increase wakefulness.  For example, see an account of a medical student using Focalin (dexmethylphenidate) here.  Surveys, for example by Shy et al of emergency residents, suggest that use of stimulants by housetaff is rare,(1), but survey respondents may be unwilling to admit to such behavior, and emergency medicine residents may work shorter shifts than medicine and surgery residents.

Also, there is some other evidence that medical educators may encourage use of stimulants.  At least one 2014 guest poster on the KevinMD blog stated

at one medical university, it is common knowledge among the student body that struggling individuals are encouraged to see a physician about their 'possible ADD,' or attention deficit disorder.

Furthermore, in 2009, Rose and Curry writing in the Mayo Clinic Proceedings (2) noted that 

extending the use of drug therapy to include resident with no identified sleep disorder to improve concentration and learning, improve wakefulness, enhance performance, and promote high-quality patient care (especially at night) raises a variety of concerns

without explaining who came up with that idea in the first place.  However, in a response to a letter challenging their commentary, they denied (3) that they were advocating for such drug use, but never made clear who else was.

As we have noted, stimulants used for attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are  amphetamines or relatives of amphetamines, and have dangerous adverse effects.  Encouraging, even subliminally, medical trainees to use such dangerous drugs to try to compensate for underfunding of training programs seems unethical, as the above letter writer pointed out.(3)  That medical educators would resort to such an extreme solution suggests how they are now boxed in. 

Conclusion: the Problem is Managerialism   

While the ongoing trials of housestaff sleep deprivation have been largely anechoic, the recent Washington Post commentary by Clark and Harari make questions about why in the world medical academics would have set up such trials and continue to defend them even more stark.

But it seems that medical academics are boxed in, playing a zero-sum game.  They may know that there housestaff are overworked and sleep deprived, a situation that endangers the housestaff and their patients.  Yet every reasonable way one could imagined improving the situation would require spending more money, most likely to hire more people to spread the workload.  Yet spending more money may be an anathema to the generic managers to whom medical academics report.  Spending more money would decrease revenue, and for many managerialist managers, increasing revenue, not patient outcomes or physician performance, is the prime directive.    


We have frequently posted about what we have called generic management, the manager's coup d'etat, and mission-hostile management. Managerialism wraps these concepts up into a single package.  The idea is that all organizations, including health care organizations, ought to be run people with generic management training and background, not necessarily by people with specific backgrounds or training in the organizations' areas of operation.  Thus, for example, hospitals ought to be run by MBAs, not doctors, nurses, or public health experts.  Furthermore, all organizations ought to be run according to the same basic principles of business management.  These principles in turn ought to be based on current neoliberal dogma, with the prime directive that short-term revenue is the primary goal.

To conclude, as I did on my first post on the sleep deprivation studies....  I hope that the two studies create the degree of controversy they deserve, and that the federal government promptly starts investigating honestly and thoroughly.  I further hope that this unseemly episode causes medical educators to rethink the cozy or at least conflict averse relationships they have with their managerialist leaders.

True health care reform would restore health care leadership that understands health care and medicine, upholds the health care mission, is accountable for its actions, and is transparent, ethical and honest.



References

1.  Shy BD, Portelli I, Nelson LS. Emergency medicine residents' use of psychostimulants and sedatives to aid in shift work. Am J Emerg Med 2011; 29: 1034-36. Link here.

2.  Rose SH, Curry TB.  Fatigue, countermeasures and performance enhancement in resident physicians.  Mayo Clin Proc 2009; 84:  955-57.  Link here.


3.  Paparodis R. Fatigue, countermeasures and performance enhancement in resident physicians.  Mayo Clin Proc 2010; 85: 300 - 303.  Link here.

Wednesday, September 30, 2015

Academic Medical Leaders as Directors of For-Profit Health Care Corporations: the Prevalence of This "New Species" of Conflict of Interest Documented in the BMJ

The important conflicts of interest generated when academic health care leaders also serve on the boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations is suddenly less anechoic, thanks to some intrepid researchers and the British Journal of Medicine.

Background: Academic Health Care Leaders Also Serving as Directors of For-Profit Health Care Corporations

First Discovered Cases

In 2006, we first noticed that leaders of academic medicine also were serving as board members of large for-profit health care corporations.  The first example we discussed was that of Marye Anne Fox, Chancellor (equivalent to president) of the University of California - San Diego, and hence the person to whom the University of California, San Diego School of Medicine and its academic medical center report. The conflict was between this position, and her service as a member of the board of directors of Boston Scientific, a medical device manufacture, and the board of directors of Pharmaceutical Product Development Inc., a contract research organization.

Later that year, we discussed a "new species of conflict of interest."  At that time we wrote:

Medical schools and their academic medical centers and teaching hospitals must deal with all sorts of health care companies, drug and device manufacturers, information technology venders, managed care organizations and health insurers, etc, in the course of fulfilling their patient care, teaching, and research missions. Thus, it seems that service on the board of directors of a such public for-profit health care company would generate a severe conflict for an academic health care leader, because such service entails a fiduciary duty to uphold the interests of the company and its stockholders. Such a duty ought on its face to have a much more important effect on thinking and decision making than receiving a gift, or even being paid for research or consulting services. Furthermore, the financial rewards for service on a company board, which usually include directors' fees and stock options, are comparable to the most highly paid consulting positions. What supports the interests of the company, however, may not always be good for the medical school, academic medical center or teaching hospital.

Since 2006, we continued to find colorful examples of such conflicts of interest, e.g.,

- In 2006, the UnitedHealth board included multiple academic leaders, at least one of whom seemed partly responsible as a member of the board compensation committee for allowing the then UnitedHealth CEO to collect many backdated stock options (look here)
- In 2009, some attributed the problems at George Washington University's medical school that caused it to be put on probation to the conflict of interest of its provost and vice president for health affairs,  who also sat on the board of Universal Health Services, which owned the university hospital (look here)...

Through more recent years,

- In 2014, members of the AMA committee that has an outsize role in how the government fixes the pay of US doctors wer also found to be members of boards of directors of such companies as Kindred Healthcare, Hanger Inc, and Sante. (Look here.)
- In 2015, the academic physician and research unit leader nominated to be the new head of the US Food and Drug was a director of Portola Pharmaceuticals (look here)...

Look here for even more

Our Early Cross-Sectional Study

In 2007, we did a somewhat rough and ready research project based on 2005 data to determine the prevalence of such conflicts.  The results were presented in abstract form,(1) but not published as an article:

In 2005, there were 164 US health care companies in the 2005 S&P 1500, and 125 US medical schools. We identified 198 people who served on the companies' boards of directors who had faculty or leadership positions at these medical schools. Of the 125 medical schools, 65 schools had at least one faculty member and/or leader who also served on a health care corporation's board of directors. 15 schools had more than five, and 4 had more than 10 such individuals. Of the 125 schools, 7 reported to university presidents who were also directors of health care corporations, and 11 schools reported to vice-presidents for health affairs who were also such corporate directors. Four schools were lead by deans who were also health care corporate directors, and 10 schools had academic medical center CEOs who were such directors. 22 schools had at least one top leader who was also a director of a health care corporation. 36 schools reported to university boards of trustees which each included at least one director of a health care corporation, and 12 schools' own boards of trustees included at least one such director.

We concluded:

more than one-half of US medical schools had a leader or faculty member who also was a director of a major US for-profit publicly traded Bpure^ health care corporation, more than one-sixth of schools had a top leader who was also such a director, and more than one-fifth reported to boards of trustees which included such directors.

More Modern and Complete Data

Unfortunately, we never wrote a full paper about this work, although the likelihood we could have gotten it published around 2007 was very small.  It is fortunate that Anderson and colleagues did a more complete and current version of this project, which was published online this week by the British Medical Journal.(2)

Methods

Their methodology was similar to our earlier work, but more sophisticated.  They obtained data on the 2013 board members of 446 public for-profit US companies listed on New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ and classified as in the healthcare sector, including pharmaceutical, biotechnology, medical equipment and supply companies and health care providers from the companies' 2014 proxy statements.

Results

Their results were striking, suggesting even a greater prevalence of conflicted academic leaders than our preliminary results suggested

Directors were affiliated with 85 geographically diverse non-profit academic institutions, including 19 of the top 20 National Institute of Health funded medical schools and all of the 17 US News honor roll hospitals. Overall, these 279 academically affiliated directors included 73 leaders, 121 professors, and 85 trustees. Leaders included 17 chief executive officers and 11 vice presidents or executive officers of health systems and hospitals; 15 university presidents, provosts, and chancellors; and eight medical school deans or presidents.

The new study also described the direct financial relationships among the academic leaders, professors and trustees and the corporations on whose boards they served.

The total annual compensation to academically affiliated directors for their services to companies was $54 995 786 (£35 836 000; €49 185 900) (median individual compensation $193 000) and directors beneficially owned 59 831 477 shares of company stock (median 50 699 shares).

Discussion

As we have suggested, Anderson et al stated that being on the board of directors of a for-profit health care corporation creates conflicts of interest beyond those created by simply having a financial relationship with a health care company, e.g., by participating in a commercially sponsored research project or acting as a consultant to a company.

Similar to individuals engaging in consulting relationships, directors on industry boards enter a formal contract with the company and receive financial payment for services; however, they are subject to two important differences. Firstly, unlike consultants who are compensated to provide expertise on a specific issue, directors are subject to a fiduciary responsibility to company shareholders to advance the general interests of the company and increase profits. Secondly, directors are reimbursed both through larger cash fees than typical consulting contracts and through stock options, the value of which is directly tied to the financial success of the company.

They also added the reminder that,

Though the missions of academia and for profit companies can overlap, they may also diverge, specifically when the for profit mission of industry competes with the non-profit taxpayer funded clinical and research missions of academic medical and research institutions.

So,

previous guidelines have emphasized the relationships of clinicians and researchers with industry, but institutional conflicts of interest, which arise when administrators, including executive officers, trustees, and clinical leaders have a financial relationship with industry, are increasingly recognized and pose a unique set of risks to academic missions. 

Our Summary

We have written again and again on the problem of conflicts of interest affecting health care professionals, academics, and policy makers.  The worst such conflicts may occur when individuals are simultaneously leaders of large mission-oriented health care non-profit organizations, such as teaching hospitals, medical schools, or research institutes, and board members of for-profit health care corporations.  Despite our attempts to raise such issues as important, and probably important causes of health care dysfunction, they have remained anechoic.

Now a broadly based study of this no longer so "new species" of conflict of interest has appeared in one of the biggest and most prestigious medical journals.  Let us hope it will bring this issue to the forefront, and also partially counter those who have been preaching that concerns about conflicts of interest in health care are overblown.

As we have said again and again, the web of conflicts of interest that is pervasive in medicine and health care is now threatening to strangle medicine and health care.  Furthermore, this web is now strong enough to have effectively transformed US health care into an oligarchy or plutocracy.  Health care is effectively run by a relatively small group of people, mainly professional managers plus a few (lapsed?) health care professionals, who simultaneously run or influence multiple corporations and organizations.

For patients and the public to trust health care professionals and health care organizations, they need to know that these individuals and organizations are putting patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain. Health care professionals who care for patients, those who teach about medicine and health care, clinical researchers, and those who make medical and health care policy should do so free from conflicts of interest that might inhibit their abilities to put patients and the public's health first.

Health care professionals ought to make it their highest priority to ensure that the organizations for which they work, or with which they interact also put patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain, especially the private gain of the organizations' leaders and their cronies.

ADDENDUM (16 November, 2015) - Note that an abbreviated version of this post has appeared as an electronic "rapid response" to the article by Anderson et al (link here), although the published form has on it our original submission date.   

References

1. Poses RM, Smith WR, Crausman R, Maulitz R. Selling them the rope: prevalence of for-profit health care corporate dirctors among academic medical leaders. J Gen Intern Med 2007; 22 (Suppl 1): 98.
2.  Anderson TS, Good CB, Gellad WF.  Prevalence and compensation of academic leaders, professors and trustees on publicly trade US healthcare company boards of directors: cross sectional study.  Brit Med J 2015; 351:h4826.  Link here

Thursday, April 03, 2014

Finally, An Article in a Large Circulation Medical Journal with Systematic Data about Leaders of Academic Medicine Conflicted by their Service on Health Care Corporate Boards

Background - a New Species of Conflict of Interest

Since 2006, we have posted repeatedly about  what was then a new species of severe conflicts of interest.  This occurs when leaders of academic medical institutions or other health care non-profit organizations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also serve as members of boards of directors of for-profit corporations  whose products and actions have major effects on health care.

Most recently, we discussed the cases of the current CEO of the National Quality Forum and past CEO of the American Board of Internal Medicine who was found to be on the board of for-profit hospital group purchasing organization Premier Inc, and had been on the board of its privately held but for-profit predecessors.  We then discussed the case of the incoming president of the US Institute of Medicine and former Chancellor of Health Affairs at Duke University who was on the boards of Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Medtronic and Pepsico.  We next discussed the case of the current Dean of medicine at the University of Illinois who is on the board of Novartis. 

We also recently posted about the first time these sorts of severe conflicts of interest issue have been addressed in a large circulation medical journal.  A commentary in JAMA called for many such conflicts to be banned.

A Small Study of the Prevalence of a New Species of Conflict of Interest

Now JAMA has just published a research letter which examined the prevalence of board members of large, for-profit, publicly held pharmaceutical companies who also were among the leadership of academic medical centers. [Anderson TS, Dave S, Good CB et al. Academic medical center leadership on pharmaceutical company boards of directors.  JAMA 2014; 311: 1353-5.  Link here.]

The authors looked at public data about 2012 board membership of the 47 biggest publicly held companies based on global prescription drug sales. They tabulated those who were also leaders at (apparently only US) academic medical centers. 

The most important findings were:
- 19/47 companies (40%) had at least one board member who was a leader of an academic medical center (AMC)
- 16/17 US based companies had at least one board member who was also a leader of a US AMC
-  pharmaceutical company board members included 2 university presidents, 6 deans of medicine, 6 hospital or health system executives, 7 clinical department chairs or center directors
-  28 board members were also members of boards of trustees or directors of US hospitals, medical schools, or their parent universities.

Comments

We have been trying to raise awareness of this issue since 2006.  Now we have some idea of the size of the problem.

Keep in mind that this study did not attempt to determine the prevalence of academic medical center leaders on boards of smaller pharmaceutical companies, privately held companies, biotechnology or device companies, or other health care and health care related companies (e.g., for-profit hospital systems, health insurance companies, for-profit contract research organizations, for-profit medical education and communication companies, large companies with major health care components, etc, etc, etc)  It also did not attempt to determine the prevalence of leaders of other important health care non-profit organizations (e.g., hospitals and hospital systems, insurance companies, professional societies, patient advocacy groups, accrediting boards, etc, etc, etc) on health care or related corporate boards.  It also did not address leaders of health care organizations outside of the US.  So this study likely greatly underestimates the overall prevalence of and the number of people involved in what we first called a "new species of conflict of interest."

But it is a start.  And publishing it in JAMA will begin to make more health care professionals, policy makers, and researchers, and more of the public at large aware of the problem.

As I said before, it is very nice to see that the issue of what we once called a new species of conflict of interest finally has made the big time.  Whether it now gets any more traction remains to be seen.  Unfortunately, since conflicts of interest can be so profitable for the directly affected parties, I fully expect they will continue to oppose any restrictions.  The money they have made will likely be used to deploy marketing and public relations personnel and legal counsel to counter any attempts to try to make this aspect of health care more honest.

As we have said again and again, the web of conflicts of interest that is pervasive in medicine and health care is now threatening to strangle medicine and health care.  Furthermore, this web is now strong enough to have effectively transformed US health care into an oligarchy or plutocracy.  Health care is effectively run by a relatively small group of people, mainly professional managers plus a few (lapsed?) health care professionals, who simultaneously run or influence multiple corporations and organizations.

For patients and the public to trust health care professionals and health care organizations, they need to know that these individuals and organizations are putting patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain. Health care professionals who care for patients, those who teach about medicine and health care, clinical researchers, and those who make medical and health care policy should do so free from conflicts of interest that might inhibit their abilities to put patients and the public's health first.

Health care professionals ought to make it their highest priority to ensure that the organizations for which they work, or with which they interact also put patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain, especially the private gain of the organizations' leaders and their cronies.

ADDENDUM (3 April, 2014) - see also comments by Paul Levy on the Not Running a Hospital blog, on the 1BoringOldMan blog, and by Ed Silverman (welcome back!) on the WSJ Corporate Intelligence blog

Thursday, March 20, 2014

Better Late than Never - JAMA Article Advocates Banning Academic Medical Leaders from Serving on Many Health Care Corporate Boards

Will wonders never cease? Eight years after we started posting about this issue, it has made it into a large circulation medical journal, albeit not completely

A JAMA Commentary Decries Leaders of Academic Medical Centers Serving on Boards of Organizations with Conflicting Priorities

A recent JAMA commentary(1) noted the importance of conflicts of interest affecting top leaders of academic medicine,

Conflict of interest is particularly relevant for those in the upper echelons of academic health system leadership—presidents, vice presidents, provosts, deans, chief executive officers, and the senior administrators who report to them.

(The article oddly omitted discussing conflicts of interest affecting the boards of trustees of such institutions, who are charged with their stewardship.)

Anyway, the authors' rationale was that,

Unlike most faculty and staff, senior institutional officials are involved in financial and business decisions, including purchasing, resource allocation, and development of corporate partnerships, and have fiduciary responsibility to the entire institution. In addition, it is critical that the public, students, employees, and faculty maintain confidence in the integrity of institutional leaders. Leaders have a responsibility to set an example for others in their institution, especially for those training to be health care professionals.

Independence and integrity of judgment are core precepts of professionalism. Every employee, faculty member, and student in an academic health system should feel confident that their leaders are making decisions based on the best interests of the institution and not driven by biases secondary to financial connections to outside corporate entities.

So,

Having a fiduciary responsibility to 2 separate entities is at best a very difficult situation. Will the leader direct business inappropriately to the outside company on whose board he or she sits? Will the leader inappropriately use information about the institution he or she leads to influence decisions by the outside corporation? It is difficult to separate these types of activities and decisions. In addition, there are administrative costs associated with the management of this level of conflict, and such relationships might have a 'chilling effect' on other companies that could do business with the academic health system. Beyond service on fiduciary boards, undertaking any paid role (consulting, participation on advisory boards, etc) with an outside entity with interests that overlap those of the leader’s institution raises the same issues.

The authors stressed that the most intense conflicts are generated by service on the boards of directors of "organizations with interests that overlap those of the academic health system."  Presumably they would have included among such organizations health care corporations that sell goods or services that might be used within academic medical centers, and/or be the subject of teaching or research by faculty at these centers, although the article did not make that explicit.

The authors suggested such conflicts are not infrequent, noting a survey by Campbell et al of department chairs in academic medical institutions that showed a majority had some sort of relationships with industry, although they did not specify what these relationships were.  In fact, the Campbell article did report that 11% of department chairs admitted to being on the board of directors of companies that had activities that related to the chairs' academic or administrative responsibilities.(2)

Finally, the authors called for banning most such conflicts

the fiduciary responsibilities of presidents, provosts, vice presidents, deans, chief executive officers, and those who report to them should preclude a paid relationship with an outside entity in related and relevant areas,... 

Note however that they did offer some loopholes.

unless a case can be made that there is a compelling institutional interest in the leader’s service in such a role, or if the role with the outside organization is outside the scope of the leader’s role at the academic health system.

Despite the omissions and loopholes, this is a very significant article.  It is the first challenge to such severe conflicts of interest affecting academic medicine to appear as an article in a major medical journal, at least to my knowledge. 

You Heard It Here First

However, on Health Care Renewal we have been attempting to challenge such conflicts for at least eight years. In 2006 we first discussed a newly discovered species of conflict of interest in health care, in which leaders of medical or health care organizations were simultaneously serving on boards of directors of health care corporations.

We posited these conflicts would be particularly important because being on the board of directors entails not just a financial incentive.  It ostensibly requires board members to "demonstrate unyielding loyalty to the company's shareholders" [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.]  Of course, after the global financial collapse of 2008 made us sadder and a little wiser, we realized that many board members actually seem to have unyielding loyalty to their cronies among top management.  However, in any case, the stated or actual interests of a member of the board of a health care corporation, like a pharmaceutical company or medical device company, could be very different and at odds with the mission of an academic medical institution or a non-profit ostensibly dedicated to improving health care quality.

Vivid Cases Would Strengthen the Argument

It is odd that the JAMA article included very little evidence about the occurrence of such conflicts of interest.  It really is not hard to find.  Since 2006, we have discussed numerous cases of such conflicts of interest.

The case that first attracted our attention was that of Marye Anne Fox, the then Chancellor of the University of California - San Diego, a major campus of the state university that includes a medical school.  January, 2006 media reports noted that Chancellor Fox was simultaneously servingon 10 corporate boards, including those of two health care corporations, Boston Scientific, a medical device company, and Pharmaceutical Product Development Inc (PPDI), a for-profit contract research organization.  At the time, I wrote,

having ultimate leadership responsibilities for a medical school and medical center, while also having ultimate fiduciary responsibilities for the management of a medical device company and a contract medical research company amounts to the biggest conflicts of interest I have ever seen.   

Nonetheless, beyond local media, the case got little attention at the time.  What attention it did get focused on the magnitude of Chancellor Fox's commitments to outside organizations, not the conflicts they apparently caused (look here).  Chancellor Fox apparently retired from the PPDI board in 2008 (look here) but did not retire from the Boston Scientific Board until 2011 (look here). 

Since then, we found many more striking cases.
-  A month later, there was the case of the president of the University of Miami, a board member of for-profit health insurance company UnitedHealth, whose lowest paid employees were on strike to protest their lack of health insurance, among other issues.
-  It turned out the UnitedHealth board in particular seemed to be a refuge for multiple academic leaders, at least one of whom seemed partly responsible for allowing the then UnitedHealth CEO to collect many backdated stock options (look here)..
-  Then there was the 2008 case of the conflict of interest involving an anti-health company.  After Virginia Commonwealth University was criticized for taking money from giant tobacco company Philip Morris for medical research, it turned out that the then president of the university, Eugene Trani, was on the board of another tobacco company, Universal Corp (see post here).
-  Then, in 2009, some attributed the problems at George Washington University's medical school that caused it to be put on probation to the conflict of interest of its provost and vice president for health affairs, John F Williams, who also sat on the board of Universal Health Services, which owned the university hospital (look here).
 We posted about a number of other colorful cases since then (look here)


Although this evidence is admittedly case based and therefore anecdotal, it could be used to highlight the importance of the problem and develop support for its solution.

A Welcome Addition to Previous Recommendations about Countering Conflicts of Interest

For whatever reason, this issue somehow seemed to escape the attention of many of those who have written about conflicts of interest in health care.  Even those who advocated taking a harder line on conflicts of interest have generally avoided this issue.

Brennan et al made recommendations about reducing conflicts of interest in 2006, but focused on students and faculty, not top leaders and executives (see post here).(3)  The 2009 Institute of Medicine report set relatively tough standards for managing conflicts of interest affecting clinical research and teaching, which unfortunately since have largely been ignored.  It did call for senior institutional officials to disclose their conflicts of interest, and for institutional boards of trustees to form conflicts of interest committees that would exclude conflicted individuals, but otherwise did not address conflicts of interest affecting academic leaders or institutional trustees.  The 2013 Pew Charitable Trusts Conflicts-of-Interest Policies for Academic Medical Centers suggested restrictions on conflicts affecting faculty, trainees, and students, but again did not mention senior institutional leaders or boards of trustees.

Conclusion

So it is very nice to see that the issue of what we once called a new species of conflict of interest finally has made the big time.  Whether it now gets any traction remains to be seen.  Unfortunately, since conflicts of interest can be so profitable for the directly affected parties, I fully expect they will continue to oppose any restrictions.  The money they have made will likely be used to deploy marketing and public relations personnel and legal counsel to counter any attempts to try to make this aspect of health care more honest.

As we have said again and again, the web of conflicts of interest that is pervasive in medicine and health care is now threatening to strangle medicine and health care.  For patients and the public to trust health care professionals and health care organizations, they need to know that these individuals and organizations are putting patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain. Health care professionals who care for patients, those who teach about medicine and health care, clinical researchers, and those who make medical and health care policy should do so free from conflicts of interest that might inhibit their abilities to put patients and the public's health first. 


References

1. Pisano ED, Golden RN,Schweitzer L. Conflict of interest policies for academic health system leaders who work with outside corporations.  JAMA 2014;311(11):1111-1112. doi:10.1001/jama.2014.788  Link here.

2.  Campbell EG, Weissman JS, Ehringhaus S et al.  Institutional academic-industry relationships.  JAMA 2007;298(15):1779-1786. doi:10.1001/jama.298.15.1779.  Link here.
3,  Brennan TA, Rothman DJ, Blank L et al.  Health industry practices that create conflicts of interest.  a policy proposal for academic medical centers.  JAMA  2006;295(4):429-433. doi:10.1001/jama.295.4.429  Link here.

Wednesday, February 13, 2013

Non-Profit Hospital Executive Salaries Continue to Defy Gravity and Logic

The old saying is that nothing is certain except death and taxes.  In health care, the other near certainty seems to be that compensation for health care leaders is big and always getting bigger. 

Over the past few weeks several reports about the compensation of top executives of US non-profit hospitals and hospital systems have appeared.  So it is time to do our latest round-up of incessantly buoyant hospital executive compensation, and argumentative hot air that seems to fuel it.  I will first summarize the latest cases in alphabetical order by state, and then examine some common justifications for the seemingly anti gravitational nature of executive compensation in this part of health care.

Arizona

On AZCentral.com was an article about the CEO of a single relatively small public hospital system:

The leaders of Maricopa County’s public health-care system agreed to raise chief executive Betsey Bayless’ pay by 33 percent, bringing her salary to $500,000.

That may not seem like a lot of money as executive compensation goes, but consider the context:

The Maricopa Integrated Health System is a public hospital system that provides care for the Valley’s poor and uninsured. It is funded by federal and state health-care dollars and a special county levy paid by all county property-tax payers.

MIHS budgeted $3.5 million for market adjustments and merit raises for its employees in fiscal 2013. Bayless’ salary increase alone will consume one-quarter of the $500,000 the board had allocated this fiscal year to bring all employees’ pay in line with similar positions elsewhere.

The health-care system’s rank-and-file employees have received annual merit-based salary increases of no more than 2.9 percent since fiscal 2008.

Nonetheless, the CEO did not exactly feel rich:

Bayless said she did not request the raise and was not expecting it. She said she believes MIHS employees will understand that her salary has been comparatively low and that her replacement likely will be brought in at an even higher salary.


She justified her pay by comparing it to what she thought the market would bear.

'Any salary information will show you that my salary is always the lowest of any (hospital) CEO currently in the entire state, even the little-bitty hospitals,' Bayless said. 'On any measure, 375 (thousand dollars) is below market. So, do I feel undercompensated? I don’t know. But on any measure, it always comes in below market.'

Members of the hospital system's board also justified the pay on the grounds that it was at the market rate:

[Board Members Mary] Harden and [Terence] McMahon said they voted for the pay raise because a national search firm hired to find Bayless’ replacement set $500,000 as a minimum competitive salary for qualified candidates.

Another board member also noted how hard CEO Bayless works:

'The lady works 70-plus hours a week. She’s on call 24/7. So, I think the job warrants it. She works very, very hard,'  Dewane said.
I am sure health care professionals who also work long hours, and are frequently on call, but unlike managers, have to make decisions with real life and death consequences would understand, or not.


California

In California a report focused in contrast on the bigger hospitals and hospital systems.  California Healthcare News reported on the best compensated hospital executives in the state.  In general,

More than one in five non-profit hospital chief executive officers in California received compensation totaling $1 million or more in 2010, according to a new pay survey by Payers & Providers.

Altogether, 32 CEOs of the 154 surveyed received pay packages that ventured into the seven figures. That compares to 19 CEOs who received seven-figure pay packages in the only prior survey Payers & Providers conducted. That survey was published in June 2010, and relied primarily on data from 2007 and 2008.  

Some specifics about the best paid executives:

Kaiser Permanente's George Halvorson is the most highly-compensated hospital system executive in California, receiving $7.74 million in 2010. That included more than $6 million in additional compensation. Halvorson is retiring as Kaiser's CEO in June.

Thomas Priselac, the chief executive officer of Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles, was the highest-paid standalone hospital CEO, earning $2.77 million in 2010. That included additional compensation of $1.6 million.

The article provided the justification for Priselac's seven-figure compensation:

According to an email response from Cedars-Sinai spokesperson Duke Helfand, Priselac's compensation 'reflects the top-tier clinical, research and educational performance the medical center consistently has delivered in his 19 years of leadership.'

He did not offer how this performance was measured, how it compared to that of any other hospital, or whether anyone other than the CEO might have been responsible for that performance.

The survey results included the best compensated CEO of a health-district

Michael Covert,  the CEO of the two hospital Palomar-Pomerado Health system in San Diego County, was the highest-paid district hospital CEO, earning $1.09 million in 2010. He was among two district hospital CEOs to earn seven-figure compensation.

The survey results also included the best compensated CEO for academic medical centers run by the (state supported) University of California:

David T. Feinberg, M.D., is by far the highest-paid CEO among those who oversee the five research hospitals operated by the University of California. Feinberg, who runs Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center, earned $1.33 million in 2010 – the only seven-figure pay package among that cohort of CEOs, and nearly $450,000 more than the second-highest earner in that group, Mark Laret of UC San Francisco Medical Center.
Connecticut

Becker's Hospital Review provided information on the highest paid Connecticut hospital CEOs:

Here are the nine CEOs who earned at least $1 million in 2011.

•    Clarence Silvia, The Hospital of Central Connecticut: $2.76 million
•    Marna Borgstrom, Yale-New Haven Hospital: $2.59 million
•    Brian Grissler, Stamford Hospital: $2.24 million
•    Elliot Joseph, Hartford Hospital: $1.74 million
(*CEO is now Jeff Flaks)
•    Frank Corvino, Greenwich Hospital: $1.71 million
•    Susan Davis, RN, Saint Vincent's Medical Center: $1.48 million
•    Chris Dadlez, Saint Francis Hospital and Medical Center: $1.42 million
•    John Murphy, MD, Danbury Hospital: $1.08 million
•    Christopher O'Connor, Hospital of Saint Raphael: $1.04 million

 The report did not provide any justification for the pay levels, and I could find no further news coverage that was relevant.

Massachusetts

The Fitchburg (MA) Sentinel and Enterprise seemed to be the only media outlet which  noted the compensation of hospital executives reported to the state attorney general.  It listed compensation of some regional hospital leaders,

Patrick Muldoon, president and CEO of HealthAlliance Hospital, a member of the UMass Memorial Health Care system, received a compensation package of $653,868 in 2010, the most recent year for which compensation data is publicly available.

The HealthAlliance system includes a 135-bed community hospital with services on two campuses in Leominster and Fitchburg.

Over that same period, Daniel P. Moen, former president and CEO of the 153-bed Heywood Hospital in Gardner, received a compensation package of $386,126.

Christine Schuster, CEO of Emerson Hospital in Concord, earned a total compensation package of $669,844. Emerson has 179 beds.

Lahey Clinic chief executive Howard Grant, who oversees a facility with 317 beds, was paid a total compensation package of $768,568 in 2010.

The article did not note the justification for the pay of any of these CEOs.  I was unable to find any other recent reporting that took advantage of the data supplied to the state Attorney General.

New York

SUNY - Downstate Medical Center

The New York Daily News reported on compensation given to executives at one state supported university medical center:

15 SUNY Downstate Medical Center bigs are raking in $200,000-plus salaries even as plans move forward to shut down its Long Island College Hospital campus.

Downstate president Dr. John Williams who’s leading the drive to close the Cobble Hill hospital gets the fattest pay of all.

He’s paid $650,000 a year salary and gets an annual housing allowance of up to $80,000 and the use of a car.
It listed the following compensation information for other executives:

Other big hospital administrators’ salaries, 2011
* $552,556.33 — Debra Carey, vice president
* $357,379.26 - Grace Wong, vice president
* $334,072.19 — Ivan Lisnitzer, vice president
* $312,182.24 — Paul Davis, assistant vice president
* $286,954.51 Renee Poncet, vice president


This should be viewed in the context of the medical center's current dire straits:

SUNY Downstate — which has a hospital and medical school in East Flatbush — is in such bad financial shape it could go broke by March, SUNY chairman Carl McCall has said.

Of course, despite these financial threats, a "spokesman" defended these payments again as market-based:

[Robert] Bellafioire defended the brigade of big salaries — though the controller’s audit suggested Downstate should consider cutting the number of high-paid administrators.
'We have to offer competitive compensation, particularly when we’re up against any number of the country’s best hospitals and medical schools just across the bridge and in the metropolitan area,' Bellafiore said.
Rural Hospitals in Upstate New York

On the other hand, the Plattsburgh (NY) Press-Republican reported on the compensation given to hospital executives in rural northern New York state.  These included Alice Hyde Medical Center:

John Johnson, president and chief executive officer, was paid $339,539 in 2010. He retired in the fall of 2012.

He was replaced by Douglas DiVello, who is paid $246,682 in salary and benefits.

Then there was CVPH Medical Center in Plattsburgh

Hospital President Stephens Mundy has been at CVPH for 10 years and was paid $749,563 in salary, bonuses and other compensation in 2010.

His base salary for 2013 is $478,421,...
In addition, there was Elizabethtown Community:
Rodney Boula, president and chief executive officer at ECH, was paid $229,902 in 2010.
Note that later the article explained that this hospital has no more than 25 beds.

However, the reporter was unable to find out the compensation of the CEO of the Adirondack Medical Center in Saranac Lake:

Chandler Ralph, president and chief executive officer for 16 years, is not employed by the hospital or its umbrella organization, Adirondack Health.

She is paid through a contract with a management company, Health Tech Management Services, said Joe Riccio, AMC communications director.

Her salary is a confidential employment contract, 'just like any other vendor that does business' with the hospital, he said.

Because of that, her salary was not available through IRS records. The Press-Republican pressed Ralph to release her salary, noting that it was publishing the pay of all other area hospital CEOs, but she refused, citing confidentiality.
Parenthetically, this seems to be an unusual case of the actual outsourcing of top leadership.

This compensation information again should be considered in the context.  These are all relatively small hospitals in a rural area with low costs of living.  In addition, these hospitals were facing substantial financial challenges:
Numerous jobs were cut in 2012 at the area’s five hospitals, some the first substantial layoffs in decades. One hospital recorded an operating deficit, and at some, programs and services were reduced.

Adirondack Health, parent company of Adirondack Medical Center in Saranac Lake, and CVPH Medical Center in Plattsburgh, each laid off 17 employees last fall and eliminated vacant positions.

Alice Hyde Medical Center in Malone let 12 people go in September and had closed down more than a dozen vacancies.

Nonetheless, the justifications for these compensation levels included the usual suspects.In an introductory discussion not specific to any hospital, we find:

'The responsibilities of a CEO have exploded in the last four years,' said William Van Slyke of the Healthcare Association of New York State, an organization that represents hospitals and health-care systems across the state.
Similarly,

'Being a hospital CEO, you are ‘all in,’ all the time, every hour. It’s a tremendous responsibility.'
 
This is the familiar argument about how hard seemingly all hospital CEOs work.  As noted above, it is particularly incongruous in a health care setting in which numerous health professionals are also "all in," and these professionals bear the responsibility of making decisions and taking actions that can directly affect patients' health, safety, and even survival.

 Following this were the equally familiar arguments that the compensation of CEOs is determined by the market, and so to retain CEOs one must pay at this market rate:

'Being a hospital CEO, especially in the state of New York, is complex and demanding job. There is an extraordinarily limited pool of candidates, and that increases their value.'

'I can’t speak for the hospitals in your area,' he told the Press-Republican, 'but a qualified and successful CEO can go anywhere in the country and make equal or higher salaries.'

The Press Republican also elicited very similar articles justifying pay for individual hospital CEOs, for example, regarding the CEO of the Alice Hyde Medical Center, here is the "compensation is determined by the market" argument from "Dean Johnston, president of the Board of Trustees, and member of the hospital's Compensation Committee"

'It’s important that the salary is competitive with other institutions because it’s difficult to attract professional leaders who will improve the quality of care.'

And from the same person, here is the "CEOs work very hard" argument

 'It’s difficult being CEO,' Johnston continued, 'because you’re the head of a complex and multi-faceted institution.'

Very similar arguments were made to justify the compensation of the CEO of CVPH Medical Center. 

The Usual Talking Points and Logical Fallacies

So, to summarize, hospital executive compensation, at least such compensation that gets noted in the media, seemingly never has been better.  CEOs at even the smallest, most rural, non-profit community hospitals can make well into the six figures.  CEOs at public hospitals can make over half a million dollars.  CEOs at larger hospitals, even those that are state supported, can make even more, up to millions a year for CEOs of moderate to large non-profit hospital systems.  Even hospitals that are facing financial challenges, or that are laying off employees still pay substantial amounts.

In previous posts, we noted that whenever anyone bothers to try to justify extravagant executive compensation at hospitals, and for that matter, other health care organizations throughout the US, they seem to repeat the same set of talking points.    We first listed the talking points here, and then provided additional examples of their use here, here and here.   The talking points are:
-  we pay what everyone else pays
-  CEOs work hard and are brilliant, and so deserve high pay
-  high pay is needed to attract and retain competent, if not brilliant people.

None of the examples of these talking points we have seen so far explain why these apply to CEOs and other top hired managers, but not to other kinds of employees. 

So it should be no surprise that the justifications for the largesse to hospital executives found in the cases above follow the talking points yet again.

We Pay What Everyone Else Pays

 Another way to put this is that some market determines CEO pay.  We saw versions of this to support the compensation of the CEOs of Maricopa Integrated Health System in Arizona, and SUNY - Downstate Medical Center and Alice Hyde Medical Center in New York.

Note that almost never is this argument supported by data about whether comparisons were actually made to a representative peer group.  In any case, as we asserted before, this justification may be a logical fallacy, an appeal to common practice.

CEOs Work Hard and Are Brilliant

 This is an especially frequently used talking point.  I have yet to see an instance in which any hospital official would omit a CEO was anything other than supremely diligent and totally brilliant.  We saw versions of this to support the compensation of the CEOs of Maricopa (AZ), Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in California, the Alice Hyde Medical Center and CVPH Medical Center in New York, and generically to support all New York State hospital CEOs.

As we noted above, this justification is almost never accompanied by any evidence that CEOs work harder or are more brilliant than the numerous health care professionals who actually make it possible for the hospital to operate.  I would guess it would be very hard to show that CEOs work longer hours, are under more stress, make more consequential decisions, are smarter or better trained than typical doctors, nurses and other health care professionals.  This justification thus appears to be another kind of logical fallacy, an appeal to authority.

High Pay is Needed for Retention

 We saw versions of this to support the CEOs of Maricopa, SUNY - Downstate, Alice Hyde, CVPH, and generically again to support all NY hospital CEOs. 
 
Note that this justification is also almost never supported by any evidence.  As we noted here, while this argument, probably like the others, comes from the generic business management literature, there is little data in the larger business world to show that CEOs are very mobile, or likely to succeed when transplanted to a new environment.  In fact, a recent report looking at the mobility of CEOs worldwide called this a "self-serving myth."  (See this summary for a link to it.)
 
It is too bad that no one ever seems to get the opportunity to challenge these talking points when they are offered as justifications for outlandish executive compensation. 

Read more here: http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2013/02/06/3835851/charlotte-hospital-pay.html#storylink=cpy

Read more here: http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2013/02/06/3835851/charlotte-hospital-pay.html#storylink=cpy

Summary

As we have shown again and again, the pay of top health care leaders seems to endlessly increase, without clear justification, regardless of the vicissitudes affecting the organizations they lead, their employees, their patients and society.  This suggests that health care organizations, like many other organizations, seem to be run primarily for the benefit of their executives and their cronies, regardless of what happens to anyone else.  

As we have frequently said, current policies about paying hired health care managers leave the managers unaccountable for the effects of their actions on patients' and the public's health, and worse, fail to deter and may even encourage ignorance of the health care mission, frankly mission-hostile behavior, self-interest, conflicts of interest, and outright corruption.  Meanwhile, paying nearly all top managers as if they were brilliant, while setting much harsher standards for the employees who actually take care of patients, including health professionals, demoralizes those on whom patients actually depend for care.

As we have said endlessly,....   Health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.


Thursday, December 06, 2012

The Parts of Professionalism We Are Not Supposed to Discuss

A recent article in a a relatively obscure medical ethics journal dared to approach some important aspects of medical ethics that medical ethicists fear to discuss, but did not address the reasons for this fear or what to do about it. (Glenn JE. The eroding principle of justice in teaching medical ethics.  HEC Forum 2012; 24: 293-305.  Link here.)

The Basic Ethics Case - A Prescription for the Patient's Spouse?

Glenn began with a case typically discussed in medical school ethics courses:

a scenario where a standardized patient asks the student at the end of the examination if his prescription can be written in his spouse’s name as the spouse has health insurance which includes prescription drug coverage while the patient does not.

This

poses the question as to whether it is ethical for physicians to deceive third party payers to secure coverage for their patients.

The Politically Correct Way to Teach the Case

Glenn stated that there is a politically correct way for faculty to teach this case:

 Though we are never expressly instructed to tow [sic] a party line, there is a 'correct' answer to this ethical quandary as far as the institution we work for is concerned. Students who express a willingness to practice deception of third party payers for the good of their patients are to be commended for having their heart in the right place. However, we discuss many reasons why this action would not be a good solution to the problem. One of the issues is that to do so would be committing fraud.

Now, of course, writing a prescription for a patient who does not actually need the drug in question, understanding that the patient will give the drug to someone else who does not have insurance coverage to pay for it, is dishonest.  However, the larger point that Glenn made is that it is not politically correct to allow discussion about why the patient made such a request in the first place, and that this ought to be troubling.

Note that Glenn did not explain how he inferred what the "correct" answer was, nor its actual source within the institution.

Over the first few years of having this conversation with young medical students, I have always come away feeling empty and flat. Framed as a session on the ethics of 'truth telling,' the conversation and the readings we provide to prepare for it works to obfuscate the much larger ethical issue impossible to tackle in an hour’s time. In essence, 'truth telling' is only a secondary ethical issue at play. The more important ethical issue is a question of social justice: what commitment do doctors have to poor patients and making sure that they get the health care services that they need?

Social Justice as Part of Professionalism, and its Avoidance

The article by Glenn then emphasized that some of the original conceptions of physicians' professionalism included social justice.  A definition promulgated by Herbert Swick in 2000 expressly included these relevant competencies.  Physicians ought to:
-  subordinate their own interests to the interests of others
-  respond to social needs and work toward the benefit of the communities in which they live and serve
-  adhere to the core humanistic values of honesty and integrity, compassion, altruism, empathy, respect for others, and trustworthiness.


Glenn noted that these three competencies, however, have been turned into a more narrow imperative, that

doctors should treat patients with an equally high quality irrespective of their race, ethnicity, gender, religion or cultural background according to what is best for them. In most codes of professionalism, however, class is not expressly implicated.

Note that Glenn did not question why the issues of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or cultural background became important in this context.  He did further question why the issue of class did not.  While

 The professionalism code adopted by the American Board of Internal Medicine in 1999 was bolder and specifically states that doctors are to advocate for 'the best possible care [for their patients] regardless of the ability to pay'

Glenn asked

 But where in the medical school curriculum do we teach medical students to be strong patient advocates and take on third party payers and hospital administrators? We now discuss the importance of prescribing generic drugs and we warn against the influence of big pharma, but when do we teach students to rebel against the high cost of medical education that drives students toward boutique medicine and fields of specialty care that offer the most money and most comfortable lifestyles?

Furthermore, he noted,

 When it comes to justice in medical ethics instruction, the parameters of the discussion are usually constricted to focus on the conservation of health care resources and rationing care rather than providing more care to more patients.

So, now seemingly getting to the key question,

We have created an entire system where all the middlemen that stand between a patient and her health care are expecting to get rich. No oath or professionalism curriculum is structured to teach medical students how to ethically and morally navigate through that. How did the terms of the debate get so co-opted by the health care economists?

The Key Question also Avoided

However, after this build up, Glenn then had trouble grappling with that question.  He noted that the prices of various parts of US health care are rarely questioned, and wrote about some of the particular issues in pricing new technologies, including the costs of development of new drugs, the tax treatment of drug development, and whether the licenses drug companies obtain from universities to develop drugs are fairly priced.  He also touched on the rising cost of medical school tuition and students' consequent assumption of large levels of debt.  This was interesting, and provided some useful references, but never really directly addressed the key questions above: why was the discussion framed in terms only of current health economics, and more importantly,  why did he and other ethicists feel they could not openly discuss any larger issues?

Only at the very end of the article did this appear

the structure of our current medical system has created a network of health care providers, researchers, purveyors and administrators who have strong financial incentives to work against the best interests of patients. This situation makes it difficult to talk with students about the ethical principle of justice in any meaningful way that is not hypocritical, leaving it seldom emphasized relative to the other three core principles of medical ethics.

Glenn did not further explain these "financial incentives," detail further who had them, explain how they "work against the best interests of patients," and most importantly, explain how these incentives make "it difficult to talk with students about the ethical principal of justice in any meaningful way that is not hypocritical."  He concluded only

 How can we cultivate within our students an understanding of the threats to medical professionalism posed by the conflicts of interest inherent in the various financial and organizational arrangements in the practice of medicine?  We start by not shying away from the conversation.

Summary

So Professor Glenn argued that social justice has been considered part of health care ethics, and that ethicists should teach about it by questioning the current economic arrangements within the health care system.  He then suggested that ethicists have been somehow pressured not do raise such questions, and that this pressure has something to do with perverse incentives and conflicts of interest prevalent within health care.  However, he never actually addressed who pressured the ethicists, how the pressure was applied, and how that pressure was related to conflicts of interest.

Thus, it seems that authors in scholarly health care journals may now hint that there are certain things one must not discuss, that are taboo to discuss in health care, but cannot actually say what exactly is taboo, and why it became that way.  Thus, the article by Glenn seems related to what we sometimes coyly call the "anechoic effect,"  that the issues we discuss on Health Care Renewal often do not seem to be considered topics of polite conversation.  But in a strange recursive way, the article never could quite manage to discuss what it is it said others cannot discuss, which in a way just further validates the importance of the anechoic effect.

The Glenn article is reminiscent of another article we posted about.  That article, by Souba and colleagues,  found that there are many "elephants," that is,  unmentionable subjects, in academic medicine,  However, that article also never clearly defined what these unmentionable subjects actually are, other than subjects that displease those in power.  Thus this too reinforced just how taboo these topics are.  Even those willing to admit that taboo topics exist are still unable to name them.

At least the Glenn article did suggest, however vaguely, a relationship between conflicts of interest and the anechoic effect.  We have documented that individual and institutional conflicts of interest are rampant in health care, including, and probably particularly academic medicine.  For example, pharmaceutical companies (and also all sorts of other health care corporations) may pay medical school faculty members and administrators (as consultants, "key opinion leaders," speakers, advisers, even board members).  The leaders of academic medicine seem particularly prone to such conflicts. For example, a majority of US medical school department chairs have significant financial relationships with health care corporations (see post here).  We have shown how top medical school leaders may simultaneously serve on the boards of directors of health care corporations (see post here). Such health care corporations may now also support various aspects of medical academia (through research grants, "unrestricted" and other educational grants, other gifts to hospitals and universities, etc).  Financial conflicts of interest may help to directly enrich many faculty and academic leaders, and indirectly enrich them by enriching their organizations. People who are personally profiting from relationships with health care corporations are unlikely to question such relationships.  The leaders of organizations which depend on funding from such corporations are unlikely to question whether conflicts of interest might lead to corruption.  People whose colleagues, friends, family members, or supervisors are personally benefiting from conflicts of interest may hesitate to challenge such relationships.   Since these relationships permeate the economics of health care, is it any wonder that the entire topic has become taboo?  

So the first step in challenging this taboo is to acknowledge it exists, and to not "shy away" from discussing it, as Glenn suggested.  People are beginning to acknowledge there is an elephant in the room.  Now we have to describe the elephant, discuss the elephant, and eventually figure out how to get the elephant out of the room.     

Hat tip - to the Medical Professionalism Blog.

Wednesday, October 03, 2012

Health Care Academics' Unrest and Bad Health Care Leadership?

Last month we discussed a recent, large scale study of physician burnout, and wondered whether it would finally inspire some discourse about why physicians are really so upset.  In particular, we hypothesized,  based on some real, if limited data, that physician angst, dissatisfaction, burnout, etc may mainly be a response to the problems with leadership and governance of health care organization we post about on Health Care Renewal.

After that post, one of our scouts found a very interesting and relevant article from earlier this year which got little attention at the time, but deserves more.  [Pololi LH, Krupat E, Civian JT, Ash AS, Brennan RT. Why are a quarter of faculty considering leaving academic medicine? A study of their perceptions of institutional culture and intentions to leave at 26 representative U.S. medical schools. Acad Med. 2012; 87: 859-69. Link here.]

Study Design

This was a cross-sectional survey of faculty at 26 medical schools in the US, selected to be similar to the general population of medical schools in the country.  At each school, 150 faculty were randomly chosen stratified by sex and age, and then the sample was enriched to include additional minority faculty and women surgeons, for a total of 4578.

The faculty were sent a multi item survey to assess their perception of the organizational culture of their institutions, and asked about their intentions to continue in or leave their current positions and academic medicine.  Responses to each survey item were allowed to be from 1 = strongly disagree, to 5 = strongly agree.  The items on the survey were combined into various scales.  A number of items on the survey seemed to be related to issues we frequently discuss on Health Care Renewal.  These items ended up in three different scales, entitled Relatedness/Inclusion, Values Alignment, and Ethical/Moral Distress.  The survey items are listed below, grouped by issue, with the scales into which they were combined noted.

Issue: Mission-Hostile Leadership

Administration only interested in me for revenue   (Reverse coded) (Values Alignment)
Institution committed to serving the public (VA)
Institution's actions well-aligned with stated values and mission (VA)
Institution puts own needs ahead of educational/clinical missions (RC) (VA)
My values well-aligned with school's (VA)
Institution awards excellence in clinical care (VA)
Institution does not value teaching (RC) (VA)
Have to compromise values to work here (Ethical/Moral Distress)

Issue: Deceptive, Unethical Leadership

Felt pressure to behave unethically (Ethical/Moral Distress)
Need to be deceitful in order to succeed (EMD)
Others have taken credit for my work (EMD)

Issue: Generation of the Anechoic Effect by  Suppression of Free Speech, Academic Freedom, Dissent, Whistle-Blowing,

Feel ignored/ invisible (RC) (Relatedness/Inclusion)
Hide what I think and feel (RC) (R/I)
Reluctant to express opinion/ fear negative consequences (RC) (R/I)

So in summary, the survey contained quite a few questions about mission-hostile management, comprising nearly all of the Values Alignment scale, some questions about deceptive or unethical leadership, all in the Ethical/Moral Distress scale, and some about generation of the anechoic effect by suppression of free speech, academic freedom, dissent, and whistle-blowing, all in the Relatedness/Inclusion scale.

Results

The response rate was 52% (N=2381.)

Unfortunately, the article did not include the distributions of the responses to individual survey items, and only included the mean and standard error of the scale scores.  The values for the scales of most interest were:
Relatedness/Inclusion  3.56 SE= 0.022
Values Alignment  3.25 SE=0.028
Ethical/Moral Distress 2.36 SE=0.022

Note that the article did not address the degree individual items, especially those listed above, contributed to variation in the scale scores.


A small majority of faculty indicated their intentions to stay at their institutions (57%).  Of the remainder, 14% were considering leaving their school due to dissatisfaction, and another 21% were considering leaving academic medicine due to dissatisfaction.  The remainder were considering leaving due to personal/ family reasons or to retire.

The authors did complex multinomial logit modeling to assess the relationships among the various scales, demographic factors, and intention to leave.  Most relevant to us, Relatedness/Inclusion was significantly related to intention to leave the institution due to dissatisfaction (Coefficient -0.69, p lt 0.001, OR =0.50), as was Values Alignment (-0.39, p=0.04, OR=0.68), but not Ethical/ Moral Distress.  Furthermore, Relatedness/Inclusion was related to intention to leave academic medicine due to dissatisfaction (-0.48, p lt 0.001, 0.62), as was Ethical/Moral Distress (0.60, p lt 0.001, OR =1.82). The article did not address whether individual survey items, including those of most interest listed above, were related to intention to leave.  The article also did not address whether responses to the survey or intention to leave varied across faculty characteristics, medical school characteristics, or individual medical schools. 

Summary and Comments

This very large survey of faculty from multiple US medical schools showed that more than one-third were considering leaving their institutions or academic medicine due to dissatisfaction, indicating a striking prevalence of faculty distress.  Their responses to questions about perceived organizational cultural and leadership problems, including those possibly related to leadership's perceived hostility to the mission, leadership's perceived dishonesty or unethical behavior, and leadership's suppression of dissent, free speech, academic freedom, and whistle-blowing were related to their intentions to leave due to dissatisfaction.

These results suggest the hypothesis that much of faculty angst may be due to the sorts of problems with leadership and hence organizational culture that we discuss on Health Care Renewal.  Since this was a cross-sectional survey, it certainly does not offer scientific proof of this hypothesis.  Note that there is other evidence from numerous cases discussed in Health Care Renewal, qualitative studies and our much smaller study published only in abstract form that also supports this hypothesis (look here). 

One part of the author's discussion of their findings was particularly relevant:


Our findings are congruent with metaanalyses of 25 years of organizational justice research outside medicine. These studies suggest that employee perceptions of organizational justice and an ethical climate are related to increased job satisfaction, trust in leadership, enhanced performance, commitment to one’s employer, and reduced turnover.

 The scale of ethical/moral distress (see Table 1) reflects reactions to the prevailing norms and possible erosion of professionalism and increased organizational self-interest. There is a growing belief that organizations influence and are responsible for the ethical or unethical behaviors of their employees.To our knowledge, faculty perceptions of 'moral atmosphere' and 'just community' embedded in our survey have not been previously investigated in academic medicine, even though the ethical concepts of professionalism and justice can be used to guide the pursuit of excellence in the missions of medical schools. Several scholars have called for academic medicine to attend to its social justice and moral mission. Faculty perceptions
of organizational justice are pivotal to the critical issue of professionalism in medicine. The ethical/moral distress scale in the survey reported here included items such as 'the culture of my institution discourages altruism' and 'I find working here to be dehumanizing.' (See Table 1 for other items in this scale.) In that ethical/moral distress was more strongly related to intent to leave academic medicine entirely than intent to leave one’s own institution, these negative feelings among faculty must be particularly disheartening to them and may color major career decisions.
I believe that the study by Pololi et al adds to the evidence that physician distress is a symptom of a dysfunctional system in which major health care organizations have been taken over by leaders more devoted to self-interest and short-term revenue than the values prized by health care professionals and academics.  This applies obviously to academic medical institutions, but also to other organizations that might have been expected to defend such professional and academic values, such as professional associations, accrediting organizations, and health care foundations.  As we said before, if physicians really want to address what is making them burned out and dissatisfied, they will have to regain control of their own societies, organizations, and academic institutions, and ensure that these organizations put core values, not revenue generation and providing  cushy compensation to their executives, first.